26 CO 46, 25SA134 Moreno, Mary v. Circle K

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
June 15, 2026

# 2026 CO 46

No. 25SA134, Moreno v. Circle K Stores-Wrongful Termination - Public-Policy
Exception-Employment Law.

The supreme court answers the following question of law certified to the
court by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado:

Does Colorado law recognize a public-policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine that allows an employee to bring a wrongful
termination claim in the event the employee is terminated for actions
taken in self-defense?

Applying the test established in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100,
109 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court concludes that the right to self-defense,
established by section 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2025), and article II, section 3 of the
Colorado Constitution, supports a public-policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine. The court determines that (1) both the statute and the
constitutional provision clearly express the boundaries and extent of the right;
(2) self-defense is inherently a public right, rather than an individual proprietary
right; and (3) the right is work-related insofar as the need to defend oneself from
an unprovoked attack can occur anywhere, including at work.

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The supreme court thus answers the question in the affirmative and returns
this case to the district court for further proceedings.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 46

Supreme Court Case No. 25SA134
Certification of Question of Law
United States District Court for the District of Colorado Case No.
22-cv-02327-NYW-STV

Plaintiff:
Mary Ann Moreno,

V.

Defendant:

Circle K Stores, Inc.

Certified Question Answered
en banc
June 15, 2026

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

Rathod Mohamedbhai LLC

Virginia Hill Butler

Iris Halpern

Matthew Cron

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant:

Littler Mendelson, P.C.

Thomas W. Carroll

Nicholas Hankins

Denver, Colorado

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JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and
JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HOOD dissented.

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JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11
Seventy-two-year-old Mary Ann Moreno ("Moreno") sued her employer,
Circle K Stores, Inc. ("Circle K"), for wrongful termination. She asserted that she
was fired for lawfully exercising her right to self-defense after she was cornered
by an armed robber during one of her shifts and that her termination violated
Colorado public policy. We accepted jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21.1 to answer the
following question of law certified to us by the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado:

Does Colorado law recognize a public-policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine that allows an employee to bring a wrongful
termination claim in the event the employee is terminated for actions
taken in self-defense?

12
This court first recognized a public-policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo.
1992). There, we identified a number of circumstances under which an at-will
employee may bring a claim for wrongful discharge: if the employee was
terminated for (1) refusing to engage in an illegal act, (2) performing a public duty,
or (3) exercising an important job-related right or privilege. Id. To serve as the
basis for such a claim, the right must be clearly expressed, sufficiently public, and
granted to workers. Id .; Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 552
(Colo. 1997) (citing Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525
(Colo. 1996)).

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13 We have previously recognized, however, that "public-policy wrongful
discharge is not subject to precise definition," Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552, and that
the exception is rooted in the long-standing rule that "a contract violative of public
policy should not be enforced," Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 108 (citing Russell v.
Courier Printing & Publ'g Co., 95 P. 936, 938 (Colo. 1908)). Based on that
long-standing rule, we have concluded that it is "axiomatic that a contractual
condition, such as the terminability condition of an at-will employment contract,
should also be deemed unenforceable when violative of public policy." Id. at 109.

14 This case requires us to decide if the right to self-defense, established either
by section 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2025) ("section 704"), or by article II, section 3 of the
Colorado Constitution ("article II, section 3"), meets the test we articulated in
Martin Marietta. In answering the certified question, we first determine that both
the statute and the constitutional provision clearly express the boundaries and
extent of the right to self-defense based on their explicit language and the extensive
and well-defined body of case law regarding self-defense. Next, we decide that
the right to self-defense is inherently a public right, rather than an individual
proprietary right, because it is an essential, inalienable right guaranteed to all
people. Finally, we conclude that the right to self-defense, as expressed by both
the statute and the constitutional provision, is a right that is job-related insofar as

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the need to exercise the right to defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can
occur anywhere, including at work.

15 While we conclude that this is a right granted to all people that is not left at
the door simply because a person enters the workplace, we emphasize that the
scope of the exception that we recognize today is narrow. It is limited,
importantly, to self-defense as an essential, inalienable right. And, critically, the
exception applies only when an employee lawfully exercises the right in response
to an unprovoked attack at work.

16 It is also important to understand what this case is not about. The certified
question asks us only to answer if an exception exists. We are not called on to
decide whether Circle K's policy bars its employees from acting in self-defense - as
Moreno claims-or whether the policy simply prohibits employees from
confronting shoplifters - as Circle K claims. We also need not decide if Moreno
acted in self-defense or if Circle K fired Moreno for defending herself. We offer no
opinion on any of those matters.

17 Instead, we answer only the certified question. For the reasons detailed
below, we answer the question in the affirmative and return this case to the district
court for further proceedings.

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## I. Facts and Procedural History1

18
Moreno was working at Circle K one evening when Tyler Wimmer
approached the register holding several items, including two hunting knives. He
placed the knives on the U-shaped counter that separated him from Moreno. After
Wimmer told Moreno to get him a pack of cigarettes, Moreno asked what brand
he wanted and retrieved them from the display case behind her. When Moreno
began to ring up the cigarettes, Wimmer said something to the effect of, "[J]ust
give them to me for free." Moreno refused.

19
Wimmer then picked up the knives and began to walk around the counter.
Moreno twice told Wimmer, "[D]on't come back here." Undeterred, and with
knives in hand, Wimmer continued to approach. When Moreno was within
Wimmer's reach, Moreno extended her arms. In Moreno's telling, she instinctively
did this to defend herself and to prevent Wimmer from coming closer to her.

1 Circle K's description of these events differs significantly from Moreno's. It
contends that Moreno was trying to stop Tyler Wimmer from stealing cigarettes.
While we accept the facts as set out in the complaint and the opinions of the federal
court(s) below to provide some background on the way to answering the certified
question, we note that the issue presented is one of law. Our decision does not
turn on either party's version of the facts. See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 642 (Colo.
2006) ("We recite these facts [from the district court] to give context for the certified
question."); Klabon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 2024 CO 66, 1 3 n.1, 556 P.3d
793, 798 n.1 ("We derive the following facts from Klabon's complaint and the
district court's certification order."). And, as we have already explained, we
express no opinion as to whether Moreno acted to defend herself or the cigarettes.

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Wimmer grabbed a pack of cigarettes, left the store, and was subsequently arrested
for armed robbery.2

110 Circle K terminated Moreno for violating its "Don't Chase or Confront"
policy.3 The policy instructs employees not to "confront[,] follow, pursue, track,
chase, fight[,] or follow" any customer suspected of shoplifting. Moreno sued
Circle K in state court, claiming, in pertinent part, that she was wrongfully
discharged in violation of Colorado public policy because she was exercising her
right to self-defense and trying to protect herself from being attacked.

