26 CO 1, 25SA204, In re: Interest of B.J.S. 26 CO 2, 25SA179, In Re: People v. Castorena 26 CO 3, 25SA203, People v. Soron 26 CO 4, 25SA224, In Re: People v. McGee

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
January 12, 2026

# 2026 CO 3

## No. 25SA203, People v. Soron-Physician-Patient Privilege-Child Abuse Exception to Physician-Patient Privilege.

In this interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of certain hospital
records, a police officer's body-worn camera video, and the officer's notes of
proceedings at a hospital, the supreme court concludes that the trial court correctly
determined that (1) hospital records created when the defendant and her deceased
newborn child were found behind a store and taken to a hospital are protected by
the physician-patient privilege and (2) the child abuse exception to that privilege
does not apply because that exception relates only to testimony, not to documents.
The court further concludes, however, that additional findings are necessary to
determine whether the officer's body-worn camera video and notes documenting
treatment that the defendant received at the hospital are protected by the
physician-patient privilege and, if so, whether the legislature has narrowed that
privilege based on other policy interests.

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Accordingly, the court affirms in part and reverses in part the trial court's
suppression order, and the court remands this case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 3

Supreme Court Case No. 25SA203
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court
Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 23CR609
Honorable Natalie Girard Stricklin, Judge

Plaintiff-Appellant:
The People of the State of Colorado,

V.
Defendant-Appellee:
Amanda Ann Soron.

Order Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part
en banc
January 12, 2026

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Amy L. Padden, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District
L. Andrew Cooper, Senior Deputy District Attorney
Centennial, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee:

Megan A. Ring, Public Defender

Gracen W. Short, Deputy Public Defender

Dillon, Colorado

Erin Domaracki, Deputy Public Defender
Centennial, Colorado

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, and JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER joined.
JUSTICE SAMOUR concurred in part and dissented in part.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 In this interlocutory appeal, the People ask this court to reverse the trial
court's order suppressing both Amanda Ann Soron's hospital records and the
body-worn camera video and notes of a police officer who was present in the
ambulance ride to a hospital and during Soron's treatment at the hospital after
police found her and her deceased newborn child behind a store.

12 We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Soron's medical
records are protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the child abuse
exception to that privilege does not apply because that exception relates only to
testimony, not to documents. We further conclude, however, that additional
findings are necessary to determine whether the information contained in the
officer's body-worn camera video and notes is protected by the physician-patient
privilege and, if so, whether the legislature has narrowed that privilege based on
other policy interests.

13 Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's
suppression order, and we remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

## I. Facts and Procedural Background

14
Soron, who was unhoused, gave birth outdoors behind a Lowe's home
improvement store. Temperatures were reportedly below freezing at the time,

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and police found her shortly after the birth under a tarp with the child still attached
to her by the umbilical cord. Soron and the child were transported by ambulance
to Sky Ridge Medical Center, a hospital, where the child was pronounced dead.

15 Greenwood Village Police Officer Diego Moreno accompanied Soron in the
ambulance and then during portions of her stay at the hospital. Although Officer
Moreno did not arrest Soron and told medical personnel that she was not in
custody but rather was in an investigative detention, he donned scrubs and sat in
on a surgical procedure to deliver Soron's placenta. (Soron was sedated during
this procedure.) Officer Moreno's body-worn camera recorded the procedure,
and, while at the hospital, he collected evidence, took photographs, and initiated
a crime scene log in which he recorded the statements that Soron had made to
medical providers.

16
6 Approximately four months later, Soron was arrested and charged with one
count of child abuse resulting in death under section 18-6-401(1)(a) and (7)(a)(I),
C.R.S. (2025), a class 2 felony. The parties then began conducting discovery.

17 The following month, Greenwood Village Police Detective Anthony
Costarella filed an affidavit in support of a request for a court order for production
of records ("POR"). This request sought "all medical-related information about
Amanda SORON's and the deceased female baby's entire hospital visit while at
Skyridge [sic] Medical Center."

