People v. J.P.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
May 28, 2026

2026 COA 41

No. 24CA2067, People v. J.P. — Public Records — Sealing
Criminal Justice Records Other than Convictions; Trials —
Verdicts and Findings — Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity

A court shall order a defendant’s criminal justice records

sealed when the defendant is “acquitted of all counts in the case.”

§ 24-72-705(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025. A division of the court of appeals

holds that a defendant who is found not guilty by reason of insanity

(NGRI) is eligible for record sealing under the statute because an

NGRI judgment operates as an acquittal of the charged offenses.

Accordingly, the division reverses the district court’s orders denying

the defendant’s requests to seal his criminal justice records and

remands the case to the district court to seal his records.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 41

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2067
El Paso County District Court Nos. 02CR5134, 03CR26 & 03CR46
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

J.P.,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDERS REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Harris and Moultrie, JJ., concur

Announced May 28, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

J.P., Pro Se
¶1 A court shall order a defendant’s criminal justice records

sealed when the defendant is “acquitted of all counts in the case.”

§ 24-72-705(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025. The question in this case is

whether defendant, J.P., who was found not guilty by reason of

insanity (NGRI) in three criminal cases, is eligible to have his

criminal justice records sealed.

¶2 Because an NGRI judgment operates as an acquittal of the

charged offenses, we answer yes to that question. We therefore

reverse the district court’s orders denying J.P.’s requests to seal his

criminal justice records and remand the case to the district court to

seal his records.

I. Background

¶3 In the early aughts, the People charged J.P. with multiple

crimes in three separate cases in El Paso County, Colorado (Case

Nos. 02CR5134, 03CR26, and 03CR46). After a bench trial, the

court found J.P. NGRI in all three cases. The court committed J.P.

to the department of human services for care and psychiatric

treatment.

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¶4 During his commitment, J.P. pleaded guilty to second degree

murder and aggravated robbery in connection with a cold case

homicide. The court sentenced him to sixty years in prison.

¶5 In April 2021, a psychiatrist at the Colorado Mental Health

Institute at Pueblo opined that it was appropriate for J.P. to be

unconditionally released to serve his prison sentence. The district

court then unconditionally released J.P. from commitment.

¶6 Three years later, J.P. filed motions in his three El Paso

County cases to seal his criminal records under section 24-72-705.1

He asserted that because the charges in each case “ended in

acquittal” and a “finding of not guilty,” his records were eligible for

sealing.

¶7 The district court denied the motions, concluding that section

24-72-705 does not authorize sealing records in cases where a

defendant is found NGRI.

1 J.P. also filed a sealing motion in a fourth case, which is not at

issue here.

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II. Discussion

¶8 J.P. contends that because an NGRI verdict is an acquittal, his

records are eligible for sealing under section 24-72-705(1)(a)(II), and

the district court erred by denying his motion to seal.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶9 We generally review a district court’s decision whether to seal

criminal justice records for an abuse of discretion. People v. C.H.,

2023 COA 86, ¶ 18. But when — as here — a court’s sealing

decision rests on statutory interpretation, we review the court’s

interpretation de novo. Id. at ¶ 19.

¶ 10 Our primary task in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and

give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. People v. Rau, 2022 CO

3, ¶ 15. To do that, we apply the plain and ordinary meanings of

undefined phrases and read statutes “in context” to give

“consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of [their] parts.”

McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶¶ 37-38.

B. Section 24-72-705: The 2019 Enactment

¶ 11 In 2019, the General Assembly comprehensively revised the

sealing statutes. See Ch. 295, sec. 1, §§ 24-72-701 to -708, 2019

Colo. Sess. Laws 2732-47. The purpose of the revisions “was to

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increase eligibility for criminal record sealing.” People v.

Prendergast, 2024 COA 127, ¶ 16. Among other amendments, the

General Assembly added section 24-72-705, which governs the

sealing of criminal justice records other than convictions. § 24-72-

705, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws at 2739-41; see C.H., ¶ 15.

