Peo v. Caime

23CA1580 Peo v Caime 06-18-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1580
Arapahoe County District Court No. 15CR1883
Honorable Eric White, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jeffrey Thomas Caime,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Johnson and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 18, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jillian J. Price, Deputy Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Chelsea E. Mowrer, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jeffrey Thomas Caime, appeals the district court’s

order concluding that his sixty-four-year habitual criminal sentence

does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2015, the People charged Caime with possession with intent

to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a controlled

substance, both as a special offender. At Caime’s trial, the jury

heard evidence that two officers spotted a parked car that had been

reported stolen. They observed a man get out of a truck and

approach the stolen car, where he ultimately got into the passenger

seat. Caime was in the driver’s seat.

¶3 The officers pinned the car with their vehicle and approached

both sides of the vehicle. The officer on the driver’s side

commanded Caime to show his hands, stop moving, and turn the

car off. Instead, the officer testified, Caime reached toward the

center console area, which, in the officer’s experience, was

consistent with retrieving a weapon. An officer used his baton to

break the driver’s side window. The passenger complied with orders

to exit the car, and Caime was pulled out of the passenger’s side

after he dove toward it.

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¶4 Both men were placed in custody, and a search of the car

revealed a bag of methamphetamine on the driver-side floorboard,

and a semiautomatic pistol shoved between the driver’s seat and

the center console. DNA evidence found on the pistol established a

match to Caime’s DNA profile. In a police interview, a recording of

which was played at trial, Caime admitted that he dealt

methamphetamine, possessed methamphetamine during the

incident in question, and was there to sell some to the man who got

into the car with him. People v. Caime, 2021 COA 134, ¶ 5.

¶5 The jury acquitted Caime of the intent to distribute charge but

convicted him of the lesser offense of possession of a controlled

substance. The jury also entered a specific finding that Caime was

a special offender based on the presence of the semiautomatic

pistol. The jury’s special offender finding meant that the sentence

for Caime’s level 4 drug felony conviction would be enhanced to the

sentence applicable to a level 1 drug felony. See

§ 18-18-407(1)(d)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (a defendant who commits any

drug felony commits a level 1 drug felony and is a special offender if

the defendant or a confederate possessed a firearm to which the

defendant or confederate had access in a manner that posed a risk

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to others or in a vehicle the defendant was occupying at the time of

the commission of the violation); People v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 201,

204 (Colo. App. 2001) (the special offender statute is a sentence

enhancing provision).

¶6 In addition to his possession conviction, Caime was charged

and adjudicated as a habitual offender based on a finding that he

had five prior adult felony convictions between 2004 and 2014:

criminal mischief; vehicular assault (reckless driving); possession

with intent to distribute a controlled substance

(methamphetamine); and two separate instances of possession of a

weapon by a previous offender (POWPO).

¶7 The district court imposed the statutorily mandated

sixty-four-year habitual criminal sentence and, after conducting an

abbreviated proportionality review, found no inference of gross

disproportionality. Caime, ¶¶ 47, 39. In doing so, the court

concluded that the predicate offenses of possession with intent to

distribute a controlled substance, POWPO, and vehicular assault

were all per se grave or serious offenses. Id. at ¶ 47.

¶8 On direct appeal, however, a division of this court concluded

that Caime was entitled to a new abbreviated proportionality review

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because those three offenses are not per se grave or serious. Id. at

¶¶ 56-57 (vehicular assault (reckless driving) is not per se grave or

serious); Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, ¶¶ 71-72 (possession

with intent to distribute a controlled substance is not per se grave

or serious); People v. Wright, 2021 COA 106, ¶¶ 73-79 (POWPO is

not per se grave or serious).

¶9 The division remanded the case to the district court for a new

abbreviated proportionality review with specific instructions to

consider (1) the factual circumstances underlying Caime’s five

predicate offenses to determine the gravity or seriousness of those

crimes; and (2) “the harshness of Caime’s sixty-four-year sentence

in light of the gravity or seriousness — or lack thereof — of these

offenses along with Caime’s triggering offense of possession of a

controlled substance as a special offender, as well as his parole

eligibility.” Caime, ¶ 58. The division expressed “no opinion

regarding the proper outcome of the proportionality review.” Id. at

¶ 57 n.4.

