Marriage of Vasquez

25CA1442 Marriage of Vasquez 06-25-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1442
Weld County District Court No. 24DR30138
Honorable Jayme Muehlenkamp, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Luis Carlos Villalobos Vasquez,

Appellee,

and

Diana Mendoza,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 25, 2026

Zane M. Pic, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Antommaria Ilevska Elder, LLC, Amy Antommaria, Greeley, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case, Diana Mendoza (wife)

appeals the district court’s order denying her motion for

postjudgment relief. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Wife married Luis Carlos Villalobos Vasquez (husband) in

2008. Husband petitioned to dissolve the marriage in 2024.

¶3 The parties consented to a district court magistrate hearing

their case. After holding a hearing, the magistrate issued

permanent orders on April 25, 2025. As relevant to this appeal, the

magistrate

• allocated a property located in Milliken that was

encumbered by a mortgage and a line of credit to wife;

• allocated a property located in La Salle that was

encumbered by a mortgage to husband;

• allocated a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado that was

encumbered by debt to husband;

• allocated a trailer with a power washer (collectively, the

power washer) that was encumbered by debt to husband;

• found that a 2011 GMC Denali wasn’t part of the marital

estate because “Husband transferred the vehicle to

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Husband’s Father in Mexico” before filing the petition;

and

• ordered wife to pay a $45,000 equalization payment to

husband because the magistrate determined that wife

had been allocated property worth approximately

$168,000 while husband had been allocated property

worth approximately $60,000.

¶4 The permanent orders also stated: “Review of this order is

subject to C.R.M. 7(b) and the Colorado Rules of Appellate

Procedure.”

¶5 On May 9, 2025, wife filed a “motion to correct clerical mistake

in division of assets and debts pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(a).” She

argued that the magistrate committed multiple clerical mistakes in

valuing and allocating property in the permanent orders and

requested that the magistrate revise the equalization payment or

remove the requirement that wife transfer investments to husband.

Wife didn’t file any motion under C.R.C.P. 59 or C.R.C.P. 60(b).

¶6 The magistrate denied wife’s motion on July 15, 2025,

explaining that wife’s “assertions are requests for reconsideration of

the [c]ourt’s order or disagreements with the [c]ourt’s findings and

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conclusions,” not “clerical errors.” Wife filed her notice of appeal

twenty days later, on August 4, 2025.

II. Discussion

¶7 On appeal, wife contends that the magistrate erred by denying

her Rule 60(a) motion, arguing that she identified clerical mistakes

in the permanent orders that the magistrate should have corrected.

We disagree.

A. Jurisdiction

¶8 As a preliminary matter, we address husband’s contention

that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Shortly after wife filed

her notice of appeal, husband moved to dismiss wife’s appeal,

arguing that she didn’t timely appeal the permanent orders. The

motions division of this court deferred a ruling on that motion to

us. We now deny husband’s motion and reject his argument that

we lack jurisdiction.

¶9 Rule 60(a) permits a court to correct a clerical mistake in an

order “at any time.” And, at all relevant times to this appeal, a

magistrate couldn’t consider most postjudgment motions but did

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have the authority to correct clerical mistakes under Rule 60(a).1

See C.R.M. 5(a) (2025) (“Except for correction of clerical errors

pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(a), a magistrate has no authority to

consider a petition for rehearing.”); In re Marriage of James, 2023

COA 51, ¶ 19 (“[E]ven where a magistrate’s actions require the

parties’ consent, C.R.M. 5(a) prohibits the magistrate from

entertaining C.R.C.P. 59 postjudgment motions.”).

¶ 10 We therefore conclude that, while the magistrate couldn’t rule

on a postjudgment motion that challenged the substance of the

permanent orders, the magistrate did have authority to rule on

wife’s Rule 60(a) motion that asserted clerical mistakes. And wife

timely appealed the magistrate’s denial of her Rule 60(a) motion.