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18
The trial court subsequently issued a POR, ordering the hospital to produce
all medical records relating to Soron's and the child's treatment from the time they
were taken by ambulance to the hospital until Soron was released from treatment.
The records ordered to be produced included (1) the entire medical record for
treating Soron and the child; (2) the entire radiological records and films of any
related medical procedures conducted on Soron and the child; (3) all laboratory
and toxicology results related to the medical treatment for Soron and the child;
and (4) all ambulance notes, trip sheets, and doctors' or nurses' notes relating to
the treatment of Soron and the child. The hospital appears to have complied with
the POR.

19 Soron subsequently moved to prevent the People from reviewing her
medical records without a waiver or consent and further requested a veracity
hearing relating to Detective Costarella's above-described affidavit, based on
Soron's allegations that the affidavit contained misstatements by omission.
Shortly thereafter, however, the court referred Soron for an evaluation of her
competency, and in an order issued one month later, the court found Soron
incompetent to proceed and committed her for in-patient restoration to
competency.

110 Almost two years later, while Soron was still deemed incompetent, the court
conducted a review hearing related to Soron's competency. At this hearing,

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Soron's counsel asked the court to rule on Soron's previously filed motion to
prevent review of her medical records. Because the prosecutor of record was not
present at this hearing (another prosecutor was covering for her), the court
scheduled a veracity hearing for two months later.

111 Nine days after the competency review hearing, however, the prosecution
filed a request to deny Soron's motion and to vacate the veracity hearing. Soron's
counsel then filed a new motion requesting that the trial court vacate the POR.
112 In this new motion, Soron's counsel argued, among other things, that the
detective's affidavit had misled the court by omitting the facts that (1) the POR
had implicated Soron's privileged health records; (2) Soron was actively psychotic
and under the influence of hospital drugs at the time she made the statements
quoted in Detective Costarella's affidavit; and (3) without Soron's knowledge or
consent, officers had taped medical procedures that Soron had undergone.
Counsel further contended that because Soron had not consented to the
production of her medical records, the prosecution had obtained those records
illegally and in violation of the POR statute. Counsel thus asserted that everything
that had happened at the hospital, including the medical procedures that were
captured on Officer Moreno's body-worn camera video, was protected by the
physician-patient privilege and that the court should take action to preclude
unauthorized persons from obtaining access to Soron's privileged information.

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Counsel also renewed Soron's request for a veracity hearing to consider the
alleged omissions in the detective's affidavit.

113 The prosecution responded to Soron's counsel's new motion, arguing, as
pertinent here, that the physician-patient privilege did not apply in a case such as
this, in which child abuse is alleged. Soron's counsel then filed a reply, and both
parties submitted supplemental information. Thereafter, Soron was restored to
competency.

114 Upon Soron's restoration to competency, the trial court issued a detailed
written order, granting Soron's motion to prevent review of her privileged medical
information. In so ruling, the court found that the child abuse exception to the
physician-patient privilege did not apply to authorize the production of Soron's
medical records because the exception only authorizes physicians to testify in child
abuse prosecutions. It does not cover documents. The court further found that
the procedures captured on Officer Moreno's body-worn camera video and in his
related notes were for purposes of medical treatment and had been obtained
without Soron's knowledge or consent. As a result, in the court's view, the footage
and notes reflected privileged medical information that the law enforcement
officers had accessed improperly.

115 Based on these findings, the trial court ordered the People to surrender
Soron's medical file to the court for preservation and sealing. The court further

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ordered that the body-worn camera footage should be sealed from the view of
members of law enforcement and the prosecution. And the court ordered the
People to provide a copy of that footage to the court for preservation and sealing.
Having so ruled, the court denied Soron's renewed request for a veracity hearing
as moot.

[16 The People thereafter filed this interlocutory appeal.

## II. Analysis

117 We begin by addressing our jurisdiction over this matter. Next, we set forth
the pertinent standard of review and principles of statutory construction. We then
discuss the applicable law and apply that law to the facts before us, first addressing
the medical records and then the body-worn camera video and related notes.

