Peo v. Wortman

23CA1790 Peo v Wortman 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1790
Weld County District Court No. 19CR539
Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jeremy Edward Wortman,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Fox and Dunn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Emeson & Zale, LLC, Brian S. Emeson, Boulder, Colorado for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jeremy Edward Wortman, appeals the district

court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion following an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Wortman was charged with first degree kidnapping, second

degree kidnapping, third degree assault, and obstruction of

telephone or telegraph service. The charges stemmed from

allegations that Wortman and the victim (his ex-girlfriend) met in a

parking lot to discuss custody issues concerning their daughter.

The victim got into Wortman’s car to talk. When they began to

argue, however, Wortman drove off. He drove erratically, crashing

the car at one point, and refused to let the victim out of the car or

allow her to call 911. When the victim tried to escape the car,

Wortman grabbed her, causing pain and injury. Eventually, law

enforcement officers stopped the car and Wortman was arrested.

¶3 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wortman pleaded guilty to

attempted first degree kidnapping. The remaining counts were

dismissed. The parties stipulated to a prison sentence of between

eight and eighteen years. The district court imposed an eighteen-

year sentence. Wortman didn’t directly appeal his sentence.

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¶4 Thereafter, Wortman filed a pro se motion under Crim. P.

35(c), asserting that (1) plea counsel had provided him with

ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion under Crim. P. 35(b)

despite promising to do so, and (2) his sentence was grossly

disproportionate. The district court appointed counsel, who later

supplemented Wortman’s ineffective assistance claim and included

additional information pertinent to the Crim. P. 35(b) motion. At a

status conference, the prosecution confessed Wortman’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, and the court agreed to allow Wortman

to pursue his untimely Crim. P. 35(b) motion.

¶5 Wortman asked the district court to reconsider his sentence

based on his (1) expressed remorse for his actions; (2) progression

from maximum security to minimum security incarceration and his

lack of disciplinary reports while in the custody of the Department

of Corrections (DOC); (3) successful completion of multiple DOC

classes, programs, and treatment; (4) successful completion of

educational courses through Pueblo Community College and Adams

State University; and (5) strong family support. In a written

response, the prosecution opposed any reduction in Wortman’s

sentence, noting the seriousness of the offense, Wortman’s prior

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criminal history, and the victim and her family’s strong support of

the original sentence.

¶6 The district court set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing,

the court heard testimony from the victim, the victim’s family,

Wortman, and Wortman’s family. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court declined to reduce Wortman’s sentence. The court

remarked that it was “impressed” with all the classes Wortman had

taken and was convinced that his work spoke “very highly” of his

“character” and would set him up for “success” upon his release.

However, the court acknowledged the “seriousness of the offense”

and the “extremely aggravated nature of the case.” And the court

observed that the sentence, while punitive, also recognized that

Wortman was “not beyond rehabilitation” because the sentence

allowed for his “ultimate release into the community.” (Wortman

had faced a potential sentence of life in prison.) The court also

observed that although Wortman was remorseful, his remorse

“reflect[ed] primarily a concern about [him]self and [his] family” and

not the victim. Further, the court noted that the classes Wortman

had taken “appear[ed] to be [about] improving [him]self and [his]

situation,” but didn’t seem to have “that same focus on victim

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impact” and “understanding the impact on others in making sure

that this type of behavior d[id not] happen again.” Ultimately, the

court concluded that a reduction in Wortman’s sentence wasn’t

warranted but noted that its decision didn’t “diminish the amount

of work or the quality of work that [Wortman had] done.”

II. Discussion

¶7 Wortman contends that the district court abused its discretion

by denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion because the court (1) relied on

an erroneous factual finding that he hadn’t expressed remorse for

the victim and (2) concluded that Wortman’s performance and

rehabilitation in prison was insufficient to warrant a sentence

reduction. We don’t see any abuse of discretion.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 We review the denial of a Crim. P. 35(b) motion for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Chavez, 2020 COA 80M, ¶ 8. A district court

abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or “based on an erroneous view of the law.”

Hoang v. People, 2014 CO 27, ¶ 12.

