People in the Interest of A.V

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 20, 2018

2018COA138

No. 17CA0130 People in Interest of A.V. — Juvenile Court —
Delinquency — Sentencing — Restitution

In this juvenile restitution case, a division of the court of

appeals interprets the juvenile restitution statute, section 19-2-918,

C.R.S. 2018, to conclude that a court does not need to consider or

make findings concerning whether the total restitution amount

would cause “serious hardship or injustice” to the juvenile, contrary

to the holding in People in Interest of A.R.M., 832 P.2d 1093, 1096

(Colo. App. 1992), where another division of this court interpreted

an earlier version of the statute which specifically permitted

consideration of “serious hardship or injustice.”

The division further concludes that the juvenile waived his

causation argument as to the dismissed arson count, and that the

invoices submitted with a victim impact statement constituted
sufficient evidence to support the restitution ordered for that victim.

The restitution orders are affirmed.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA138

Court of Appeals No. 17CA0130
Weld County District Court Nos. 16JD123, 16JD124 & 16JD141
Honorable Randall C. Lococo, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of A.V.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Terry and Navarro, JJ., concur

Announced September 20, 2018

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Christine C. Brady, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Nicole M. Mooney, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-
Appellant
¶1 A.V., a juvenile, appeals the juvenile court’s restitution orders

stemming from a global disposition of several different cases. He

challenges causation and estimated costs in the burglary of the

Country Inn Restaurant, the sufficiency of the evidence in a

dismissed count for burglary of the Animal Attractions Pet Store,

and the absence of specific reasonableness findings concerning

total restitution. We reject his contentions as to the Country Inn

restitution orders and conclude that he waived his causation

argument. We affirm the Animal Attractions order because the

record supports the court’s findings. As a matter of first

impression, in Part V of this opinion, we interpret the juvenile

restitution statute and conclude that amendments occurring in

1996 and 2000, removing the language on which A.V. relies, no

longer require the juvenile court to make specific reasonableness

findings before imposing restitution. Therefore, we affirm the

court’s restitution orders.

I. Background

¶2 In early 2016, a series of home and business burglaries

occurred in Greeley. They all occurred in the same general location,

at night, and several were accomplished by breaking a back door or

1
window. The victim businesses included Boost Mobile Cellular,

Blue Mug Coffee, Taste of Philly, Animal Attractions Pet Store, CG

Vapors, and the Country Inn Restaurant. The Country Inn also

sustained extensive fire damage in the burglary, and the fire

destroyed most of the business.

¶3 Police apprehended A.V. and an accomplice fleeing from one of

the home burglaries. The accomplice confessed and implicated A.V.

When questioned, A.V. admitted being in the backyard of the home

during the burglary and provided details of other burglaries in the

same general area. In particular, he described the burglaries of

Taste of Philly, Blue Mug Coffee, Animal Attractions, Country Inn,

and CG Vapors. He also possessed a lizard from Animal Attractions

and was wearing shoes whose prints matched shoeprints found at

the other burglary scenes.

¶4 During a search of A.V.’s home, police recovered a vape pen

stolen from CG Vapors, two mobile phones stolen from Boost

Mobile, a distinctive backpack and hat that matched those seen on

surveillance video from Taste of Philly, and the lizard. Thereafter,

the prosecution charged A.V. in five separate cases: (1) 16JD123

(Taste of Philly); (2) 16JD124 (Country Inn); (3) 16JD141 (home

2
burglaries); (4) 16JD121 (Animal Attractions and CG Vapors); and

(5) 16JD118 (Boost Mobile). A.V. pleaded guilty to one count in

16JD123, one count in 16JD124, and two counts in 16JD141 in

exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts and cases

16JD121 and 16JD118.

¶5 As part of this global disposition and as relevant here, A.V.

pleaded guilty to second degree burglary of the Country Inn in

exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts, including first

degree arson. In the written plea agreement, A.V. stipulated to a

factual basis and agreed to pay restitution to the victims of the

dismissed counts. Similarly, A.V. pleaded guilty to second degree

burglary in the Taste of Philly case in exchange for the dismissal of

the remaining counts and the dismissal of the Animal Attractions,

CG Vapors, and Boost Mobile cases. He stipulated to a factual

basis and agreed to pay restitution to the victims of the dismissed

counts and cases in the plea agreement.1

1 A.V. similarly resolved other cases, not at issue here, in which he
stipulated to a factual basis and restitution for victims of the
dismissed counts and dismissed cases.

