Peo v. Eddington

23CA1855 Peo v Eddington 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1855
Douglas County District Court No. 19CR479
Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Harlan Nelson Eddington,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kevin M. Whitfield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Harlan Nelson Eddington, pleaded guilty to two

crimes involving the death of his romantic partner. He appeals his

sentence and the order imposing restitution.

I. Background

¶2 Eddington and his romantic partner, Molly Sadler, got into a

verbal dispute while Eddington was driving on Highway 67.

Eddington suddenly turned his doorless Jeep into oncoming traffic,

and a car collided with the passenger side of the vehicle, where

Sadler was sitting. Eddington got out of the vehicle immediately

after the collision and ran from the scene. Police apprehended him

on foot several hours later and noted that he appeared to be under

the influence of alcohol. Sadler was taken to the hospital and died

the next day due to injuries sustained in the crash. At the time of

the collision, a protection order prohibited Eddington from

interacting with Sadler and from using alcohol or controlled

substances.

¶3 Eddington pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident in

violation of section 42-4-1601(1), (2)(c), C.R.S. 2025, and vehicular

homicide in violation of section 18-3-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The

plea agreement contained a stipulated sentencing range of four to

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eighteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections

(DOC). The sentencing court imposed an eighteen-year sentence.

The court also ordered Eddington to pay $5,487 in restitution to

compensate the Crime Victim Compensation Board (CVCB)1 for

payments it made to Sadler’s family for her funeral and burial

expenses.

¶4 Eddington now argues that (1) the sentencing judge was

biased against him, and (2) the sentencing judge erred by ordering

him to pay the full amount of restitution to the CVCB when Sadler’s

family had also received donations from a GoFundMe campaign.

We address each contention in turn.

1 The terms “Crime Victim Compensation Board” and “Crime Victim

Compensation Fund” are used interchangeably throughout the
record in this case. Prior opinions from this court discussing
restitution use both “board” and “fund” and also refer to a “Crime
Victim Compensation Program.” As best we can discern, all these
terms refer to an entity that is a “victim” under the restitution
statute because it is a “victim compensation board that has paid a
victim compensation claim.” § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV), C.R.S. 2025.
Thus, for consistency, we use the term “CVCB” throughout this
opinion.

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II. Sentencing

¶5 Eddington argues that his eighteen-year sentence (the

maximum possible sentence under the plea agreement) is the result

of actual bias on the part of the sentencing judge. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶6 At the sentencing hearing, the court heard testimony from

eight witnesses for the State, one mitigation witness for the defense,

and from Eddington. After the testimony and while sentencing

Eddington, the judge made the following remarks:

• People who never met Sadler “will never get to see this

beautiful face. People who never met her, like myself,

will never get to hear this beautiful laugh. We’ll never get

a kiss on the lips and a hug when I meet her. And that’s

a loss. Everyone’s a victim.”

• “You killed [Sadler] . . . And like what your witness said,

it is all your fault.”

• Sadler “suffered a year of abuse under the hands of Mr.

Eddington.”

• The most haunting part of the case is Sadler’s words that

“were overheard by a witness about Mr. Eddington killing

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her, and Mr. Eddington’s father warning her. [Sadler]

knew she was going to die in the hands of Mr. Eddington.

She didn’t know when; she didn’t know how, but I think

she knew.”

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 Because Eddington didn’t move to disqualify the sentencing

judge, our review is limited to whether the judge displayed “actual

bias.” People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶¶ 6-7. We review claims of

actual bias de novo. People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶¶ 27-28.

¶8 Actual bias is “bias or prejudice that in all probability will

prevent [a judge] from dealing fairly with a party.” People v. Julien,

47 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Colo. 2002). A defendant arguing that the trial

judge was biased “must establish that the judge had a substantial

bent of mind against him.” People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249

(Colo. 1988). Mere speculative statements are not enough, and the

record must clearly establish such bias. Id.

¶9 In Colorado, “[t]he general rule of law is that what a judge

learns in his judicial capacity is a proper basis for judicial

observations, and that the use of such information is not the kind

of matter that results in disqualification.” Smith v. Dist. Ct., 629

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P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1981). “[O]pinions formed by the judge on

the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the

current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or

partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Dobler,

¶ 25 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

C. Analysis

¶ 10 Eddington argues that the sentencing judge was biased for two

reasons. First, he argues that the sentencing judge exhibited actual

bias by “counting himself as a victim” and by telling Eddington that

Sadler’s death was “all [Eddington’s] fault.” Second, Eddington

contends that the judge based his opinions about Eddington (and,

thus, the sentence) on facts that weren’t in the record. We address

each argument in turn.

1. “Victim” and “Fault” Remarks

¶ 11 Eddington argues that the sentencing judge exhibited actual

bias when he said, “We’ll never get a kiss on the lips and a hug

when I meet [Sadler]. And that’s a loss. Everyone’s a victim.” He

also contends the judge exhibited bias when he admonished

Eddington by telling him, “[I]t is all your fault.” We disagree.

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¶ 12 Read in context, the record reveals that the judge’s

observation that “[p]eople who never met [Sadler], like myself,”

would never receive a “kiss on the lips and a hug” related directly to

the following testimony from Sadler’s niece:

I loved introducing new people to her, without
warning, and she would go in for that kiss and
big old hug and surprise them. No one will
ever get that experience again. There are not
that many people in the world that are willing
to show that much love as she did to anyone
she met, to anyone.
¶ 13 The judge’s statements showed empathy to Sadler’s family,

acknowledged their testimony about the warm greetings Sadler gave

to strangers, and acknowledged the impact the family believed

Sadler’s loss had had on the community. They don’t display

“deep-seated favoritism” toward Sadler or “deep-seated . . .

antagonism” against Eddington. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Dobler,

¶¶ 25-26.

