Housing Authority v. Williams

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Housing Authority v. Williams
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE TOWN OF EAST
HARTFORD v. HARRIETT WILLIAMS
(AC 48089)
Elgo, Seeley and Bishop, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff landlord appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the
defendant tenant in the plaintiff’s summary process action. The plaintiff
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly found that certain evidentiary
statements proffered by the plaintiff were the product of duress. Held:
The trial court’s finding that certain written statements by former tenants
of the plaintiff were likely made under duress was clearly erroneous, as there
was no basis in the record for such a finding other than mere speculation.
The trial court erroneously required the plaintiff to submit direct evidence
to establish its serious nuisance claim, as such a requirement is contrary to
law, and, on the basis of this court’s careful review of the ample testimonial,
documentary, and security video evidence admitted at trial, this court was left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed with
respect to the trial court’s finding that there was no evidence in the record
that the defendant committed a serious nuisance through violent altercations
in the defendant’s unit and alleged drug activity in the defendant’s unit.
This court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial, as the
trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, premised in part on
speculation, contradictory, and incorrect as a matter of law and, thus, were
not harmless and warranted reversal of the judgment rendered against the
plaintiff.
Argued September 9, 2025—officially released March 31, 2026
Procedural History
Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Ses-
sion, and tried to the court, Esperance-Smith, J.; judg-
ment of possession for the defendant, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; new trial.
Michael S. Wrona, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion
ELGO, J. In this summary process action, the plaintiff,
the Housing Authority of the town of East Hartford,
appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in

Housing Authority v. Williams
favor of the defendant, Harriett Williams.1 On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly found
that certain evidentiary statements proffered by the
plaintiff were the product of duress and (2) erred in
requiring direct evidence to find that the defendant had
committed a serious nuisance. We agree and, accordingly,
reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural
history. The plaintiff is the owner of Meadow Hill, a low-
income housing development in East Hartford (develop-
ment). On or about December 20, 2021, the defendant
entered into a lease agreement with the plaintiff for a
unit in the development (unit). At all relevant times, the
defendant remained in possession of the unit.
On January 1, 2023, a tenant of the plaintiff, identi-
fied as Lucius Mathis, and another unidentified indi-
vidual exited the defendant’s unit and immediately began
attacking each other with knives. That violent altercation
spilled into the elevator, where they repeatedly stabbed
each other, causing injuries. The unidentified individual
sustained a punctured lung, and Mathis sustained vari-
ous lacerations.2
On December 7, 2023, a tenant of the plaintiff, identi-
fied as Julia Rivera, dragged another tenant, identified
as Angela Brown, out of the defendant’s unit by her hair
and into the hallway. Brown remained in the hallway,
knocking on the defendant’s door for about ten minutes.
At approximately 3:25 a.m. on December 29, 2023,
the plaintiff’s security cameras recorded Mathis exiting
the defendant’s unit, walking through the building, and
1 The defendant appeared but has not participated in this appeal.
Because she did not file an appellate brief, we ordered that the appeal
shall be considered on the basis of the plaintiff’s brief and appendix,
the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument by the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Ammar I. v. Evelyn W., 227 Conn. App. 827, 830
n.2, 323 A.3d 1111 (2024).
2 Following that January 1, 2023 altercation, Mathis was evicted from
his residence in the development. He thereafter continued to live as an
unauthorized occupant in the development with Julia Rivera, another
tenant of the plaintiff.

