Marriage of Laffaye

25CA0143 Marriage of Laffaye 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0143
La Plata County District Court No. 14DR2163
Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Ann Marie Laffaye,

Appellee,

and

Patrick William Laffaye,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 16, 2026

Hinds and Hinds Family Law, P.C., C. Darin Jensen, Greenwood Village,
Colorado, for Appellee

The Law Firm of Lisa Ward, LLC, Lisa Ward, Donald Lawrence, Jr., Durango,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 This post-decree dissolution of marriage appeal involves a

dispute over the distribution of funds from a deferred compensation

account. Husband, Patrick William Laffaye, appeals the district

court’s order modifying the terms of the parties’ separation

agreement based on its unconscionability. He also appeals the

portion of the order declining to award him attorney fees under

section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025. We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 Husband and Ann Marie Laffaye (wife) jointly petitioned for

divorce in 2014. Neither party was represented by counsel. The

parties entered into a separation agreement and a parenting plan,

which included the following relevant provisions:

• Wife shall receive 100% of the “Distribution of Funds,

Shares, etc., within the” Westport Strategies Retirement

Account.

• “The Westport Strategies Retirement Account (a.k.a.

Gartner Deferred Compensation Account) is to be used

exclusively for post-secondary education as outlined in

Section D(4) of the Parenting Plan. Expense reports are to

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be submitted to [husband] semi-annually. Any shortages

or overages will be divided equally by both parties.”

• “Post-secondary education expenses for the child(ren) shall

be divided with [wife] paying 100% and [husband] paying

0% of” tuition, room and board, books, fees, travel, and

spending money.

¶3 Sometime later, the parties discovered that the Westport

Strategies Retirement Account (Gartner account) couldn’t be

accessed for regular withdrawals or distributions without significant

tax penalties. (The parties were apparently unaware of the tax

penalty issue when they entered into the agreement.) Wife then

paid the children’s colleges expenses out-of-pocket from her

separate resources. Wife also took one distribution from the

Gartner account in January 2020 (2020 distribution). The gross

amount of the distribution was $118,820.84; however, wife received

only $76,247.00 after tax withholdings. (It’s unclear from the

record whether wife used the funds from this distribution to

reimburse herself for college expenses she had paid from other

sources or whether the funds went directly to college expenses.)

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¶4 After the children finished their postsecondary education,

husband asked wife for his share of the remaining balance of the

Gartner account. However, the parties disagreed about how the

account would be divided. Husband then filed a contempt motion,

alleging that wife hadn’t complied with her obligations under the

separation agreement. The court declined to find wife in contempt

because the separation agreement lacked sufficient detail regarding

the date upon which wife was supposed to pay husband his share.

The court advised the parties, “[I]f the parties believe the execution

of the separation agreement is not possible as written, the parties

may seek additional orders of the Court to effectuate the intent of

the separation agreement. The party seeking the Court’s

intervention must file a motion.”

¶5 Wife filed a “Motion for the Court to Resolve Remaining Issues

with Separation Agreement and Declaratory Relief Pursuant to

C.R.C.P. 57,” in which she requested that the court address

compensation owed for her out-of-pocket payments for college

expenses, the valuation date of the Gartner account, the tax

implications of future distributions from the Gartner account, and

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how the parties should account for the 2020 distribution. The

court set the matter for a hearing.

¶6 As we understand it, the parties appear to have broadly agreed

that (1) their separation agreement says that wife would pay the

children’s college expenses from the Gartner account and that the

parties would “equally” divide what was left in it (though they

disagreed about the details of that division) or be equally

responsible for any deficit; (2) wife instead made the vast majority (if

not all) of the college expense payments from other sources; and

(3) the court’s job at the hearing was to determine how much money

from the Gartner account was due from wife to husband after

accounting for the 2020 distribution and the payment of college

expenses from other sources.

¶7 As relevant here, the parties stipulated to or disputed the

following facts heading into the hearing:

• The parties stipulated that wife paid $585,322.32 for the

children’s college expenses, for which the parties were

equally responsible.

