Marriage of Broderick

24CA1633 Marriage of Broderick 04-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1633
El Paso County District Court No. 23DR30179
Honorable Marcus Henson, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Edward Stephan Broderick, Jr.,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant,

and

Samantha Allyn Weeks,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 2, 2026

The Drexler Law Group, LLC, Matthew B. Drexler, Teresa A. Drexler, M.
Addison Freebairn, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-
Appellant

Law Office of Joel M Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant and Cross-Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Samantha Allyn

Weeks (wife) and Edward Stephen Broderick, Jr. (husband), both

parties appeal those portions of the permanent orders concerning

the property division and child support. We reverse the marital

property division and therefore also reverse the district court’s

orders concerning maintenance and child support. We remand the

case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In 2023, husband petitioned to dissolve the parties’ eight-year

marriage. The proceedings were bifurcated: the district court

entered a decree of dissolution effective October 23, 2023, and held

the permanent orders hearing on March 21, 2024. In the resulting

permanent orders, the court equally divided the marital estate,

which was valued in excess of $3 million. The court declined to

award either party maintenance but it ordered husband to pay wife

$694 per month in child support.

II. Bifurcation

¶3 As an initial matter, we consider and reject husband’s

contention that the district court abused its discretion by

bifurcating the proceedings.

1
¶4 Under section 14-10-106(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025, a district court

may defer the entry of the permanent orders until after the entry of

the decree of dissolution, if it finds that such a deferral is in the

parties’ best interests. This option should be considered only in

exceptional circumstances. Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d

943, 951 (Colo. 1997). Even so, we will not disturb a court’s

decision to bifurcate absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.

See id. (“Therefore, the district court properly exercised its

discretion, under these exceptional circumstances, in bifurcating

the proceedings.”). A court abuses its discretion when its decision

is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misconstrues or misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Medeiros,

2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28.

¶5 Here, the district court continued the original, half-day

permanent orders hearing scheduled for October 4, 2023, to March

21, 2024, because husband asked that the hearing be set for a full

day. However, when the court granted husband’s motion, the

parties had already assembled exhibits and prepared for the

original hearing date.

2
¶6 Accordingly, wife asked the court to immediately enter the

decree so that the parties would not have to redo the entirety of

their trial preparation for the new hearing, including updating

sworn financial statements and exhibits to reflect changes in the

value of the parties’ property. Wife cited the escalating costs of the

proceeding, arguing that because of the parties’ litigiousness, she

had already incurred an extraordinary amount of attorney fees,

even though a permanent orders hearing had yet to occur.

Therefore, wife asserted that bifurcation would contain costs by

preventing disputes as to constant changes in the value of the

marital estate. Wife also cited the complex financial issues involved

and her desire to be divorced.

¶7 The district court agreed with wife and dissolved the parties’

marriage as of October 23, 2023. In doing so, the court cited the

“extraordinary expense[s]” that would be incurred by both parties if

the court did not bifurcate because the parties had already incurred

significant costs to prepare for the original hearing.

¶8 Given that (1) the original continuance was at the behest of

husband; (2) the gap between the decree and permanent orders

hearing was less than five months; (3) both parties were litigious;

3
and (4) the parties had already spent substantial money and effort

preparing for an October 2023 division of the marital estate, we

cannot say that the court’s decision to bifurcate the proceedings

was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See Burford, 935

P.2d at 951; see also In re Marriage of Lester, 647 P.2d 688 (Colo.

App. 1982) (no error in bifurcating decree and continuing hearing

on property division).

¶9 Husband also argues that the court should have held an

evidentiary hearing as to whether bifurcation was warranted under

Burford, 935 P.2d at 951. But the court’s decision to bifurcate was

made at a status conference at which the parties, who had received

notice that bifurcation would be addressed, presented extensive

argument on the issue. At no point during that status conference

did husband request an evidentiary hearing on bifurcation.

¶ 10 Therefore, to the extent that husband may have been entitled

to a hearing on bifurcation, we agree with wife that he failed to

preserve the issue for appeal. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P.

v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18 (“It is axiomatic that

issues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be

addressed for the first time on appeal.”).

