Marriage of Zunker

25CA1431 Marriage of Zunker 05-14-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1431
City and County of Denver District Court No. 11DR4141
Honorable Michael W.V. Angel, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Derek Zunker,

Appellee,

and

Sabrina Zunker,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDER AFFIRMED,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 14, 2026

Sherr Puttmann Akins Lamb PC, Tanya L. Akins, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee

Sabrina Zunker, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Derek

Zunker (father) and Sabrina Zunker (mother), mother appeals the

district court’s adoption of a magistrate’s order awarding father

$80,082.25 in attorney fees related to numerous pro se filings that

mother initiated starting in October 2022.1 We dismiss mother’s

appeal in part and otherwise affirm. And we remand to the district

court to determine father’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and

costs.

I. Background

¶2 The parties’ three-year marriage ended in 2012. They are the

parents of one child.

¶3 The parties originally shared equal parenting time. In

November 2017, a district court magistrate awarded father sole

decision-making responsibility and modified parenting time, with

father becoming the majority-time parent. In October 2020,

mother’s attorneys withdrew from the case.

1 Given the number of orders that Mother discusses in her briefing,

and that we consequently mention in this opinion, we refer to this
order as the order on appeal for clarity’s sake.

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¶4 Since October 2022, mother has engaged in a persistent

campaign of filing pro se motions and other requests for relief with

the district court. In all, mother filed more than twenty-five

motions and other requests for relief between October 2022 and

September 2024.

¶5 Given mother’s barrage of pro se filings, in November 2023,

father moved for an award of attorney fees under section 13-17-

102, C.R.S. 2025. In support, father asserted that mother’s filings

were largely frivolous and that mother had failed to comply with

various court rules and orders during the prosecution of her

numerous requests for relief. In January 2024, father also moved

to enjoin mother from filing additional pleadings as a pro se party

without first obtaining the court’s permission “pursuant to a

reasonable procedure or first obtaining counsel,” among other relief.

¶6 In May 2024, the magistrate issued an order granting father’s

request for attorney fees. But after mother requested an evidentiary

hearing on the request, the magistrate set a hearing for September

24, 2024, to address both the attorney fee issue and father’s

request to prohibit mother from making additional pro se filings.

Before the hearing, father filed a supplemental motion for attorney

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fees, in which he updated the amount of attorney fees that he had

incurred and summarized additional filings that mother had made

since he filed his original motion.

¶7 Following the hearing, the magistrate issued two orders. In

the first order, the magistrate prohibited mother from filing any

further motions or other requests for relief pro se. Mother

petitioned for district court review, and the district court adopted

the magistrate’s first order. A division of this court affirmed in In re

Marriage of Zunker, (Colo. App. No. 25CA0123, Oct. 23, 2025) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The division agreed that

mother’s filings “were often meritless, given that they did not

contain relevant legal authority, were repetitious and circular, and

otherwise contained numerous arguments recycled from previously

denied motions.” Id. at ¶ 19.

¶8 In the second order — the order on appeal — the magistrate

awarded father $80,082.25 in attorney fees under section

13-17-102 and section 13-17-103, C.R.S. 2025, related to mother’s

numerous pro se filings. Mother sought district court review. The

district court denied mother’s petition for review, effectively

adopting the magistrate’s order.

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II. Mother’s Appeal of an October 2020 Order

¶9 To start, we dismiss mother’s apparent challenge to an

October 2020 magistrate order that she alleges exceeded the

magistrate’s authority and violated her due process rights.

¶ 10 Mother’s attempt to appeal the October 2020 order is barred

because she failed to first seek district court review of the order and

otherwise failed to timely appeal to this court. See C.R.M. 7(a)(11)

(2025) (repealed 2026)2 (“Appeal of an order or judgment of a

district court magistrate may not be taken to the appellate court

unless a timely petition for review has been filed and decided by a

reviewing court in accordance with these Rules.”); In re Marriage of

Stockman, 251 P.3d 541, 542 (Colo. App. 2010) (holding that

district court review of the magistrate’s order is a jurisdictional

prerequisite for this court’s review); see also C.A.R. 4(a)(1) (requiring

the filing of a notice of appeal within 49 days after entry of the

judgment, decree, or order being appealed). Because the time for

mother to appeal the October 2020 order has long since lapsed, we

dismiss this portion of her appeal.