3
¶6 The prosecution requested $682,600 in restitution for the

Country Inn case and $8119.202 for the dismissed Animal

Attractions case. Before the restitution hearing began, the

prosecutor stated his understanding that A.V.’s stipulation to a

factual basis in each case (including the dismissed cases) included

and constituted a stipulation to causation. Defense counsel

responded, “I think that’s the understanding of how things go here.”

Consistent with this understanding, the court took judicial notice of

the court files in each case, including the warrantless arrest

affidavits.

¶7 During argument, A.V. conceded that he owed $470,874.47

(costs incurred to date) in the Country Inn case, which represented

the repair and reconstruction expenses resulting from the arson.

He asked the court to order that amount, and contested only the

estimated costs of $211,759.53 to complete the repairs. As to

Animal Attractions, the prosecution called no witnesses and relied

2 Taste of Philly and CG Vapors did not request restitution, but A.V.
agreed to pay Animal Attractions and Boost Mobile restitution as
part of the plea agreement. Animal Attractions requested $2564.42
and its insurer requested $2938.74. Boost Mobile and its insurer
requested $2616.04.

4
on invoices submitted to victims’ compensation3 for reimbursement.

A.V. argued that these invoices alone were insufficient to establish

an amount owed.

¶8 In a detailed oral order, the juvenile court concluded that the

testimony of Country Inn’s owner, the insurer’s attorney, and the

admitted exhibits established restitution of $1000 to Country Inn’s

owner for the deductible and $681,600 to Country Inn’s insurer for

the repair work. The court found that A.V.’s stipulation to a factual

basis, coupled with the similarities between the Country Inn

burglary and the other burglaries, showed that “[A.V.]’s conduct

more likely than not was the proximate cause of the damage and

the claimed injuries at the Country Inn and that of their insurers.”

¶9 The juvenile court further found that the loss amounts

submitted by Animal Attractions and its insurer in the victim

impact statements sufficiently established the victims’ losses to

order restitution in the amount requested. The court found that

A.V.’s conduct proximately caused the claimed losses based on the

3 Section 24-4.1-105, C.R.S. 2018, permits crime victims to apply
for compensation from the victim compensation board by
submitting documents demonstrating damages.

5
stipulated factual basis and the judicially noticed information in the

affidavits for warrantless arrest.

II. A.V. Waived His Proximate Cause Challenge

¶ 10 A.V. contends that no facts exist to show that he caused the

Country Inn fire and that the prosecution failed to meet its burden

of proving proximate cause for these claimed losses. We conclude

that under the unique facts of this case, A.V. waived his challenge

to proximate cause by (1) stipulating to a factual basis in the plea

agreement and at the providency hearing; (2) stipulating to pay

restitution to the victims of the dismissed counts (in this case the

arson count) in the plea agreement; (3) agreeing with the prosecutor

before the restitution hearing that A.V.’s stipulated factual bases in

all cases included a stipulation to causation; and (4) asking the

court to order $470,874.47 for losses related to the dismissed arson

count.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 A.V. admits that he did not challenge proximate cause in the

juvenile court, but asserts that sufficiency of the evidence may be

raised for the first time on appeal. Relying on section 18-1-409,

C.R.S. 2018, and C.A.R. 4, he reasons that because restitution is

6
part of a sentence and because the statute provides a right to

directly appeal a sentence — including the sufficiency and the

accuracy of the information on which it is based — we should

review his claim de novo.

¶ 12 The People respond that A.V. waived this alleged error. See

People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39. For this argument, they rely

on A.V.’s stipulation to a factual basis in all cases and all counts,

including dismissed cases and dismissed counts, his agreement to

pay restitution to the victims of dismissed counts, and his request

for the court to specifically order $470,874.47 in restitution for the

dismissed arson count. For the reasons described below, we agree

with the People.