111 Circle K removed the case to the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado and moved for summary judgment. It argued that (1) Moreno was
not acting in self-defense; (2) Circle K's decision to fire Moreno was based on an
honest belief that she had not acted in self-defense; and (3) Colorado law does not
recognize self-defense as a public-policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine. Moreno countered that (1) she was acting in self-defense and (2) the

2 Later, Wimmer pleaded guilty to menacing with a deadly weapon.

3 As previously noted, the only issue before us is the purely legal one set forth in
the certified question. Moreno contends that Circle K's "Don't Chase or Confront"
policy prohibits its employees from exercising their right to self-defense. Circle K
contends it does not. It asserts that the company's policy aims to prevent
employees from provoking encounters with shoplifters and placing themselves in
situations where self-defense is necessary. For the reasons we have already
explained, we express no opinion on this dispute.

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court should recognize self-defense as a public-policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine.

112 The district court granted Circle K's summary judgment motion. It
concluded that Colorado's statutory and constitutional right to self-defense does
not give rise to a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
These provisions, the court explained, do not set forth a sufficiently clear
job-related right or privilege. In so ruling, the district court highlighted its
cautious approach, noting that, as a federal court, it was "simply not in the position
to recognize, in the first instance, a new type of public-policy exception to
Colorado's at-will employment doctrine."

113 Moreno appealed to the Tenth Circuit. It reversed the district court's order,
concluding that factual issues-regarding (1) whether Moreno had used
self-defense and (2) whether Circle K had fired her for doing so-remained
unresolved and were potentially dispositive. The Tenth Circuit, accordingly,
remanded the case to the district court for further factual findings.

114 On remand, the district court found that genuine disputed issues of material
fact existed as to both questions. Specifically, the district court determined that
questions regarding Moreno's credibility, interpretation of the surveillance video,
and Circle K's motivation in terminating Moreno all presented genuine issues of

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material fact for a jury to decide. In light of these disputed issues of fact, the court
denied the motion for summary judgment.

115 Moreno then filed a motion to certify to this court the legal question of
whether Colorado recognizes self-defense as a public-policy exception to the
at-will employment doctrine. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that
the question (1) is likely determinative of the action, (2) presents a novel question
of public policy requiring guidance, and (3) is an important issue. The district
court noted that, because this case originated in state court, the question was
well-suited for review by this court.

116 We accepted review of the certified question. Applying the factors we
articulated in Martin Marietta, we now hold that the statutory and constitutional
right to self-defense in Colorado is a clearly articulated right that belongs to all
people, including employees.

117 We accordingly recognize a self-defense public-policy exception to the
at-will employment doctrine.

## II. Analysis

118 We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and the relevant
case law. We then consider the language of section 704 and article II, section 3,
each of which sets out the right to self-defense. Next, we answer the certified

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question, addressing in turn each prong of the test we established in Martin
Marietta.

119 We hold that both section 704 and article II, section 3 establish a public
policy in favor of self-defense. First, both clearly express the extent of a person's
right to act in reasonable self-defense when they have reasonable grounds to
believe they are in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, or of becoming
the victim of certain other crimes. Second, because self-defense is an essential,
inalienable right possessed by all Coloradans, it is a public, rather than a
proprietary, right. Third, we conclude that the right to self-defense is a right
guaranteed to all people, including people in the workplace. It is a job-related
right insofar as the need to exercise the right to lawfully defend oneself from an
unprovoked attack can occur in the workplace.

120 Therefore, we conclude that applying the public-policy exception to this
specific inalienable right is entirely consistent with the rationale underlying the
exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

## A. Jurisdiction

121 Rule 21.1(a) grants us jurisdiction to resolve questions of law certified by a
federal court. We exercise our jurisdiction when a question "may be determinative
of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears . . . that
there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court." Skillett v.

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Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2022 CO 12, 18, 505 P.3d 664, 666 (quoting
C.A.R. 21.1(a)). We review such questions de novo. Id. Similarly, we review de
novo whether a constitutional, statutory, or other source provides a sufficiently
clear expression of public policy. Jaynes v. Centura Health Corp., 148 P.3d 241, 244
(Colo. App. 2006) (citing Mariani, 916 P.2d at 526).

## B. The Public-Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine

122 The public-policy exception generally allows an at-will employee to pursue
a claim for wrongful termination if their employer fires them for violating a clearly
expressed public policy. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109. The exception constrains
employers from terminating employees when the termination would have "a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good." Id. at 105
(quoting Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
Am., Loc. 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)). When a party claims a
public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, we consider if "the
discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public policy." Mariani,
916 P.2d at 523-24 (quoting Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 107). Although
"public-policy wrongful discharge is not subject to precise definition," Weissman,
938 P.2d at 552, the essence of the exception is that an employee will have a
cognizable claim for wrongful discharge if the discharge of the employee would

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be "detrimental to the public good," Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 108 (quoting
Russell, 95 P. at 938).

123
3 We set forth a four-part test in Martin Marietta to determine whether the
termination of an at-will employee violates public policy. An at-will employee
establishes that they were wrongfully discharged under the public-policy
exception by showing:

(1)
that the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal
act as part of the employee's work related duties or prohibited
the employee from performing a public duty or exercising an
important job-related right or privilege;

(2)
that the action directed by the employer would violate a
specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or welfare,
or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating
to the employee's basic responsibility as a citizen or the
employee's right or privilege as a worker; . . .

(3)
that the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to
perform the act directed by the employer[; and] . . .

(4)
that the employer was aware, or reasonably should have been
aware, that the employee's refusal to comply with the
employer's order or directive was based on the employee's
reasonable belief that the action ordered by the employer was
illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory policy relating to
the employee's duty as a citizen, or violative of the employee's
legal right or privilege as a worker.

Id. at 109.

124 Here, the first part of the test depends on the second part, while the third
and fourth parts are questions of fact beyond the scope of the certified question.

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We thus focus on the second: whether self-defense is a clearly expressed right or
privilege that an employee holds as a worker.

125 Colorado courts must be cautious in recognizing exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine. The power to create public policy sits squarely with the
General Assembly, not the courts. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 553 ("The General
Assembly is the branch of government charged with creating public policies, and
the courts may only recognize and enforce such policies."). As such, we only
recognize a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine if the
policy has been clearly expressed. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109. Importantly,
that expression of public policy must also affect the public, not just an individual.
Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552-53.

126 Constitutional provisions, professional ethical codes, and administrative
regulations may also serve as a basis for a public-policy exception. Mariani,
916 P.2d at 524-25; Weissman, 938 P.2d at 553; Kearl v. Portage Env't, Inc., 205 P.3d
496, 499 (Colo. App. 2008) (deriving a public-policy exception from existing case
law).

