SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC

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SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
SNM II CORP. v. TANGO YANKEE, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 48214)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Moll, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment finding that the
defendant had violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA)
(§ 42-110a et seq.) by charging the plaintiff unauthorized storage fees for its
airplane. The plaintiff had delivered the plane to M Co. for certain service and
repair work. The plaintiff and M Co. became involved in a dispute regarding
payment for that work, and M Co. moved the plane to the defendant’s property
for storage. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the court erroneously
concluded that it violated CUTPA by charging the plaintiff storage fees
because those fees were authorized pursuant to statute (§ 49-92g), in that
it stored the plane at the request of M Co., which was the legal possessor of
the plane at that time. Held:
The trial court erroneously concluded that the defendant violated CUTPA by
charging the plaintiff storage fees for the plane without the request or consent
of the plaintiff, as M Co. was in control of the plane after the plaintiff placed
the aircraft in its possession, when M Co. performed the repairs requested
by the plaintiff and when M Co. moved the plane to the defendant’s property
for storage, and, accordingly, because M Co. was the legal possessor of the
plane when it requested that the defendant store the plane, the plain language
of § 49-92g authorized the defendant to charge the plaintiff for storing the
plane and to file a lien on the plane when the storage charges were not paid.
Argued November 17, 2025—officially released March 17, 2026
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, alleged vio-
lations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Danbury, where Master Aviation,
Inc., was cited in as an additional defendant; thereafter,
the case was tried to the court, Shaban, J.; judgment
in part for the plaintiff, from which the named defen-
dant appealed to this court. Reversed in part; judgment
directed.
Christopher G. Brown, for the appellant (named defen-
dant).

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. The defendant Tango Yankee, LLC,
doing business as Business Aircraft Center,1 appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, following a court
trial, rendered in favor of the plaintiff, SNM II Corp., on
the ground that the defendant violated the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes
§ 42-110a et seq., by charging the plaintiff unauthorized
storage fees for its airplane. Because we conclude that
the storage fees charged by the defendant were autho-
rized under General Statutes § 49-92g,2 we reverse the
judgment of the trial court.3
The following facts, as set forth by the trial court,
and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of
this appeal. “In 2016, [the plaintiff] was the registered
owner of a Piper Aerostar 601P/700P airplane Iden-
tity Number N800FY. The principal of the [plaintiff]
1 Although Master Aviation, Inc., and SSSuperstar, LLC, also are
defendants in this action, they have not participated in this appeal.
We therefore refer to Tango Yankee, LLC, doing business as Business
Aircraft Center, as the defendant in this opinion.
2 General Statutes § 49-92g provides: “Any person who stores, cares
for, maintains, repairs, or furnishes any services, gasoline, accessories,
materials or other supplies at the request of or with the consent of the
owner, his agent or legal possessor of an aircraft, as defined in sec-
tion 15-34, has a lien upon the aircraft until the sum due for any fees,
expenses or charges for such storage, care, maintenance or repair or the
furnishing of such services, gasoline, accessories, materials or other
supplies has been paid. The lienor shall be entitled to retain possession
of the aircraft until the amount of fees, expenses or charges for such
storage, care, maintenance or repair or the furnishing of such services,
gasoline, accessories, materials or other supplies has been paid or the lien
has been dissolved. The lien shall be superior to all other liens, except
liens for taxes. Any person entitled to a lien pursuant to this section
shall, within ninety days after the date upon which work or services were
performed or when such fees, expenses or charges were incurred, file a
verified statement in the office of the Secretary of the State, pursuant
to the provisions of sections 49-92h and 49-92i.”
3 The plaintiff did not file a brief in this appeal and did not attend
oral argument before this court. We, therefore, have considered this
appeal on the basis of the defendant’s brief and oral argument, the clerk
appendix, and the record. See, e.g., Marino v. Marino, 222 Conn. App.
902, 903 n.1, 302 A.3d 953 (2023).