2 We apply the version of the Magistrate Rules in effect at the times

relevant to mother’s appeal.

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III. The Magistrate’s Award of Attorney Fees to Father

¶ 11 As to the order on appeal, mother contends that the

magistrate made insufficient and otherwise unsupported findings

under section 13-17-103(1) when awarding father attorney fees. We

disagree.

A. Appellate Review of Magistrate Orders

¶ 12 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the

magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In

re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8. However, we review de

novo questions of law. Sheehan, ¶ 22.

B. Preservation

¶ 13 We begin by rejecting father’s assertion that mother did not

preserve her challenge to the order on appeal because the district

court denied her petition for review for failure to comply with the

magistrate rules. Specifically, the district court found that mother’s

petition for review contained “numerous immaterial and irrelevant

allegations dating back to 2017, the majority of which have no

bearing on the order for attorney[] fees.” For this reason, the

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district court held that her petition failed to specify, with

particularity, the magistrate’s alleged errors, as C.R.M. 7(a)(7)

(2025) (repealed 2026) required.

¶ 14 We note that mother’s petition for review included a block of

nearly twenty pages of uninterrupted text that makes it difficult to

glean her specific challenges. Nevertheless, parsing through

mother’s petition reveals her contention that the magistrate erred in

applying the statutory factors under section 13-17-103(1). Thus,

we cannot say that mother failed to allege with particularity at least

some errors as to order on appeal, and we will thus review her

challenge. (That being said, we do not condone mother’s

approach — which she repeated in her briefing on appeal — of

“throw everything against the wall and see what sticks.”)

C. Relevant Law

¶ 15 An award of attorney fees is an important sanction against an

attorney or party who improperly instigates or prolongs litigation.

City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 618 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 16 Section 13-17-102(4) authorizes a district court to award

attorney fees if a party brought or defended an action that “lacked

substantial justification.” The court must make findings explaining

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why the conduct lacked substantial justification. In re Marriage of

Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1379 (Colo. 1997); cf. In re Marriage of

Gomez, 728 P.2d 747, 750 (Colo. App. 1986) (a conclusory

statement that a claim is frivolous is an insufficient finding on

which to support an attorney fees award under section

13-17-102(4)).

¶ 17 A court awarding fees under this section must consider the

factors listed in section 13-17-103(1):

(a) The extent of any effort made to determine
the validity of any action or claim before said
action or claim was asserted;

(b) The extent of any effort made after the
commencement of an action to reduce the
number of claims or defenses being asserted or
to dismiss claims or defenses found not to be
valid within an action;

(c) The availability of facts to assist a party in
determining the validity of a claim or defense;

(d) The relative financial positions of the
parties involved;

(e) Whether or not the action was prosecuted
or defended, in whole or in part, in bad faith;

(f) Whether or not issues of fact determinative
of the validity of a party’s claim or defense
were reasonably in conflict;

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(g) The extent to which the party prevailed with
respect to the amount of and number of claims
in controversy;

(h) The amount and conditions of any offer of
judgment or settlement as related to the
amount and conditions of the ultimate relief
granted by the court.

¶ 18 A court need only address those factors relevant to the

circumstances. Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1378-79. If some of the factors

are not at issue, the court is under no obligation to make specific

findings with regard to those factors. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d

1188, 1197 (Colo. 2010). However, the court must make findings of

fact and conclusions of law sufficiently explicit to give an appellate

court a clear understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage

of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9.

¶ 19 Whether to award attorney fees lies within the district court’s

discretion, and we will not disturb such a decision absent an abuse

of discretion. Padilla v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653, 662 (Colo. App.

2007).

D. Discussion

¶ 20 We disagree with mother’s assertion that the magistrate made

insufficient findings under section 13-17-103(1).

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¶ 21 The order on appeal spanned eleven pages and contained

detailed factual findings concerning the testimony and exhibits

presented at the September 24, 2024, hearing. The magistrate

detailed mother’s numerous filings since October 2022 and found

that her filings were “duplicative, redundant[,] and vexatious.” The

magistrate then made findings on each of the section 13-17-103(1)

factors, to the extent that they were applicable.