4
III. Marital Property Division

¶ 11 We next address the parties’ contentions concerning the

marital property division.

A. Restricted Stock Units

¶ 12 Both parties assert that the district court erred when valuing

and dividing certain restricted stock units (RSUs) associated with

wife’s employment. Specifically, wife argues that the court erred in

finding that the unvested portion of the RSUs were marital property

subject to division, and both parties challenge the court’s $710,000

valuation of the RSUs. Husband also asserts that the court failed

to value and divide the vested RSUs.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 13 Starting in April 2021, wife was employed by Shift4 Payments,

Inc., and in mid-2022, she was promoted to the role of chief

transformation officer. As part of her compensation package, wife

was awarded four separate grants of RSUs.

¶ 14 Wife received such grants in August 2021, December 2021,

and March 2023, with the RSUs incrementally vesting between

August 2022 and March 2026. The grants of RSUs were governed

5
by both the Restricted Stock Unit Award Agreement accompanying

each grant and Shift4’s Incentive Award Plan.

¶ 15 However, between the entry of the decree and the permanent

orders hearing, wife’s position at Shift4 was eliminated. In the

process, wife signed an employment separation agreement with

Shift4 ending her employment as of February 23, 2024. That

agreement provided wife severance benefits to “assist [her] while

[she] pursue[d] other opportunities.” Specifically, the agreement

entitled wife to a lump sum severance payment of $710,000 and

lifted certain non-competition restrictions that she had previously

agreed to. The agreement also required wife to forfeit any RSUs

that had been granted to her but had not yet vested.

¶ 16 At the permanent orders hearing, husband suggested that

wife’s severance payment was effectively an in-kind exchange for

her unvested RSUs. Husband valued the unvested RSUs at

$967,000 based on the stock price of Shift4 as of March 11, 2024,

the date wife executed the separation agreement.

¶ 17 Conversely, wife argued that only the vested RSUs were

marital property, and given the elimination of her position at Shift4,

6
she had lost any right to the unvested RSUs. Wife denied that the

severance payment was in exchange for the unvested RSUs.

¶ 18 The district court first found that all the RSUs were marital

property, reasoning that even though some of the RSUs had not

vested, wife had an enforceable right to receive them. Then, the

court valued the RSUs at $710,000 because (1) the unvested RSUs

could not be divided in kind as they no longer existed given wife’s

separation from her employment at Shift4, and (2) wife had received

a $710,000 payment as part of her severance package. Therefore,

the court linked wife’s severance package to the value of the RSUs,

explaining that “the Court does find it appropriate [to] allocate

$710,000 in value related to the Shift4 RSUs” on the marital

spreadsheet.

2. Governing Legal Standards

¶ 19 A property division requires two steps: first, the court

determines whether an interest constitutes “property” and then, if

so, whether it is marital or separate property. In re Marriage of

Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). It then sets apart the

separate property and divides the marital property. § 14-10-113(1),

C.R.S. 2025. With certain exceptions not applicable here, marital

7
property means all property acquired by either spouse during the

marriage. § 14-10-113(2); Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35-36.

¶ 20 An RSU is “a form of equity-based compensation consisting of

contractual promises by an employer to deliver shares of stock at a

future date once the [units] have vested.” In re E.J.S., 483 P.3d

110, 111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). It is similar to a stock option,

which is a “contractual right to purchase stock during a specified

period at a predetermined price” once the option has vested. In re

Marriage of Miller, 915 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Colo. 1996). The only

substantive difference between an RSU and a stock option is that

an RSU results in an employee being granted ownership of company

stock, as opposed to merely receiving the option to purchase stock.

See E.J.S., 483 P.3d at 111; Miller, 915 P.2d at 1317.