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
corporation, Sergio Morgandinho, [was] a pilot for thirty
years, [and] . . . [the plaintiff] had been the owner . . . of
the six seater twin engine plane since 2005. In the fall of
2016, Morgandinho flew the plane from Maryland [where
he resided] to the airport in Danbury . . . to be inspected
by Master Aviation [Inc. (Master Aviation)] [because]
he had an individual who was interested in purchasing
the plane. The plane was brought there because Master
Aviation was one of the few companies nationally [that
was] experienced enough to work on such planes given
both its age and that they were no longer in production.
The plane needed to be worked on [because] it had sat idle
for nearly five years while being held as evidence due to a
federal investigation of the plane’s prior servicer. Once it
was in Danbury, Morgandinho left the plane’s logbooks
with the president of [Master Aviation], [Alan Speak-
master], so that he could enter Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) mandated annual certifications into
them following any necessary service or repair work. .
. . Following his initial inspection of the plane, Speak-
master determined that it was in such poor condition
that it should not be flown any further and made clear to
the potential buyer [that] he should not purchase it. . . .
“[A]lthough an annual certification of the plane’s air-
worthiness would typically take between thirty [and]
sixty days, Morgandinho expected the work to take
approximately three to six months given the plane’s con-
dition. The plaintiff then agreed to hire Master Aviation
to perform the services necessary to place the plane into a
safe operating condition and have its annual certification
performed for 2017. Based on his initial review, Speak-
master estimated the repair costs to be approximately
$25,000. After a more detailed inspection, Speakmas-
ter informed the plaintiff that the [plane] was unsafe
to fly and that the cost to make all [of] the necessary
repairs to obtain a certification would be approximately
$50,000. [Morgandinho] agreed and made the payment of
$50,000 on February 7, 2017, and the work on the plane
commenced. On July 11, 2017, Master Aviation billed
the plaintiff for work done to that date, which totaled

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
$73,017.93, leaving a balance due of $23,017.93. All bills
were sent to Morgandinho by email. The plaintiff made
three separate payments on July 11, September 8 and
October 25, 2017, which completely paid off the bill. .
. . The work was completed sometime around September,
2017. At that time, Speakmaster entered a ‘return to
service’ notation into the logbook (i.e., the certification
that the plane was airworthy), contacted [Morgandinho]
and informed him the plane was ready and asked him to
come up to fly the plane. Although Morgandinho twice
told Speakmaster he would do so, he did not come. Mor-
gandinho claimed he did not pick up the plane in 2017
because he had not received the certification from Master
Aviation that he had specifically asked be sent to him.
Once Speakmaster had finished working on the plane,
he had it removed from the hangar where the work had
been done and moved to a ‘tie-down’ space on the tarmac
at the airport.
“In the late fall of 2017, Morgandinho’s mother became
ill, which caused him to leave the country and attend to
her in Portugal for several months. He returned to the
United States in late April, 2018. At that time, he spoke
to Speakmaster and asked that a new certification for
2018 be done because the existing certification would
expire in June, 2018. Speakmaster agreed to do so but
Morgandinho did not hear from him until December,
2018, when Speakmaster sent a text [message] saying
[that] the annual certification had been done. When
Morgandinho inquired about the bill for the certifications
for 2017 and 2018, Speakmaster notified him that there
was an additional bill for $12,311.81, which was invoiced
on December 3, 2018. . . . In a contentious and heated
phone conversation, Morgandinho repeatedly asked for
proof of the certifications for 2017 and 2018 but was not
given any response. He then indicated to Speakmaster
that he did not have the funds to immediately pay the
additional bill but said [that] if he could pick up the
plane and complete the sale to an interested buyer, he
could then do so. A series of [text messages] between
the parties ensued between January 7 and October 25,

