Duoc Van Nguyen v. Huyen T. Lai

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
December 8, 2022

2022COA141

No. 21CA0418, Nguyen v. Lai — Family Law — Uniform
Dissolution of Marriage Act — Declaration of Invalidity —
Disposition of Property

In this domestic relations case, appellant wife appeals the

district court’s judgment declaring her marriage to appellee

husband invalid and concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to divide

the parties’ jointly owned property. A division of the court of

appeals holds that the district court’s conclusion that it lacked

jurisdiction over the division of the parties’ property was error and

reverses that portion of the district court’s judgement. Because the

court’s decree of invalidity doesn’t address property division at all,

the division dismisses without prejudice appellant wife’s appeal

concerning the decree of invalidity of marriage for lack of a final

order and remands the case to the district court for further
proceedings with the understanding that it has jurisdiction over the

division of the parties’ property.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA141

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0418
City and County of Denver District Court No. 20DR30226
Honorable Darryl F. Shockley, Judge

Duoc Van Nguyen,

Appellee,

v.

Huyen T. Lai,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART, APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

Announced December 8, 2022

Woody Law Firm LLC, Danae D. Woody, James H. Delman, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellee

Campbell Killin Brittan & Ray, Michael Mirabella, Megan Cronin, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Huyen T. Lai appeals the district court’s judgment declaring

that her marriage to Duoc Van Nguyen was invalid and concluding

that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the parties’ jointly owned

property. We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that it

lacked jurisdiction over the division of the parties’ property and

reverse that portion of the court’s judgement. Based on that

decision, we dismiss without prejudice Ms. Lai’s appeal concerning

the decree of invalidity of marriage for lack of a final order.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 Mr. Nguyen and Ms. Lai were married in November 2017. In

March 2020, Mr. Nguyen filed a petition to declare the marriage

invalid. He alleged that, at the time of their marriage, Ms. Lai was

legally married to another person and that she fraudulently

represented to him that the prior marriage had ended.

¶3 After a hearing, the district court entered a decree invalidating

the marriage. The court found that the marriage was prohibited by

law because Ms. Lai was married to another person when she

married Mr. Nguyen and that Mr. Nguyen entered into the marriage

in reliance on Ms. Lai’s misrepresentations. The court also

determined that Ms. Lai wasn’t eligible for putative spouse status.

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¶4 In its oral ruling (but not in the written decree), the court

indicated that it didn’t have jurisdiction over the parties’ property,

which includes real estate, vehicles, and bank accounts.

¶5 Ms. Lai appealed. After briefing was complete, this court

issued a show cause order questioning the finality of the judgment

because the district court hadn’t entered permanent orders

concerning the parties’ property. Nguyen v. Lai, (Colo. App. No.

21CA0418, Feb. 17, 2022) (unpublished order). And a motions

division of this court dismissed the appeal. Nguyen v. Lai, (Colo.

App. No. 21CA0418, Mar. 18, 2022) (unpublished order).

¶6 Ms. Lai then requested and obtained an amended decree from

the district court. In the amended decree, the court said that “due

to the [i]nvalidity of the [m]arriage, the [c]ourt does not have

jurisdiction over the division of the [p]arties’ jointly owned

property.”

¶7 In light of the amended decree, the motions division granted

Ms. Lai’s petition for rehearing on the order dismissing the appeal

and reinstated the appeal. Nguyen v. Lai, (Colo. App. No.

21CA0418, Apr. 12, 2022) (unpublished order). However, the

division clarified that its order didn’t preclude the merits division

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from addressing the district court’s determination that it lacked

jurisdiction to divide the parties’ jointly owned property and,

depending on the resolution of that question, whether the balance

of the judgment is final and subject to appeal. Id.; see also Chavez

v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 12 (noting that the division of this court

that considers and decides the merits of an appeal is “colloquially”

referred to as the “merits division”).

II. Discussion

¶8 Because the resolution of the issue impacts our jurisdiction,

we must first consider the propriety of the district court’s

conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the parties’ property.

See Spiremedia Inc. v. Wozniak, 2020 COA 10, ¶ 11; see also People

v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, ¶ 9 (“Because we must always satisfy

ourselves that we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, we may raise

jurisdictional defects [on our own], regardless of whether the parties

have raised the issue.”).

¶9 Without explanation, the district court concluded that the

invalidity of the parties’ marriage deprived it of jurisdiction over the

parties’ jointly owned property. However, our legislature has

granted the court this express authority. Section 14-10-111(6),

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C.R.S. 2022, explicitly states that the provisions of the dissolution

of marriage statutes, which allow a court to divide the spouses’

marital property, are applicable to decrees of invalidity of marriage.