¶ 12 Under section 24-72-705, a court “shall” seal criminal justice

records in the following situations:

(I) A case against a defendant is completely
dismissed;

(II) The defendant is acquitted of all counts in
the case;

(III) The defendant completes a diversion
agreement pursuant to section 18-1.3-
101[, C.R.S. 2025,] when a criminal case
has been filed; or

(IV) The defendant completes a deferred
judgment and sentence pursuant to
section 18-1.3-102[, C.R.S. 2025,] and all
counts are dismissed.

§ 24-72-705(1)(a)(I)-(IV) (emphasis added).

¶ 13 The General Assembly also made sealing retroactive for “all

eligible cases” when, as relevant here, “the defendant has been

acquitted of all counts.” § 24-72-705(1)(c), 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws

at 2740. If sealing did not occur “at the time of the dismissal or

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acquittal,” the amendment permitted the defendant to file a motion

to seal “at any time” after the “dismissal or acquittal.” § 24-72-

705(1)(b), 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws at 2740.

¶ 14 Though the sealing statutes do not define the terms

“acquitted” and “acquittal,” they have plain and accepted meanings.

And while one is a verb and the other a noun, they both mean the

same thing — that someone is absolved from criminal

responsibility, or, put simply, not guilty. See, e.g., Merriam-

Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4WVB-SA3Y (defining

“acquit” as “to discharge completely (as from an accusation or

obligation)”); see also § 18-1-301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (“There is an

acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the

trier of fact or in a determination that there was insufficient

evidence to warrant a conviction.”).

¶ 15 And it’s equally well established that because insanity is a

“complete defense” to a charged crime, Parks v. Denv. Dist. Ct., 503

P.2d 1029, 1033 (Colo. 1972), an NGRI verdict “is an adjudication

on the merits which absolves the defendant of criminal

responsibility,” People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 140 (Colo. 1992).

Thus, an NGRI verdict “operates as an acquittal of the charged

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offenses.” People v. Laeke, 2012 CO 13M, ¶ 18; see also People v.

Riggs, 87 P.3d 109, 112 (Colo. 2004) (characterizing an NGRI

verdict as an acquittal); McElrath v. Georgia, 601 U.S. 87, 90 (2024)

(concluding that NGRI verdicts are acquittals under the Double

Jeopardy Clause because “an acquittal is an acquittal”). Like any

acquittal, an NGRI verdict is “a final judgment which ends the

particular action in which it is entered.” People v. Galves, 955 P.2d

582, 583 (Colo. App. 1997).

¶ 16 Though the People don’t dispute that NGRI verdicts are

acquittals, they say we should assume that the General Assembly

did not intend for NGRI acquittals to be eligible for mandatory

sealing because section 24-72-705 doesn’t expressly refer to NGRI

acquittals. But the opposite is true. That’s because “[w]e presume

the legislature is aware of existing” case law “when it enacts or

amends statutes.” Laeke, ¶ 15. Thus, by amending the sealing

statutes in 2019 to require that criminal justice records “shall” be

sealed when a “defendant is acquitted of all counts in the case,”

§ 24-72-705(1)(a)(II), 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws at 2739, and by not

excluding NGRI acquittals, we presume that the General Assembly

intended to require sealing for all acquittals, including NGRI

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acquittals. See Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 855 (Colo. 2001)

(“[W]e generally presume that the General Assembly is aware of our

previously expressed understanding of specific language.”).

¶ 17 Had the General Assembly intended to depart from this

precedent and exclude NGRI acquittals from mandatory sealing, “it

could have done so.”2 People v. Licata, 2023 COA 34, ¶ 12. And

while the People point to policy reasons for distinguishing between

NGRI acquittals and other acquittals, we don’t make or weigh

policy. See F.M. v. People, 298 P.3d 991, 993 (Colo. App. 2011).

Because the General Assembly chose not to limit mandatory sealing

to certain types of acquittals, neither may we. See Rau, ¶ 34 (“It is

for the legislature, not our court, to rewrite a statute.”).