B. Waiver Law

¶ 13 “When a party specifically removes issues from a trial court’s

consideration, the party has waived those issues and we may not

review them on appeal.” People v. Geisick, 2016 COA 113, ¶ 16. A

valid waiver requires “that the defendant intentionally relinquish[] a

known right or privilege.” Rediger, ¶ 39; see also People v. Smith,

2018 CO 33, ¶ 17. This approach includes fundamental

constitutional rights. Rediger, ¶ 39; People v. Stackhouse, 2015 CO

7
48, ¶ 8. We must “indulge every reasonable presumption against

waiver,” Rediger, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514

(Colo. 1984)). Therefore, to determine whether a party has removed

an issue from our review, we must examine the conduct (or lack of

conduct) by the party within the context of all the circumstances.

People v. Perez-Rodriguez, 2017 COA 77, ¶ 27 (“To determine

whether the statement ‘no objection’ or even silence should be

characterized as either deliberate or inadvertent, it is necessary to

consider the objection or silence in the context of its

circumstances.”). And, because “[w]aiver is accomplished by

intent,” we focus on whether the right was “known” and whether it

was relinquished “intentional[ly].” Rediger, ¶ 40 (quoting United

States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007)).

In doing so, we are guided by cases that have decided this issue.

Rediger, ¶¶ 46-47 (defense counsel stated he had read the

instructions and was satisfied with them, and this conduct forfeited

rather than waived the instructional error); Smith, ¶ 22 (defense

counsel’s indication that he “accepted” the jury instructions

forfeited rather than waived the instructional error); Stackhouse,

¶ 17 (defense counsel’s failure to object to the known closure of the

8
courtroom during voir dire waived the issue on appeal); People v.

Allgier, 2018 COA 122, ¶¶ 4, 28 (defense counsel’s statement of “no

objection” to the admission of firearms forfeited rather than waived

the CRE 403 appellate argument related to the firearms’ admission);

People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 37 (defense counsel’s agreement

that the evidence was admissible waived the admissibility issue on

appeal); People v. Tee, 2018 COA 84, ¶ 4 (where defense counsel

affirmatively stated that she was not seeking a mistrial at that time,

after two jurors engaged in pre-deliberation discussions, counsel

waived rather than forfeited the issue on appeal); Geisick, ¶ 20

(defense counsel’s argument that the evidence supported lesser

non-included offenses forfeited, rather than waived, a sufficiency

challenge on appeal); People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36, 44 (Colo. App.

2009), aff’d sub nom. People v. Simon, 266 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2011)

(defense counsel’s participation in the formulation of an instruction

waived the instructional error).

C. Analysis

¶ 14 The record in this case reveals that when he entered his plea,

A.V. knew he would be responsible for paying restitution to the

victims named in the dismissed counts, and in particular the arson

9
count. Both he and his attorney signed the written plea agreement

in which he stipulated to a factual basis and agreed to pay

restitution to the victims of the dismissed counts. See McCarty v.

People, 874 P.2d 394, 400 (Colo. 1994) (“[W]here a defendant, as

part of a plea agreement, consents to restitution, he cannot later

disavow the restitution obligation.”); People v. Quinonez, 735 P.2d

159, 164 (Colo. 1987) (“Where a defendant agrees to make

restitution at the time of entering a plea, he cannot later disavow

the agreement on the basis that there was no showing that he had

caused the victim’s injury.”), superseded by statute on other grounds

as stated in Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 44 (Colo. 2009).

¶ 15 We are not persuaded by A.V.’s assertion that the stipulated

facts related only to the burglary count, to which he pleaded guilty,

and not to the dismissed counts. The language in the plea

agreement does not contain this limitation, nor did the court’s

discussion with him. Indeed, during the providency hearing, the

juvenile court said, “You understand you do not have to plead guilty

to anything, you can say not guilty, I didn’t do it, or I want my day

in court?” and A.V. responded, “Yeah.” Then, before imposing

sentence, the court reiterated that “[a]ny victims on dismissed

10
counts in individual cases are included in the plea that was made

in each of those cases, specifically on the [Country Inn] case,

dismissed counts 2 through 4. Victims identified there are included

in his plea to Count 1.” Neither A.V. nor his attorney expressed any

disagreement with this statement or offered to correct it. See People

v. DiGuglielmo, 33 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Colo. App. 2001) (explaining

that a defendant must request clarification from the court rather

than assert on appeal that he or she was confused at the

providency hearing); cf. People v. Randolph, 852 P.2d 1282, 1283-84

(Colo. App. 1992) (Because the defendant was convicted of theft by

receiving, “was not charged with any offense relating to the other

property,” and the “record is devoid of evidence establishing

defendant’s involvement in the theft of the personal property,” it

was error to impose restitution for missing items.).