127 We have explained that to be "clearly expressed," a source of public policy
must (1) provide a concrete, rather than hortatory or general, statement of policy;
(2) provide employees with a clear mandate as to what constitutes appropriate
conduct; and (3) provide employers sufficient notice of the policy. Mariani,

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916 P.2d at 525-26; Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 590 P.2d 513, 515 (Colo. App.
1978); see also Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, 1 26, 440 P.3d 424, 431 (holding that
professional rules, which prohibit certain actions, provide a clear mandate).

128 Because the General Assembly is typically the ultimate source of public
policy, the clearest expressions of a particular policy occur when a statute
(1) explicitly prohibits a behavior, see Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 108, 111;
(2) establishes a right, see Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1372 (Colo.
App. 1989); or (3) creates a statutory scheme, id. Thus, if a statute prohibits certain
acts in conjunction with other indicia of legislative intent, it may give rise to a
public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. See Jones v. Stevinson's
Golden Ford, 36 P.3d 129, 133 (Colo. App. 2001) (concluding that a public-policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine exists based on "[t]he broad
legislative purpose of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act").

129 A statute or comparable provision, however, need not proscribe or prescribe
specific actions to give rise to a public-policy exception. Provisions that encourage
a particular beneficial behavior without establishing specific obligations related to
employment may also be sufficient to create a public-policy exception. See Flores v.
Am. Pharm. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d 455, 459 (Colo. App. 1999) ("Also, while
[section] 10-1-127(1.5)(a)[, C.R.S. (2025),] does not explicitly require employees or

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citizens to take an active part in ferreting out insurance fraud, the act encourages
its exposure and detection.").

130 To clearly express public policy, the statute or comparable provision must
also implicate public safety, health, or welfare rather than an issue involving a
primarily personal or proprietary interest of an individual. Weissman, 938 P.2d at
552-53 (citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992)). The right must
touch upon a public health, safety, or welfare concern, or an employee's basic
rights or duties. Id. at 553; see also Mariani, 916 P.2d at 524. And the right must
broadly implicate the public as a whole to outweigh the at-will employment
doctrine. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 553.

131 Finally, for a plaintiff to claim that one of their rights or privileges was
undermined, that right or privilege must be granted to them as a worker or be
related to their job. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109. Examples include: a privilege
or right that is connected to conduct that occurs at work, like taking a lunch break;
conduct arising from work, such as seeking compensation for a job-related injury;
or obligations owed by the employer, such as proper compensation. Bonidy v. Vail
Valley Ctr. for Aesthetic Dentistry, P.C., 186 P.3d 80, 84-85 (Colo. App. 2008);
Herrera v. San Luis Cent. R.R. Co., 997 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Colo. App. 1999); Hoyt v.
Target Stores, 981 P.2d 188, 192 (Colo. App. 1998); see also Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas

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Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (holding that firing a worker for filing a
workers' compensation claim violated public policy).

132 Circle K acknowledges that the right to self-defense is a Colorado public
policy but asserts that it is not clearly expressed by either section 704 or article II,
section 3; is not a right that affects the public; and does not relate to employment.
We briefly describe each provision, then discuss these issues.

## C. Section 704

133 The General Assembly has statutorily recognized the right to self-defense
since the days of the Colorado territory. An Act Concerning Criminal Jurisprudence:
Division IV, Offenses Against the Persons of Individuals, Secs. 28, 30, 1861 Colo.
Territorial Sess. Laws 290, 294 ("1861 Self-Defense Law") (establishing
"[j]ustifiable homicide" as "the killing of a human being in necessary
self-defense"). In its modern form, a person may justifiably use force against
another to defend themselves "from what he reasonably believes to be the use or
imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a
degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose."
§ 18-1-704(1).

134 Self-defense, like other legal justifications, is an affirmative defense.
§ 18-1-710, C.R.S. (2025). This court has repeatedly characterized section 704 as
expressing a right to self-defense. See, e.g., Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, 1 58,

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421 P.3d 1141, 1150; People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 352 (Colo. 2000); Beckett v. People,
800 P.2d 74, 77-78 (Colo. 1990); see also Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, 1 57, 476 P.3d
746, 759 (Márquez, J., dissenting).

135 The statute specifically limits the right to self-defense. First, a person must
reasonably believe that they will imminently be subject to unlawful physical force.
§ 18-1-704(1). Second, the use of force must be reasonably necessary. Id. Third,
deadly force is only permissible under certain circumstances. § 18-1-704(2).
Finally, subject to limited exceptions, self-defense is unjustified if the person
asserting the defense was the initial aggressor or if the use of force is based on the
victim's gender identity or sexual orientation. § 18-1-704(3).

## D. Article II, Section 3

136 Article II, section 3 sets out "natural, essential[,] and inalienable" rights.
Colo. Const. art. II, § 3; see also Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 380 P.2d
34, 39-40 (Colo. 1962). These rights include "the right of enjoying and defending
[one's life]." Colo. Const. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).

137 Constitutional rights are not absolute and are subject to reasonable
limitations. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 485 P.2d 500, 503 (Colo. 1971) ("[T]his case
clearly and explicitly recognizes that limitations may be placed upon an
inalienable or inherent right .... "). They are also defined, interpreted, and bound
by the jurisprudence of this court. See In re Legis. Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66, 68

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(Colo. 1962) ("The judicial branch of the government has imposed upon it the
obligation of interpreting the [c]onstitution and of safeguarding the basic rights
granted thereby to the people." (quoting Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 161 A.2d
705, 710 (N.J. 1960))).

138 With both the statutory and constitutional text in mind, we now consider
whether either provision is sufficient to establish self-defense as a public-policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

## E. Section 704 and Article II, Section 3 Evince Public Policy Favoring Self-Defense that Encompasses Self-Defense by Employees

## 1. Section 704 and Article II, Section 3 Clearly Express Public Policy in Favor of the Right to Self-Defense

139
First, we consider if section 704 and article II, section 3 clearly express a
public policy in favor of the right to self-defense. Section 704 sets out by whom,
when, and how the right to self-defense may be exercised. § 18-1-704(1)-(4). Any
person, including any employee, may justifiably use force when they reasonably
believe they face the "use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by [another]
person." § 18-1-704(1). They may not use excessive force. § 18-1-704(2)-(3). And
with limited exceptions, they are not justified in using force if they were the initial
aggressor. § 18-1-704(3)(b). In short, the statute mandates how a person may
defend themselves. Thus, an employee would know that they could use force to
defend themself, but that using force to confront a shoplifter, for example, would

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be unlawful. An employer would similarly be on notice about the lawful exercise
of this right.

140 Additionally, a statute setting out a criminal right or defense is as much an
expression of the General Assembly's intent as a statute setting out criminal or
civil liability and is no less a source of public policy. As we observed in Martin
Marietta, an employee should not have to "choose between losing their job[] or
engaging in criminal conduct." 823 P.2d at 111. So too with the right to
self-defense: An employee should never have to choose between their job and their
safety. Thus, section 704 is strong evidence of Colorado's public policy in favor of
self-defense.

