Roley v. Eisele

25CA0650 Roley v Eisele 06-25-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0650
El Paso County District Court No. 24CV31305
Honorable David Prince, Judge

Julie Ann Roley,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Warren Eisele,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Kuhn and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 25, 2026

Frederick W. Newall, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mark Anthony Law, Mark Anthony Barrionuevo, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Warren Eisele, appeals the district court’s

judgment partitioning real property that he owned with plaintiff,

Julie Ann Roley. We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Eisele and Roley were romantically involved for approximately

eight years, but they never married. In 2019, they moved into a

Colorado Springs property. Eisele purchased the property using

proceeds from the sale of his previous property and $13,776.79

supplied by Roley. At the time, the property was titled solely in

Eisele’s name. In 2021, Eisele executed a quitclaim deed

transferring an interest in the property to Roley. The deed

established Eisele and Roley as joint tenants.

¶3 In 2021 Eisele purchased a 2017 Mazda CX-5 (the vehicle).

Eisele titled the vehicle in both their names.

¶4 In 2023, Eisele filed a petition for declaratory judgment

requesting quiet title to the property and the vehicle pursuant to

section 13-51-101, C.R.S. 2025, C.R.C.P. 57, and C.R.C.P. 105 (the

2023 litigation). Eisele alleged that he and Roley had entered into

two oral contracts. Under the first oral contract, Eisele would

relinquish an interest in the property to Roley if the two remained in

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a romantic, nonmarital relationship for the remainder of their lives.

Under the second oral contract, Eisele would pay for the

maintenance, oil changes, gas, costs, and repairs for the vehicle —

and would allow Roley to drive the vehicle — if the two remained

together in a romantic, nonmarital relationship. Eisele alleged that

Roley breached both oral contracts. Roley denied both the

existence of the oral contracts and that she breached them. Eisele

also alleged that Roley had engaged in wrongdoing, including fraud.

He asserted that Roley owed him the value of the vehicle because

she had taken possession of it without his permission.

¶5 Following a bench trial, the district court clarified that Eisele

claimed a breach of contract and that he requested alteration of the

parties’ rights to the property and vehicle. The district court found

that Eisele had provided “no substance that the Court can plausibly

analyze to determine whether an offer was actually made and

whether it was accepted,” nor any evidence that an oral contract

existed. Therefore, the rights of the parties to the property and the

vehicle constituted those reflected in the record title documents for

each. Accordingly, Eisele and Roley held the property as joint

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tenants and were co-owners of the vehicle. Neither party appealed

the court’s decision.

¶6 In 2024, Roley commenced this action and requested a

partition of the property pursuant to section 38-28-101, C.R.S.

2025. Roley argued that she and Eisele had made no agreements

as to the disposition of the property and that because it was a

single-family residence, equitable division was impractical. She

therefore requested that the two agree to a mutually acceptable real

estate agent to effectuate a sale and partition. Roley asserted that

Eisele had continued to reside at the property since November 15,

2023.

¶7 In response, Eisele claimed that the court must “assign a

value to the property and then allocate value between [Roley] and

[Eisele] in proportion with their title interests.” He argued that “[a]n

accounting of each parties’ respective contributions toward the

property, such as acquiring the property and paying taxes, to reach

an equitable result must first occur.” Eisele then stated that he

contributed the “vast majority of the monies to purchase the

residence,” installed solar panels, painted the residence, and paid

entirely for all other significant improvements. Therefore, Eisele

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argued, it would be manifestly prejudicial to him to sell the

property. Instead, he would pay Roley “what she was owed.” Eisele

requested that Roley’s contributions, such as the $13,776.79 Roley

contributed to purchase the property, be treated as gifts and that

Roley be entitled only to her monetary contributions to the property

and 2.7% of the equity increase in the property, which amounted to

less than 50% of the property’s value.

¶8 Roley responded that Eisele’s request for more than 50% of the

value of the property had been decided in the 2023 litigation (where

Eisele had requested a declaratory judgment). Therefore, Eisele’s

claims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. Roley

argued that the only adjustments remaining to the parties’ 50-50

ownership were those after the ruling in the 2023 litigation.

¶9 In February 2025, Roley then filed a motion for declaratory

judgment.1 She argued that Eisele “had his day in court arguing

legal or equitable off-sets upon Roley’s joint ownership which was

heard and ruled upon.” She further argued that res judicata and

collateral estoppel barred Eisele’s request for an equitable offset

1 Roley’s motion for declaratory judgment was joined with the

partition action.