¶ 21 We thus find instructive the cases discussing whether stock

options received during the marriage are marital property. Under

Balanson, 25 P.3d at 39, stock options constitute property for

purposes of dissolution proceedings only when the spouse has an

enforceable right to the options. If the options were granted as an

incentive for accepting employment or as consideration for past

services, the spouse has an enforceable right to them even if that

8
right is not yet exercisable because the options are unvested. Id.

Conversely, if the options are awarded in consideration for future

services, the spouse “does not have enforceable rights under the

option agreement until such time as the future services have been

performed.” Id. at 40 (quoting Miller, 915 P.2d at 1318). “In

determining whether one has an enforceable right to employee stock

options, a court must look to the terms of the contract granting

such options.” Id. at 39.

¶ 22 We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the

documents governing the interest in question and the court’s

resulting determination of whether the interest is property. See In

re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009)

(reviewing stock option plan de novo in determining whether the

options were marital property); cf. Miller, 915 P.2d at 1319-20

(concluding, based on the restricted stock agreement, that

restricted stock received during the marriage was marital property).

¶ 23 The valuation of marital property — and thus, necessarily, the

determination of whether something is property at all — is

established on the date of the decree where, as here, the date of the

decree preceded the date of the hearing on disposition of property.

9
See § 14-10-113(5); In re Marriage of Turner, 2022 COA 39, ¶ 15.

We will not disturb the court’s determination of the value of marital

property unless the valuation is unsupported by the record. In re

Marriage of Schmedeman, 190 P.3d 788, 790 (Colo. App. 2008); see

also In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (noting that the

district court’s property valuation will not be disturbed if it is

reasonable in light of the evidence as a whole).

3. The District Court Properly Concluded that the Unvested RSUs
were Marital Property

¶ 24 Both parties agree that any RSUs that were vested as of date

of the decree of dissolution were marital property. See Turner, ¶ 15.

Therefore, our inquiry is limited to the district court’s

characterization of the unvested RSUs as marital property. And we

conclude that as of the October 23, 2023, decree, the unvested

RSUs were entirely marital property.

¶ 25 We reach this conclusion based on a de novo review of the

documents governing wife’s RSUs. To start, we observe that the

RSU Award Agreement did not clearly state whether the RSUs were

awarded to wife in consideration for past or future services.

Instead, the agreement provided that the RSUs were granted “[i]n

10
consideration of [wife’s] past and/or continued employment with or

service to [Shift4] and for other good and valuable consideration.”

Yet, despite this lack of clarity, we nevertheless conclude that wife

had an enforceable right to the RSUs based on other language in

both the RSU Award Agreement and Shift4’s Incentive Award Plan.

¶ 26 The Award Agreement provided that each RSU represented the

right to receive one share of Shift4 stock, but “unless and until the

RSUs have vested, [the employee] will have no right to the payment

of any Shares.” In turn, the agreement provided that “[s]ubject to

[wife’s] continued employment with . . . [Shift4,] on each applicable

vesting date . . ., the RSUs shall vest . . . as . . . set forth in [each

RSU] Grant Notice.” The agreement also stated that wife would

surrender all unvested RSUs in the event her employment was

terminated.

¶ 27 The Award Agreement also listed certain events that would

trigger either the immediate or ongoing, automatic vesting of any

unvested RSUs, such as wife’s death, disability, or the occurrence

of certain triggering events following a change in control of Shift4.

In addition, while under certain circumstances, the plan

administrator could terminate the Shift4 Incentive Award Plan, and

11
could amend the plan, any award granted under the plan, and any

corresponding award agreement, such changes could not

“materially and adversely” affect an award holder unless the award

holder had consented.

¶ 28 Given such terms in the Award Agreement and Incentive

Award Plan, we are convinced that wife had enforceable rights to

the RSUs. Critically, after the grants of the RSUs to wife, absent

the termination of her employment, there was no provision in the

RSU Award Agreement or Incentive Award Plan which would have

terminated her interest in the RSUs. See Powell, 220 P.3d at 956-

57 (even where terms of the relevant documents were unclear as to

whether stock options were granted for past or future services,

stock options that had already been granted to wife were marital

property because, so long as wife remained employed, there was

nothing which could have terminated her interest in the options).