• Wife claimed she paid additional college expenses;

husband disputed the classification, necessity, or

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reasonableness of these additional payments (disputed

expenses).

• The parties stipulated that husband paid $9,003.96 in

college expenses and was entitled to a credit in that

amount.

• The parties disputed how to account for the 2020

distribution in the division of the Gartner account.

Husband argued (as he does on appeal) that he should

receive a credit for the gross amount of the 2020

distribution. Wife argued that the court should consider

only the net amount.

• The parties stipulated that husband was entitled to a

payment of half of the Gartner account funds after the

court determined how to account for the college expenses

and the 2020 distribution (remaining funds).

• However, the parties disagreed as to the “valuation date”

for the Gartner account. Husband argued that he should

receive half of the remaining funds as of the date of the

hearing. Wife argued that husband should receive half of

the remaining funds as of “December 2022” (the end of

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the year in which wife made the final college expense

payment).

• As best we understand the record, the parties agreed

that, as a matter of fact, any future distributions from

the Gartner account would be subject to tax withholding.

The parties disagreed about how to allocate or account

for the tax burden on the remaining funds. Husband

argued that he should receive the gross amount of his

share of the remaining funds tax free. Wife argued that

husband’s share of the remaining funds should be

reduced by her marginal tax rate.

• Wife couldn’t take any distributions from the Gartner

account at the time of the hearing. Thus, the parties

agreed that if wife had to pay the remaining funds to

husband in the near term, she would pay them from

another source.

¶8 The district court set the matter for a half-day hearing and

gave the parties equal time to present their evidence. Husband’s

counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of wife, and as a

result, husband wasn’t able to testify. The district court denied

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husband’s request for additional time to testify and denied his

request for attorney fees under section 14-10-119 because husband

didn’t present any evidence of his financial resources during the

hearing.

¶9 After the hearing, the court issued an “Order re: Motion for

Court to Resolve Remaining Issues with Separation Agreement and

Declaratory Relief Rule 57” (declaratory relief order). The court

noted, “The agreement and decree are both ‘silent on the power to

modify,’ and therefore, pursuant to [In re Marriage of Thompson,

640 P.2d 279, 281 (Colo. App. 1982)], the Court finds it has the

authority to consider the terms for ‘present unconscionability’ and

therefore, possible modification.” After also noting that the

separation agreement failed to state the method by which each

party would receive half of the Gartner account and whether the

remaining funds would be distributed before or after tax, the

district court ruled, “The Court must issue orders to give effect to as

many of the terms of the agreement while maintaining the fair and

conscionable requirement of an agreement.” The court entered the

following orders:

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• Valuation date. The court valued the Gartner account as

of December 31, 2022. The balance of the account on

that date was $832,796.65. Thus, the court concluded

that each party had a “starting share” of $416,339.30.1

• Disputed college expenses. The court concluded that

$24,622.63 of the disputed expenses were properly

classified as college expenses that should be accounted

for in the division of the Gartner account. Thus, the total

amount of college expenses paid by wife was

$609,945.00, and each party was responsible for

$304,972.50.

• 2020 distribution. The court concluded that, based on

the language of the separation agreement, the parties

“intended for any distribution to be of equal benefit to

both parties.” The court also recognized that had wife

continued to take distributions to pay the children’s

college expenses, the Gartner account would have been

1 It appears the district court miscalculated one-half of $832,796.65

by roughly $59.00. Neither party raises this de minimis error on
appeal. We use the court’s “starting share” calculation of
$416,339.30 for the remainder of this section for consistency.

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substantially more depleted due to the tax withholdings

on the distributions. Thus, the court ordered that the

net amount of the 2020 distribution be credited toward

the college expenses with husband receiving “credit” for

$38,123.50 — one-half of the net distribution.

¶ 10 The following table demonstrates how the court calculated

husband’s share of the gross remaining funds.