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
2019, in which Morgandinho repeatedly asked for proof
of the certifications and/or the logbooks [because] he had
potential buyers for the plane and wanted to come pick it
up. Morgandinho specifically asked for the certifications
on January 22 and 25, twice on January 30, May 1, [in]
June, June 12 and October 25, 2019. . . .
“Because of the statutory ninety day limit for the filing
of a statutory lien for work done on the plane, Master
Aviation filed its lien against the plane on February 4,
2019, for the balance due. . . . By May, 2019, Morgan-
dinho had learned that Master Aviation had put the lien
on the plane [because] Speakmaster sent him a copy. . . .
Speakmaster also indicated in an October 25, 2019 text
[message] that, because the bill had not been paid, he had
removed seats and navigational equipment from the plane
so that it could not be taken by Morgandinho before he
had made payment. . . . Eventually, Morgandinho offered
to pay the bill provided that Speakmaster [produce] the
certifications. Speakmaster offered to accept $50 per
month toward the bill and that Morgandinho could then
come get the certifications. [Although] Speakmaster
. . . could have easily sent a copy of the certifications by
text [message] . . . by that point, no matter what Mor-
gandinho proposed, he was uncomfortable with him and
did not trust him. For example, in the October 25, 2019
text [message], Morgandinho asked that an updated cer-
tification be done for 2019. Speakmaster conceded that
he ignored this request because he found it ‘disgusting’
given that he had not been paid for the 2017 and 2018
certifications. A review of the text exchanges makes
it abundantly clear that both parties were so greatly
frustrated with the other that neither party was will-
ing to accept the other’s offers, thereby resulting in an
absolute stalemate.
“By October 9, 2019, Master Aviation had its counsel
issue a letter to [the plaintiff], to Morgandinho’s atten-
tion, stating [that] it had liened the plane for the amount
due, that there had been no action brought to dissolve the
lien or substitute a bond, and that, if the debt remained

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
unpaid, Master Aviation would commence the process
of auctioning the plane to satisfy the lien pursuant to
. . . § 49-92g et seq. . . .
“The work performed by Master Aviation was done at
a hangar located at [the] Danbury airport. At that time,
approximately one third of the space in the hangar . . .
was leased from [the defendant] doing business as Busi-
ness Aircraft Center. Because of the length of time that
the dispute lasted, Speakmaster had moved the plane to
one of the sixty spots available on the tarmac and had it
tied down at that spot.4 That space was owned by [the
defendant], which charged storage fees for the use of its
space. Speakmaster never discussed storage fees with
Morgandinho because he never envisioned that the plane
would be left at the airport for a long period of time. In
the October 25, 2019 text [message], given the length
of time the dispute had carried on, Morgandinho told
Speakmaster that he should take care of any parking
fees (i.e., storage costs) [because] it was ‘not my fault
you prevented me from picking up the aircraft.’ . . .
He offered to come pick up the plane to remove it from
the airport if it was a problem. Speakmaster repeatedly
responded by demanding payment of the bill first before
he would release the plane.
“Some four months later, on February 27, 2020, the
plaintiff was contacted through email by Lynda and
Santo Silvestro, the owners of [the defendant], who
inquired as to why the [storage] bill had not been paid.
The email noted that ‘[the] aircraft has been sitting
in a tie-down spot at my business for over [eighteen]
months and we need to get payment. This aircraft will
not leave our premises until we . . . are made whole.’
Responding the same day, Morgandinho asked, ‘Who
are you?’ Lynda Silvestro . . . responded by stating she
was the owner of [the defendant]. . . . Morgandinho
then called Lynda Silvestro, who demanded payment.
4 Speakmaster testified that he only leased three spaces in the hangar
and that it was customary for him to ask the defendant to move planes
from the hangar to a tie-down spot after he serviced them.