¶ 29 And we disagree with wife that the RSUs were mere

expectancies because they were unvested. The fact that wife would

not realize the value of the RSUs unless and until she remained

employed for a specified period after each grant does not make the

RSUs a mere expectancy. See Miller, 915 P.2d at 1319-20; see also

12
Balanson, 25 P.3d at 39 (vesting is not determinative of whether a

stock option, or similar interest, is a divisible property interest).

Instead, the determinative issue is whether she has an enforceable

right to the interest regardless of whether that right is presently

exercisable. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 39; see also Miller, 915 P.2d at

1317-20; Powell, 220 P.3d at 957.

¶ 30 Lastly, because wife remains entitled to her RSUs even if the

Incentive Award Plan is terminated by Shift4, and because the plan

and Award Agreement cannot be modified to adversely affect the

RSUs already granted to her without her consent, her RSUs are not

akin to a revocable trust or an interest under a will of a living

person, which are not “property” under section 14-10-113(7)(b).

See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 41 (spouse’s interest in a revocable or

discretionary trust is not a property interest, but an interest in an

irrevocable trust is a property interest).

¶ 31 In sum, the district court did not err by concluding that the

unvested RSUs were a marital asset subject to the court’s division.

4. The District Court’s Valuation of the RSUs

¶ 32 We next address the district court’s valuation of the RSUs. We

agree with wife that the court erred by valuing the RSUs based on

13
her $710,000 in severance pay, but we disagree with husband that

the court was required to value the unvested RSUs on the date that

wife signed her separation agreement with Shift4.

¶ 33 We conclude that the district court abused its discretion for

multiple reasons. To start, the court was required to value the

RSUs as of the date of the decree because the decree preceded the

permanent orders hearing. See § 14-10-113(5); Turner, ¶ 15.

Instead, the court valued the RSUs based on wife’s severance

payment, which she received multiple months after the entry of the

decree. In doing so, the court did not explain how the value of

wife’s severance payment was indicative of the value of the RSUs as

of the date of the decree given such a lapse in time. See In re

Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (requiring the district court

to make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to provide a clear

understanding of the basis of its order); C.R.C.P. 52.

¶ 34 Moreover, the district court erred because, by using the

severance payment to value the RSUs, it de facto divided wife’s

severance payment as marital property in place of the RSUs,

without first making any findings as to whether the severance

14
payment was in fact property as of the date of the decree. See

Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35; Turner, ¶ 15.

¶ 35 While section 14-10-113(2)(c) defines marital property as “all

property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,”

the district court may only divide assets or debt “existing at the

time of dissolution,” In re Marriage of Lockwood, 971 P.2d 264, 267

(Colo. App. 1998). Therefore, assets acquired post-decree “are not

considered marital property and . . . are not distributable.” In re

Marriage of Heupel, 936 P.2d 561, 572 (Colo. 1997). Consequently,

absent a finding that wife had a contractually enforceable right to

her severance payment as of the date of the decree, see Balanson,

25 P.3d at 35, 39-40, the district court was prohibited from dividing

wife’s severance payment as marital property. Cf. In re Marriage of

Holmes, 841 P.2d 388, 389 (Colo. App. 1992) (holding that

“severance pay [received] to replace expected loss of income and not

deferred compensation for services rendered during the marriage” is

not marital property subject to division).

¶ 36 Lastly, notwithstanding the district court’s insufficient

findings, we agree with wife that the court’s valuation of the RSUs

was unsupported by the record. Husband speculated that wife

15
received the severance payment as an in-kind payment for

surrendering her unvested RSUs. But the court sustained wife’s

objection to some of husband’s testimony, and husband’s theory

and even higher $967,000 proposed valuation of the unvested RSUs

were based on Shift4’s stock price as of March 11, 2024, when wife

signed the separation agreement. Thus, husband’s testimony could

not support a valuation of the RSUs as of the date of the decree,

which was almost five months earlier. See § 14-10-113(5); Turner, ¶

15.