Funds Amounts ($)

One-half of Gartner account 416,339.30
value as of December 31, 2022
One-half of total college -304,972.50
expenses paid by wife
Credit for one-half of net 2020 +38,123.50
distribution
Credit for husband’s direct +9,003.96
payment of college expenses
Husband’s share of remaining 158,494.26
funds of Gartner account

¶ 11 Regarding taxes, the court noted that the separation

agreement was silent about the allocation of the tax burden on the

remaining funds. However, given the agreement’s directive to divide

the remaining funds in the Gartner account “equally,” the court

ordered that each party would be responsible for the taxes on their

respective portions of the remaining funds. Because the parties

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stipulated that no distributions could be taken from the Gartner

account at the time, the court ordered husband’s portion of the

remaining funds be paid to him from wife’s separate 401(k) account

through a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).

¶ 12 Husband contends that the court erred by (1) modifying the

parties’ separation agreement based on unconscionability; (2) using

the net amount of the 2020 distribution in its accounting;

(3) denying him additional time to testify during the half-day

hearing; and (4) denying his request for attorney fees under section

14-10-119. We address each argument in turn.

II. The Separation Agreement

¶ 13 Husband first asserts that (1) the district court erred by

modifying the terms of the separation agreement regarding the

Gartner account; (2) he was entitled to 50% of the remaining funds

as of the date the account was divided; and (3) he was entitled to

receive his share of the remaining funds tax free. We agree that the

court erred by modifying the separation agreement based on

unconscionability, but we don’t agree that the court was required to

implement husband’s proposed division.

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A. Modification of the Separation Agreement

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 14 We review de novo whether the court applied the correct law.

In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 9.

¶ 15 Section 14-10-112(1), C.R.S. 2025, authorizes parties to enter

into a separation agreement as part of their dissolution of marriage

proceedings. A separation agreement is a contract between parties

to a marriage. In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669, 671 (Colo.

1983). Unless the court finds the separation agreement to be

unconscionable, the property division and spousal maintenance

terms of the agreement are binding on the court. § 14-10-112(2); In

re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 16 After the separation agreement is incorporated into a decree of

dissolution of marriage, “the provisions as to property disposition”

may not be revoked or modified “unless the court finds the

existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment.”

§ 14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; Camack v. Camack, 62 P.3d 1097,

1099 (Colo. App. 2002); In re Marriage of Seely, 689 P.2d 1154,

1159 (Colo. App. 1984).

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2. Analysis

¶ 17 The district court erred to the extent that it purported to

modify the separation agreement due to “present

unconscionability.” The agreement became enforceable as a court

order when it was incorporated into the decree of dissolution. See

§ 14-10-112(2). Thus, the agreement can’t be modified except

under C.R.C.P. 60.2

¶ 18 However, this doesn’t end our analysis because — as wife

correctly points out — the district court could have interpreted the

parties’ separation agreement to give effect to their intent. We turn

to that issue next.

B. Interpretation of the Separation Agreement

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 19 When parties disagree about the meaning of their separation

agreement, a court can enter orders interpreting the agreement as it

would interpret a contract. See In re Marriage of Crowder, 77 P.3d

2 To the extent wife contends that we can affirm the court’s order

based on C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), her argument is undeveloped, and we
don’t consider it. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d
582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (appellate courts don’t address
undeveloped arguments).

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858, 860-61 (Colo. App. 2003). “In construing a contract, our goal

is to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined

primarily from the language of the contract itself.” Id. We give

words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. 802 E.

Cooper, LLC v. Z-GKids, LLC, 2023 COA 48, ¶ 21. And we construe

the agreement as a whole and avoid interpreting specific terms and

phrases in isolation. See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d

887, 898 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 20 If the language of the agreement is plain, clear, and

unambiguous, the court must enforce the agreement as written.

Randall & Blake, Inc. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 77

P.3d 804, 806 (Colo. App. 2003). However, if a separation

agreement is ambiguous, the district court must consider extrinsic

evidence to determine the parties’ mutual intent at the time of

contracting. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Denv. Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310,

1314 (Colo. 1984). “This extrinsic evidence may include any

pertinent circumstances attendant upon the transaction, including

the conduct of the parties under the agreement.” Id.