Housing Authority v. Williams
entering Rivera’s unit, where he lived as an unauthor-
ized resident. Rivera entered her unit at approximately
5:27 a.m. At this point, Mathis apparently was unre-
sponsive. Rivera, or another resident, called emergency
services, who arrived at Rivera’s unit at approximately
5:37 a.m. and attempted to revive Mathis. Their efforts
were unsuccessful, and Mathis died due to a drug related
overdose.3
In addition to these three incidents, the plaintiff’s
security cameras recorded heavy foot traffic at the defen-
dant’s unit on a recurring basis. The foot traffic was
comprised of various individuals, some of whom were
tenants, visiting the unit for varying lengths of time
and at all hours of the day and night.
On December 12, 2023, the plaintiff sent the defen-
dant a pretermination notice. On January 31, 2024,
the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit.
On March 12, 2024, the plaintiff served the defendant
with a summary process complaint, attaching both the
pretermination notice and the notice to quit. In count one
of its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had violated her lease4 by disturbing her neighbors’ quiet
enjoyment, engaging in or allowing others to engage
3 Rivera subsequently was evicted from the development due to this
incident and for allowing Mathis, an unauthorized individual, to live
with her.
4 The defendant’s lease provides in relevant part that the tenant “[s]hall
act, and cause household members or guests to act, in a manner that will
not disturb other resident’s peaceful enjoyment of their accommodations
and will be conducive to maintaining the development in a decent, safe
and sanitary condition.” The defendant’s lease also provides in relevant
part that the tenant “[s]hall not engage in any unlawful activities in the
dwelling unit or premises, and shall prevent criminal activity in the unit
or premises . . . . Any of the following criminal activities by a [h]ousehold
member, on the premises . . . shall be a violation of the lease, a cause for
termination of tenancy, and for eviction from the unit: (a) any crime
or threat of physical violence to persons or property . . . (b) illegal use,
sale, manufacture or distribution of narcotics, or possession with the
intent to use, sell, manufacture or distribute controlled substances.”
Furthermore, the lease provides that the plaintiff may terminate the
lease for a “serious or repeated” lease violation, including if the ten-
ant or the tenant’s guests cause “physical violence to other tenants . . .

Housing Authority v. Williams
in physical violence regarding the December 7, 2023
altercation between Rivera and Brown, and using or
allowing others to use her unit to sell drugs. In count two,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had committed
a nuisance, as defined by General Statutes § 47a-32,5
in light of both the December 7, 2023 altercation and
the defendant’s use of her unit to sell drugs. In count
three, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant commit-
ted a serious nuisance, as defined by General Statutes
§ 47a-15,6 for the same reasons specified in count two.
In count four, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
violated her responsibilities as a tenant, as defined in
General Statutes § 47a-11,7 by creating a nuisance, by
using her unit to sell drugs, and in light of the December
7, 2023 altercation.
On April 19, 2024, the defendant filed an answer and
special defenses, denying the plaintiff’s allegations and
alleging that any statements made about her were made
under duress.8 The matter was tried to the court on July
3 and August 9, 2024.
At trial, the plaintiff called witnesses Urleen
Naughton,9 the compliance director for the plain-
tiff; Brian Dixon, the housing coordinator for the
or threaten the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of our
premises by other residents or employees . . . .”
5 General Statutes § 47a-32 defines a nuisance as including, but not
limited to, “any conduct which interferes substantially with the comfort
or safety of other tenants or occupants of the same or adjacent build-
ings or structures.”
6 General Statutes § 47a-15 defines a serious nuisance in relevant
part as “conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to
the safety of other tenants or the landlord” or “using the premises or
allowing the premises to be used for . . . the illegal sale of drugs . . . .”
7 General Statutes § 47a-11 defines a tenant’s statutory responsibili-
ties, which include keeping the premises “clean and safe” and conduct-
ing himself or herself and guests “in a manner that will not disturb his
neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of the premises or constitute a nuisance
. . . or a serious nuisance . . . .”
8 Specifically, the defendant pleaded that “[e]verything that was said
about [her] was by a third part[y] and signed by several people in order
to keep their apartment[s].”
9 The transcripts refer to Naughton as both Urleen and Lynn.

Housing Authority v. Williams
development; and Frank Healy, the information tech-
nology manager for the plaintiff. The plaintiff also intro-
duced several exhibits into evidence, including security
footage videos, demonstrative exhibits, and written
statements by Rivera, Dixon, and former resident Fran-
ces Brewster.10
Naughton testified that the plaintiff sought to evict the
defendant due to “excessive amounts” of disturbances,
illegal activity, and tenants being harmed as a result of
visits to the defendant’s unit. Naughton testified that
she had received “numerous complaints in [regard] to the
drug activity in the building . . . [s]temming from [the
defendant’s] unit.” Naughton further testified that the
defendant’s activities constituted a “health and safety
violation” and “other tenants [were] concerned about
their safety.” Naughton testified that Brown, Rivera,
and Brewster had complained about the defendant. Addi-
tionally, Naughton testified that other residents, who
did not provide statements, had likewise complained to
the plaintiff about the defendant.
Healy testified that he had reviewed approximately
twenty days of security camera footage involving the
door to the defendant’s unit. From that footage, Healy
created demonstrative exhibits of the foot traffic at the
defendant’s unit. Those exhibits were admitted into
evidence as full exhibits at trial.11 Those exhibits docu-
mented fifty visits to the defendant’s unit on December
14, 2023; forty visits on January 8, 2024; forty-four
visits on February 2 and 3, 2024; twenty-seven visits on
March 3 and 4, 2024; thirty-one visits on April 1 and 2,
2024; and twenty-seven visits on June 28 and 29, 2024.
10 Those exhibits included an uncut video from approximately 8:03
p.m. on December 6, 2023, to 12:37 a.m. on December 7, 2023, which
showed the foot traffic to and from the defendant’s unit and was rep-
resentative of the type of security footage Healy reviewed to create the
plaintiff’s demonstrative exhibits recording the heavy foot traffic at
the defendant’s unit.
11 The plaintiff’s demonstrative exhibits (1) described the visitors to
the defendant’s unit on a particular day, (2) noted the number of times
that visitors entered the defendant’s unit that day, and (3) noted the
length of time the visitors stayed in the defendant’s unit.