¶ 10 On remand, Caime asked the district court to consider various

legislative amendments, including (1) the reclassification of his

triggering offense from a level 4 drug felony to a level 1 drug

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misdemeanor; and (2) the fact that the direct file statute had been

amended such that, had Caime’s criminal mischief and vehicular

assault offenses “happened today,” he could not have been charged

as an adult under the direct file statute.

¶ 11 In conducting the new abbreviated proportionality review, the

court considered (1) the specific factual circumstances underlying

the triggering and predicate offenses; (2) the legislative changes

identified by defense counsel; (3) Caime’s history of recidivism; and

(4) the harshness of the penalty. In combination, the court

concluded, Caime’s triggering and predicate offenses were not so

lacking in gravity and seriousness as to raise an inference that the

sixty-four-year habitual criminal sentence imposed on the triggering

offense was grossly disproportionate.

II. Discussion

¶ 12 Caime contends that a particularized analysis of the facts and

circumstances of his triggering and predicate offenses “reveals [that]

none of them are grave and serious.” Thus, in his view, his

triggering and predicate offenses are, in combination, so lacking in

gravity or seriousness as to suggest that his sixty-four-year

sentence is grossly disproportionate. We disagree.

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A. Proportionality: Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 13 The habitual criminal statute, when applicable, strips a

district court of its discretion in sentencing. Wells-Yates, ¶ 20.

“But the legislature’s authority to prescribe harsher punishment for

habitual criminals is not without constitutional contours.” Id. at ¶

1. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prohibits the imposition of a sentence that is grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed. Harmelin v.

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment); Wells-Yates, ¶ 5. The Eighth

Amendment “does not require strict proportionality between crime

and sentence.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Rather, it

forbids only extreme sentences. Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 536

(Colo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by, Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 16-17.

¶ 14 When, as here, a defendant challenges the proportionality of a

habitual criminal sentence, the district court must first conduct an

abbreviated proportionality review assessing (1) the gravity or

seriousness of both the triggering and predicate offenses and (2) the

harshness of the penalty imposed for the triggering offense.

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Wells-Yates, ¶ 23. If a crime has not been designated per se grave

or serious, the gravity or seriousness of the offense requires a

fact-based inquiry into several factors, including but not limited to

the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society; whether the

offense involved violence or the threat of violence; the “absolute

magnitude of the crime”; whether the offense is the lesser included

or greater offense; whether the offense was an attempted or a

completed crime; whether the defendant was an accessory,

complicitor, or principal; and the defendant’s culpability and

motive. McDonald v. People, 2024 CO 75, ¶ 12 (citation omitted).

Also, “[i]n determining the gravity or seriousness of [an] offense

during an abbreviated proportionality review, the trial court should

consider relevant legislative amendments enacted after the date of

the offense, even if the amendments do not apply retroactively.”

Wells-Yates, ¶ 45.

¶ 15 In analyzing the gravity or seriousness of the triggering and

predicate offenses, a court need not classify each crime as grave or

serious. People v. Terry, 2019 COA 9, ¶ 41, overruled on other

grounds by, People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70. Instead, it determines

whether, in combination, those offenses “are so lacking in gravity or

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seriousness so as to suggest that the sentence is unconstitutionally

disproportionate to the crime.” Wells-Yates, ¶ 23.

¶ 16 In assessing the harshness of the penalty, the court should

consider both the length of the sentence and the defendant’s

eligibility for parole, affording “great deference” to the legislature’s

determination. Id. at ¶ 62. Given the “primacy of the General

Assembly in crafting sentencing schemes,” an abbreviated

proportionality review will almost always result in a conclusion that

the sentence is not unconstitutional. Id. at ¶ 21 (citation omitted).

¶ 17 We review de novo whether a sentence raises an inference of

gross disproportionality. See id. at ¶ 35.

B. The Gravity or Seriousness of the
Predicate and Triggering Offenses

¶ 18 Although Caime asserts that none of his predicate and

triggering offenses are grave or serious on their facts, we partially

agree with the district court’s assessment that they are.

¶ 19 Caime’s predicate offense of criminal mischief involved more

than thirty victims and damage to multiple vehicles using rocks and

golf clubs totaling more than $23,000. The probable cause affidavit

reflects that Caime drove a group of friends around and, though not

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the one to come up with the idea, he was among the first of the

group to participate in smashing car windows along an entire block.