¶ 16 Still, under our waiver jurisprudence, simply stipulating to a

factual basis may be insufficient to waive causation where the issue

of causation is not specifically identified or discussed. Allgier, ¶ 10

(proposing six possible explanations for counsel’s statement of “no

objection”). So we look further. The record reveals that the

prosecutor provided timely notice of the restitution amounts

11
requested, and A.V. does not claim otherwise. Indeed, because of

the large amount requested in the Country Inn case, defense

counsel told the court it was unlikely that she and the prosecutor

could reach a resolution without a restitution hearing.

¶ 17 Importantly, at the hearing and before presenting any

evidence, the prosecutor clarified his understanding that A.V.’s

stipulation to a factual basis included a stipulation to causation. In

our view, this clarification and defense counsel’s affirmative

response that this was also her understanding constituted more

than general acquiescence or a failure to object — it established

A.V.’s counsel’s knowledge that causation was an issue that was

not being contested (or proved by the prosecution) at the restitution

hearing. See Kessler, ¶ 37 (finding that defense counsel’s

concession that evidence was admissible waived the ability to

contest admissibility on appeal). We can think of no other reason

for the prosecutor to raise this issue before the hearing except to

clarify the scope of his burden of proof at the hearing.

¶ 18 Finally, any possible question that causation remained an

issue was dispelled by defense counsel’s concession (i.e., intentional

relinquishment) during argument that A.V. owed $470,874.47 for

12
the arson-related damages and her specific request that the court

order restitution in this amount. Counsel never argued that A.V.

had not caused the fire and did not otherwise hedge her restitution

request based on an objection to paying any restitution.

Accordingly, in light of all the circumstances, we conclude that A.V.

waived any challenge to causation and that we have nothing to

review in that regard.

III. Estimated Repair Costs are Part of Restitution

¶ 19 A.V. next contends that the juvenile court erroneously ordered

him to pay the estimated repair costs to Country Inn’s insurer. He

argues that this amount is speculative and that he should only be

obligated to pay for expenses incurred to date. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 We review a trial court’s restitution order for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Henry, 2018 COA 48M, ¶ 12. A court abuses

its discretion when it misconstrues or misapplies the law, or its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. We

will not disturb the court’s determination of restitution if it is

supported by the record. Id.

13
¶ 21 We review and interpret statutes de novo. People v. Padilla-

Lopez, 2012 CO 49, ¶ 7; People v. McLain, 2016 COA 74, ¶ 9. When

construing statutes, we aim to ascertain and give effect to the intent

of the General Assembly. Padilla-Lopez, ¶ 7. We accord words and

phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. “Where the

language is clear, it is not necessary to resort to other tools of

statutory construction.” Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017

CO 13, ¶ 17.

¶ 22 Restitution in juvenile cases is governed by the adult

restitution statute. People in Interest of D.I., 2015 COA 136, ¶ 9.

“Restitution” is “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim,” including

but not limited to certain enumerated types of losses “and other

losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and

that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”

§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2018.

¶ 23 Offenders are required to pay “full restitution” to victims

harmed by their misconduct. § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018. This

includes recovery of the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the victim

as a direct result of the defendant’s conduct, including “anticipated

future expenses.” See § 18-1.3-602(3)(a). One purpose of

14
restitution is to make the victim whole to the extent practicable.

People v. Courtney, 868 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Colo. App. 1993). Other

purposes include rehabilitation, deterring future criminality, and

reducing the financial burden on victims and their families, as well

as compensating them for their losses. § 18-1.3-601(1)(c)-(g). The

restitution statute must be liberally construed to accomplish these

goals. § 18-1.3-601(2).

¶ 24 A court bases its restitution order on information provided by

the prosecuting attorney. § 18-1.3-603(2), C.R.S. 2018. The

prosecution bears the burden of proving the amount of restitution

owed by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Vasseur, 2016

COA 107, ¶ 15. The defendant must have the opportunity to

contest the amount of the victim’s loss, but the court need not

“conduct a mini-trial on the issue of damages.” People v. Johnson,

780 P.2d 504, 507 (Colo. 1989); accord Vasseur, ¶ 15. More than

speculation is required for a defendant to bear responsibility for a

victim’s loss. People v. Stafford, 93 P.3d 572, 576 (Colo. App. 2004).