141 Article II, section 3 similarly provides a clear mandate. It concisely and
unambiguously recognizes that "[a]ll persons have ... the right of enjoying and
defending their lives." Colo. Const. art. II, § 3. Despite its brevity, it provides a
common understanding of when it's appropriate to exercise the right of
self-defense. Our jurisprudence lays out the boundaries of the constitutional right
to self-defense, as we discussed in Part II.C.

142 The constitutional right to self-defense is further understood through its
evolution alongside Colorado's statutory right to self-defense. The territorial
statute, first enacted in 1861, predates the constitutional right, which was ratified
in 1876, nearly a decade and a half later. See 1861 Self-Defense Law. The judicial

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understanding of the inalienable right to self-defense identified in article II,
section 3 developed alongside Colorado's self-defense statute. See, e.g., Idrogo v.
People, 818 P.2d 752, 754 (Colo. 1991) (describing the evolution of § 18-1-704(2));
§ 18-1-704. Because the statute codifies elements of the common law, its evolution
provides guidance as to the extent of the constitutional right. People ex rel. Graves v.
Dist. Ct., 86 P. 87, 89 (Colo. 1906) ("The [c]onstitution of a state is not the beginning
of the law for a state. Under our system of jurisprudence it assumes the existence
of the common law from which we must draw in interpreting its provisions.").
Accordingly, the expression of the right to self-defense set out in the Colorado
Constitution draws on the expression of the right set out by statute.

143 The combination of precedent and statutory language clearly defines the
permissible boundaries of the constitutional right to self-defense in Colorado.
Thus, though the language of article II, section 3 extends broadly - as it must to
protect the inalienable rights of Coloradans - it is not a purely hortatory provision.
See Mariani, 916 P.2d at 525. It identifies a "clear mandate," id. at 526, bound by
our case law, giving notice to employees and employers as to what conduct is
permissible and what is not. Accordingly, we conclude that it too presents a clear
public policy in favor of self-defense.

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## 2. Self-Defense Impacts the Public and Is a Public Right

144 Next, we consider whether the right to self-defense is a public right. We
first explained the distinction between public rights and rights that do not "truly
impact[] the public" in Weissman. 938 P.2d at 552. There, a typist claimed that she
was wrongfully discharged for taking rest breaks she had a right to take pursuant
to Colorado Minimum Wage Order No. 19, Dep't of Lab. & Emp., 7 Colo. Code
Regs. 1103-3 (1983). Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552-53. We held that the rights she
relied on were not significant enough to implicate a "fundamental, substantial
public policy." Id.4

145 Here, by contrast, the right to self-defense is an essential, inalienable right
expressed in this state's constitution - one that has been statutorily recognized for
longer than Colorado has been a state. See 1861 Self-Defense Law. Though this
essential, inalienable right is possessed and exercised by individuals, its impact is
necessarily public. See Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
("While rights are won and lost by the individual actions of people, the assertion

4 However, a division applying a similar wage order in slightly different
circumstances concluded that the order did create "clearly expressed public
policy." Bonidy, 186 P.3d at 85. The division distinguished the case from Weissman,
noting that Bonidy had presented evidence that, as a dental assistant, a lack of rest
and lunch breaks could adversely affect the safety of patients, and thus, the public.
Id. So, a source may express a public policy "relating to certain employees' basic
rights," id., so long as denying an employee those rights would increase the risk of
their customers and, by extension, the public.

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of the right establishes it and benefits all [people] .... "). Furthermore,
consideration of a right's public impact should not be examined through too
narrow a lens. Otherwise, this element would swallow the entire public-policy
exception, as any right guaranteed to the public could also be characterized as an
individual matter. For instance, the right to file for workers' compensation could
be cast as the right of an individual worker, not the general public; the right to be
paid for work is the right of the individual worker who performed the work, not
the general public; and the right to take lunch breaks is the right of an individual
worker, not the general public. Yet all these rights have given rise to public-policy
exceptions.

146 Cases from other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that self-defense is
a public right. See, e.g., State v. Merk, 164 P. 655, 657 (Mont. 1917) ("[T]he
possession and exercise of the right of self-defense by the individual are still
deemed to be necessary to personal safety and security and not incompatible with
the public good."). As the Utah Supreme Court noted in a case similar to this one,
"A policy favoring the right of self-defense preserves and protects human
life .... [Such a policy] protects individuals from serious injuries and deters the
completion of crime." Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 627 (Utah 2015)
(footnotes omitted). Similarly, the West Virgina Supreme Court has recognized
that the right to self-defense affects the safety of the public. Feliciano v. 7-Eleven,

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Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 750 (W. Va. 2001). These cases support our conclusion that
section 704 and article II, section 3 both set forth a sufficiently public right affecting
the safety of the broader public.

147 Circle K relies on Hoven v. Walgreen Co., 751 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2014), to
advance its position that self-defense is not a public right. There, the Sixth Circuit
considered a pharmacist's claim that he was terminated for exercising his right to
self-defense. Id. at 784. The court analyzed multiple potential sources of public
policy: the United States and Michigan Constitutions, Michigan's self-defense and
concealed-carry statutes, and a jury instruction. Id. at 785-86. It concluded that
these sources were insufficient under Michigan law to create an exception to
at-will employment because only statutes that directly "confer[red] a right on the
public" could support a claim of termination in violation of public policy. Id.

148 Analogizing to Hoven, Circle K argues that section 704 creates only an
individually applicable exemption from liability. This reliance is misplaced.
Notably, the statute interpreted in Hoven provides that

it is a rebuttable presumption in a civil or criminal case that an
individual who uses deadly force or force other than deadly force
under section 2 of the self-defense act has an honest and reasonable
belief that imminent death of, sexual assault of, or great bodily harm
to himself or herself or another individual will occur . . . .

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.951(1) (West 2026) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).

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149 The holding in Hoven is inapplicable here, however, given the limited extent
of the Michigan statute and Michigan's prohibition on using constitutional
provisions as a source of public policy. 751 F.3d at 784-85 ("The right, if any, that
is conferred is simply the right to present a defense in a criminal case."). Even if
our court's repeated references to the "right of self-defense," see Part II.C, supra,
were set aside, the plain language of section 704 sets out a legal justification for the
use of force, not simply a right to present a defense, see § 18-1-704(1). In sum, the
statutory and constitutional right to self-defense is a generally applicable public
right.

## 3. The Public-Policy Exception Protects Employees from Being Forced to Choose Between Their Safety and Their Employment

150 Finally, we consider whether an employer's firing of an at-will employee for
exercising their right to self-defense constitutes termination based on the
employee's exercise of a job-related right. In Martin Marietta, we explained that
one of the elements to consider in determining if the termination of an at-will
employee violates public policy is whether the action directed by the employer
would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the employee's
right or privilege as a worker. 823 P.2d at 109. Historically, the rights and
privileges that Colorado courts have found to fit this description largely concerned
worker conditions and compensation. See Bonidy, 186 P.3d at 85. Courts have

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deemed these rights and privileges to be job-related insofar as they occur at work
or arise from work. Id.

