People v. Medina

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
May 7, 2026

2026 COA 36

No. 24CA2021, People v. Medina — Criminal Law —
Postconviction Remedies — Punishment for Habitual Criminals

In this postconviction proceeding, a division of the court of

appeals considers, as a matter of first impression in Colorado,

whether the rule announced in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S.

821, 835 (2024) — which requires that a jury, rather than a judge,

determine whether a defendant committed prior offenses on

separate occasions for purposes of habitual sentencing — may be

applied retroactively to cases that became final before the rule’s

announcement. Applying the framework established in Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-11 (1989), the division concludes that, to

the extent that Erlinger announced a new rule of constitutional law,

the rule is neither substantive nor a watershed rule of procedure

and, thus, it does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The
division therefore affirms the postconviction court’s denial of the

defendant’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion, which was both untimely and

successive.

The division also rejects the defendant’s claim alleging a

violation of his speedy trial rights under the Uniform Mandatory

Disposition of Detainers Act. Applying the law of the case doctrine,

the division declines to consider this issue, which was previously

rejected by two prior divisions of the court.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 36

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2021
Jefferson County District Court No. 14CR3044
Honorable Chantel Contiguglia, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Delano Marco Medina,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur

Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Delano Marco Medina, Pro Se
¶1 The United States Supreme Court held in Erlinger v. United

States that for purposes of sentencing a defendant under the federal

Armed Career Criminal Act — which increases prison terms for

defendants who previously committed three violent felonies or

serious drug offenses on separate occasions — the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments require a jury, rather than a judge, to decide whether

the defendant’s prior offenses were committed on separate

occasions. 602 U.S. 821, 835 (2024). The Colorado Supreme Court

has held that this rule applies to Colorado’s habitual criminal

sentencing statute, such that a jury, rather than a judge, must

decide whether a defendant’s prior felony convictions arose out of

separate and distinct criminal episodes. People v. Gregg, 2025 CO

57, ¶ 24; see § 18-1.3-801(1)(b)(I), (1.5), (2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025.1

¶2 In this appeal, defendant, Delano Marco Medina, asks us to

consider, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, whether this

rule may be applied retroactively to cases that became final before

the rule was announced. We hold that it cannot. Therefore, we

1 After the announcement of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821

(2024), the General Assembly amended the habitual criminal
sentencing statute to require a jury to make such decisions. See
Ch. 344, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-803(1), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1866.

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conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Medina’s

untimely and successive postconviction motion raising the issue.

¶3 Medina also challenges the postconviction court’s order

denying his motion to dismiss all the charges against him based on

an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Uniform

Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), §§ 16-14-101 to

-108, C.R.S. 2025. We decline to consider his challenge, which two

prior divisions of this court have already rejected.

¶4 Accordingly, we affirm both orders.

I. Background

¶5 Following an incident in which Medina pursued and fired a

gun toward someone he claimed had threatened his girlfriend,

Medina was charged with attempted first degree assault, two counts

of felony menacing, possession of a weapon by a previous offender,

and seven habitual counts. Not long after the initial charges were

filed, Medina was arrested and held in another county of the state

on charges and warrants issued in other cases.

¶6 In December 2014, Medina submitted a request under the

UMDDA, which allows a person in the custody of the Department of

Corrections (DOC) to request the final disposition of any untried

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charges pending against them in the state. See § 16-14-102(1),

C.R.S. 2025. But the district attorney in this case initially didn’t

receive the request, and while Medina sent a copy of the request to

the DOC, he wasn’t in DOC custody at the time. He entered DOC

custody in mid-March 2015, and the DOC forwarded his request to

the district attorney in late April. The district attorney received it in

early May. Medina’s trial was set for mid-August of that year.

¶7 A few weeks before trial, Medina filed a motion to dismiss the

charges, asserting that the court had lost jurisdiction over the case

because it hadn’t gone to trial within the statutory deadline of 182

days after he submitted his UMDDA request. See § 16-14-104(1),

C.R.S. 2025. The trial court denied the motion.

¶8 The trial proceeded, and a jury convicted Medina on all the

substantive charges. The trial court then found Medina guilty of all

the habitual charges, adjudicated him a habitual criminal, and

sentenced him to forty-four years in the custody of the DOC.