But the prosecution is not required to prove restitution by the same

quality of evidence required in a trial on the merits of the case.

People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429, 433 (Colo. App. 2005).

15
B. Analysis

¶ 25 At the hearing, Country Inn’s owner described his insurance

policy, with its $1000 deductible, and his belief that the policy limit

for repairs was $410,000. Yet, the insurer’s attorney and the

uncontested documentary evidence showed that the insurer had

paid $470,874.47 in repair expenses as of the date of the hearing.

The attorney testified that the insurer had obtained an estimate of

$683,000 to perform all required repair work and that the insurer

intended to cover repair costs up to that estimated amount.

¶ 26 When challenged on the accuracy of the estimate, the attorney

admitted that it was based on industry standards and that actual

costs could be different. He described this difference as a “cost of

doing business as a construction company” and said any

differences would be absorbed by the construction company and

not the insured.

¶ 27 During argument, A.V.’s counsel asked the court to order

restitution only in the amount paid to date. In particular, she

argued that the balance to complete the repairs existed only as a

number in an exhibit, that the insurer’s attorney “had no idea what

[the] policy limits were,” “couldn’t testify to what amount out of

16
what had been paid,” and did not know “whether the [estimate] was

going to be the exact amount.” She reasoned that the inaccuracy of

the estimate would create a windfall for the insurance company.

¶ 28 Relying on the owner’s testimony, the attorney’s testimony,

and two exhibits, the juvenile court found that, without considering

depreciation, the total cost of repairing Country Inn would be in

excess of $800,000. But, considering the depreciation, the insurer

agreed to pay $687,365 and had $683,000 in reserves. The court

rejected A.V.’s inaccuracy argument and found that estimates “are

permitted in restitution claims and may be considered by [the court]

for purposes of restitution.” Thereafter, it ordered A.V. to pay

$681,6004 to the insurer and $1000 to the owner.

¶ 29 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s order because

the record supports it. As the fact finder, the court had the

authority to determine the weight of the evidence, the witnesses’

credibility, and ultimately the accuracy of the estimate. See People

v. Leonard, 167 P.3d 178, 182 (Colo. App. 2007); cf. People v.

Henson, 2013 COA 36, ¶¶ 18-19 (evidence, including a victim’s

4 This reflects the $683,000 minus the $1000 deductible and $400
in attorney fees.

17
testimony, that supported lost wages was “somewhat thin and

unclear” but sufficient to support lost wage finding). Moreover, the

court correctly found that it had the legal authority to consider

estimated costs. See § 18-1.3-602(3)(a) (restitution includes

“anticipated future expenses”); Stafford, 93 P.3d at 576 (concluding

that witness testimony concerning company’s total expenses

incurred as a result of the defendant’s theft was sufficient to

support a restitution order); Courtney, 868 P.2d at 1128 (explaining

how the victim’s estimate of the value of tools inside his stolen car

was sufficient to support restitution for lost tools). And the record

demonstrates that A.V. thoroughly cross-examined the attorney on

the accuracy of the estimates.

¶ 30 Once the prosecution presented competent evidence of the

estimated expenses, A.V. could have rebutted the estimate by

offering evidence of its inaccuracy. People v. Miller, 830 P.2d 1092,

1094 (Colo. App. 1991) (“[I]f the defendant fails to show that the

information is inaccurate or untrue, the trial court is entitled to rely

upon the report or statement as submitted.”). Because he did not,

the juvenile court properly relied on the evidence presented and

imposed restitution for the total amount of the repairs. Therefore,

18
we affirm its restitution order with respect to the Country Inn

losses.

IV. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Animal Attractions Order

¶ 31 A.V. next contends that the invoices submitted with Animal

Attractions’ victim impact statement were insufficient to establish

restitution and that the prosecution was required to present

witness testimony to satisfy its burden. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Law

¶ 32 A.V. preserved this issue when he objected to the court’s order

absent witness testimony. We review sufficiency challenges de

novo. People v. Barbe, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 25; People v. Ortiz, 2016

COA 58, ¶ 26. We determine “whether the evidence is sufficient in

both quality and quantity to satisfy the applicable burden of proof.”