151 But a provision need not specifically regulate or even mention employment
to give rise to an employee's rights or privileges as a worker. See Martin Marietta,
823 P.2d at 110-11 (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which broadly prohibits
making false representations to the federal government, was related to a plaintiff's
job). As we have recognized, "public-policy wrongful discharge is not subject to
precise definition." Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552. The exception itself is rooted in a
broader principle: the long-standing rule that "a contract violative of public policy
should not be enforced." Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 108 (citing Russell, 95 P. at
938). Based on that fundamental concept, we have recognized that the essence of
the exception is that an employee will have a cognizable claim for wrongful
discharge if their discharge would be "detrimental to the public good." Id.
(quoting Russell, 95 P. at 938).

152 To be sure, at-will employment gives employers broad discretion over the
terms of employment. It does not, however, allow employers to require employees
to commit illegal acts. Id. at 108, 113. Nor does it allow employers to prevent
employees from reporting legal violations or from performing legal duties,
Mariani, 916 P.2d at 526, or from exercising important job-related rights, Lathrop,
770 P.2d at 1375. One broad, unifying principle in cases analyzing the

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public-policy exception-here and across the country -is that an employer may
not use termination to penalize an employee for exercising a constitutional or
statutory right that reflects an important, clearly expressed public policy that
affects the public. See id .; Bonidy, 186 P.3d at 84-85; Herrera, 997 P.2d at 1240; see
also Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 427 (holding that a worker was wrongfully terminated
for filing a workers' compensation claim authorized by Indiana statute). Applying
these principles here, we conclude that an employer may not lawfully terminate
an employee for properly exercising their essential, inalienable right to
self-defense if the employee suffers an unprovoked attack at work.

153 The employment relationship should not be used to strip workers of the
ordinary legal privileges every person possesses. The right to self-defense has
never been cabined by role or location. See Colo. Const. art. II, § 3. It is a unique,
essential, and inalienable right that exists for workers, students, retirees, and the
unemployed alike. It allows people to protect themselves in their homes, schools,
houses of worship, and workplaces under very specifically defined circumstances.
Here, it is the very breadth of the right - of the policy -that informs the analysis.
It makes no sense to suggest that everyone has an inalienable right to defend
themselves if faced with imminent danger, unless they are at work. Rather, the
right follows the employee from home to work and back and everywhere in
between.

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154 Put another way, the right to self-defense is job-related insofar as the need
to lawfully defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can occur at work. Thus,
even though the right to self-defense-constitutional and statutory -does not
explicitly mention workers, it is nonetheless a right guaranteed to workers within
the meaning of Martin Marietta. Under the law, it is an essential, inalienable right
guaranteed to everyone, including people at work. It is not a right that is left at
the door when a person enters the workplace.

155 A central question in the public-policy-exception analysis is whether an
employee is "put to the choice of either obeying an employer's order [in
contravention of public policy] or losing his or her job." Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d
at 109. The exception aims to prevent an employer from leveraging the threat of
retaliatory discharge to compel employees into either illegal conduct or into giving
up their rights or privileges. See id. at 110; see also Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28
(analogizing wrongful termination in violation of public policy to retaliatory
eviction).

156 Self-defense is certainly no less important a right to a worker than workers'
compensation, which is not a "right" at all but which our court of appeals and
other jurisdictions have recognized as giving rise to a public-policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine. Just as permitting employers to discharge
employees for filing workers' compensation claims would undermine the

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workers' compensation system, so too would permitting discharge on the basis of
self-defense undermine the right to self-defense. The choice between a loss of
income-a rippling instability that in some cases may upend a person's entire
life- or enduring a physical attack is exactly the choice of evils the public-policy
exception was meant to prevent. Plus, it is illogical to conclude that an employee
may not be fired for seeking workers' compensation benefits if physically attacked
and injured at work, but the same employee may be fired for defending
themselves from being punched, stabbed, or sexually assaulted. Notably,
however, this does not mean that an employer may not place reasonable
limitations on these broader, societal rights to maintain the efficiency, safety, and
stability of a workplace.

## 4. Colorado Recognizes Constitutional Provisions as a Source of Public-Policy Exceptions to At-Will Employment

157 Finally, we address Circle K's argument that article II, section 3 cannot be a
source of a public-policy exception because the section only protects against
governmental, rather than private, actions. We disagree.

158 Circle K's logic suggests that no provision in Colorado's bill of rights, or
perhaps in the whole constitution, can ever give rise to a public-policy exception
to at-will employment. True, constitutions are, by definition, restraints on
governmental, rather than private, power. People v. Rodriguez, 112 P.3d 693, 695

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(Colo. 2005) ("Colorado's Constitution . .. 'does not comprise a grant of but rather,
a limitation on power."" (quoting Reale v. Bd. of Real Est. Appraisers, 880 P.2d 1205,
1208 (Colo. 1994))); People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 74 P. 167, 186 (Colo. 1903) ("The
[c]onstitution of a state is an instrument of restraints or limitations on legislative
power."); see also United States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251, 260 (Pa. 1805)
(Brackenridge, J., concurring); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska
1970). But this conclusion-i.e., limiting sources of public policy in this specific
context to only those that restrain private, rather than public, action-would
effectively abrogate long-established precedent. See Mariani, 916 P.2d at 524
(identifying sources of public policy including constitutional provisions, ethical
codes, statutes, and administrative regulations).

159 We also decline to follow the analysis in Slaughter v. John Elway Dodge
Southwest/AutoNation, 107 P.3d 1165, 1170 (Colo. App. 2005), where a division of
the court of appeals noted that the plain text of article II, section 3 does not clearly
express a right to refuse drug testing-or indeed even a right to privacy. The
question in Slaughter is a far cry from the question here, particularly given that the
plain text of article II, section 3 explicitly grants "the right of enjoying and
defending [one's life]." Colo. Const. art. II, § 3. And while Slaughter holds that the
Fourth Amendment binds only governmental actors, it draws no analogy between
the Fourth Amendment and article II, section 3. 107 P.3d at 1169-70.

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160 As we have already observed, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hoven does not
change our analysis. Michigan law does not recognize any constitutional provision
as the source of a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
Hoven, 751 F.3d at 784 ("[U]nder Michigan law, constitutional provisions may not
be the source of a claim for termination in violation of public policy against a
private employer."). Because Colorado law recognizes that constitutional
provisions may serve as the basis of public-policy exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine, the Sixth Circuit's analysis is inapplicable here.