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
In turn, Morgandinho stated [that] he had never heard
of them before and had never authorized the plane to be
placed onto their property. There was no evidence that,
as [the plaintiff’s] agent, Morgandinho ever asked or
consented, either directly or indirectly, to Master Avia-
tion moving the plane to be tied down on the area of the
tarmac controlled by [the defendant]. Nor was there any
evidence produced of any contact or an oral or written
agreement between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff]
for the charging of storage fees.
“The email sent by the Silvestros referenced certified
letters that had been sent to Morgandinho that were
returned and noted by the post office as unable to be for-
warded. Morgandinho claimed that he had never received
any such letters in any form. He also noted that he had
never heard of [the defendant] and had not given either
[the defendant], or the Silvestros individually, his email
address. In speaking to Lynda Silvestro, Morgandinho
told her that Master Aviation, through Speakmaster,
had never told him that he would be charged for storage
by anyone. During that conversation, Morgandinho first
learned of [the defendant] having placed a lien on the
plane for the storage fees and indicated that he had not
been served by a marshal, certified mail, or otherwise. He
spoke to Santo Silvestro the next day and told him the
same thing.5 He made clear that he considered Master
Aviation to be responsible for any such fees as he had
not authorized it to place the plane on [the defendant’s]
property. . . .
“As a result of the plaintiff having failed to pay Master
Aviation for the 2018 invoice of $12,311.81 and [the
defendant’s] claimed [storage] fee of $5970, both parties
placed a lien on the plane pursuant to [§ 49-92g]. Master
Aviation’s lien for the invoiced amount was filed with
the Secretary of the State’s office on February 4, 2019. .
. . [The defendant’s] lien was filed with the Secretary of
5 It was disputed at trial whether or when the plaintiff learned of the
liens placed on his plane. The court’s determinations as to when and
how the plaintiff was notified of the liens are not at issue in this appeal.

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
the State’s office on November 15, 2021. . . . That lien
claimed storage fees for the period May 12, 2017, until
the date of filing . . . . The November 15, 2021 date was
the end date of the lien [because] Santo Silvestro, without
any input from the plaintiff, directed [that] the plane
be put in the hangar since he intended to have the plane
auctioned off to pay the lien.
“In late 2021, [the defendant] retained counsel expe-
rienced in aviation law, James McLaughlin, to initiate
the procedures provided by [§ 49-92g et seq.] for the col-
lection of its invoice. McLaughlin obtained the mailing
address of [the plaintiff] from the registration form on
file with the FAA. . . . The registration form was issued
on October 16, 2018, was valid through October 31, 2021,
and referenced an address of 9058 Major Smith Lane,
Frederick, Maryland. . . .
“Consistent with the information on the FAA form and
General Statutes § 49-92h (a), McLaughlin sent notice
of the lien and auction procedure to [the plaintiff] at the
9058 Major Smith Lane, Frederick, Maryland address
by certified mail on November 16, 2021. Receipt of the
notice was acknowledged and verified by the United
States Postal Service by document dated November 18,
2021. . . . [T]he letter was issued for the purpose of advis-
ing [the plaintiff] and Morgandinho of [the defendant’s]
lien having been placed on the plane and of the auction
procedure pursuant to the General Statutes. . . . [T]he
notice called for the auction to be held on January 19,
2022, and . . . the notice was published in the Danbury
News-Times newspaper on December 13, 20 and 27, 2021,
in accordance with the statute. . . .
“[The plaintiff] received the letter and had notice of
the lien and auction procedure. No court action was taken
by [the plaintiff] to contest the lien. An auction was held
on January 19, 2022, as scheduled. At the time of the
auction, the plane had been at the [Danbury] airport
for approximately five years. The paint on the plane
had begun to peel and rust was showing. Shortly before
the auction, Santo Silvestro created a new company,