Ortiz, ¶ 26.

¶ 33 To meet its burden of proof, a prosecutor may rely solely on

victim impact statements. See § 18-1.3-603(2); People v. Hill, 296

P.3d 121, 126 (Colo. App. 2011). The court may also order

restitution for victims not named in the counts reflected in the

judgment of conviction. People v. Foos, 2016 COA 139, ¶ 21; People

v. Steinbeck, 186 P.3d 54, 60 (Colo. App. 2007) (restitution statute

19
does not require the defendant be charged with a specific act to be

ordered to pay restitution); People v Armijo, 989 P.2d 224, 227

(Colo. App. 1999) (explaining that the restitution statute does not

authorize an award of restitution to persons not designated in the

charge, unless the defendant agrees to pay such restitution); see

also United States v. Thompson, 39 F.3d 1103, 1104 (10th Cir.

1994) (holding that where the defendant agreed to pay full

restitution in exchange for the dismissal of forty-seven counts, it

was proper to order full restitution).

B. Analysis

¶ 34 Before the restitution hearing, Animal Attractions submitted a

victim impact statement requesting $2564.42 for its losses not

covered by insurance. Its insurer requested $2938.74 for the

money it had paid out. Attached to the statement were sales

receipts documenting the money stolen from the safe and the

damage to the back door, as well as a statement from its insurer

documenting the costs related to lost terrariums and reptiles, and

damage to the security cameras and monitor, safe, pet supplies,

register, and clean up.

20
¶ 35 Contrary to A.V.’s argument, we are not persuaded that People

v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010), where a division of this

court affirmed a restitution order based on documents and a

witness statement at sentencing, required the juvenile court to

receive testimony before ordering restitution here. First, nothing in

Rivera or in the plain language of the restitution statute requires

the prosecution to present evidence in the form of testimony. § 18-

1.3-603(2) (“The court shall base its order for restitution upon

information presented to the court by the prosecuting

attorney . . . .”); see also Vasseur, ¶¶ 18-22 (the right of

confrontation and the rules of evidence do not apply in a restitution

proceeding). To the contrary, the prosecution may rely solely on

documentary evidence to meet its burden. See, e.g., People v.

Stanley, 2017 COA 121, ¶¶ 7-9 (ordering restitution based on

documents only); People v. Welliver, 2012 COA 44, ¶ 6 (court was

justified in relying on two documents attached to the presentence

report in determining the amount of restitution); People v.

Brockelman, 862 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Colo. App. 1993) (victim impact

statement and police report established a basis for an order of

restitution). And when the prosecutor here submitted documents to

21
support his request, the burden shifted to A.V. to show that the

requested amount was incorrect. See Miller, 830 P.2d at 1094

(absent evidence the information is incorrect, the trial court can rely

on evidence submitted by the prosecutor). Because the documents

support the court’s order and A.V. offered no rebuttal evidence, we

conclude that the court’s order was not an abuse of discretion and

affirm it.

V. No Specific Reasonableness Findings Are Required

¶ 36 Relying on section 19-2-918(2), C.R.S. 2018, and People in

Interest of A.R.M., 832 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1992), A.V. last

contends that the juvenile court was required to make specific

reasonableness findings before ordering restitution and that

$692,806.20 is not a reasonable amount of restitution to be

awarded against an incarcerated juvenile. Because the General

Assembly has twice amended the version of the statute interpreted

by A.R.M., we conclude that A.R.M.’s holding is not relevant here

and that no abuse of discretion occurred.

¶ 37 The current juvenile restitution statute provides as follows:

(1) If the court finds that a juvenile who . . . is
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent has damaged
the personal or real property of a victim, that

22
the victim’s personal property has been lost, or
that personal injury has been caused to a
victim as a result of the juvenile’s delinquent
act, the court, in addition to any other
sentence or commitment that it may impose on
the juvenile pursuant to section 19-2-907,
shall enter a sentencing order requiring the
juvenile to make restitution as required by
article 18.5 of title 16 and part 6 of article 1.3
of title 18, C.R.S.