## III. Conclusion

161 For these reasons, we answer the certified question by concluding that yes,
both section 704 and article II, section 3 can serve as the basis for a claim of
wrongful termination contrary to public policy.5 To hold otherwise would fatally
undermine that right.

5 We cabin our holding today to exercises of self-defense, as the Colorado
Constitution only establishes self-defense as an inalienable right. See Colo. Const.
art. II, § 3.

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, joined by JUSTICE HOOD, dissenting.

162 Today the majority establishes a new public-policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine grounded in the right to self-defense found in article II,
section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and the justification of self-defense found
in Colorado's Criminal Code in section 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2025). In doing so, the
majority misapplies (and effectively rewrites) our test for public-policy exceptions
established in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992).

163 First, by answering the certified question in the abstract, the majority's
analysis is largely divorced from the underlying facts of this case. The majority's
holding appears to be grounded in its concern that no person should be forced to
choose between their job and their personal safety. Maj. op. 1 40. Yet Circle K
Stores, Inc.'s "Don't Chase or Confront Policy" demands no such choice. Because
the majority answers the legal question without wrestling with important
underlying facts, including the purpose and narrow scope of the employer policy
at issue here, the majority's opinion makes broad pronouncements with
implications for the at-will employment doctrine that reach well beyond this case.
164 The majority reasons that any individual constitutional right is a "public"
right merely because it is an "essential, inalienable right" held by all individuals.
Id. at TT 4, 45. Moreover, it concludes that a constitutional right held by all

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individuals meets the job-related requirement of our Martin Marietta test simply
because a right guaranteed to "everyone" includes "people at work." Id. at | 54.
165 Taken together, the majority's reasoning has startling implications.
Although the majority acknowledges that rights conferred by the constitution
constrain only state action, id. at 1 58, its reasoning means that after today, a private
employer may not lawfully terminate an at-will employee for conduct related to the
exercise of any inalienable constitutional right-even if the employee's conduct
plainly violates the employer's policies.

166 I not only disagree with the majority's reasoning that a constitutional
provision can be the source of a claim for termination in violation of public policy
against a private employer, but I also fear that the practical implications of today's
ruling will tie employers' hands and ultimately undermine workplace safety.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

## I. Summary of the Facts

167 Although we have been asked to address an issue of law, the factual context
giving rise to the certified question here remains important. See In re Phillips,
139 P.3d 639, 647 (Colo. 2006) (Eid, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that a full picture
of the facts can be important context, even when answering a certified question,
because "[f]acts enable the [c]ourt to consider how the doctrine works in context,
rather than in isolation"). On its face, Circle K's "Don't Chase or Confront Policy"

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does not prohibit an employee from acting in self-defense in response to an assault
or the imminent use of unlawful physical force against that employee. Rather, as
its title makes clear, the policy prohibits employees from actively pursuing or
confronting suspected shoplifters. Specifically, the policy instructs employees not
to "confront[,] follow, pursue, track, chase, [or] fight" persons suspected of theft,
but instead to "maintain[] a safe position behind the sales counter" or "go to a safer
area in the back of the store":

CONFRONT & CHASE POLICY
We want you to always have a safe and enjoyable
working experience with Circle K and especially
during any special events and holiday weekends.

So please remember the
"Don't Chase or Confront Policy"

Do not confront follow, pursue, track, chase, fight or follow [inside and/or
outside] any person[s] suspected of shoplifting products and/or cash from the
site, beer runs or any other confrontational situation.

If you observe theft at the site, wait until the person(s) leave the site and call the police
immediately. Remember to try to obtain as much information about the person(s) as
possible while maintaining a safe position behind the sales counter. Do not go outside after
the person(s), if there is any reason you need to go outside for you are to wait at least 5
minutes and have called the police department and verbally spoke to the Store Manager or
Market Manager.

At no time do you come from behind the counter, go to or out the doors to attempt to get
additional information. If you can safely obtain information from where you are standing
that will be sufficient. Stay where you are or go to a safer area in the back of the store. Do
not approach the front doors or go out them. Call 9-1-1 immediately.

At no time do you stop, question or accuse a person(s) of theft.

At no time do you get into a verbal altercation with any customer and/or person(s) you
suspect of theft. At no time are you to go outside after dark! Sun down to sun up!

This policy is for your protection and for the safety of everyone!

If you have any questions or issues, please refer to the 5-Minute Rule of communication or your
MM. Never talk to the media or answer any questions on the immediate situation or any
others.

FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE "DON'T CHASE or CONFRONT POLICY" WILL RESULT IN
IMMEDIATE TERMINATION

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168 In sum, the policy aims to prevent employees from provoking encounters
or escalating situations with would-be thieves that might increase the risk of harm
to both employees and customers. As Circle K points out, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration ("OSHA") specifically recommends that employers
maintain de-escalation policies such as this to guard against workplace violence.
OSHA, OSHA FactSheet: Workplace Violence (2024), https://www.osha.gov/sites/
default/files/ publications/FACTSHEET-WORKPLACE-VIOLENCE.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44SZ-XK3D]. Nothing about Circle K's policy suggests that an
employee would be "fired for defending themselves from being punched, stabbed,
or sexually assaulted." Maj. op. 1 56.

169 Although the majority sets forth Mary Ann Moreno's version of events, id.
at TT 8-9, Circle K views the surveillance video of the incident differently. Circle
K contends it did not terminate Moreno for acting in self-defense but rather,
because she violated the "Don't Chase or Confront Policy" by unnecessarily
confronting Tyler Wimmer, the shoplifter, to try to prevent him from stealing
cigarettes.

170 According to Circle K, as Wimmer walked toward the cigarette display case,
Moreno did not move out of the way, but stood her ground, and in violation of the
policy, confronted Wimmer, saying, "Don't come back here." As Wimmer came
around the counter to take the cigarettes, he moved a knife he was carrying into

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his right hand, away from Moreno. At that point, Moreno took a step toward
Wimmer and positioned herself between him and the cigarettes, while extending
her left arm toward him. Wimmer turned his back to Moreno to reach past her
with his left hand to get to the cigarettes. Moreno then grabbed Wimmer by the
back of the shirt and pulled on his left sleeve and left elbow, trying to pull him
away from the cigarettes and telling him she would call the cops. Wimmer was
quickly able to grab the cigarettes and pull free of Moreno before walking away
from her and leaving the store.

171 In Circle K's view, Moreno had the opportunity to cooperate and limit the
possibility of violence. Instead, in violation of the "Don't Chase or Confront
Policy," Moreno chose to verbally confront and physically engage Wimmer,
elevating the risk of harm to herself and others.