¶9 Medina appealed, arguing, as relevant here, that his right to a

speedy trial under the UMDDA had been violated. A division of this

court rejected his argument and affirmed the judgment. See People

v. Medina, slip op. at ¶ 22 (Colo. App. No. 15CA1681, May 23, 2019)

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(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)), as modified on denial of

reh’g (Aug. 22, 2019) (Medina I). The division concluded that

because Medina had only substantially (not strictly) complied with

the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, he had to establish that the

prosecution had actual notice of his UMDDA request. Id. at ¶¶ 17-

19; see People v. McKimmy, 2014 CO 76, ¶ 24. And because the

prosecution didn’t have actual notice until May 2015 and the trial

was held less than 182 days later, the trial was timely. Medina I,

slip op. at ¶ 20; see § 16-14-104(1). The division also concluded

that, to the extent that the DOC had failed to timely submit

Medina’s UMDDA request to the prosecution, Medina hadn’t

suffered any prejudice because the trial occurred within 182 days of

when the court and the prosecution would’ve received the request

had the DOC sent it in a timely manner. Medina I, slip op. at ¶¶ 9,

21; see Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789, 792-93 (Colo. 1987).

¶ 10 Then, in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, Medina again invoked the

UMDDA, presenting additional evidence that he claimed established

that he was in DOC custody at the time he made his UMDDA

request. The postconviction court denied the motion. Another

division of this court affirmed the denial, concluding that the

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evidence Medina had presented either wasn’t new or didn’t support

his claim. People v. Medina, slip op. at ¶¶ 17-22 (Colo. App. Nos.

21CA0604 & 21CA0704, Jan. 25, 2024) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)) (Medina II).

¶ 11 Thereafter, Medina filed the two motions now at issue. First,

he filed another motion to dismiss all charges, once again arguing

that his UMDDA rights were violated, but this time raising the issue

under Crim. P. 35(a). The postconviction court summarily denied

the motion. And second, he filed a motion to dismiss the habitual

charges, arguing that, under Erlinger — which was announced after

the Medina II decision — his conviction on the habitual charges was

unconstitutional because a judge, rather than a jury, had made the

determination that his prior convictions arose out of separate and

distinct criminal episodes. The postconviction court denied the

motion, concluding that Erlinger didn’t apply retroactively.

¶ 12 Medina now appeals the postconviction court’s orders denying

his two motions to dismiss.

II. UMDDA Challenge

¶ 13 Medina first contends that his sentence is illegal because the

trial court lacked jurisdiction due to violation of the UMDDA.

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Applying the law of the case doctrine, we decline to address this

issue, as it has already been resolved by two divisions of this court.2

¶ 14 We review a court’s summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(a) motion

de novo. See People v. Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20. We likewise

review de novo the question whether a prior ruling by a court

constitutes the law of the case. People v. Misenhelter, 214 P.3d 497,

500 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d, 234 P.3d 657 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 15 The law of the case doctrine rests on the principle that “when

an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the

matter.” Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Colo. App. 1982)

(quoting United States v. U.S. Smelting Refin. & Mining Co., 339 U.S.

186, 198 (1950)). This doctrine applies to attempts to relitigate an

appellate court’s holdings and the rulings logically necessary to

those holdings. People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1983).

It also applies to successive postconviction motions brought under

Crim. P. 35(a). People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Colo. App. 2007).

2 This issue also is more properly raised under Crim. P. 35(c) than

under Crim. P. 35(a), as it doesn’t challenge Medina’s sentence so
much as it challenges the judgment of conviction. See People v.
Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo. App. 2006) (comparing these
two subsections of Rule 35). As such, it is likely both untimely and
successive, just like Medina’s Erlinger challenge.

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¶ 16 Although one division of this court is not bound by the

decision of any other division, see People v. Williams, 2025 COA 26,

¶ 14, we generally apply the law of the case doctrine to refuse to

revisit issues resolved by another division in the same case unless

“the previous decision is no longer sound because of changed

conditions or law, or legal or factual error” or applying “the prior

decision would result in manifest injustice,” Cummings v. Arapahoe

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2021 COA 122, ¶ 12 (quoting Saint John’s

Church in Wilderness v. Scott, 2012 COA 72, ¶ 9).

¶ 17 Here, while Medina’s UMDDA argument is framed differently

than before, the substance of his argument is virtually the same as

it was in his earlier appeals. Again, he argues that he was in DOC

custody when he made his UMDDA request and that the 182-day

statutory deadline expired before the time of trial. And while he

claims the previous decisions didn’t address some of his specific

arguments, the divisions in those cases nonetheless rejected his

UMDDA claim and fully explained their reasons for doing so.