(2) Restitution shall be ordered to be paid in a
reasonable manner, as determined by the
court and in accordance with article 18.5 of
title 16 and part 6 of article 1.3 of title 18,
C.R.S.

§ 19-2-918. A.V. relies on the “reasonable manner” language and

A.R.M. to argue that a court is required to make specific,

on-the-record findings about the reasonableness of the restitution

amount and the reasonableness of repayment terms, considering

whether the restitution would cause serious hardship or injustice to

the juvenile. He further argues that a court should consider the

family’s circumstances and the juvenile’s potential ability to pay

after his release from incarceration.

¶ 38 In A.R.M., the juvenile argued that the statute required the

court to consider his ability to pay restitution, and that since he

was incarcerated and unable to pay anything, the order should be

23
vacated. 832 P.2d at 1096. A division of this court disagreed,

noting that the juvenile system has a strong interest in

“encouraging the juvenile to be responsible for the damage he has

caused,” and so “wherever possible, restitution should be required.”

Id. It held that a court could order restitution for an incarcerated

juvenile. Id. However, it further held that,

at the time restitution is ordered, the court
must make findings of the reasonableness of
the restitution amount and the reasonableness
of the repayment terms. In considering
whether restitution would cause serious
hardship or injustice to the juvenile, the court
may consider family circumstances as well as
the juvenile’s potential ability to pay after his
release from incarceration.

Id.

¶ 39 While we have no disagreement with the division’s logical

interpretation of the juvenile restitution statute in A.R.M., we are

precluded from following it because the General Assembly has

amended the statute twice to remove the language on which A.R.M.

relied. The version of the statute interpreted by A.R.M. provided

that

[i]f the court finds that a juvenile who receives
a deferral of adjudication or who is adjudicated
a juvenile delinquent has damaged the

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personal or real property of a victim, that the
victim’s personal property has been lost, or
that personal injury has been caused to a
victim as a result of the juvenile’s delinquent
act, the court shall enter a sentencing order
requiring the juvenile to make restitution for
actual damages done to persons or property;
except that the court shall not order restitution
if it finds that monetary payment or payment in
kind would cause serious hardship or injustice
to the juvenile. Such order shall require
payment of insurers and other persons or
entities succeeding to the rights of the victim
through subrogation or otherwise, if
appropriate. Restitution shall be ordered in a
reasonable amount to be paid in a reasonable
manner, as determined by the court.

§ 19-2-703(4), C.R.S. 1991 (emphasis added).

¶ 40 In 1996, the General Assembly relocated and amended the

statute, removing the “in a reasonable amount” language. See Ch.

288, sec. 9, § 19-2-918, 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1782. Four years

later, it amended the statute again and removed the exception

language that precluded restitution if it “would cause serious

hardship or injustice to the juvenile.” Ch. 232, sec. 2, § 19-2-918,

2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 1041-42.

¶ 41 We conclude that these deletions reflect the General

Assembly’s intent to remove ability to pay and hardship from a

juvenile court’s consideration when ordering restitution. McLain,

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¶ 9 (when statutory language is clear we look no further). In doing

so, we recognize the harsh result of our interpretation in this case,

and its arguable inconsistency with other legislative enactments in

recent years aimed at diminishing the punitive aspects and

increasing the rehabilitative aspects of juvenile sentencing. See,

e.g., § 19-2-102(1), C.R.S. 2018 (explaining that the intent of the

juvenile system includes consideration of the “best interests of the

juvenile”); § 19-2-402(1)(c), C.R.S. 2018 (limiting juvenile detention

for juveniles between ten and thirteen years old); Ch. 128, sec. 1,

§ 19-2-517, 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 439-40 (raising the age of direct-

filing from fourteen to sixteen); see also People in Interest of J.S.R.,

2014 COA 98M, ¶ 31 (“[U]nlike the adult criminal justice system,

the purpose of the juvenile system is primarily rehabilitative, not

punitive.”). Nevertheless, we are bound by the statute’s plain

language, which mandates that the juvenile court order full

restitution for the victims’ losses. See Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 218,

221 (Colo. 2004) (“There is a presumption that the word ‘shall’ when

used in a statute is mandatory.”). Accordingly, we affirm the court’s

orders.

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VI. Conclusion

¶ 42 The orders of restitution are affirmed.

JUDGE TERRY and JUDGE NAVARRO concur.

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