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B. Analysis

¶9 Crim. P. 35(b) permits a district court to review a sentence to

ensure that it is proper before making it final. People v. Dunlap, 36

P.3d 778, 780 (Colo. 2001). “Any decision to reduce a sentence

based on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion remains within the sound

discretion of the trial court.” Id.

¶ 10 In exercising its discretion, a district court must “consider all

relevant and material factors, including new evidence as well as

facts known at the time the original sentence was pronounced.”

People v. Busch, 835 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App. 1992). The district

court isn’t required to make findings of fact when ruling on a

motion for reduction of a sentence but should “provide a statement

of the basic reasons in support of its ruling.” People v. Olivas, 911

P.2d 675, 677 (Colo. App. 1995). “Only if the trial court has refused

to consider any information in mitigation and fails to make findings

in support of its decision is there a failure by the trial court to

exercise its judicial discretion.” Busch, 835 P.2d at 583.

¶ 11 Wortman first contends that the district court abused its

discretion by denying his motion based on a purportedly erroneous

factual finding that he expressed no remorse for the harm he had

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caused the victim. Specifically, he asserts that the court

erroneously found that he had not expressed concern for the victim

because the court said, “[b]ut I didn’t hear anything about [the

victim],” which he argues suggested that he appeared more

concerned with the impact his sentence had on him and his family.

But the court made this statement after already acknowledging that

Wortman had “apologized multiple times.” Nevertheless, it was the

court’s perception that his words reflected “primarily” a concern

about himself and his family. The hearing transcript supports this

finding. Wortman apologized twice to the victim but also said the

following:

• “This [hearing] has brought some hope to me
and my family during a very depressing time in
our lives.”

• “I can’t express enough how sorry I am to [the
victim] and everyone else affected, including
the community.”

• “Of course, this time has been extremely
difficult on me. But what makes it worse is
that I’m not the only one suffering. It breaks
my heart knowing how hard this has been on
my loved ones. And to hear my mother crying
completely crushes me, because I know how
badly that she wants me home.”

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• “It’s not only emotionally difficult, but this
prison time has been a huge financial burden
on my family, as well.”

• “And year after year, my poor mother
continues to help pay for my food, hygiene,
clothing, [and] phone time. I feel terrible not
being able to provide for myself as a grown
adult.”

• “Again, I want to apologize to . . . the victim,
her family, my family, and anyone else that
was affected that night.”

¶ 12 Thus, contrary to Wortman’s characterization of the district

court’s findings, the record reflects that it considered and weighed

the evidence before it. And its determination is supported by the

record.

¶ 13 We next reject Wortman’s second contention — that the

district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence

based on his performance and rehabilitation in prison.

¶ 14 To begin, we disagree with the People’s assertion that this

portion of the appeal should be dismissed because it concerns only

the propriety of the sentence imposed. See Olivas, 911 P.2d at 677

(“There is no right to appeal the trial court’s denial of a motion for

reduction of sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(b) when the only

issue presented to and resolved by the court is the propriety of the

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sentence itself.”). Rather, we conclude that this claim challenges

the propriety of the court’s Crim. P. 35(b) ruling and is properly

before us. See id.

¶ 15 Wortman contends that his performance in prison warranted a

reduction in his sentence. In support, he recounts the numerous

courses, programs, classes, and therapy he has completed as well

as his exemplary disciplinary record. But the district court

expressly acknowledged that it had considered Wortman’s progress

in prison and commended him for it. Nevertheless, the court found

this information unpersuasive when weighed against other factors:

(1) the serious nature of the offense; (2) that the current sentence

provided a “punitive sanction” but also accounted for Wortman’s

“ultimate release into the community”; and (3) the remorse

Wortman expressed was “primarily” directed toward himself and his

family and not toward the victim. This wasn’t an abuse of

discretion. See id. (no abuse of discretion if the district court “noted

the matters it considered” and “provide[d] a statement of the basic

reasons in support of its ruling”); see also Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 782

(“Crim. P. 35(b) affords trial judges a large amount of discretion

when considering the defendant’s motion.”).

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¶ 16 Because the district court’s order reflects sufficient

consideration of the mitigating evidence provided by Wortman and

states the basic reasons for denying the motion, we perceive no

abuse of discretion.

III. Disposition

¶ 17 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE DUNN concur.

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