Under these circumstances, Caime’s criminal mischief conviction is

serious. See People v. Mershon, 874 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Colo. 1994)

(examining the facts and circumstances underlying the crime of

attempted criminal mischief and concluding that it constituted a

serious crime where the defendant was seen knocking over traffic

signs, which he then used to smash the window and body of a car,

causing approximately $4,400 worth of damage), abrogated on other

grounds by, Melton v. People, 2019 CO 89.

¶ 20 Five months after the criminal mischief offense, Caime pleaded

guilty to the offense of vehicular assault (reckless driving). A

witness observed that Caime “blew through a stop sign,” making no

attempt to stop, and “T-Boned” another vehicle. The driver of the

other vehicle suffered serious bodily injury — broken ribs, a

fractured hip, and internal injuries to his spleen. Law enforcement

determined that Caime was traveling twenty-two miles per hour

over the posted speed limit at the time of the collision. Given

Caime’s admitted culpability and the grave harm caused to the

victim, this crime was likewise grave and serious on its facts.

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¶ 21 The next year, Caime pleaded guilty to one count of POWPO.

The conviction arose after individuals reported hearing gunshots in

their neighborhood. One witness reported hearing twelve shots and

a responding officer concluded that the “shots were fired

indiscriminately into the neighborhood.” Law enforcement

contacted a car in which Caime and several others were riding. One

of the passengers reported that all of the passengers who were

sitting by windows, including Caime, had fired shots from the

vehicle, and a 9mm gun was recovered from the floorboard. A

round of 9mm ammunition was found in Caime’s pocket.

Notwithstanding Caime’s assertion that no people or homes were

targeted or harmed and this was not a violent crime, this completed

crime was grave and serious due to the serious threat of harm it

presented and Caime’s level of culpability in admitting to possessing

a firearm.

¶ 22 Caime’s next POWPO conviction stemmed from evidence that

he was contacted by law enforcement while in a vehicle. An illegal

switchblade was located under the driver’s seat cover, beneath

where Caime had been sitting. In exchange for the dismissal of

other felony counts, Caime pleaded guilty to an added count of

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POWPO. Although possession of a weapon by a convicted felon

always presents some risk to society, possession of a switchblade

without some corresponding evidence of harm or threatened harm

leads us to conclude that this crime was not, on its own, grave or

serious.

¶ 23 Likewise, we conclude that Caime’s prior conviction for

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine was,

standing alone, not grave or serious. After law enforcement

discovered he was driving with a revoked license, they searched his

person and vehicle and discovered a methamphetamine pipe in his

pants pocket and a case containing empty, individual baggies of

varying sizes, and two larger baggies containing what was later

identified as methamphetamine. Caime’s guilty plea indicated that

the weight of the methamphetamine was fourteen grams or less.

Although our supreme court has “anticipate[d] that many

convictions for possession with intent will be grave or serious,”

Wells-Yates, ¶ 70, the quantity of methamphetamine found in

Caime’s possession was small. See id. at ¶¶ 30, 69 (characterizing

seven grams or less of methamphetamine as a “small amount” such

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that the person found with it might not be engaged in a grave or

serious crime).

¶ 24 Last, we consider the triggering offense. Based on the facts set

forth in Part I of this opinion, we conclude that it was serious.

True, Caime was found guilty of the lesser offense of simple

possession of only a small amount of methamphetamine. But this

was not Caime’s first felony conviction, indicating a greater level of

seriousness. See id. at ¶ 23 (concluding that a defendant’s “history

of felony recidivism” is a relevant consideration to the grave or

serious inquiry). Moreover, the circumstances showed that he

appeared to be reaching for a weapon when confronted by law

enforcement, and a semiautomatic pistol containing his DNA was

recovered from the area into which he was reaching.

¶ 25 Nonetheless, Caime advances four reasons why we should find

that, taken together, his crimes raise an inference of gross

disproportionality.

¶ 26 First, relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012),

and similar cases addressing the constitutionality of juvenile

sentencing, he notes that his criminal mischief and vehicular

assault convictions were committed when he had not yet reached

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the age of eighteen, and he thus had a diminished culpability

because “children are constitutionally different from adults for

purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 471. He further notes that, though

he was no longer a juvenile when he committed his first POWPO

offense, “neurologically speaking he was still a child.” But Caime

was an adult when he received the enhanced sentence here. And

when a defendant receives such a sentence because of prior felonies

he committed, “his age at the time of the prior felonies doesn’t

impact the validity of the adult sentence under the Eighth

Amendment.” People v. Porter, 2019 COA 73, ¶ 19.