¶ 37 In support of his $967,000 valuation, husband asks us to

apply In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996),

which holds that “if marital assets are dissipated by one of the

parties, they must be valued as of the time when they existed.”

¶ 38 But Finer is inapplicable here. There was no finding of

dissipation, as the district court explicitly rejected husband’s

suggestion that wife had lost her job for “nefarious” reasons. And

nothing in Finer suggests that, even in cases of dissipation, the

court may value marital property based on a date occurring after,

as applicable here, the entry of the decree. See id. (recognizing that

compliance with section 14-10-113(5) is “mandatory”). Thus, under

16
no circumstances could the district court have valued the RSUs as

of March 11, 2024.

¶ 39 In sum, because the district court abused its discretion when

valuing the RSUs, we reverse the marital property division and

remand for the court’s reconsideration.

5. Vested RSUs

¶ 40 We agree with husband, however, that to the extent the

district court failed to value and divide the vested RSUs, which both

parties agreed were marital property, it erred. In the permanent

orders, the court simply divided the entirety of the RSUs at a

$710,000 valuation, without explaining what portion, if any, of that

value corresponded to the vested RSUs. Thus, when reconsidering

the marital property division, the court should both value and

divide the vested RSUs along with the unvested RSUs and

sufficiently explain the basis of its ruling. See § 14-10-113(1)

(requiring the court to divide the marital property as it deems just);

Gibbs, ¶ 9.

6. Remand Instructions

¶ 41 Because we are reversing the marital property division, the

court must consider the parties’ economic circumstances at the

17
time of the remand. In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 14;

see § 14-10-113(1)(c) (When equitably dividing the marital estate, a

court must consider “[t]he economic circumstances of each spouse

at the time the division of property is to become effective.”).

¶ 42 Except as otherwise expressed herein, the court may not

recharacterize or revalue the marital property or debts properly

accounted for in the existing property division. See § 14-10-113(5);

see also Medeiros, ¶ 25 (noting that in most circumstances there is

no basis for the court on remand to recharacterize or revalue the

marital property or debts accounted for in the existing property

division). However, it may reallocate the marital estate in light of

the new evidence, if any, on the parties’ current economic

circumstances, as well as the relevant evidence from the previous

permanent orders hearing. In re Marriage of Wells, 850 P.2d 694,

697 n.6 (Colo. 1993); In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 52;

In re Marriage of Joel, 2012 COA 128, ¶ 28. It is within the court’s

discretion to receive additional evidence, including evidence as to

the value of the vested and unvested RSUs as of the date of the

decree. See In re Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. App.

1989); § 14-10-113(5).

18
B. Wife’s Military Retirement

¶ 43 Wife next contends that the district court abused its discretion

by valuing the marital portion of her military retirement, which her

attorney characterized as a “military pension,” at $391,762. We

disagree, although the district court may nevertheless reconsider

the way it divides the military retirement on remand.

¶ 44 The district court may distribute a spouse’s pension in one of

three ways: (1) net present value; (2) deferred distribution; and (3)

reserve jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Kelm, 912 P.2d 545, 547

(Colo. 1996) (describing the three methods); In re Marriage of Hunt,

909 P.2d 525, 530-31 (Colo. 1995) (same). The decision of which

method to use lies within the district court’s sound discretion. See

Kelm, 912 P.2d at 551.

¶ 45 It was undisputed that wife’s military retirement was vested

and had matured. Wife asked the court to use the time rule

formula to divide the retirement, which would have involved using

either the deferred distribution or reserve jurisdiction method. See

Hunt, 909 P.2d at 531-35. Instead, the district used the net

present value method, as proposed by husband, and divided wife’s

19
military retirement as part of the marital estate at a value of

$391,762.

¶ 46 Wife argues that the district court made inadequate findings in

support of its valuation and that the valuation was otherwise

unsupported by the record. But we are unpersuaded because it is

apparent to us that the court’s valuation was based on husband’s

proposed marital spreadsheet, which in turn listed an expert report

admitted as Exhibit 26 valuing the marital portion of the military

retirement at $391,762.