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
SSSuperstar, LLC [(SSSuperstar)], for the purpose of
bidding on the plane. That company was the only bidder
at the time of the auction. From the proceeds of the sale,
the full amount of the liens of both Master Aviation
($12,311.81) and [the defendant] ($5970) were paid.6
SSSuperstar claimed that, after acquiring the plane, it
spent over $100,000 in repairs to make the plane capable
of flying and to be certified for the current year. It is
clear that some repairs had become necessary due to
the plane’s condition having deteriorated over such a
lengthy time sitting idle on the tarmac at the airport.
Speakmaster confirmed that, as of the time of the auc-
tion, the plane’s condition had deteriorated [because it
had not] been maintained and that SSSuperstar ‘had
to spend a fortune’ to bring the plane back to a flyable
condition. However, no documentation was produced
by either Speakmaster or SSSuperstar to evidence the
claimed expenditures. Following whatever repairs to the
plane had been made, SSSuperstar engaged a broker to
sell it and it was eventually sold to a third party . . . for
approximately $142,500.
“Subsequent to the auction, Morgandinho found out
about the sale of the plane through information discov-
ered on the Internet. He never received any paperwork
regarding the plane’s sale following the auction.” (Cita-
tions omitted; footnotes added; footnote in original.)
The plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages
for the alleged unauthorized sale of its plane. In the
operative five count complaint, filed on November 27,
2023, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant
violated CUTPA because the storage fees charged by the
6 “Lynda Sylvestro testified that the May 12, 2017 date for commence-
ment of services on the lien was incorrect as amounts due for 2018
and prior years had been written off. She stated the start date for any
amounts due should have been from January 1, 2019, forward. Also,
defendants’ exhibit A is a Tango Yankee, LLC, invoice showing a bal-
ance due of $7405 for the period July 1, 2019, to January 1, 2022, and
marked as having been paid in full. The payment was made out of the
proceeds of the auction of the plane even though the lien filed was for
a different period of time and for a different amount.”

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
defendant were unauthorized in that the plaintiff had
never requested or consented to the storage of its plane
by the defendant.7 The defendant denied the allegations
of the plaintiff’s complaint.
On November 6, 2024, following a trial to the court
and the filing of posttrial briefs by the parties, the court
filed a memorandum of decision finding, inter alia, in
favor of the plaintiff on its CUTPA claim against the
defendant.8 In so doing, the court reasoned: “[Although]
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to lead the
court to conclude that, while the [defendant’s] lien was
properly noticed pursuant to statute, the amount claimed
for storage charges was not supported by any agreement
with [the plaintiff]. In fact, the plane was placed on the
[defendant’s] property at the direction of Master Avia-
tion without the consent or knowledge of [the plaintiff].
[The defendant] charged fees to [the plaintiff] without
having had any contact with [the plaintiff], its princi-
pal or agent, and without having entered into any oral
or written agreement to do so. It did not even know of
any contact information for [the plaintiff] until it later
obtained the information from Master Aviation. . . . The
court also notes its collection of $7405 from the sale of
the plane was substantially more than the $5970 set forth
in its lien. See footnote [6 of this opinion].
“The court finds that [the defendant] was involved in
the trade or commerce of running an airport and that its
unauthorized actions with respect to the storage of the
plane at the airport and the collection of $1435 in excess
of its lien constitute an unfair trade practice [that] caused
substantial injury to [the plaintiff].9 Collectively, these
7 The plaintiff also alleged conversion as to the defendant and SSSu-
perstar and CUTPA violations by Master Aviation and SSSuperstar.
8 The court found in favor of the defendant and SSSuperstar on the
plaintiff’s conversion claims. The court found in favor of SSSuperstar
on the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim, but in favor of the plaintiff on its
CUTPA claim against Master Aviation. Those rulings have not been
challenged on appeal.
9 The court also concluded: “There was also a lack of any evidence
whatsoever that [the defendant] had complied with § 49-92h (c) rela-
tive to payment to the owner of record the balance of any sale proceeds