### A. Jurisdiction

118 Section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2025), and C.A.R. 4.1(a) authorize the
prosecution to file an interlocutory appeal in this court from a trial court's order
granting a defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence under, among other
rules, Crim. P. 41(e) (providing for the suppression of evidence obtained by way
of a warrantless search or an invalid warrant in violation of Fourth Amendment
principles). To obtain interlocutory review, however, the prosecution must certify
to both the judge who granted the motion and this court that the appeal is not
taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence at issue is a substantial part of

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the proof of the charge pending against the defendant. § 16-12-102(2);
C.A.R. 4.1(a); accord People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15, 1 13, 500 P.3d 1075, 1078. The
prosecution has so certified here, but Soron contests our jurisdiction, arguing that
the trial court did not base its order on Fourth Amendment concerns but rather
relied on alleged violations of the physician-patient privilege and the POR statute.
119 Although we acknowledge that Soron's argument finds some support in the
record, we note that in issuing the ruling now before us, the trial court expressly
looked to Crim. P. 41(e), analyzed the questions presented to it in accordance with
the law governing search warrants, and relied on Fourth Amendment principles.
In these circumstances, we conclude that we may properly exercise jurisdiction
over the People's appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1(a).

### B. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

120 A trial court's suppression order presents a mixed question of law and fact.
Thompson, [ 15, 500 P.3d at 1078. Accordingly, on review, we accept the court's
findings of historic fact if those findings are supported by competent evidence, but
we assess the legal significance of the facts de novo. Id. In conducting our review,
we do not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court unless the court's
findings are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. People v. Glick,
250 P.3d 578, 582 (Colo. 2011). We will, however, correct on review the court's
application of an erroneous legal standard or its ultimate legal conclusion, if that

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conclusion is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings. People v.
Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 483 (Colo. 2001).

121 "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we look solely
to the record created at the suppression hearing." Thompson, [ 16, 500 P.3d at 1078.

122 In addition, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People
in Int. of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28, 1 24, 569 P.3d 74, 79. When interpreting a statute, we
seek to discern and effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. In doing so, we apply
words and phrases in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings, and we
consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible
effect to all of its parts. Id. Moreover, we must avoid interpretations that would
render any statutory words or phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical
or absurd results. Id.

123 In construing a statute, we respect the legislature's choice of language. Id.
at [ 25, 569 P.3d at 79. Accordingly, we may not add words to a statute or subtract
words from it. Id.

124 If the statutory language is unambiguous, then we apply it as written, and
we need not look to other rules of statutory construction. Id. at | 26, 569 P.3d at
79.

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## C. PORs and the Physician-Patient Privilege

125 A court may order a POR for records in the actual or constructive control of
a business entity when such records "would be material evidence in a subsequent
criminal prosecution in this state." § 16-3-301.1(2)(e), C.R.S. (2025). A court may
order the POR, however, "only on receipt of an affidavit sworn to or affirmed
before the judge and relating facts sufficient to ... [i]dentify or describe, as nearly
as may be, the records that shall be produced." § 16-3-301.1(3)(a)(II).

126 In its definition of "[r]ecords," the POR statute exempts from the scope of a
POR any records protected by the physician-patient privilege: "'Records' shall
include all documents ... or other information retained by a business entity in
connection with business activity, but shall not include an item that is privileged
pursuant to section 13-90-107, C.R.S., unless the person who possesses the privilege gives
consent." § 16-3-301.1(11)(e) (emphasis added).

127 Section 13-90-107(1)(d), C.R.S. (2025), in turn, sets forth the
physician-patient privilege:

[A] person must not be examined as a witness in the following
cases: . ..

(d) A physician, surgeon, or registered professional nurse duly
authorized to practice his or her profession pursuant to the laws of
this state or any other state shall not be examined without the consent
of his or her patient as to any information acquired in attending the
patient that was necessary to enable him or her to prescribe or act for
the patient, [subject to exceptions not applicable here].