172 These disputed facts will ultimately have to be resolved by a jury, but I note
them because they reveal important context overlooked by the majority when
answering the certified question in the abstract. It is possible that a jury could find
that Moreno was not acting in self-defense during her encounter with Wimmer.
And yet, the majority's decision today broadly nullifies policies like Circle K's by
preventing employers from terminating employees who choose to confront
would-be shoplifters- arguably even when doing so only to defend property and

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not themselves. I fear that employers' inability to enforce such de-escalation
policies will undermine workplace safety.

## II. Analysis

173 In general, employment contracts in Colorado are at-will, meaning that
either the employer or the employee may terminate the relationship at any time.
Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987). In Martin Marietta,
we recognized an exception to this general rule in situations where an employer
terminates an employment contract in violation of public policy. 823 P.2d at 109.
Under the public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, an
employee has a cognizable claim for wrongful discharge if the discharge
contravenes a "clear mandate of public policy." Id. at 107 (quoting Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984)).

174 We have traditionally taken a cautious approach to announcing public-
policy exceptions to at-will employment because "expansive definition[s] of public
policy would be both unwieldy and unpredictable leaving employers and
employees alike without direction as to the contours of the public policy
exception." Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 524 (Colo.
1996). We have emphasized that "[w]e must develop the common law in this area
with care." Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 553 (Colo. 1997).

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Accordingly, we require parties seeking a public-policy exception to meet four
requirements. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109; Mariani, 916 P.2d at 527.

175 Specifically, an at-will employee has a prima facie case for wrongful
discharge under the public-policy exception if the employee presents evidence
that the employer's action interfered with or undermined the employee's job-
related right or privilege as a worker by establishing the following four elements:

(1) the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act as
part of the employee's work related duties or prohibited the
employee from performing a public duty or exercising an important
job-related right or privilege; . . .

(2) the action directed by the employer would violate a specific statute
relating to the public health, safety, or welfare, or would
undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the
employee's basic responsibility as a citizen or the employee's right
or privilege as a worker; . . .

(3) the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to perform
the act directed by the employer[; and] . . .

(4) the employee present[s] evidence showing that the employer was
aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that the employee's
refusal to comply with the employer's order or directive was based
on the employee's reasonable belief that the action ordered by the
employer was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory
policy relating to the employee's duty as a citizen, or violative of
the employee's legal right or privilege as a worker.

Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109 (emphases added).

176 Our test plainly focuses on the infringement of an employee's job-related
right or privilege as a worker. Our case law applying the test confirms this. Id. at

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111; Mariani, 916 P.2d at 526. Moreover, the public policy must be clearly
expressed so it provides "employers and employees" sufficient notice of "the
behavior it requires." Mariani, 916 P.2d at 524-25; see also Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019
CO 23, 11 20-27, 440 P.3d 424, 430-32 (requiring the public policy to offer a "clear
mandate to act (or not act) in a certain way").

177 In addition, the clearly expressed policy must "concern behavior that truly
impacts the public," Mariani, 916 P.2d at 525, rather than an individual's "purely
personal or proprietary interest," Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552. See also Maj. op. 1 30.
178 In sum, to find a public-policy exception to at-will employment, our test
requires a clearly expressed public policy that (1) relates to the employee's rights
or privileges as a worker, and (2) truly impacts the public.

179 The majority correctly recites the test and its factors, id. at [[ 22-23, but then
proceeds to misapply the test to this case, and in doing so, effectively rewrites part
of it. Specifically, the majority holds that article II, section 3 of the Colorado
Constitution and section 18-1-704 clearly express a general right to self-defense
that is sufficiently public and related to an employee's rights or privileges as a
worker. Maj. op. 11 16-17, 44-56. I disagree.

### A. Colorado's Right to Self-Defense Is Not Related to an Employee's Rights or Privileges as a Worker

180 Even assuming for the sake of argument that article II, section 3 of the
Colorado Constitution and section 18-1-704 "clearly express" a right to self-

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defense, neither provision relates to an employee's rights or privileges as a worker.
Article II, section 3 provides that "[a]ll persons have certain natural, essential and
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." These broad,
general rights, which have been part of our constitution since statehood, have no
specific connection to employment. Like other individual constitutional rights,
these rights reflect limitations on government power, not restrictions on private
employers. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2016 CO 29, 1 58, 369 P.3d
573, 585-86 ("[Article II, section 3] protects fundamental rights from abridgment
by the state absent a compelling government interest.").

181 In turn, section 18-1-704 codifies the right to defend one's life against
government intrusion by prohibiting the state from holding a person criminally
liable for acting in self-defense.1 Similarly, section 18-1-706, C.R.S. (2025), creates
a defense to criminal liability for using force in defense of property "to prevent
what [an individual] reasonably believes to be an attempt by the other person to
commit theft, criminal mischief, or criminal tampering involving property." And

1 Section 18-1-704 is codified in article 1, part 7 of the Colorado Criminal Code,
entitled "Justification and Exemptions from Criminal Responsibility."

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section 18-1-704.5(4), C.R.S. (2025), shields "occupant[s] of a dwelling" from civil
liability for acting in self-defense under certain circumstances.

182 Our previous cases finding public-policy exceptions to at-will employment
concerned clearly expressed public policies directly related to rights or privileges
associated with the employee's work. In Martin Marietta, the employee "had a
duty as principal investigator of several NASA projects" to report and control
deficiencies, and the employer's insistence that the employee contravene this duty
was directly related to the employee's job duties. 823 P.2d at 111. The same was
true in Mariani. There, the employer allegedly pressured the employee to violate
a professional ethics rule requiring the employee to "report financial information
fairly and accurately" -a duty directly connected to the employee's work as an
accountant. Mariani, 916 P.2d at 526.

183 Here, the right to be free from criminal liability for acting in self-defense has
no inherent connection to work, and the majority's attempt to argue that it does
has dangerously broad implications.

184 Per the majority, the right to self-defense is job-related because the need to
defend oneself "can occur at work." Maj. op. 1 54. The majority reasons that the
right "has never been cabined by role or location" and "allows people to protect
themselves in their homes, schools, houses of worship, and workplaces." Id. at

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1 53. Therefore, the majority argues, the right is necessarily job-related. Id. at
TT 53-54.

185 I agree that the right to be free from criminal liability for actions taken in
self-defense does apply to everyone, everywhere in Colorado. But a constraint on
governmental prosecutorial power does not make the right to self-defense job-
related, nor does it somehow impose constraints on employers in the context of an
at-will employment relationship. The majority argues that it would be illogical to
allow a public-policy exception for seeking workers' compensation benefits but
not to allow one for acting in self-defense at work. Id. at [ 56. Yet workers'
compensation benefits are inherently connected to work and are directly job-
related. Indeed, such benefits arise only in the context of employment.

186 Nothing about a general right applicable to everyone everywhere renders
that right inherently job-related. In concluding otherwise, the majority misapplies
our test and our precedent.