See In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 268 (Colo. App. 2010); see

also § 14-10-113, C.R.S. 2022; In re Marriage of Joel, 2012 COA

128, ¶¶ 6, 21. Therefore, a court that declares a marriage invalid is

vested with the same authority to divide the parties’ property

acquired during the invalid marriage as if the court had dissolved a

valid marriage. See Farr, 228 P.3d at 268; In re Marriage of

Dickson, 983 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo. App. 1998) (recognizing that after a

“judgment of nullity,” the district court retained “jurisdiction to

enter orders as to property”); cf. Joel, ¶ 24 (“[A]s to property

acquired after the date of the voided marriage, or as to an increase

in the value of property acquired before the voided marriage, the

most the court may award to the party who engaged in fraud is the

proportion of property or increase in value attributable to the

financial contribution of that party.”) (citation omitted).

¶ 10 Still, at oral argument, Mr. Nguyen contended that the district

court didn’t err because section 14-10-111(6) merely allows the

court to divide the parties’ property; it does not require it. And he

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argues that the court implicitly declined to exercise that authority.

Even if we assume, without deciding, that the court may, within its

discretion, decline to exercise jurisdiction as conferred by section

14-10-111(6), the district court didn’t indicate it had done so here.

To the contrary, it concluded that it did “not have jurisdiction” over

the parties’ property.

¶ 11 Nor are we persuaded that the district court was divested of

jurisdiction after it determined that Ms. Lai wasn’t a putative

spouse. While a putative spouse acquires the rights conferred on a

legal spouse when a marriage is declared invalid, see § 14-2-111,

C.R.S. 2022, nothing in the plain language of section 14-10-111(6)

conditions the court’s authority to address the spouses’ property on

a determination that one of them is a putative spouse, see

Przekurat v. Torres, 2018 CO 69, ¶ 8 (“If the language is ‘plain and

clear,’ then we apply the statute ‘as written.’” (quoting Clyncke v.

Waneka, 157 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Colo. 2007)).

¶ 12 The district court therefore erred by concluding that the decree

invalidating the marriage deprived it of jurisdiction to divide the

parties’ property. See § 14-10-111(6); Farr, 228 P.3d at 268;

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Dickson, 983 P.2d at 47. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the

court’s judgment.

¶ 13 Given our conclusion that the court erred by determining it

lacked jurisdiction to enter orders regarding division of the parties’

property, we are now left with a nonfinal order and must, therefore,

dismiss Ms. Lai’s appeal challenging the decree of invalidity. A final

judgment is “one that ends the particular action in which it is

entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do

in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in

the proceedings.” People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31,

¶ 37 (quoting People v. Guatney, 214 P.3d 1049, 1051 (Colo. 2009));

accord Baldwin v. Bright Mortg. Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Colo.

1988). Absent exceptions not applicable here, we have jurisdiction

only over a district court’s final judgment. § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S.

2022; C.A.R. 1(a)(1); Chavez, ¶ 24; Spiremedia, ¶ 12; see also Cyr v.

Dist. Ct., 685 P.2d 769, 770 (Colo. 1984) (stating the “general rule”

that “an entire case must be decided” to appeal a ruling). If a

judgment is not final, we must dismiss the appeal. See S.X.G.,

¶¶ 11, 20; see also Wilson v. Kennedy, 2020 COA 122, ¶ 6

(providing that our appellate jurisdiction is conferred by statute and

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we have no authority to expand our jurisdiction beyond that

granted by the legislature).

¶ 14 Due to its erroneous jurisdictional finding, the district court

hasn’t issued a final judgment that fully resolves the dispute

between Ms. Lai and Mr. Nguyen; the division of their property

remains outstanding. See In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291,

295 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding that an order not resolving all issues

between the parties can’t be appealed until all final orders are

entered). Without a final order, we lack jurisdiction to review Ms.

Lai’s appeal of the decree invalidating the marriage. See Chavez,

¶ 24; Spiremedia, ¶ 12.

¶ 15 While the parties undoubtedly desire a resolution on the

propriety of the decree of invalidity at this time, they cannot

consent to, or waive, our jurisdiction over the matter when

jurisdiction does not exist. See Arevalo v. Colo. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 72 P.3d 436, 437 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Torkelson, 971

P.2d 660, 661 (Colo. App. 1998). Nor can we confer jurisdiction

upon ourselves. Torkelson, 971 P.2d at 661. We therefore must

dismiss without prejudice the balance of Ms. Lai’s appeal.

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III. Attorney Fees on Appeal

¶ 16 Mr. Nguyen requests an award of appellate attorney fees under

section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2022, arguing that Ms. Lai’s appeal was

frivolous. We decline to award such fees. See In re Estate of

Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 17 We reverse in part, concluding that the district court erred by

determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the parties’ property,

and dismiss in part without prejudice as it relates to Ms. Lai’s

appeal of the decree invalidating the marriage because the decree,

by itself, is not a final judgment. Accordingly, we remand the case

to the district court for further proceedings with the understanding

that it has jurisdiction over the division of the parties’ property.

We, however, express no opinion as to whether the district court

should or must divide the parties’ property, as that issue isn’t

before us or ripe for our review. See, e.g., Tippett v. Johnson, 742

P.2d 314, 315 (Colo. 1987) (appellate courts are not empowered to

give advisory opinions).

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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