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because it constituted a re-litigation of his contentions in the 2023

litigation.

¶ 10 Eisele responded that claim preclusion did not apply because

the issues in this case were not identical to the issues litigated in

the prior proceeding because the court “declined to address the

issues of partition.” Moreover, there was no final judgment on the

merits of apportioning the property of the parties in the 2023

litigation. Eisele asserted that “because [Roley] owns a small

percentage of the [property] and no percentage of the [vehicle],

[Eisele] can refinance the [property] and make [Roley] whole

pursuant to the decision of the Court after a partition hearing

occurs.”

¶ 11 In her reply, Roley argued that Eisele had previously presented

the relative contributions of the parties and argued that he be

awarded the vast majority, if not all, of the value of the house, the

same argument he was making here. Further, she argued that

because Eisele ousted her from the property on November 14, 2023,

she was entitled to an offset from April 2024 to the present.

¶ 12 In a pretrial ruling, the district court found that the claims for

an “accounting,” based on alleged actions, including fraud, or

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contributions made before the ruling in the 2023 litigation, were

precluded. Claims to adjust ownership based on events occurring

after the 2023 litigation would be permitted. In its ruling, the

district court found that Eisele was attempting to argue that an

accounting in partition could be used to revisit allegations he made

in the 2023 litigation to reset the ownership shares declared in that

lawsuit. More specifically, the court found,

The basic injury being alleged by Eisele [in the
2023 litigation] is the perceived and argued
loss of his unequal contribution to the two
assets. This was one of Defendant Eisele’s
core allegations and arguments in the 2023
case and is his core allegation in the current
case — that, by way of example, he should
have a greater than 50% ownership of the
assets because he contributed gutters, paint,
money, etc.

¶ 13 In April 2025, following a bench trial addressing the partition

of the property and vehicle, the court rejected each party’s

recommended method of partition and implemented the statutory

remedy of a public sale. The district court found that Eisele had

again asked the court to adjust the parties’ respective ownership

percentages based on events that preceded the declaration of equal

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ownership entered in the 2023 litigation. The court declined to

address these arguments.

¶ 14 Concerning Roley’s argument that she was ousted from the

property, the district court found the following:

• In El Paso County Case No. 23C4046, Eisele filed a

protection order.

• Both parties agreed that this was the timeframe in which

Roley stopped residing in the house.

• The ultimate ruling in Case No. 23C4046 was that

Eisele’s request for a protection order was denied.

• Still, both parties agreed that the case or events

surrounding it prevented Roley from occupying the

property thereafter.

• Eisele pointed to Case No. 23C4046 as demonstrating

that Roley was abusive and therefore could not be said to

have been ousted.

• The minute order in Case No. 23C4046 reflected that the

judge found that “prong one” was established even

though the request for a protection order was denied.

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¶ 15 The district court concluded that it did not need to address

whether the court’s finding in Case No. 23C4046 provided sufficient

evidence to determine whether Roley was ousted from the property.

The district court continued:

This argument is presented in support of a
request to account for the unequal distribution
of the benefits of ownership of the property
since the decree entered in April of 2024 (one
year ago). There is no dispute that [Eisele] has
resided at the property during this time. There
is no dispute that [Roley] has not resided at
the property during this time frame. There is
no dispute that [Roley] has not resided at the
property despite her 50% ownership during
that time. Thus, [Eisele] has enjoyed a
significant benefit of ownership since the
decree of equal ownership that [Roley] has not
enjoyed. The Court does not find the evidence
to be sufficient to persuade the Court that this
is an equitable result. The Court finds and
concludes that equity is served by awarding
[Roley] an offset for [Eisele] having occupied
the property to the exclusion of [Roley] for the
one year period since the declaration of equal
ownership.

¶ 16 The district court ordered the property to be sold at a public

sale. The court found that Roley was owed a gross payment of

$23,400 beyond her 50% share of the proceeds as of the end of

April 2025, and that Eisele was owed a gross payment of $12,291

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beyond his 50% share of the proceeds as of the end of April 2025

resulting in a net payment of $11,109 owed to Roley.

¶ 17 On appeal, Eisele contends the district court erred by (1) not

permitting him to present his affirmative defense of fraud;

(2) precluding his claim for an equitable contribution determination

regarding his contributions to the acquisition of the property and

the vehicle; (3) not making any findings regarding ouster; and

(4) awarding rental monies to Roley. We disagree and affirm the

judgment.