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This privilege recognizes "the inherent importance of privacy in the
128
physician-patient relationship by protecting the confidences once made." Alcon v.
Spicer, 113 P.3d 735, 738 (Colo. 2005). Moreover, the privilege is not limited to
communications with a physician during an examination conducted for purposes
of treatment. Trenshaw v. Jennings, 2025 CO 23, 1 26, 568 P.3d 413, 421. It also
includes observations made by a physician during such an examination. Id. And
the privilege's protection extends beyond in-court testimony and covers the
pretrial discovery of information, including privileged information contained in
medical records. Id. The privilege may protect such information even if it may be
relevant to the subject matter of the case. Id. at | 28, 568 P.3d at 421.

129 The physician-patient privilege is personal to the patient and, thus, may not
be invoked or waived by the physician or a third party. Id. at | 29, 568 P.3d at
421-22. The privilege does, however, have limits. For example, information is
privileged only when it is necessary to enable the physician "to prescribe or act for
the patient." § 13-90-107(1)(d). Accordingly, the privilege does not cover
information obtained by a physician to assist a patient in pending litigation.
Trenshaw, 1 30, 568 P.3d at 422. Nor would it cover a physician's testimony in a
criminal case premised on a blood sample obtained at the request of a law
enforcement officer investigating a defendant's level of intoxication. Id.

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130 In addition to the foregoing limitations, the legislature has carved out an
exception to the physician-patient privilege for testimony relating to child abuse:
"The statutory privilege between patient and physician . .. shall not be available
for excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution for a violation of this section
[i.e., the statute defining child abuse]." § 18-6-401(3) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court has defined "[t]estimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (second alteration in original)
(quoting 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language
(1828)); see also Testimony, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining
"testimony" as "[e]vidence that a competent witness under oath or affirmation
gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition").

## D. Soron's Medical Records

131 Turning then to the facts before us, we initially acknowledge Soron's
contention that the POR at issue was not sufficiently particular and that it was
overbroad. We need not address these concerns, however, because assuming
without deciding that the POR was sufficiently particular and not overbroad, we
conclude that the trial court properly determined that Soron's medical records are
protected by the physician-patient privilege outlined in section 13-90-107(1)(d)
and that those records do not fall within the above-quoted child abuse exception.

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132 Soron's medical records were created during the course of her treatment.
Moreover, although a police officer was present when Soron was transported to
and treated at the hospital, Soron had not been placed under arrest. And there is
no indication in the record before us that the officer directed Soron's treatment for
law enforcement purposes. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Soron's
medical records were created as health care professionals were treating her and
contained information necessary to allow the treatment providers to "prescribe or
act" on her behalf as a patient. Id. Such records therefore fall within the
physician-patient privilege. See id.

133 The question thus becomes whether the above-noted child abuse exception
to the physician-patient privilege applies here. We conclude that it does not.

134 As noted above, the legislature expressly stated that the child abuse
exception applies only to "testimony." § 18-6-401(3). In our view, this language is
plain and unambiguous, and we must therefore apply it as written. B.C.B., 1 26,
569 P.3d at 79. Accordingly, we conclude that the child abuse exception does not
apply to Soron's medical records, and, thus, those records remain privileged.

135 We are not persuaded otherwise by the People's reliance on our opinion in
People v. Christian, 632 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981). Unlike the case now before us, that
case did not involve the admissibility of documentary evidence. Id. at 1036.
Rather, the question was whether the marital privilege applied to bar the

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defendant's wife's testimony in a child abuse case (notwithstanding the child
abuse exception to the marital privilege), given the defendant's argument that his
wife's testimony was unrelated to the issue of child abuse. Id. We concluded that
the exception applied and that the wife's testimony was admissible because if her
testimony was not probative of the child abuse charge, then it should have been
excluded, not on the basis of privilege, but because it was irrelevant or prejudicial.
Id. We determined, however, that the testimony was, in fact, relevant. Id. at 1037.
This reasoning, which concerned a witness's testimony and not documentary
evidence, has no bearing on the issues before us in this case.