¶ 21 The mere fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of

contract terms does not itself create an ambiguity. In re Marriage of

13
Thomason, 802 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Colo. App. 1990). A separation

agreement is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation. See Crowder, 77 P.3d at 861.

¶ 22 The interpretation of a separation agreement and the

determination whether the agreement is ambiguous are questions of

law that we review de novo. Id. at 860; In re Marriage of Williams,

2017 COA 120M, ¶ 11. If an agreement is ambiguous, the

determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact. Gagne v.

Gagne, 2014 COA 127, ¶ 52.

2. Analysis

¶ 23 We agree with wife that the separation agreement is

ambiguous as to both the valuation date and the allocation of the

tax burden on the remaining funds. However, because the court

didn’t make sufficient findings about the parties’ intent at the time

of contracting for us to affirm on that basis, we remand the case for

further proceedings.

a. Valuation Date

¶ 24 The separation agreement says that the Gartner account will

be used exclusively for postsecondary education and that any

“shortages or overages will be divided equally by both parties.”

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¶ 25 Husband contends that the district court erred by setting

December 31, 2022, as the valuation date for the Gartner account’s

remaining funds because the separation agreement entitles him to

“half of that account, on the very date it is paid out to [him],

including any increases in the value of his half.” Husband’s

interpretation is reasonable, but we disagree that it is the only

reasonable interpretation.

¶ 26 As the district court observed, the agreement doesn’t say

anything about the date on which the “shortages or overages” (i.e.

the remaining funds) will be calculated. The court adopted wife’s

proposed valuation date of December 2022, reasoning that

(1) husband originally asked to divide the account upon the

children’s graduation in July 2022 and (2) post-divorce increases in

account value typically belong to the party to whom the account is

allocated. This interpretation is also reasonable, given the

separation agreement’s silence about the valuation date and its

directive that wife “shall receive 100% of the Distribution of Funds,

Shares, etc.” within the account.

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b. Allocation of Tax Burden on Remaining Funds

¶ 27 Wife urges us to affirm the district court’s conclusion that the

parties’ intent was to share the tax burden on the remaining funds

because the separation agreement says that the parties will

“equally” divide the “shortages or overages” in the Gartner account.

Husband contends that the separation agreement unambiguously

requires that wife bear the entire tax burden and that he receive his

share tax free. We again conclude that the agreement is ambiguous

because both parties’ interpretations are reasonable.

¶ 28 We agree with wife and the district court that the word “equal”

generally connotes an intent that each party will receive “the same

measure, quantity, amount, or number” as the other.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/NY5N-9MQS. If

husband were to receive his portion of the remaining funds tax free

while wife was solely responsible for paying the taxes on both her

portion and husband’s portion of the funds, their respective shares

would be unequal.

¶ 29 However, we cannot read the Gartner account provisions in

isolation. See Rogers, 29 P.3d at 898. As husband observes, the

parties expressly agreed to divide a different retirement account in

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wife’s name by using a QDRO. A QDRO “is a device created by the

IRS by which a participant’s retirement funds can be transferred

from a participant to a . . . former spouse.” Thomason, 802 P.2d at

1190. The parties’ QDRO provided that husband would be

responsible for the federal and state taxes on any distributions of

his share of the funds. This demonstrates that the parties were

aware that at least some types of retirement accounts required the

allocation of tax burdens and that they allocated those burdens

equally where they saw fit. Because the parties didn’t make any

similar provision for the tax burden on the remaining funds,

husband’s interpretation that the parties intended to divide the

remaining funds without regard to tax consequences is also

reasonable.

c. Remand

¶ 30 The district court seems to have recognized these ambiguities

in the separation agreement when it said that the agreement was

“deficient in detail” and did “not state . . . the method by which each

party w[ould] receive their half” of the remaining funds. However,

apart from some limited information about the parties’ course of

conduct regarding the valuation date, the court didn’t receive (and

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thus, didn’t consider) extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent about

either the valuation date or the allocation of tax burdens at the time

of contracting.