II. Claim Preclusion

¶ 18 Eisele contends that the district court erred in failing to

consider his affirmative defense of fraud and in precluding his claim

for an equitable contribution determination concerning the property

and vehicle. Because we conclude that claim preclusion applies to

both contentions, we disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 We review de novo a judgment entered on the basis of claim

preclusion. See Loveland Essential Grp., LLC v. Grommon Farms,

Inc., 2012 COA 22, ¶ 13. Claim preclusion bars the relitigation of

matters that have already been decided, or could have been raised,

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in a prior proceeding. Argus Real Est., Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway

Auth., 109 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo. 2005). Claim preclusion applies

only when “(1) the judgment in the prior proceeding was final;

(2) the prior and current proceedings involved identical subject

matter; (3) the prior and current proceedings involved identical

claims for relief; and (4) the parties to the proceedings were

identical or in privity with one another.” Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist.

v. Ground Water Comm’n, 2015 CO 64, ¶ 36. “In the broadest

sense, claim preclusion prevents the perpetual [relitigation] of the

same claim or cause of action. The goal of the doctrine is to

promote judicial economy by barring a claim litigated in a prior

proceeding from being litigated again in a second proceeding.”

Foster v. Plock, 2017 CO 39, ¶ 12.

B. Analysis

1. Finality of Judgment

¶ 20 To satisfy the first claim preclusion factor, there must be

finality of the judgment. Argus Real Est., Inc., 109 P.3d at 608. As

the district court found in its pretrial order, the rulings in the 2023

litigation were entered following full litigation and trial. Further, no

postjudgment challenges were made in the trial or appellate court

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and those deadlines have expired. Therefore, we conclude this

factor is satisfied.

2. Identity of Subject Matter

¶ 21 The second factor requires proof of identical subject matter.

Argus Real Est., Inc., 109 P.3d at 608. Because the subject matter

in the 2023 litigation and this case arises from a dispute regarding

the same property and vehicle, we conclude that this factor is

satisfied. See, e.g., Argus Real Est., Inc., 109 P.3d at 608-09 (same

parcel of land and same agreement as the prior litigation sufficient

for identity of subject matter); City & County of Denver v. Block 173

Assocs., 814 P.2d 824, 831 (Colo. 1991) (same land transaction and

same underlying facts generate identity of subject matter), overruled

on other grounds by Carousel Farms Metro. Dist. v. Woodcrest

Homes, Inc., 2019 CO 51.

3. Identity of Claims for Relief

¶ 22 The third factor requires identical claims for relief between the

two cases. Argus Real Est., Inc., 109 P.3d at 608. Thus, a court

must determine whether the claim at issue in the current case is

the same claim that was brought, or could have been brought, in

the first proceeding. Foster, ¶ 29. The focus of the inquiry is

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whether the “same claim or cause of action requirement is bounded

by the injury for which relief is demanded, and not by the legal

theory on which the person asserting the claim relies.” Argus Real

Est., Inc., 109 P.3d at 608-09 (quoting Farmers High Line Canal &

Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 199 (Colo. 1999)).

¶ 23 Beginning with Eisele’s affirmative defense of fraud, we are

unpersuaded that an affirmative defense may be “repeatedly applied

in different lawsuits if necessary” when it requires a court to reopen

a previously decided issue. We cannot find, and Eisele did not

provide, any authority supporting his contention that an affirmative

defense is exempt from the doctrine of claim preclusion. Rather,

claim preclusion bars not only claims that were decided, but also

claims that could have been raised, but were not, in the prior

proceeding. See Foster, ¶ 29. Eisele cannot, through an affirmative

defense, relitigate the same ownership issues of the property and

vehicle that were decided in the 2023 litigation. See id.

¶ 24 Additionally, we conclude that Eisele’s claim for an equitable

contribution determination was properly precluded. We are

unpersuaded by Eisele’s argument that the claims made in this

case — a partition — are different from those in the 2023

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litigation — a declaration of the parties’ rights in the subject

properties. Instead, we agree with the district court that the claims

in the two cases are the same because “[t]he basic injury being

alleged by Defendant Eisle is the perceived and argued loss of his

unequal contribution to the two assets.” Here, as in the 2023

litigation, Eisele argues that he should have a greater than 50%

ownership of the property and vehicle because of his contributions

to both. We conclude that his requests to adjust ownership interest

percentages based on events arising before the prior declaration of

equal ownership in the 2023 litigation are barred by principles of

finality. Eisele provides no evidence acquired after the 2023

litigation to support his partition contentions in this case.

Moreover, “[a] court’s function when deciding a partition action is

not to create new interests in property . . . , but is merely to sever

the unity of possession owned by the tenants.” Martinez v.