¶ 18 We decline to reconsider this issue. Medina hasn’t shown that

the previous divisions’ decisions are no longer sound due to

changed conditions, new law, or legal or factual error, nor has he

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shown that applying those decisions would result in manifest

injustice. See Cummings, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we treat the decisions

as the law of the case and do not revisit them.

III. Erlinger Challenge

¶ 19 Medina also contends that his habitual sentence is illegal

under Erlinger because a judge, rather than a jury, made the

determination that his prior convictions arose out of separate and

distinct criminal episodes. While the rule set forth in Erlinger does

apply to habitual sentences like Medina’s, see Gregg, ¶ 24, in this

case, unlike in Gregg, Medina’s conviction was final before Erlinger

was announced. And we agree with the postconviction court’s

conclusion that Erlinger cannot be applied retroactively on collateral

review. Accordingly, we conclude that Medina’s challenge was

properly denied, as it is both untimely and successive.3

A. Procedural Bars to Review

¶ 20 The People assert that Medina’s postconviction motion based

on Erlinger was untimely under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I) and section

16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025, because he didn’t file it within three years

3 We reject the People’s argument that Medina failed to properly

include his Erlinger challenge within the scope of his appeal.

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after his conviction became final and didn’t identify an applicable

exception to the limitation period. However, “[a] reviewing court has

the discretion to address the merits of an untimely motion for

postconviction relief if the motion is premised on newly arising

authority of constitutional magnitude” that applies retroactively to

cases on collateral review. People v. Rainer, 2013 COA 51, ¶ 28,

rev’d on other grounds, 2017 CO 50.

¶ 21 Similarly, the People assert that Medina’s Erlinger challenge is

successive because he could’ve raised it in his direct appeal or his

earlier Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII). But again,

we may address “[a]ny claim based on a new rule of constitutional

law that was previously unavailable,” so long as the rule applies

retroactively to cases on collateral review. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(c).

¶ 22 Therefore, to determine whether we can address the merits of

Medina’s claim, we must assess whether Erlinger established a new

rule of constitutional law that can be applied retroactively to cases

on collateral review. See Rainer, ¶ 29; Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(c).

B. The Teague Framework

¶ 23 We apply the test set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,

310-11 (1989), to determine whether a new constitutional rule of

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criminal procedure applies retroactively to cases on collateral

review. Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 983 (Colo. 2006). This

analysis presents a question of law that we review de novo. See

People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7. Under the Teague test, we

examine (1) whether the defendant’s conviction is final; (2) whether

the rule is in fact new; and (3) whether the rule meets either of the

two exceptions to the general bar precluding retroactive application

of new rules to cases that were final before the rules were

announced. Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. The two exceptions are

when the new rule is substantive in nature and when it is a

watershed procedural rule. Id. at 986; Cooper, ¶ 8.4

¶ 24 Here, there is no question as to the finality of Medina’s

conviction. The conviction became final when the mandate was

4 The United States Supreme Court has abolished the watershed

exception for purposes of federal collateral review. See Edwards v.
Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 272 (2021). But the Colorado Supreme
Court had already adopted that exception as part of Colorado’s test,
see Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 986 (Colo. 2006), and it
hasn’t since then determined whether the exception still applies
under Colorado law, see McDonald v. People, 2024 CO 75, ¶ 16 n.3
(avoiding the issue). Therefore, we presume that the exception still
applies. See People v. Harmon, 2019 COA 156, ¶ 3 n.1 (“[W]e are
bound by holdings of the Colorado Supreme Court and must follow
those holdings unless and until they are overruled by that court.”).

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issued in his direct appeal. See Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. Thus,

we turn to consideration of the rule announced in Erlinger.

C. Whether Erlinger Announced a New Constitutional Rule

¶ 25 We first conclude that Erlinger announced a new rule of

constitutional law.

¶ 26 “[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or

imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Thus, a rule is not new if it “was dictated

by then-existing precedent” and “was apparent to all reasonable

jurists” at the time. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413 (2004)

(quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)).

¶ 27 Under this test, Erlinger announced a new rule because it

broke new ground.

¶ 28 In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the United States

Supreme Court held that when recidivism is treated as a sentence

enhancer, a judge can find the fact of a prior conviction rather than

submitting the issue to a jury. 523 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1998). Then,

in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact

of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a

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jury.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). And in Blakely v. Washington, the

Court held that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is

the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of

the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”

542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis omitted).

¶ 29 In the wake of these and other related decisions, all twelve

federal circuit courts held that judges may make the determination

of whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions. Erlinger,

602 U.S. at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). But

the United States Supreme Court disagreed in Erlinger, concluding

that to comply with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, juries — not

judges — must make such determinations. 602 U.S. at 835.