Housing Authority v. Williams
Not all visits, however, were unique, with some individu-
als visiting multiple times per day.
Also admitted into evidence were several written state-
ments by former tenants, which described drug activi-
ties in the defendant’s unit. Rivera’s written statement
provides: “I live at [the development] and there has been
[drug selling] in the [defendant’s unit]. [The defendant]
sells the crack [from] her unit in her bedroom. There is a
lot of drug [selling].” Brewster’s written statement pro-
vides in relevant part: “I’m receiving drugs in exchange
for money from . . . [the defendant] in [her unit].”
Dixon’s written statement, which concerned a recorded
statement from Brown, provides in relevant part: “Brown
stated that she had spent the money and no longer had it. .
. . [Naughton] asked what happened to the other forty
dollars. It was then that Brown admitted to ‘buying’ from
[the defendant] out of [her unit]. Brown seemed scared
that she told us this information and as a result did not
accompany us up to [the defendant’s unit] . . . .” Dixon
testified that “buying” meant purchasing narcotics.
Dixon further testified that Brown offered her statement
to the plaintiff “voluntarily” and that the plaintiff made
no promises to Brown in exchange for her statement.
Mathis’ statement, which was admitted into evidence
without objection through Naughton’s testimony, pro-
vides in relevant part that the January 1, 2023 alterca-
tion was the result of a “drug deal that went bad” and
that the unidentified individual “owed [Mathis] money
for the drugs that [he and the defendant] were selling out
of [the defendant’s] unit.” Naughton further testified
that Mathis reported that crack, cocaine, and fentanyl
were being sold out of the defendant’s unit.12
The defendant testified on her own behalf at trial.13
She produced no other witnesses or additional evidence.
12 Naughton’s testimony regarding Mathis’ statement was admitted
at trial into evidence without objection by the defendant.
13 We note that the court made no credibility determination as to the
defendant’s testimony, concluding, instead, that the plaintiff had not
met its burden of proof with respect to any of the counts.

Housing Authority v. Williams
She testified that the plaintiff had evicted residents who
visited her apartment “because they wanted statements
from these people to testify or to say something against
me . . . .” Much of the defendant’s testimony accused the
plaintiff of proffering “false statements” against her.
The defendant also denied the amount of foot traffic at
her apartment, stating that she did not receive the num-
ber of visitors the plaintiff alleges the recordings and
demonstrative exhibits show. The defendant, however,
subsequently explained that the visitors came to her unit
to help her with cooking and to play cards.
The defendant testified that she did not “sell any drugs.
I never sold drugs. I had sold drugs twenty years ago, but
. . . in the recent past, I have not sold [any] drugs . . . .” The
defendant claimed that the statements provided by previ-
ous residents were false and the product of the plaintiff’s
coercion. The defendant also claimed that, regarding the
December 7, 2023 altercation, she had asked Rivera to
remove Brown from her unit before Rivera “dragged
[Brown] out . . . of [the defendant’s] unit.”
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that
the written statements by former tenants were “likely
made in duress” and discredited them. The court deter-
mined that there was “no evidence” of the defendant’s
involvement in any instances of violence that took place.
The court also determined that there was “no evidence
presented that the defendant was engaged in or allowed
the illegal sale of drugs on the subject premises” and
that there was “no direct evidence” that Mathis’ death
was related to drug activity at the defendant’s unit.
The court specifically cited the lack of “direct evidence”
in the record regarding any alleged drug activity. The
court determined that the plaintiff failed to meet its
evidentiary burden for serious nuisance and that “[t]here
was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant
violated her lease or created a nuisance . . . .” This appeal
followed.
As a preliminary matter, we note that “[s]ummary pro-
cess is a special statutory procedure designed to provide