Martinez, 638 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo. App. 1981). Accordingly, we

conclude that the claims between the two cases are identical.

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4. Identity of Parties

¶ 25 Finally, there must be identical parties to satisfy the final

factor in a claim preclusion case. Argus Real Est., Inc., 109 P.3d at

608. Because the parties are the same, this factor is satisfied.

¶ 26 Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s ruling

and affirm it.

III. Ouster

¶ 27 Eisele next contends that the district court erred by not

making ouster findings and by awarding Roley rental money for the

time she owned, but did not live in, the property. We are not

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 28 “An ouster, in the law of tenancy in common, is the wrongful

dispossession or exclusion by one tenant in common of his cotenant

or cotenants from the common property of which they are entitled

to possession.” Hed v. Pullara, 261 P.2d 509, 511 (Colo. 1953)

(citation omitted). An ouster only occurs if one co-owner wrongfully

excludes another co-owner who has a right to possession of the

property. Id. Under that scenario, the excluded co-owner has the

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right to recover rent from the other co-owner for the period that he

or she is wrongfully excluded from the property. Id.

¶ 29 As previously stated, “[a] court’s function when deciding a

partition action is not to create new interests in property held by

tenants in common[] but is merely to sever the unity of possession

owned by the tenants.” Martinez, 638 P.2d at 836.

¶ 30 A partition suit is an equitable proceeding, and a court must

make a “complete adjudication as to the rights of all persons to the

property.” Id. Under section 38-28-110, C.R.S. 2025, “[t]he court

at any time may make such orders as it may deem necessary to

promote the ends of justice to completely adjudicate every question

and controversy concerning the title, rights, and interest of all

persons.” After the court has divided the property, the court may

then, to reach an equitable result, “compute the contribution of

each tenant and offset any amount owing against the one half share

held by each tenant.” Martinez, 638 P.2d at 836.

¶ 31 We review a district court’s fashioning of an equitable remedy

for an abuse of discretion. See Young Props. v. Wolflick, 87 P.3d

235, 237 (Colo. App. 2003). A court abuses its discretion only

where it misapplies or misconstrues the law, or if its decision is

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manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Gagne v. Gagne,

2019 COA 42, ¶ 16.

B. Analysis

¶ 32 While we acknowledge the discrepancy between the district

court’s finding in the 2023 litigation that the parties owned the

property in joint tenancy and the district court’s statement in this

case that it had previously found the parties owned the property as

tenants in common, this discrepancy is irrelevant to our analysis

because the function of a partition action is to sever the unity of

possession between joint owners. See Martinez, 638 P.2d at 836.

¶ 33 Despite the district court stating that it need not reach the

question of whether an ouster occurred, we conclude any error is

harmless because the record shows that an ouster occurred and

supports the court’s equitable partition of the property and vehicle.

Indeed, on September 23, 2023, Eisele pleaded (in the previous

action) that both possession and equitable title rested with him and

that Roley was entitled to no monies, thereby establishing “the

adverse character of possession” known by Roley. Hed, 261 P.2d at

511 (citation omitted). Thereafter, in November, Eisele filed a

protection order against Roley and she left the house. Although the

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order expired in December, Eisele testified that when the order

ended, he “took most of her belongings up to her house” and

claimed that he desired to keep the house for himself, thereby

establishing that he claimed the entire property in his own right.

First Nat’l Bank of Denv. v. Groussman, 483 P.2d 398, 402 (Colo.

App.), aff’d, 491 P.2d 1382 (Colo. 1971). Roley presented her

ouster argument in support of her request for an adjustment to

account for the unequal distribution of the benefits of ownership

since the 2023 litigation, which had established the parties as joint

owners. The record supports the district court’s finding that since

the November 2023 protection order, Eisele resided at the property

and Roley had not. Roley had not resided at the property despite

her 50% ownership. Therefore, Eisele enjoyed a significant benefit

of ownership since the decree of equal ownership that Roley had

not. The district court was not required to make “ouster” findings

after it had determined that equity would be served by awarding

Roley an offset for Eisele having occupied the property to Roley’s

exclusion for the one-year period since the declaration of equal

ownership. See Martinez, 638 P.2d at 836.

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¶ 34 Accordingly, the district court’s ruling that Eisele’s sole

possession of the property entitled Roley to an offset of one half of

the rent from April 3, 2024, to the present was not an abuse of

discretion. See Young Props., 87 P.3d at 237.

IV. Disposition

¶ 35 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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