¶ 30 Thus, the rule announced in Erlinger was neither dictated by

pre-existing precedent nor apparent to all reasonable jurists. See

Beard, 542 U.S. at 413. Accordingly, it was a new constitutional

rule. See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 352 (2013) (a

decision announced a new rule when it “answered a question about

the Sixth Amendment’s reach that [the Supreme Court] had left

open, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions”).

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D. Whether Erlinger Meets Either Teague Exception

¶ 31 But while Erlinger did announce a new constitutional rule, we

conclude that the rule doesn’t meet either Teague exception, as it is

neither a substantive rule nor a watershed procedural rule.

¶ 32 As to the first exception, rules are substantive if they “forbid[]

‘criminal punishment of certain primary conduct’” or “prohibit[] ‘a

certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of

their status or offense.’” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190,

206 (2016) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)).

In other words, “[a] rule is substantive rather than procedural if it

alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law

punishes.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004). “In

contrast, rules that regulate only the manner of determining the

defendant’s culpability are procedural.” Id. Procedural rules “alter

‘the range of permissible methods for determining whether a

defendant’s conduct is punishable.’” Welch v. United States, 578

U.S. 120, 129 (2016) (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353). “Rules that

allocate decisionmaking authority” between a judge and a jury “are

prototypical procedural rules.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353.

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¶ 33 The rule announced in Erlinger is procedural, not substantive.

It doesn’t alter the range of conduct or the class of persons the law

punishes. See id. Rather, it solely affects the manner of

determining a defendant’s punishment by allocating decision-

making authority between a judge and a jury on an issue affecting

habitual sentencing. See id.; see also People v. Johnson, 142 P.3d

722, 725 (Colo. 2006) (the rule announced in Blakely was

procedural); People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 498 (Colo. App. 2002)

(the rule announced in Apprendi was procedural). See generally

United States v. Charles, 813 F. Supp. 3d 200, 203 (D. Mass. 2025)

(“There is no question that Erlinger’s rule is procedural.”).

¶ 34 The second, watershed exception is “extremely narrow,” People

v. Tate, 2015 CO 42, ¶ 56 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352), and

applies only when a rule of criminal procedure “implicat[es] the

fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,”

Johnson, 142 P.3d at 726 (quoting Beard, 542 U.S. at 417). “[I]n

order to be considered watershed, the new rule must be more than

‘fundamental’; it ‘must be one “without which the likelihood of an

accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”’” Edwards, 129 P.3d

at 986-87 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352).

14
¶ 35 As the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized, the watershed

exception doesn’t apply to the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona,

536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) — which is that only a jury, not a judge,

may find an aggravating circumstance necessary to impose the

death penalty — because “the type of judicial factfinding in question

[does] not create an impermissible risk of injustice.” Edwards, 129

P.3d at 987 (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. at 356). For similar reasons,

and because the issue involved sentencing procedures as opposed

to a determination of innocence or guilt, the Colorado Supreme

Court later determined that Blakely, too, doesn’t fall within the

exception. Johnson, 142 P.3d at 727-28. And a division of this

court also held that Apprendi doesn’t fall within the exception.

Bradbury, 68 P.3d at 499.

¶ 36 Given that all these cases raise similar issues concerning the

allocation of decision-making authority between a judge and a jury,

if Ring, Apprendi, and Blakely don’t qualify as cases announcing

watershed procedural rules, it’s difficult for us to understand how

Erlinger could. And Medina doesn’t offer any arguments that might

support such a distinction. Accordingly, we conclude that the rule

announced in Erlinger isn’t a watershed procedural rule.

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E. Conclusion

¶ 37 Because neither of the Teague exceptions to the bar on

retroactivity applies, we conclude that the rule announced in

Erlinger does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The

postconviction court thus properly denied Medina’s Erlinger motion,

as the motion was both untimely and successive. See Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(I), (VII); § 16-5-402(1).5 Therefore, we don’t address the

merits of Medina’s claim challenging his habitual sentence.

IV. Disposition

¶ 38 The orders are affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

5 Medina argues that there’s no need for the rule announced in

Erlinger to be retroactive because the rule pronounced in Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), still applies, and under that
rule, he was entitled to have a jury consider his habitual charges.
But that doesn’t help his case. Apprendi was announced in 2000,
long before Medina’s case became final, so it doesn’t enable him to
overcome the procedural bars to his untimely and successive
postconviction claim. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I), (VII); § 16-5-402(1),
C.R.S. 2025.

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