136 We further decline the People's invitation to follow decisions in other states
concluding that the physician-patient privilege does not apply in circumstances
involving alleged child abuse. Those cases involved statutory language different
from the plain and unambiguous statutory language at issue here, which, as noted
above, involves only testimony. See, e.g., State ex rel. Udall v. Superior Ct., 904 P.2d
1286, 1288-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that medical records of a juvenile
charged with first degree murder after her newborn child was found deceased
were admissible when the statute excepting criminal prosecutions for child abuse
from the physician-patient privilege did not distinguish between documentary
evidence and testimony); State ex rel. Juv. Dep't v. Spencer, 108 P.3d 1189, 1192, 1195
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that a juvenile charged with child abuse could not

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rely on the psychotherapist-patient privilege to exclude testimony or records of
his treatment when the pertinent statute excluded "evidence" from the privilege
and did not distinguish between testimony and documentary evidence); In re
M.C., 391 N.W.2d 674, 675-76 (S.D. 1986) (concluding, in a dependency and
neglect matter, that the trial court had properly admitted the testimony of the
mother's psychotherapist when the statutory exception to the physician-patient
privilege in proceedings involving child abuse or neglect did not distinguish
between testimony and documentary evidence).

137 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that
Soron's medical records were privileged and properly compelled the People to
surrender those records to the court for preservation and sealing and to destroy
any copies in the People's possession.

## E. Body-Worn Camera Video and Related Notes

138 Having determined that Soron's medical records are privileged, we turn to
Officer Moreno's body-worn camera video and related notes.

139 The trial court concluded that the body-worn camera footage reflected
medical information and, thus, the video and the officer's related notes regarding
Soron's treatment were privileged. The People contend that this was error
because, in their view, the body-worn camera video was not created by medical
personnel but rather was a statutorily required recording created by law

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enforcement and is, therefore, not a medical record protected by the
physician-patient privilege. We conclude that further proceedings are necessary
to decide this question.

140 In People v. Covington, 19 P.3d 15, 22 (Colo. 2001), we observed that the
physician-patient privilege is a statutory creation in derogation of the common
law and that the legislature may narrow that privilege when doing so satisfies an
overriding public policy need.

141 Here, although the trial court concluded that the body-worn camera footage
and the officer's related notes reflected medical information within the scope of
the physician-patient privilege, the court apparently did so without taking any
evidence and without making evidence-based factual findings in support of that
ruling. Moreover, in so ruling, the court does not appear to have considered
whether the statutory requirements governing the use of body-worn cameras,
§ 24-31-902, C.R.S. (2025), evince countervailing public policy interests impacting
the potential applicability of the physician-patient privilege in the circumstances
presented here.

142 Because we believe that the trial court is best positioned to consider these
questions in the first instance, we reverse the portion of the trial court's order
compelling the prosecution to seal the body-worn camera video and to provide
the video to the court for preservation, and we remand to that court the issue of

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the admissibility of the video and the officer's notes, with instructions that the
court conduct the foregoing analysis and make appropriate findings in connection
therewith. We, of course, express no opinion as to how the court should rule after
conducting this analysis.

## III. Conclusion

143 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that
Soron's medical records are protected by the physician-patient privilege and that
the child abuse exception to the privilege does not apply here. We further
conclude, however, that additional findings are necessary to determine whether
the information contained in the officer's body-worn camera video or the officer's
notes is also protected by the physician-patient privilege and, if so, whether the
legislature has narrowed the privilege based on other policy interests.

144 Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's
suppression order, and we remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE SAMOUR concurred in part and dissented in part.

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JUSTICE SAMOUR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

145 I agree with the majority that it was error for the district court to conclude,
without taking any evidence and making factual findings, that Officer Diego
Moreno's body-worn camera footage and related notes reflect medical information
protected by the physician-patient privilege, which is set forth in
section 13-90-107(1)(d), C.R.S. (2025). Maj. op. 1 41. Relatedly, I agree with the
majority that the court mistakenly failed to consider whether the statutory
requirements governing the use of body-worn cameras, § 24-31-902, C.R.S. (2025),
evince countervailing public policy interests impacting the potential applicability
of the physician-patient privilege in the circumstances presented in this case. Maj.
op. 1 41. Because the majority and I are of one mind regarding Officer Moreno's
body-worn camera footage and related notes, I have no further comment on that
front.