## B. Article II, Section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and Section 18-1-704 Do Not Establish a "Public" Right

187 Contrary to the majority's insistence, an individual right is not a "public"
right simply because the constitution labels it "inalienable." Id. at 1 45. Our
previous cases on public-policy exceptions to at-will employment have
emphasized that "public" rights are those that "affect[] society at large" and "truly

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impact[] the public." Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552. Rights that affect only "purely
personal" interests cannot justify a public-policy exception. Id.

188 We have recognized public-policy exceptions where employers have
allegedly pressured employees to violate the law and thereby endanger the public.
As mentioned above, in Martin Marietta, a government contractor allegedly asked
an employee to commit fraud on NASA in direct violation of a federal statute.
823 P.2d at 102-04, 110-11. The public impact was plain because lying to
government agencies like NASA could endanger the public and cost taxpayer
dollars. Similarly, in Mariani, a health insurance company allegedly fired one of
its accountants for refusing to make knowing misrepresentations in violation of
professional ethics rules. 916 P.2d at 521-23. There again, the public policy at
issue was both clear and sufficiently public because the ethics rule "ensure[d] the
accurate reporting of financial information to the public" and thereby "allow[ed]
the public and the business community to rely . . . on financial reporting." Id. at
526. In contrast, we rejected the employee's claim in Weissman that a public-policy
exception existed based on the right to take a certain number of rest breaks from
her job as a typist, reasoning that such rest breaks amounted to a personal interest
and did not "truly impact[] the public." 938 P.2d at 552-53.

189 Here, the right to self-defense is similarly personal in that it absolves an
individual from criminal liability in certain circumstances for using force against

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another to defend themselves. This protection against criminal liability solely
benefits the individual; it does not impact the public at large.

190 The majority asserts that the right to self-defense in the Colorado
Constitution is a public right because it is an "inalienable" right. Maj. op. 1 45. It
insists that while an "inalienable right is possessed and exercised by individuals,
its impact is necessarily public." Id. But it fails to explain how. An "inalienable"
right is simply an inherent right that "cannot be transferred or surrendered."
Right, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). That such rights are guaranteed to
all individuals does not, ipso facto, make them "public" rights. Again, our
constitution preserves certain fundamental rights from infringement by the
government, not private actors.

191 According to the majority, examining whether a right is public "through too
narrow a lens" would "swallow the entire public-policy exception" because any
right can be "characterized as an individual matter." Maj. op. 1 45. But the
majority has it backwards. It is the majority's new broad rule that not only rewrites
our test but effectively swallows the public-policy exception entirely.

192 If a right need only be held by everyone to qualify as a "public" right, then
virtually all rights under the law, not just "inalienable" constitutional rights,
would qualify. Perhaps the majority's reasoning rests on some other special
quality of inalienable rights. But without further explanation, we are left to guess.

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193 Finally, although the majority states that "Colorado law recognizes that
constitutional provisions may serve as the basis of public-policy exceptions," id. at
1 60, none of our cases have expressly held this, id. at | 26 (first citing Mariani,
916 P.2d at 524-25; then citing Weissman, 938 P.2d at 553). In Mariani, we discussed
other jurisdictions that rely on constitutional provisions, but we did not adopt any
rule indicating that constitutional provisions may serve as sources of public-policy
exceptions. 916 P.2d at 524-26. In our other two cases on this subject, we never
even discussed constitutional provisions. See Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 104-11;
Weissman, 938 P.2d at 551-53. I cannot agree that a right stemming from the
constitution that limits state action necessarily constrains private employers to the
degree that it may serve as an exception to our doctrine of at-will employment.

## C. The Majority's Reasoning Raises Troubling Legal and Practical Questions

194 Per the majority, section 18-1-704 and our case law collectively define the
contours of the majority's newly recognized public-policy exception to at-will
employment. Maj. op. 11 35, 39. But despite the majority's insistence that its
holding is narrow, id. at 1 5, it cannot escape the breadth of its reasoning, which
gives rise to a number of troubling legal and practical questions.

195 Does the public-policy exception protect employees who act in defense of
third parties? See § 18-1-704(1) ("[A] person is justified in using physical force

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upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person . ... " (emphasis
added)). Presumably so.

196 Does it include a "no duty to retreat" doctrine like that recognized in our
case law? See People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 348 (Colo. 2000). Presumably so.

197 Does it encompass the similarly "inalienable" right to "protect[] property"
also found in article II, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and codified at
section 18-1-706? Presumably so. After all, it shares all the same qualities the
majority relies on to justify importing section 18-1-704's criminal right to self-
defense, with both an expansive constitutional provision and a more detailed
criminal statute supporting it.

198 Taken together, after today, a private employer may no longer terminate an
employee who violates a "Don't Chase or Confront Policy" like Circle K's. And
despite the majority's suggestion that its opinion does not address the ongoing
viability of such de-escalation policies, see Maj. op. 1 10 n.3, today's opinion
effectively nullifies them. The consequence, I fear, will be workplaces that are less
safe. Equally concerning is how the majority's reformulation of the Martin Marietta
test will impact future cases.

199 For example, after today, an employee who is fired for sharing sensitive
business information online about their private employer would presumably have

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a basis for a wrongful termination suit on grounds that the employee was
exercising an "essential, inalienable" right to free speech.

1100 Similarly, an employee who is fired for pulling a concealed weapon on a
suspected shoplifter in the workplace would presumably have a basis for a
wrongful termination suit on grounds that the employee was exercising their right
to bear arms under article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution and
Colorado's Concealed Carry Act, §§ 18-12-201 to -214, C.R.S. (2025).

1101 At a minimum, an employee who confronts and tackles a suspected
shoplifter to prevent them from stealing (risking injuries to the shoplifter, the
employee, and other customers) may not be fired for such behavior. Under the
majority's reasoning, the employee now has a plausible argument that the
"inalienable" right to "protect[] property," Colo. Const. art. II, § 3, coupled with
the right to act in defense of property under section 18-1-706, establishes a public-
policy exception to the doctrine of at-will employment.

1102 Before today, our case law would have indicated that the right to defend
property is a purely personal interest and not one that "affect[s] society at large."
Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552. It would have made clear that public-policy exceptions
must have some direct connection to "right[s] or privilege[s] as a worker." Martin
Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109. But after today, a right need only be "inalienable" to
impact the public and need only be able to "occur at work" to be related to rights

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and privileges as a worker. Maj. op. 11 45, 54. I worry where this new version of
the public-policy exception doctrine will lead us.

## III. Conclusion

1103 Today the majority departs from our previously cautious approach to
public-policy exceptions to at-will employment. Along the way, it dismantles the
important guardrails we placed on this doctrine in Martin Marietta and opens the
door to far more public-policy exceptions, many of which could leave workplaces
less safe. In short, the majority has left the doctrine in precisely the "unwieldy and
unpredictable" place we warned against thirty years ago in Mariani. 916 P.2d at
524. For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.