¶ 47 While wife contends that Exhibit 26 was not admitted into

evidence, the record does not support her assertion. Specifically,

during the permanent orders hearing, the parties discussed

admitting by stipulation their respective proposed marital

spreadsheets (as demonstratives), plus the supporting exhibits

listed in each spreadsheet. In discussing a stipulation, husband’s

attorney proposed that “we could at least start with the exhibits

that [our] spreadsheets are based on coming into evidence,” to

which wife’s attorney replied, “I think that’s fine.” While neither

party moved to admit any exhibits at that time, at the start of

husband’s testimony, “because there’s a stipulation,” husband

20
asked for exhibits one through thirty-two be considered admitted.

Wife’s attorney remained silent, and the district court admitted the

exhibits into evidence by responding, “[t]hey will be.”

¶ 48 Wife disputes whether Exhibit 26 was in evidence because,

sometime later, while the parties were discussing a different exhibit,

her attorney interjected and stated that “I want to make sure we’re

clear on the stipulation. . . . I agreed to any financial documents

that are statements, but I don’t agree, like, to Robert Johnson’s

report [Exhibit 26] coming into evidence without cross-

examination.” The court then responded, “I don’t think that’s where

[husband’s] counsel was headed,” and the exchange ended with

wife’s attorney replying: “Okay. . . . I wanted to make sure.”

¶ 49 However, because Exhibit 26 had already been admitted into

evidence, and because wife did not move the court for any

affirmative relief from its earlier ruling admitting Exhibit 26, we

conclude that wife failed to preserve for our review any challenge to

the admission of that exhibit. See Melat, ¶ 18; cf. Herrera v.

Anderson, 736 P.2d 416, 418 (Colo. App. 1987) (“[I]t goes without

saying that one who affirmatively seeks relief . . . must pursue his

request to its disposition before he can complain.”); Brown v. Am.

21
Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 2019 COA 11, ¶ 21 (“If a party

raises an argument to such a degree that the court has the

opportunity to rule on it, that argument is preserved for appeal.”).

¶ 50 Therefore, on remand, the district court may not revalue wife’s

military retirement. See Medeiros, ¶ 25. However, because the

court must reconsider the property division based on the parties’

current economic circumstances, Morton, ¶ 14, the court may use a

different method to divide wife’s military retirement if, in its

discretion, it concludes that a different method is appropriate in

light of the new property division. Kelm, 912 P.2d at 551. We

therefore decline to address wife’s additional argument that, even

assuming the record supports husband’s valuation, the court

abused its discretion by dividing her military retirement using the

net present value method.

C. Husband’s Bonus

¶ 51 We next address wife’s claim that the district court

erroneously excluded a bonus that husband received from his

employer from the marital estate. We conclude that the district

court must reconsider its treatment of husband’s bonus on remand.

22
¶ 52 At the permanent orders hearing, husband acknowledged that

he had received an approximately $111,000 bonus from his

employer, Southwest Airlines, in February 2024. The district court

left the bonus off of the marital spreadsheet, and when wife

inquired as to whether the court would be dividing the bonus, the

court found that “[t]o the extent that something like that was

actually something paid out to these pilots, as I understood it, I

didn’t have sufficient evidence to conclude that there was any

substantial lump sum that I could divide.” The court acknowledged

“some evidence” of a bonus paid to husband but then explained

that it “did not find that there was something I could divide as

marital property under the circumstances.”

¶ 53 We agree with wife that the district court erred because we are

unable to understand the basis of its ruling addressing the bonus.

See Gibbs, ¶ 9. It was undisputed that husband received an

approximately $111,000 bonus. Wife called a Southwest pilot as a

witness, who explained in detail that the bonus represented a

retroactive pay increase based on husband’s salary during the

parties’ marriage, whereas husband testified that the bonus was an

incentive for ratifying the union’s new contract.

23
¶ 54 It was the district court’s role as factfinder to resolve this

conflicting evidence concerning husband’s bonus. See In re

Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Colo. App. 1998).