146 Where I part company with my colleagues is on their conclusion that the
child abuse exception to the physician-patient privilege hewn in section
18-6-401(3), C.R.S. (2025), doesn't apply to the medical records at issue. Maj. op.
1 31. On this front, I do have something to say.

147 The exception sculpted by the legislature in section 18-6-401(3) provides that
the physician-patient privilege "shall not be available for excluding or refusing
testimony in any prosecution for a violation of this section [i.e., the statute defining

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child abuse]." The majority arrives at today's decision by overtechnically
construing the word "testimony" in this statutory exception to refer literally to "[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact." Maj. op. 1 30 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004),
which in turn quoted 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language (1828)); see also id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024),
which defines "testimony" as "[e]vidence that a competent witness under oath or
affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition").

148 So, what's wrong with giving the word "testimony" this rigid
interpretation? It doesn't reflect the meaning the legislature intended, and it leads
to absurd results. "[A]lthough we must give effect to the statute's plain and
ordinary meaning, the intention of the legislature will prevail over a literal
interpretation of the statute that leads to an absurd result." Cisneros v. Elder, 2022
CO 13M, 1 21, 506 P.3d 828, 832 (quoting AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
955 P.2d 1023, 1031) (Colo. 1998)).

149 The majority's interpretation of "testimony" in section 18-6-401(3) flies in
the face of our jurisprudence. We've long interpreted the physician-patient
privilege to encompass both testimony and medical records.1 Significantly, the

1 Like the majority, when I discuss either a physician's testimony or a patient's
medical records in relation to section 13-90-107(1)(d) or section 18-6-401(3), I mean
privileged information contained within such testimony or records. (The distinction

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title of the privilege statute refers to "[w]ho may not testify without consent" and
makes no mention of medical records. § 13-90-107 (emphasis added). Further, and
equally significant, subsection (1)(d) of that statute (the physician-patient
privilege) refers to the prohibition against a physician being "examined" without
a patient's consent and likewise makes no mention of medical records.
§ 13-90-107(1)(d) ("A physician ... shall not be examined without the consent of his
or her patient as to any information acquired in attending the patient that was
necessary to enable him or her to prescribe or act for the patient .... " (emphasis
added)). Yet, neither the title of the privilege statute nor the language describing
the physician-patient privilege has altered our understanding of the scope of that
privilege as encompassing both testimony and medical records.

150 Just last term, we observed that the physician-patient privilege isn't limited
to "testimony"; it also "sweeps in" the information learned during pretrial
discovery, including information contained in medical records. Trenshaw v.
Jennings, 2025 CO 23, 1 26, 568 P.3d 413, 421. And this was no breaking news.
Rather, it was merely recognition of a longstanding principle rooted in decades-
old precedent. Id. at [[ 25-26, 568 P.3d at 421 (first citing Clark v. Dist. Ct., 668 P.2d

between privileged and unprivileged information in a physician's testimony or a
patient's medical records is laid out in the majority opinion, Maj. op. 1 29, so I
don't repeat it here.)

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3, 11 (Colo. 1983); and then citing Hoffman v. Brookfield Republic, Inc., 87 P.3d 858,
861 (Colo. 2004)). Thus, a review of our case law reveals that we've never held, or
even suggested, that the protective umbrella of the physician-patient privilege
covers only testimony and leaves medical records exposed.

151 Notably, the majority acknowledges that the physician-patient privilege
shields both testimony and medical records. Maj. op. 1 28 (citing Trenshaw, 1 26,
568 P.3d at 421). But the majority doesn't explain its inconsistent treatment of, on
the one hand, "testify" in section 13-90-107 and "examined" in subsection (1)(d) of
that statute, and on the other, "testimony" in section 18-6-401(3). Instead, the
majority completely ignores the elephant in the room: It doesn't so much as
acknowledge our time-honored interpretation of "testify" and "examined" in
section 13-90-107. Absent some indication that it's what the legislature intended,
we may not construe the words "testify" and "examined" in the privilege statute
(section 13-90-107) as applying to both testimony and medical records, while
simultaneously interpreting the word "testimony" in the child abuse exception to
that privilege (section 18-6-401(3)) as applying only to testimony.