¶ 22 For example, the magistrate found that, given mother’s

tendency to reassert issues that had been previously decided,

mother had made no effort to reduce the number of claims being

asserted in the proceeding. § 13-17-103(1)(b). Similarly, the

magistrate found that the issues of fact that mother asserted were

not reasonably in conflict, § 13-17-103(1)(f), and observed that,

despite the court’s prior warnings about her litigation conduct,

mother had persisted with her additional filings, on which she

generally had not prevailed, § 13-17-103(1)(e), (g). Lastly, the

magistrate found that each party earned over $30,000 per month.

§ 13-17-103(1)(d). Given these findings, we cannot say that we lack

a clear understanding as to the magistrate’s application of the

section 13-17-103(1) factors. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.

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¶ 23 We also reject mother’s suggestion that the magistrate made

inadequate findings concerning the parties’ respective financial

resources under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025. That section,

which governs attorney fee requests for purposes of “apportioning

the costs and fees of an action equitably between the parties” in

dissolution cases, In re Marriage of Trout, 897 P.2d 838, 840 (Colo.

App. 1994), does not apply to an award of attorney fees under

section 13-17-102, which serves to sanction substantially frivolous,

substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious actions. See

Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1377 (“Because dissolution proceedings under

article 10, title 14 are civil, it is permissible for a district court to

award attorney fees under section 14-10-119, section 13-17-102, or

both. However, . . . each statutory award of fees and costs serves a

different policy purpose and consequently, requires different

findings.”).

¶ 24 Mother next suggests that the record did not support the

magistrate’s findings under section 13-17-103(1). However, our

review of mother’s contentions is hampered by her failure to provide

a transcript of the September 24, 2024, hearing. Notably, mother

included that transcript in a designation of transcripts she filed on

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February 6, 2025 — twelve days before filing her petition for district

court review of the attorney fee order; but it appears that such

designation related to her appeal of the filing restriction order. The

record does not reflect that mother provided that transcript to the

district court that was reviewing the attorney fee order. Thus,

notwithstanding mother’s inclusion of that hearing transcript in the

appellate record, her failure to provide it to the reviewing district

court precludes us from considering it. In re Marriage of Dean,

2017 COA 51, ¶ 14. We are limited to the record that was before

the district court. See In re Marriage of Rivera, 91 P.3d 464, 466

(Colo. App. 2004) (because its review was limited to the record

considered by the district court, a division of this court only

considered the party’s legal arguments). And absent that

transcript, we, like the district court, must presume that the

evidence supported the magistrate’s factual findings. See In re

Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 15.

¶ 25 Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb those findings.

See Dean, ¶ 14; Rivera, 91 P.3d at 466.

¶ 26 Mother also challenges some of the magistrate’s findings

under section 13-17-103(1) by referencing other, older portions of

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the over 15,000-page record in the proceeding. However,

“[a]rguments not presented at [the hearing] cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal.” In re Marriage of Ensminger, 209 P.3d 1163,

1167 (Colo. App. 2008). And in the absence of the transcript of the

attorney fees hearing, Dean, ¶ 14, the record does not demonstrate

whether mother properly presented the district court with the

magistrate’s challenged findings, such that she preserved that

challenge for appellate review.

¶ 27 Moreover, consistent with the very practice that resulted in the

attorney fee award that mother now appeals, she expends

considerable time and effort in her appellate briefs attempting to

relitigate other magistrate orders, such as rulings pertaining to the

parties’ respective financial disclosures, orders concerning child

support, and an order prohibiting mother from communicating with

third parties about the case. Those orders are not properly before

us. See C.R.M. 7(a)(11); C.A.R. 4(a)(1); Stockman, 251 P.3d at 542.

Similarly, to the extent mother seeks our review of her allegations of

bias against the magistrate and misconduct on the part of father’s

counsel, she has not presented us with a timely appeal of any

orders on those issues. See C.A.R. 3(d)(8) (requiring the notice of

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appeal to append the order being appealed); cf. In re Marriage of

Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 11 (“Our jurisdiction is limited to review of

final, appealable judgments or orders.”). Thus, we decline to

consider mother’s attempts to challenge or otherwise relitigate these

previously settled orders and issues.