Yet, the court did not do so and instead suggested that it had not

heard sufficient evidence as to whether the bonus existed.

¶ 55 Accordingly on remand, the district court must reconsider its

ruling concerning husband’s bonus and make sufficient findings in

support of its decision. See Gibbs, ¶ 9. As a threshold matter, the

court must determine whether, as of the date of the decree,

husband’s bonus in fact constituted property. See Turner, ¶ 24

(recognizing that under Balanson, “contractual enforceability at the

time of the permanent orders hearing (or, if earlier, the date of the

decree) is essential to the determination of whether [a bonus] is

property”). Then, only if husband’s bonus constituted property as

of the date of the decree, may the district court determine whether

the bonus was marital property and allocate it accordingly. See

Turner, ¶¶ 15-25 (holding that the district court properly excluded

wife’s bonuses from the marital property division where “no

evidence demonstrated that she had an enforceable right to them at

24
the time of the permanent orders hearing,” which predated the

decree); Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35.

¶ 56 Wife suggests that we must apply In re Marriage of Huston,

967 P.2d 181, 186 (Colo. App. 1998), disagreed with by Balanson,

25 P.3d at 39, for the proposition that a bonus “which is deferred

until after the dissolution, but fully earned during the marriage, is

marital property.” But we agree with Turner, ¶ 20, that Huston is

only applicable if the spouse first had an enforceable right to their

bonus at the time of the decree. Thus, the district court’s primary

inquiry on remand remains whether husband had an enforceable

right to his bonus as of the October 23, 2023, decree.

D. Wife’s Consulting Business

¶ 57 We next reject husband’s assertion that the district court

erred by assigning no value to a consulting business that wife

operated as a source of secondary income.

¶ 58 The expert report in husband’s Exhibit 26 also valued wife’s

side business, Samantha Weeks Consulting, LLC, at $164,100.

However, noting a “dearth of testimony” about wife’s business, the

district court found that “[Samantha] Weeks’ Consulting is pretty

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much just the value of [wife],” and therefore, “I can’t assign any

particular marital value [to the business].”

¶ 59 Husband argues that the district court erred by ignoring the

expert’s valuation. But the court “can believe all, part, or none of

[the evidence], even if uncontroverted, and its resolution of

conflicting evidence is binding on review.” In re Marriage of Amich,

192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Krejci, ¶ 23 (“The

court may select the valuation of one party over that of the other

party, or make its own valuation, and its decision will be upheld on

appeal unless clearly erroneous.”).

¶ 60 Given that the expert did not testify, and husband neither

presented nor elicited any other testimony concerning the

consulting business, it is apparent to us that the court was not

persuaded by the expert report alone as to the value of the

business. Cf. People in Interest of S.E.G., 934 P.2d 920, 922 (Colo.

App. 1997) (“The burden of proof generally rests upon the party who

asserts the affirmative of an issue.”). Thus, we may not disturb the

court’s findings as to the consulting business, Amich, 192 P.3d at

424, and the court may not otherwise revalue the business on

remand, see Medeiros, ¶ 25.

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IV. Maintenance and Child Support

¶ 61 Because we are reversing the property division, we also reverse

the portion of the permanent orders addressing maintenance and

child support for the district court’s reconsideration. See In re

Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 22 (when a district court

revisits a property division, it must also reevaluate its maintenance

and child support determinations because the issues are

interdependent). On remand, the court should consider the revised

property division and the parties’ present economic circumstances.

See Wells, 850 P.2d at 697-99; In re Marriage of Cardona, 321 P.3d

518, 525 (Colo. App. 2010). Accordingly, we decline to address the

parties’ respective contentions that the district court erred in

determining wife’s income for child support purposes.

V. Disposition

¶ 62 Those portions of the permanent orders concerning the marital

property division, maintenance, and child support are reversed.

The remainder of the judgment is not before us and remains

undisturbed. The case is remanded to the district court to conduct

further proceedings and reconsider the permanent orders

consistent with this opinion.

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JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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