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
actions and inaction constitute a basis for the finding
of a CUTPA violation by [the defendant].” (Footnote
added.) The court also found that “several of the actions
of Master Aviation in its effort to be paid leading to the
auction constituted an unfair trade practice that would
be considered unfair or unscrupulous conduct [that]
caused substantial injury to [the plaintiff].”
As to damages, the court explained: “There was suf-
ficient evidence to establish that the liens totaling
$18,281.81 were paid off by virtue of the sale of the plane,
plus an additional $1435 to [the defendant]. However,
there was no evidence of what the actual amount of the
successful bid was. The most competent evidence of the
value of the plane at the time of the auction was the evi-
dence that it was sold shortly thereafter by SSSuperstar
for $142,500. Because the actions of Master Aviation
and [the defendant] [that] led up to the auction have
been found to constitute CUTPA violations, the court
finds . . . the value of the plane as of the time of the auc-
tion less the payment of the liens to be the measure of
damages. Accordingly, the court awards the plaintiff
$124,218.19.” The court further awarded the plaintiff
“a de minimis amount of $500 in attorney’s fees and $500
in punitive damages.”10 On the basis of the foregoing,
after the satisfaction of any security interests. Even if there were no
proceeds left following payment of the security interests, it does not
excuse the failure of the [defendant] to notify [the plaintiff] as to what
the balance of the proceeds [was] following the sale. At the very least
it could have done so by email as it had Morgandinho’s email address
for approximately two years prior to the auction.” The court did not
expressly base its finding of a CUTPA violation on these deficiencies
of the defendant but, rather, focused on the conduct of the defendant
that led to the auction of the plaintiff’s plane.
10 In so doing, the court reasoned: “The court has previously noted
that it was a collective group of missteps by the parties that led them
to the courthouse. For example, regarding the billing notices and cor-
respondence of the defendants to the plaintiff, including the notice
of any liens, Morgandinho lived at three different residences between
August, 2019, and February, 2020. Yet there is no evidence that he
ever put in a change of address with the United States Postal Service
or made an attempt to notify the defendants of his current address to
ensure that he received any correspondence from them. There was also
no effort to update the address on the FAA registration of the plane.

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
the court ordered: “The judgments as to [the plaintiff’s
CUTPA claims] shall enter jointly and severally as to
. . . Master Aviation and [the defendant] in the amount
of $124,218.19 in damages plus $500 in attorney’s fees
and $500 in punitive damages for a total judgment of
$125,218.19.” This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred
in concluding that it violated CUTPA by charging the
plaintiff storage fees because those fees were authorized
under § 49-92g in that it stored the plane at the request
of Master Aviation, which was the legal possessor of the
plane at that time. We agree.
“[General Statutes §] 42-110b (a) provides that [n]o
person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce. It is well settled that in determining
whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted
the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the [F]ederal
[T]rade [C]ommission for determining when a practice is
unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily
having been previously considered unlawful, offends
public policy as it has been established by statutes, the
common law, or otherwise—in other words, it is within
at least the penumbra of some [common-law], statutory,
or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether
it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers,
[competitors or other businesspersons]. . . . All three
criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding
of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the
degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because
Further, there were significant periods of time when Morgandinho was
out of contact with Master Aviation, leaving it without direction as to
his intentions with respect to the plane. On at least two occasions, he had
phone conversations with either Speakmaster or the Silvestros in which
he yelled and used profane language about the defendants’ demands for
payment. That conduct only hardened the positions of the defendants
and made a resolution less likely. In short, his attitude and inattention
to the matter at hand played a role in the eventual auctioning of the
plane. Lastly, the conduct of the trial took only approximately [one and
one-half days] with few witnesses.”