See C.R.M. 7(b) (2025) (an order entered with the parties’ consent

when such consent is necessary “shall be appealed pursuant to the

Colorado Rules of Appellate Procedure”); C.A.R. 4(a)(1) (appellant

must file notice of appeal within forty-nine days after entry of the

1 The Colorado Rules for Magistrates recently underwent significant

amendments for magistrate orders issued on or after January 2,
2026. See Rule Change 2025(18), Colorado Rules for Magistrates
(Amended and Adopted by the Court En Banc, Sep. 4, 2025),
https://perma.cc/S7P6-9RVS. We cite the pre-amendment version
of the rules in effect at the time of the events at issue.

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order being appealed). As a result, we have jurisdiction to review

the magistrate’s denial of wife’s Rule 60(a) motion. See In re

Marriage of Buck, 60 P.3d 788, 790 (Colo. App. 2002) (permitting

husband to appeal court’s order that ruled on wife’s Rule 60(a)

motion).

¶ 11 We aren’t convinced otherwise by husband’s argument that

wife’s Rule 60(a) motion was “in actuality” a motion for

reconsideration that the magistrate lacked authority to consider. In

the July 15 order, the magistrate treated wife’s motion as one that

asserted clerical mistakes and concluded that she hadn’t identified

any. We do the same.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(a) motion for an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1212

(Colo. App. 2006). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See id. We presume

the court’s judgment is correct; the party seeking to alter the

judgment bears the burden of overcoming that presumption.

Carlson v. Benton, 701 P.2d 156, 158 (Colo. App. 1985).

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¶ 13 Rule 60(a) allows the court to avoid enforcing an honestly

mistaken judgment that is “not in accord with the expectations and

understanding of the court and the parties.” Buck, 60 P.3d at 789;

see also Diamond Back Servs., Inc. v. Willowbrook Water &

Sanitation Dist., 961 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Colo. App. 1997) (Relief

under Rule 60(a) “is limited to cases in which the trial court

originally intended to make the award granted by corrective

amendment.”). The rule isn’t meant to encompass “a relitigation of

matters which have already been decided.” Diamond Back, 961

P.2d at 1137.

C. Analysis

¶ 14 Wife contends that the magistrate committed clerical mistakes

by

• using the mortgage payoff amount, rather than the

mortgage principal balance, to calculate the equity in the

La Salle property even though it used the mortgage

principal balance to calculate the Milliken property’s

equity;

• using an outdated debt figure when valuing the 2021

Chevrolet Silverado and the power washer;

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• valuing the power washer without identifying “where [the

magistrate] got the numbers from,” asserting the

valuation was “starkly different from what each party

presented”; and

• removing the 2011 GMC Denali from the marital property

division.

¶ 15 We conclude that none of wife’s alleged errors constitutes a

clerical mistake redressable under Rule 60(a).

¶ 16 As to the real property, wife doesn’t support her argument that

the magistrate used different methodologies when valuing the La

Salle and Milliken properties with citations to the record. See

Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 COA 57, ¶ 18 (“We

generally decline to address arguments presented to us in a

conclusory manner that are lacking citations to any supporting

authority.”), aff’d, 2018 CO 39; C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (requiring

appellant’s opening brief to contain, among other things, citations

to “parts of the record on which the appellant relies”). For example,

she doesn’t identify the point in the permanent orders hearing that

she (1) presented her asserted mortgage principal balance

($419,050) on the La Salle property to the magistrate or (2) argued

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that the magistrate should use it. We fail to see how a court could

commit a clerical mistake by declining to use a value that the

parties never advocated for or presented. See Town of De Beque v.

Enewold, 606 P.2d 48, 54 (Colo. 1980) (court’s omission of findings

that were never presented to it wasn’t a clerical mistake).

¶ 17 Even if wife had properly presented the mortgage principal

balance to the magistrate, wife appears to be challenging the

magistrate’s valuation methodology and arguing that the magistrate

should have relied on different evidence. But those challenges don’t

allege clerical mistakes that are redressable under Rule 60(a). See

Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 51 P.