Housing Authority v. Williams
an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain
possession of leased premises without suffering the delay,
loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions,
they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding
over their terms. . . . Summary process statutes secure a
prompt hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore,
the statutes relating to summary process must be nar-
rowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, 209
Conn. App. 569, 575, 267 A.3d 927, cert. denied, 343
Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022).
Further, it is well established that “[t]he scope of our
appellate review depends upon the proper characteriza-
tion of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent
that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review
is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly
erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Altama,
LLC v. Napoli Motors, Inc., 181 Conn. App. 151, 158,
186 A.3d 78 (2018). “The trier of fact’s determination
of a question of fact will not be overturned unless it is
clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support
it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . Under the clearly erroneous standard of
review, a finding of fact must stand if, on the basis of the
evidence before the court and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from that evidence, a trier of fact reasonably
could have found as it did. . . . In reviewing factual find-
ings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether
the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than
the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable
presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Giglio v. Ardohain, 233 Conn. App. 743, 752, 341 A.3d
272 (2025). “[W]here . . . some of the facts found [by the
trial court] are clearly erroneous and others are supported
by the evidence, we must examine the clearly erroneous
findings to see whether they were harmless, not only in

Housing Authority v. Williams
isolation, but also taken as a whole. . . . If, when taken
as a whole, they undermine appellate confidence in the
court’s [fact-finding] process, a new hearing is required.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Autry v. Hosey,
200 Conn. App. 795, 801, 239 A.3d 381 (2020). We are
mindful that it is “the [trial] court’s exclusive province
to weigh the conflicting evidence [and] determine the
credibility of witnesses . . . . The function of the appel-
late court is to review, and not retry, the proceedings
of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Housing Authority v. Stevens, supra, 209 Conn. App.
580–81. “When, however, the trial court draws conclu-
sions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide
whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct
and find support in the facts as they appear in the record.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Proper-
ties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC, 226 Conn. App.
583, 589, 319 A.3d 123, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 905,
323 A.3d 344 (2024).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court’s finding of
duress was clearly erroneous because there was no evi-
dence in the record to support such a finding. We agree.
Duress is defined as a “forcible restraint or restriction”
or a “compulsion by threat.”14 Merriam-Webster’s Colle-
giate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 511. In its memoran-
dum of decision, the court determined that the written
statements of previous tenants that were admitted into
14 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines duress as, “[b]roadly, a
threat of harm made to compel a person to do something against his
or her will or judgment; [especially], a wrongful threat made by one
person to compel a manifestation of seeming assent by another person
to a transaction without real volition.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.
2009) p. 579. In other contexts, this court has stated: “The classical or
common law definition of duress is any wrongful act of one person that
compels a manifestation of apparent assent by another . . . without his
volition. . . . The defendant must prove: [1] a wrongful act or threat
[2] that left the victim no reasonable alternative, and [3] to which the
victim in fact acceded, and that [4] the resulting transaction was unfair
to the victim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Raffy’s
Café I, LLC, 173 Conn. App. 193, 207, 163 A.3d 672 (2017).

Housing Authority v. Williams
evidence were not “credible as they were most likely
made in duress and not one resident, past or current,
was present to testify in the multiday trial.” The court
made no other findings regarding duress.
After our careful review of the record, we cannot find
any basis for the court’s findings of duress in the record,
other than mere speculation. The defendant testified
only that statements by former residents were “false”
and that the plaintiff wanted the former residents to
testify against her. The defendant said that Naughton
had somehow fabricated the statements against her by
former residents, suggesting that there had been some
type of agreement between the plaintiff and the former
residents. The defendant offered no independent knowl-
edge of any agreement between the plaintiff and former
residents and offered no testimony to allow the court to
infer that such an agreement had been made. Further,
the defendant proffered no evidence of any act, threat, or
misconduct by the plaintiff that would compel the former
residents to offer statements against the defendant. We
conclude that the court’s finding that such statements
were “most likely made in duress” is not based on evi-
dence, but on mere speculation and is therefore clearly
erroneous.15 See In re Selena O., 104 Conn. App. 635,
644–45, 934 A.2d 860 (2007) (“[i]f the court’s conclu-
sions or findings of fact rest on speculation rather than
on sufficient evidence, they are clearly erroneous”).
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in requir-
ing it to submit direct evidence to establish a serious
nuisance claim. We agree.
15 In concluding that the court’s finding of duress is erroneous, we are
cognizant of our limited role on appeal. Whether the evidence on remand,
including statements attributed to tenants, should be credited remains
the sole province of the trier of fact. See Housing Authority v. Stevens,
supra, 209 Conn. App. 580–81 (“It is the court’s exclusive province to
weigh the conflicting evidence [and] determine the credibility of wit-
nesses . . . . Thus, if the court’s dispositive finding . . . was not clearly
erroneous, then the judgment must be affirmed. . . . The function of
the appellate court is to review, and not retry, the proceedings of the
trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