¶ 27 Second and related to his first point, Caime notes that his

criminal mischief and vehicular assault offenses are no longer

direct file eligible and, thus, would not today be eligible to serve as

predicate offenses for habitual criminal purposes. This too doesn’t

impact our proportionality analysis because, in our view, this is an

attack on his habitual criminal adjudication, not the proportionality

of his sentence, which is the limited issue before us.

¶ 28 Third, we are not persuaded that statutory changes to the

classification of criminal mischief render Caime’s criminal mischief

offense not grave or serious. Although such legislative changes are

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evidence of evolving standards of decency, Wells-Yates, ¶ 49, this

fact does not alter our conclusion that the particularized facts of

Caime’s criminal mischief offense were serious. People v. McRae,

2019 CO 91, ¶ 16 (While statutory reclassifications are relevant,

“they are not determinative of whether an offense is grave or

serious.” Rather, “they must be analyzed in conjunction with the

facts and circumstances surrounding the crime committed.”). And

to the extent Caime faults the district court for stating that he acted

“intentionally” rather than “knowingly” in committing this offense,

this likewise doesn’t change our calculus such that we would

conclude that Caime’s actions of smashing numerous cars were less

serious.

¶ 29 Fourth and finally, we note — as the district court did — that

Caime’s triggering offense has been reclassified from a level 4 drug

felony to a level 1 drug misdemeanor for offenses committed on or

after March 1, 2020. See § 18-18-403.5(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025

(possession of material containing less than four grams of a

schedule I or II controlled substance is a level 1 drug misdemeanor).

Though we are mindful that the reclassification of an offense can

provide “evidence of the legislature’s view of the gravity or

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seriousness of the crime,” Wells-Yates, ¶ 50, we think that an

additional factor here — that Caime was reaching for a firearm and

was found by a jury to be a special offender — indicates that his

crime was grave or serious notwithstanding the legislative change.

This is because “[t]he presence of a gun undoubtedly increases the

seriousness of a drug offense.” People v. Wells-Yates, 2023 COA

120, ¶ 45 (concluding that the possession of a handgun was an

“additional factor” to consider notwithstanding legislative

reclassification of a triggering offense); see also People v. Hopper,

284 P.3d 87, 91 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting “the well-known potential

for danger that exists whenever drugs and deadly weapons are

present”).

¶ 30 We also note, like the district court, Caime’s lengthy criminal

history, beginning in 2004 and continuing to the triggering offense.

Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 23 (“[T]he grave or serious inquiry

includes consideration of the defendant’s history of felony

recidivism.”). Though the district court noted a “break in

criminality between 2005 and 2012,” it surmised that this was due

to “enforced law-abiding behavior,” which the record supports as

Caime was under supervision for much of that time frame.

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¶ 31 Thus, notwithstanding our conclusion that two of Caime’s

predicate offenses were not grave or serious, we nonetheless agree

with the district court that, in combination, the predicate and

triggering offenses are not so lacking in gravity or seriousness so as

to suggest that the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate

to the crime. Id.

C. The Harshness of the Penalty

¶ 32 Next, we consider whether the sixty-four-year sentence was

unduly or unconstitutionally harsh. We conclude that it was not.

¶ 33 “[T]he fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a

substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is

properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.” Harmelin,

501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment) (citation modified). Thus, “[r]eviewing courts should

grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures

necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of

punishments for crimes.” Id. at 999 (citation modified). Caime’s

sixty-four-year sentence, though lengthy, was within the range

permitted — indeed, mandated — at the time of his offense.

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¶ 34 In addition, the record indicates that Caime will be eligible for

parole after serving less than half his sentence. Though the

sentence might seem harsh on its face, Caime’s eligibility for parole

may “reduce the actual period of confinement and render the

penalty less harsh.” Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 14.

¶ 35 Because Caime’s sentence falls within the range fixed by the

legislature and he will be eligible for parole after serving less than

half his sentence, we conclude that his sentence isn’t

unconstitutionally harsh.

III. Disposition

¶ 36 Under the circumstances, the sentence does not raise an

inference of disproportionality, and consequently, we discern no

error in the district court’s order so concluding. Thus, we affirm.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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