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
to a lesser extent it meets all three. . . . Thus a viola-
tion of CUTPA may be established by showing either an
actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to
a violation of public policy.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Herron v. Daniels, 208 Conn. App. 75, 94–95,
264 A.3d 184 (2021).11
“It is well settled that whether a defendant’s acts con-
stitute . . . deceptive or unfair trade practices under
CUTPA, is a question of fact for the trier, to which, on
appellate review, we accord our customary deference.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 96. Here, how-
ever, our review of the court’s determination that the
defendant violated CUTPA by charging the plaintiff stor-
age fees in the absence of a request from, or the consent
of, the plaintiff “requires us to construe the language
of [§ 49-92g]. Consequently . . . our review is plenary. . .
. [W]hen construing the language of a statute, General
Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the
statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If,
11 We also are mindful that, in evaluating whether the defendant’s
conduct caused substantial injury to the plaintiff, our Supreme Court
has explained that “not . . . every consumer injury is legally unfair . .
. . To justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests.
It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it
must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have
avoided.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cenatiempo v. Bank of
America, N.A., 333 Conn. 769, 802, 219 A.3d 767 (2019). Not only did
the plaintiff never attempt to retrieve its plane from the defendant, it
also made no attempt to dissolve the defendant’s lien on the plane. See
General Statutes § 49-92h (b) (“[t]he owner of the aircraft, or anyone
having a legal or equitable interest therein, may apply to any judge of
the Superior Court, within whose jurisdiction the aircraft is held or
where the lienor resides, to dissolve the lien upon the substitution of a
bond with sufficient surety”). To that extent, the injury claimed by the
plaintiff in this case—the alleged unauthorized sale of its plane—was
not an injury that the plaintiff could not reasonably have avoided.
We also agree with the defendant’s argument that, to the extent the
court’s finding of a CUTPA violation was based, in part, on the defen-
dant’s collection of $1400 more than the amount of its lien, that sum,
relative to the plaintiff’s claimed injury—the value of the plane—did
not constitute a substantial injury to the plaintiff. See Web Press
Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 205 Conn. 479, 484, 533
A.2d 1211 (1987).

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
after examining such text and considering such relation-
ship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous
and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-
textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 90–91.
Section 49-92g, which establishes the statutory frame-
work for aircraft liens, provides in relevant part: “Any
person who stores . . . at the request of or with the consent
of the owner, his agent or legal possessor of an aircraft
. . . has a lien upon the aircraft until the sum due for any
fees, expenses or charges for such storage . . . has been
paid. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The term “legal possessor”
is not defined in § 49-92g or in any other statute. It is well
settled that, “[i]n the absence of a definition of terms in
the statute itself, [w]e may presume . . . that the legis-
lature intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning
in the English language, as gleaned from the context of
its use. . . . Under such circumstances, it is appropriate
to look to the common understanding of the term as
expressed in a dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Middlebury v. Connecticut Siting Council,
326 Conn. 40, 49, 161 A.3d 537 (2017).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines legal possessor as “[o]ne
with the legal right to possess property . . . as contrasted
with the legal owner who holds legal title.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) p. 1283. To possess means “[t]o
have in one’s actual control . . . .” Id., p. 1281. In light of
these definitions, we conclude that the statute is plain
and unambiguous with respect to who constitutes a legal
possessor. That is, we do not see more than one likely or
plausible meaning of the term “legal possessor.” Under
these definitions, it is clear that the legal possessor is one
who is legally in control of an aircraft, versus the owner
who holds title to it.
Here, it was not, nor could it reasonably have been,
argued that the plaintiff’s plane was not in the control of
Master Aviation when Morgandinho placed the aircraft
in the possession of Master Aviation and it performed

SNM II Corp. v. Tango Yankee, LLC
the repairs requested by the plaintiff and later moved
the plane to the defendant’s property for storage after
completing those repairs. Thus, because Master Aviation
was the legal possessor of the plaintiff’s plane when it
requested that the defendant store the plane, the plain
language of § 49-92g authorized the defendant to charge
the plaintiff for storing the plane and to file a lien on the
plane when the storage charges were not paid. Accord-
ingly, the court’s determination that the defendant vio-
lated CUTPA by charging the plaintiff storage fees for
the plane without the request or consent of the plaintiff
was unfounded.12
The judgment is reversed as to the plaintiff’s CUTPA
claim against the defendant Tango Yankee, LLC, and the
case is remanded with direction to render judgment for
the defendant Tango Yankee, LLC, on that claim; the
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
12 In light of this conclusion, we need not address the defendant’s
additional argument that the storage charges did not proximately cause
the plaintiff’s loss of equity in its plane.