496, 501 (Colo. 1897) (court’s alleged mistake in using the “wrong

formula” wasn’t a clerical mistake); see also McNickle v. Bankers

Life & Cas. Co., 888 F.2d 678, 682 (10th Cir. 1989) (“A correction

under Rule 60(a) should require no additional proof.”).

¶ 18 Similarly, wife doesn’t provide any legal support for her

assertion that the magistrate committed a clerical mistake by

valuing the Chevrolet Silverado and the power washer based on

outdated debt statements. See Fisher, ¶ 18. And she doesn’t

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identify when she presented her preferred debt figures to the

magistrate. See Town of De Beque, 606 P.2d at 54.

¶ 19 Instead, wife’s argument again rings of disagreement with the

evidence relied on by the magistrate. See In re Marriage of Lewis,

66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2004). Her request that the

magistrate amend her findings based on that evidence should have

been brought under Rule 59(a) rather than Rule 60(a). See C.R.C.P.

59(a)(3) (party may move for “[a]mendment of findings”). And her

contention that the magistrate erred in applying section 14-10-

113(5), C.R.S. 2025, which directs courts to value property at the

earlier of the date of the hearing or the date of the decree, also

doesn’t allege a clerical mistake under Rule 60(a). See Weize Co. v.

Colo. Reg’l Constr., Inc., 251 P.3d 489, 499 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[T]he

trial court’s reliance on C.R.C.P. 60(a) was erroneous because the

correction was based on its statutory interpretation, not on a

clerical mistake.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Ch. 279,

sec. 1, 2011 Colo. Sess. Laws 1249-50; see also Warner v. City of

Bay St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1976) (Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(a) doesn’t apply to errors of law).

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¶ 20 As to the power washer, wife further argues that the

magistrate didn’t identify the evidence supporting her valuation in

the permanent orders. Again, however, wife doesn’t provide legal

support that recognizes this type of alleged error as a clerical

mistake. See Fisher, ¶ 18; see also Rutherford v. Harris County, 197

F.3d 173, 190 (5th Cir. 1999) (a court’s failure to make findings

isn’t a clerical mistake). And her contention that the magistrate’s

valuation differed from the values the parties presented again

reflects disagreement with the magistrate’s findings and

methodology, not a clerical mistake that is redressable under

Rule 60(a).

¶ 21 Wife also contends that “[h]usband just saying that the [GMC

Denali] no longer belongs to the parties should not be enough for

the [c]ourt to remove it from the marital estate.” But this argument

is an attempt to “relitigat[e] . . . matters which have already been

decided,” not a request to correct a clerical mistake. Diamond Back,

961 P.2d at 1137.

¶ 22 Given all this, we agree with the magistrate that wife hasn’t

identified any clerical mistake under Rule 60(a) and instead only

disagrees with the magistrate’s findings and conclusions. Wife lost

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the ability to raise such challenges on appeal when she failed to

timely appeal the permanent orders. See Buck, 60 P.3d at 790 (a

Rule 60(a) order doesn’t extend the time to appeal the underlying

permanent orders).

¶ 23 We also reject wife’s contention that the cumulative impact of

the magistrate’s alleged clerical mistakes created an inequitable

property division. “The doctrine of cumulative error, although

applied regularly in criminal appeals, has not been extended to civil

cases.” Acierno v. Garyfallou, 2016 COA 91, ¶ 66. Even if the

doctrine did apply here, we haven’t identified any clerical mistakes

committed by the magistrate. See People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M,

¶ 152 (“The doctrine of cumulative error requires that numerous

errors be committed, not merely alleged.”).

III. Attorney Fees

¶ 24 Finally, we deny wife’s request for attorney fees. Beyond citing

section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025, wife doesn’t explain the legal or

factual basis for her request. See C.A.R. 39.1 (“Mere citation to

[C.A.R. 39.1] or to a statute, without more, does not satisfy [C.A.R.

39.1’s] legal basis requirement” for an award of attorney fees on

appeal).

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IV. Disposition

¶ 25 We affirm the order.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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