Housing Authority v. Williams
Section 47a-15 defines a serious nuisance in relevant
part as “conduct which presents an immediate and serious
danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord” or
“using the premises or allowing the premises to be used
for . . . the illegal sale of drugs . . . .” “[T]he existence
of a nuisance generally is a question of fact, for which
we invoke a clearly erroneous standard of review . . . .”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority
v. Stevens, supra, 209 Conn. App. 580. To the extent the
court draws a conclusion of law, however, our review
is plenary. See Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic
Multimedia, LLC, supra, 226 Conn. App. 589.
We note that “there is no legal distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative
[value] is concerned. . . . In fact, circumstantial evidence
may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than
direct evidence. . . . Insofar as circumstantial evidence
can be and is routinely used to meet the higher standard
of proof in a criminal prosecution, so can it be used in a
case such as this where the applicable standard is that
of [a preponderance of the evidence].” (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v.
Conner, 89 Conn. App. 260, 278, 873 A.2d 208, cert.
denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005), and cert.
denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005).
In the present case, the court found that the plaintiff
did not proffer any evidence demonstrating that illegal
drugs, drug paraphernalia, or other items relating to
the sale of drugs were found in the defendant’s unit and
that “there was no police involvement, investigation, or
the observation of the sale of illegal drugs in or around
the subject premises.” The court thus determined that
there was “no direct evidence” tying Mathis’ death to
any alleged drug activity in the defendant’s unit. On
this basis, the court concluded that there was “no evi-
dence” that the defendant was involved in the illegal
sale of drugs.
The evidence proffered by the plaintiff regarding the
alleged drug activity in the defendant’s unit included the

Housing Authority v. Williams
January 1, 2023 altercation, the December 29, 2023 over-
dose, the Naughton/Mathis statement, Rivera’s written
statement, Brewster’s written statement, and the Dixon/
Brown written statement. The four statements were
admitted into evidence without objection, and all stated
that the defendant sold drugs out of her unit. Addition-
ally, the plaintiff provided evidence of the “unreasonably
high amount of [foot] traffic from individuals visiting at
all hours . . . .” Thus, there certainly existed testimonial
and circumstantial evidence in the record to support
the plaintiff’s claim of serious nuisance. We reiterate,
however, that we do not, as a reviewing court, suggest
that the trial court is required to credit such evidence,
circumstantial or not, in determining whether the plain-
tiff has met its burden of proof. Nevertheless, because
there is no legal distinction between circumstantial and
direct evidence, we conclude the court’s finding that
there existed “no evidence” regarding the defendant’s
alleged drug activity in the unit was clearly erroneous.
See In re Jacob W., 330 Conn. 744, 774, 200 A.3d 1091
(2019) (“[i]n light of the abundance of evidence in the
record contrary to the trial court’s statement that there
was no evidence presented . . . we are left with a firm
conviction that a mistake has been made and, therefore,
conclude that the trial court’s finding was clearly errone-
ous” (emphasis in original)); Osborn v. Waterbury, 197
Conn. App. 476, 485, 232 A.3d 134 (2020) (finding “ ‘no
evidence’ despite an abundance of evidence in the record
to the contrary” left this court with firm conviction that
mistake had been made), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 903,
242 A.3d 1010 (2021).
For similar reasons, we conclude that the court’s find-
ing that there was “no evidence” that the defendant
had engaged in or allowed others to engage in violence
in her unit also is clearly erroneous. The video evidence
admitted at trial portrays two violent altercations that
appear to begin in the defendant’s unit. Moreover, the
defendant testified regarding the December 7, 2023
altercation and confirmed that she had asked Rivera
to remove Brown from her unit before Rivera dragged