¶ 28 We also reject mother’s assertion that her numerous filings

between October 2022 and September 2024 could not form the

basis of an attorney fee award because they were meritorious.

True, one of mother’s appeals resulted in a reversal of the

challenged court order. In re Marriage of Zunker, Colo. App. No.

24CA1180, May 1, 2025 (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

But as the division in another of mother’s appeals noted, her

narrow success in that case was based on a purely procedural

error, and the division expressed no opinion on the substantive

merits of mother’s contentions. Zunker, No. 25CA0123, slip. op. at

¶¶ 17-18. (Moreover, the reversal was based on a misapplication of

the doctrine of issue preclusion, not on any “significant

constitutional issue,” as mother describes it.)

¶ 29 We also do not agree with mother that the magistrate

improperly held mother’s pro se status against her when awarding

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father his attorney fees. The case cited by mother in support of her

contention, Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 202 (Colo. 2001), has

nothing to do with attorney fees or even pro se litigants. And we do

not otherwise perceive as improper the magistrate’s common-sense

observation that, as a pro se party, mother had persisted with her

numerous repetitive filings without concerns of cost, while

significantly expanding the legal costs of father — who was

represented by counsel — through those same filings.

¶ 30 Lastly, we decline to address the multiple new or expanded

arguments presented for the first time in mother’s reply brief, such

as her contentions that her filings in the district court were

constitutionally protected activity, that the magistrate failed to

apply the heightened legal standard applicable to pro se parties

before awarding father attorney fees,3 and that the award of

attorney fees was unconstitutionally punitive. See Dean, ¶ 31.

3 We note, however, the magistrate’s finding that mother had been

repeatedly warned that her insistence on raising matters the court
had already resolved against her may be deemed stubborn
litigiousness that could result in an award of attorney fees and
costs against her. See § 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring that,
before awarding attorney fees as a sanction against a pro se party,
the court must find that the pro se party knew or reasonably knew
their filings were substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious).

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IV. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 31 Father requests an award of attorney fees under

section 13-17-102, arguing that mother’s appeal is substantially

frivolous. Father also cites the division’s opinion in Zunker, No.

25CA0123, slip op. at ¶¶ 27-28, which cautioned mother that her

future noncompliance with the appellate rules could result in

sanctions.

¶ 32 Even though this appeal concerns the magistrate’s award of

attorney fees against mother, mother begins the “Statement of the

Case” in her opening brief as follows: “This appeal challenges

multiple rulings in lengthy, multi-year litigation concerning an

unconstitutional gag order, child support, discovery and disclosure

of significant trust and business income, and attendant sanctions

and attorney-fee [sic] awards.” (Emphasis added.) And, as noted

above and true to that description, mother dedicates significant

effort to once again re-litigating the merits of long-settled issues,

including the propriety of the initial restriction on her ability to file

pro se, the calculation of father’s income for child support

purposes, the magistrate’s evidentiary findings and rulings on

disclosure disputes, and mother’s attempts to disqualify the

15
magistrate from presiding over the case. Her attempts to tie these

matters to the sole issue on appeal — the propriety of the attorney

fees award — are perfunctory at best.

¶ 33 In short, mother’s appeal continues the same course of

behavior that led to the magistrate’s fee award in the first place. As

such, it, like the bulk of her filings over the past several years, is

frivolous as argued. See Rose L. Watson Revocable Trust v. BP

America Prod. Co., 2014 COA 11, ¶¶ 25-26 (awarding appellate fees

where a party “continue[d] to assert frivolous arguments even after

courts ha[d] repeatedly declared that those arguments are

frivolous”). We therefore grant father’s request and, exercising our

discretion under C.A.R. 39.5, remand to the district court for a

determination of father’s reasonable attorney fees incurred on

appeal.

V. Disposition

¶ 34 The portion of mother’s appeal challenging the magistrate’s

October 2020 order is dismissed. The district court’s order denying

mother’s petition for review, which effectively adopted the

magistrate’s order awarding father attorney fees, is affirmed. The

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case is remanded to the district court to determine and award

father his reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

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