¶ 18 Our interpretation is supported by Licata. There, the

defendant appealed the extension of a mandatory protection order

entered against him after an NGRI verdict. Licata, ¶ 1. By statute,

a mandatory protection order remains in effect “until final

2 This is further supported by the fact that the General Assembly

added section 24-72-705(1)(g) in 2024, which states that charges
dismissed because of incompetency are “not eligible for sealing.”
Ch. 384, sec. 4, § 24-72-705(1)(g), 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 2619.
Yet, it did not amend the statute to exclude NGRI acquittals from
record sealing.

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disposition of the action.” § 18-1-1001(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; see

Licata, ¶ 10. At the time of the Licata decision, the mandatory

protection order statute provided that “[u]ntil final disposition of the

action” meant “until the case is dismissed, until the defendant is

acquitted, or until the defendant completes” their sentence. Licata,

¶ 10 (quoting § 18-1-1001(8)(b), C.R.S. 2022). Because he was

acquitted by reason of insanity, the defendant argued that the

protection order should not have remained in effect. Id. at ¶ 11.

Much as we do here, the Licata division rejected the People’s

attempt to distinguish an NGRI acquittal from other acquittals,

concluding that the effect of a “not guilty” verdict and an NGRI

verdict — “despite the different treatment of a defendant” after the

verdicts — “is the same and concludes the criminal case.”3 Id. at

¶ 14. To the extent the People argue Licata is somehow different

and doesn’t apply here, we disagree.

3 After People v. Licata, 2023 COA 34, the General Assembly

amended the statute governing the termination of mandatory
protection orders to distinguish between acquittals and NGRI
verdicts. See Ch. 263, sec. 4, § 18-1-1001, 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws
1567.

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C. Section 24-72-705: The 2022 Amendments

¶ 19 In 2022, the General Assembly amended section 24-72-705.

See Ch. 276, sec. 12, § 24-72-705, 2022 Colo. Sess. Laws 1991-92.

Included in the amendments was a new subsection that states, in

relevant part as follows:

The court shall not require a written motion or
any other written pleadings for sealing
pursuant to this section. The court shall enter
an order sealing records pursuant to this
subsection (1) at the time of disposition and
shall serve the sealing order . . . no later than
twenty-eight days after the date of disposition.

§ 24-72-705(1)(a.5), 2022 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1991 (emphasis

added).

¶ 20 The 2022 amendments also clarified that the term

“disposition” has the same meaning “as set forth in section 24-72-

302,” C.R.S. 2025, of the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act

(CCJRA). Sec. 9, § 24-72-701(5.5), 2022 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1987.

And the CCJRA defines “disposition” to include, as material here,

“the conclusion of criminal proceedings, including conviction,

acquittal, or acquittal by reason of insanity.” § 24-72-302(6). Thus,

section 24-72-705(1)(a.5) clarifies the timing of mandatory sealing.

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¶ 21 Reading the 2022 amendments together and in context with

section 24-72-705(1)(a), they simply require a court to seal eligible

records at the time of disposition. They don’t change the type of

records eligible for sealing but, instead, specifically confirm — to

the extent there was any possible doubt — that acquittals and

acquittals by reason of insanity are included in the dispositions that

must be sealed when they are entered. See § 24-72-701(5.5), C.R.S.

2025.

¶ 22 We are therefore unpersuaded by the People’s argument that

the inclusion of both acquittals and acquittals by reason of insanity

as dispositions that require sealing at the time they are entered

somehow means that the General Assembly intended to limit

mandatory sealing to acquittals other than NGRI acquittals. That

interpretation doesn’t make sense. And the People don’t explain

how the specific inclusion of NGRI acquittals in the dispositions

that must be sealed when they are entered somehow narrows what

types of acquittals are subject to sealing under section 24-72-

705(1)(a).

¶ 23 Because we conclude that section 24-72-705 requires a court

to seal a defendant’s criminal justice records when a defendant is

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acquitted by reason of insanity, we conclude that the district court

abused its discretion by denying J.P.’s motions to seal.

III. Disposition

¶ 24 We reverse the orders and remand the case to the district

court with directions to seal the criminal justice records in El Paso

County Case Nos. 02CR5134, 03CR26, and 03CR46.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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