Housing Authority v. Williams
Brown out of the unit by her hair. The trial court credited
that evidence that the altercation occurred in its find-
ings of fact, wherein the court found “a tenant residing
in the premises was dragged out of the defendant’s unit
by another tenant. The assault continued in the hall-
way, involving punching and kicking.” Accordingly,
the court’s own recitation of the facts and the evidence
adduced at trial that substantiates those findings belie
the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff proffered no
evidence in support of these allegations.
The court’s decision to require the plaintiff to submit
direct evidence, as opposed to circumstantial evidence, to
establish a serious nuisance is contrary to law. See Boc-
canfuso v. Conner, supra, 89 Conn. App. 278 (“[T]here
is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence so far as probative [value] is concerned. . . . In
fact, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, sat-
isfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Further,
on our careful review of the ample testimonial, docu-
mentary, and security video evidence admitted at trial,
we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed”; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Giglio v. Ardohain, supra, 233 Conn. App. 752;
with respect to the court’s finding that there was “no
evidence” in the record that the defendant committed
a serious nuisance through violent altercations in the
defendant’s unit and the alleged drug activity in the
defendant’s unit. See Osborn v. Waterbury, supra, 197
Conn. App. 485; see also Commissioner of Environmental
Protection v. State Five Industrial Park, Inc., 304 Conn.
128, 151, 37 A.3d 724 (2012) (reviewing court was left
with “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made” due to, inter alia, trial court’s employment
of improper reasoning when analyzing facts); Casir-
aghi v. Casiraghi, 200 Conn. App. 771, 791, 241 A.3d
717 (2020) (“[b]ecause the court’s finding of wilful-
ness stands in direct contradiction to the facts found
by the court related to the plaintiff’s ability to pay, we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that the

Housing Authority v. Williams
finding is clearly erroneous and, thus, cannot stand”).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court’s
finding that there existed “no evidence” in the record
regarding the plaintiff’s allegations that the defen-
dant committed a serious nuisance is clearly erroneous.
III
We now must determine whether the court’s clearly
erroneous factual findings were harmful and thus war-
rant reversal of the judgment rendered against the plain-
tiff. See Autry v. Hosey, supra, 200 Conn. App. 801. We
conclude that, because these determinations were clearly
erroneous, premised in part on speculation, contradic-
tory, and incorrect as a matter of law, the plaintiff is
entitled to a new hearing.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that
the written statements submitted into evidence by the
plaintiff were “most likely made in duress” even though
there was no evidence proffered to support a finding
of duress. In part I of this opinion, we concluded that
this finding was clearly erroneous. On the basis of this
clearly erroneous finding, the court “did not find those
statements to be credible . . . .” In part II of this opinion,
we concluded that the court improperly determined that
there was “no evidence” that the defendant or her guests
engaged in either of the uncontroverted acts of violence.
On the basis of that improper finding, the court deter-
mined that there was insufficient evidence in the record
to find that the defendant acted or caused her guests to
act in a manner that “presented an immediate and serious
danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord . .
. .” Lastly, the court found that there was “no evidence”
that the defendant sold drugs from her unit, despite the
evidence of foot traffic, written statements, and testi-
mony. On the basis of this clearly erroneous finding, the
court determined that there was insufficient evidence
in the record to find that the defendant had engaged in
serious nuisance.
Those erroneous findings, together with the court’s
logical inconsistencies, were inextricably intertwined

Housing Authority v. Williams
with the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to
meet its evidentiary burden on all counts of its complaint.
After our careful review of the record, we are left with
the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed”; (internal quotation marks omitted)
Giglio v. Ardohain, supra, 233 Conn. App. 752; and these
errors have undermined our “confidence in the court’s
[fact-finding] process . . . .” Autry v. Hosey, supra, 200
Conn. App. 801. We acknowledge that a reversal based
on a trial court’s findings of fact, or lack thereof, should
be rare, and one that we do not engage in lightly. Yet, we
are convinced that this is one of those rare cases where
such a mistake has been made. See Papantoniou v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 235 Conn. App. 674, 692, 346
A.3d 985 (2025). In light of the court’s clearly erroneous
findings, and its reliance on these findings in its memo-
randum of decision, we cannot conclude that these errors
were harmless. As such, a new trial is warranted in this
case. See Osborn v. Waterbury, supra, 197 Conn. App.
488 (“our careful review of the record has undermined
our confidence in the court’s fact-finding process to the
point where there is no other adequate or just remedy
but to order a new trial”).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial.
In this opinion BISHOP, J., concurred.