152 There is no basis to believe that in enacting section 18-6-401(3) the legislature
intended a partial exception to the physician-patient privilege-one that applies
to only part of the privilege (the part covering testimony, not the part covering
medical records). This is particularly the case given that (1) the legislature used

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almost identical language to define the privilege and the exception, and
(2) although the legislature has amended the privilege statute numerous times in
the last four decades, it has never taken steps to express any disagreement with
our broad interpretation of "testify" and "examined" as embracing both testimony
and medical records. See Bonde v. People, 2025 CO 24, 1 14, 569 P.3d 109, 113
(recognizing that "the legislature is presumed, by virtue of its action in amending
a previously construed statute without changing the portion that was construed,
to have accepted and ratified the prior judicial construction" (quoting People v.
Swain, 959 P.2d 426, 430-31 (Colo. 1998)).

153 Moreover, cabining the exception as the majority does will lead to absurd
results. In construing a statute, we must "avoid an interpretation that leads to an
absurd result." State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 501 (Colo. 2000).

154 Recall that the majority does not dispute that the medical records in question
here are "material evidence in a . . . criminal prosecution in this state." Maj. op.
1 25 (quoting § 16-3-301.1(2)(e), C.R.S. (2025)). Indeed, in many child abuse cases,
the child victim's medical records constitute the most material evidence in the case.

155 After today's decision, how are the People supposed to prosecute a child
abuse case like this one involving a single parent who is suspected of a child
victim's death? Soron has refused to provide consent to allow the People access
to pertinent medical records. True, the People will still be able to obtain the

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treating physician's testimony at trial. But how do the People make decisions
regarding charges, plea bargaining, and trial strategy before hearing what the
physician has to say on the stand midtrial? Additionally, how do the People
comply with their Crim. P. 16 obligations vis-à-vis such testimony? The
availability of a physician's attestations in an affidavit certainly doesn't solve the
problem. Will the People have to rely on an affiant physician to figure out what is
relevant and important to their case from the records? Will the People likewise
have to rely on an affiant physician's memory of the contents of the records for
purposes of accuracy and comprehensiveness? Lastly, how will an affiant
physician know the elements of the charged crime that must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt or what's admissible under the applicable rules of evidence?
156 Given these conundrums, the child abuse exception to the protective mantle
of the physician-patient privilege must reach medical records, not just testimony.
To my mind, there is no support for the majority's decision to elevate form over
substance and hold that in child abuse prosecutions a treating physician may
provide testimony in an affidavit or at trial about the contents of relevant medical
records, but the records themselves must remain off-limits because they are
protected by the physician-patient privilege.

157 I understand that the factual allegations against Soron make this case an
outlier. But today's far-reaching opinion applies just the same to any other child

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abuse case resulting in serious bodily injury or death. And if the defendant in such
a case is a single parent, the People may have a nearly impossible time obtaining
justice for the child victim. No one believes that this is what the legislature
intended. It isn't.

158 I am very concerned that today's opinion will inadvertently throw a monkey
wrench into the prosecution of a large swath of child abuse cases. Mindful that
children are the most vulnerable and defenseless members of our society, the
General Assembly enacted the exception in section 18-6-401(3) because it realized
that a defendant could improperly use the physician-privilege as a sword to
hamper the prosecution of child abuse charges. Today's opinion not only fails to
give effect to the legislature's intent in passing section 18-6-401(3), it unwittingly
cuts the legs out from under it.

159 Because the district court erred, and because the majority's strained
interpretation of section 18-6-401(3) endorses this error, I respectfully dissent in
part. I cannot, in good conscience, join the part of the majority opinion that
upholds the district court's denial of the People's request for relevant medical
records.

160 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
I would reverse the district court's order in its entirety.