¶ 31 We therefore reverse the portions of the order relating to the

valuation date and tax allocation, and we remand for the district

court to take additional evidence and make additional findings3

about the parties’ intent at the time they entered into the separation

agreement. The district court should then recalculate and divide

the remaining funds consistent with its intent findings.

III. 2020 Distribution

¶ 32 Husband next argues that the district court erred by

“crediting” him with only half of the net amount of the 2020

distribution. This contention is tied to his argument that the

district court erred by allocating some of the tax burden on

distributions from the Gartner account to him. Because we reverse

the portion of the order allocating the tax burdens, we reverse this

3 When a contract is ambiguous, the parties’ intent is a question of

fact, E. Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co.,
109 P.3d 969, 974 (Colo. 2005), that we cannot resolve in the first
instance, Carousel Farms Metro. Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc.,
2019 CO 51, ¶ 19 (Appellate courts “don’t (and, indeed, can’t) make
findings of fact.”).

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portion as well. On remand, the district court should reconsider

how to account for the 2020 distribution after it makes findings

about the parties’ intent regarding the tax burden.

IV. Due Process

¶ 33 Husband next argues that the district court abused its

discretion and denied him due process of law by refusing him

additional time so that he could testify during the hearing. Because

of our resolution of husband’s first argument, we need not address

this issue (except as relevant to the issue of attorney fees below).

V. Attorney Fees

¶ 34 Lastly, husband argues that the district court erred by

declining his request for attorney fees under section 14-10-119. We

disagree.

A. Preservation

¶ 35 We first reject wife’s contention that this argument is

unpreserved because husband failed to present evidence at the

hearing to support his attorney fees request. In its declaratory

relief order, the district court noted, “The parties dispute whether

one party should pay the other parties’ attorney’s fees pursuant to

[section] 14-10-119,” and it denied the request. Husband thus

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properly preserved this issue for our review. See Berra v. Springer &

Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[T]o preserve

[an] issue for appeal all that [i]s needed [i]s that the issue be

brought to the attention of the trial court and that the court be

given an opportunity to rule on it.”).

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 36 Section 14-10-119 empowers the district court to equitably

apportion costs and fees between parties based on their relative

economic circumstances. In re Marriage of Gutfreund, 148 P.3d

136, 141 (Colo. 2006). When requesting attorney fees under section

14-10-119, the party must present evidence of the reasonableness

of the fees at the time of the hearing on the matter for which the

attorney fees are sought. C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2) cmt. 2; In re

Marriage of Connerton, 260 P.3d 62, 67 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 37 We review a district court’s decision on whether to award fees

under section 14-10-119 for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage

of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 538 (Colo. App. 2011).

C. Analysis

¶ 38 Because husband presented no evidence on the

reasonableness or necessity of his request for attorney fees at the

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hearing in which he was requesting fees, we perceive no error in the

district court’s denial of his request.

¶ 39 To the extent that husband argues that he was prevented from

presenting such evidence due to time restrictions, we reject his

argument because the offers of proof his attorney made when

asking for more time contained no information about husband’s

present economic circumstances. See Itin v. Ungar, 17 P.3d 129,

136 (Colo. 2000) (“An offer of proof must sufficiently inform the

court of the nature and substance of the proposed evidence both to

enable the trial court to exercise its discretion . . . and to provide a

basis for appellate review.”).

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 40 Husband requests an award of his appellate attorney fees

under section 14-10-119. The district court is better situated to

address the necessary factual determinations related to this

request. See In re Marriage of Leverett, 2012 COA 69, ¶ 28. We

therefore exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 and direct the

district court to address whether husband is entitled to an award of

such fees and, if so, in what amount. See In re Marriage of Yates,

148 P.3d 304, 318 (Colo. App. 2006).

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VII. Disposition

¶ 41 The order is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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