¶ 14 Regarding the sentencing court’s statement, “[I]t is all your

fault,” we likewise disagree with Eddington that this statement

displays a “deep-seated . . . antagonism” amounting to actual bias.

Id. Instead, we view this statement as an opinion formed based on

the following facts introduced during the proceedings. Id.

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¶ 15 During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor recounted that

before police arrested Eddington, he told officers, “No, this was

[Sadler]’s fault,” and “It’s her fault, not mine. I’m a Good

Samaritan. I just wanted to get her help.” Defense counsel

acknowledged, “But, certainly, something we do all agree in this

room, I think every single person, is that Ms. Sadler did not need to

die; she shouldn’t have died, and Mr. Eddington’s conduct was —

was the result — or her death was a result of Mr. Eddington’s

conduct.” Viewed in context, the judge’s comment merely

admonished Eddington for initially attempting to place blame on

Sadler and reflected Eddington’s admitted guilt for the conduct that

caused her death.

2. Facts in the Record of the Proceeding

¶ 16 Next, Eddington contends that the judge’s statement that

Sadler “suffered a year of abuse under the hands of Mr. Eddington”

and his opinion that Sadler “knew she was going to die in the hands

of Mr. Eddington” aren’t supported by the record and, therefore,

indicate actual bias. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 17 During the sentencing hearing, the People discussed

Eddington’s criminal history and noted that he was charged with

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assaulting Sadler in 2018 (about six months before Sadler’s death),

his driver’s license was later revoked for driving under the

influence, and a protection order was put in place protecting Sadler

from Eddington. Defense counsel said during the hearing, “So Mr.

Eddington and Ms. Sadler were together for about a year prior to

her death. And by all accounts, it was a tenuous relationship. You

see from Mr. Eddington that he has a history of domestic violence.”

¶ 18 Based on these remarks and Eddington’s prior charge for

assaulting Sadler, the court seemingly concluded that Eddington

had abused Sadler throughout their yearlong relationship. At most,

this reflects an unsupported factual finding, which is insufficient to

show that the judge was biased against Eddington. Cf. People v.

Schupper, 2014 COA 80M, ¶ 58 (“[R]ulings of a judge, although

erroneous, numerous[,] and continuous, are not sufficient in

themselves to show bias or prejudice.” (quoting Saucerman v.

Saucerman, 461 P.2d 18, 22 (Colo. 1969))).

¶ 19 We don’t perceive the judge’s statement that Sadler “knew she

was going to die in the hands of Mr. Eddington” to show actual bias

either. Sadler’s mother testified that Eddington’s father told Sadler

at one point, “Molly, you need to stay away from him. He’s going to

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kill you.” Sadler’s mother then testified, “His dad knew what was

going to happen to [Sadler].” The prosecution also recounted

statements made by a man who overheard parts of the argument

between Eddington and Sadler before the collision, including

overhearing Sadler say to Eddington, “Oh, I suppose now you’re just

gonna kill me.” The judge’s remarks about Sadler’s knowledge were

based on reasonable inferences drawn from the record at the

sentencing.

III. Restitution

¶ 20 Eddington next argues that the sentencing court erred by

ordering him to pay the CVCB the amount of restitution requested

by the prosecution even though Sadler’s family had also received

donations from community fundraising. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 21 After the sentencing hearing, the People filed a “Restitution

Payout Order/Judgment” requesting restitution in the amount of

$5,487 to compensate the CVCB for funds it paid to Sadler’s family

for her funeral and burial expenses. Eddington filed an objection.

Screenshots attached to the objection indicated that Sadler’s sister

had organized a GoFundMe campaign, requesting donations for

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(1) veterinary expenses for Sadler’s dog; and (2) expenses related to

Sadler’s funeral, burial, and cremation. The screenshots also

indicated that the campaign had raised $2,608 for Sadler’s family.

Eddington argued — as he does here — that the CVCB was entitled

to reimbursement from Sadler’s family under section 24-4.1-110,

C.R.S. 2025, because the GoFundMe donations provided the family

with a collateral source of funds for the same expenses covered by

the CVCB. Thus, Eddington continued, he was entitled to a setoff

or reduction in the amount of restitution owed to the CVCB.

¶ 22 The People responded to the objection, attaching an email

from the director of the CVCB, who noted that the CVCB didn’t

require reimbursements of private donations because it couldn’t

confirm how donated funds were used. (For example, in this case,

it couldn’t confirm that Sadler’s family used the donated funds for

her funeral expenses.)

¶ 23 After a brief hearing at which the court heard further

argument but didn’t receive evidence, the court concluded that

Eddington hadn’t met his burden to show that the restitution

amount should be set off or decreased because there were “no

strings attached” and “no restrictions placed” on the family’s use of

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the donated funds. Therefore, the court concluded, Sadler’s family

wasn’t required to reimburse the CVCB. The court then ordered

Eddington to pay $5,487 in restitution.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 24 We interpret statutes de novo. People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74,

¶ 17. In construing a statute, we aim to give effect to the legislative

intent. Id. To discern the legislature’s intent, we look first to the

plain language of the statute and give “its words and phrases their

plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 25

(citation omitted). We must construe a statute “as a whole” with an

eye toward “giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all

of its parts” while avoiding “constructions that would render any

words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.”

McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 38. When the language is clear

and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning

“and look no further.” Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12.

C. Applicable Law

1. Statutory Law

¶ 25 Convicted offenders must “make full restitution to those

harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025.

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Restitution means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim. . . [that

is] proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can be

reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”

§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The purposes of restitution are to

deter future criminality and to “lessen the financial burdens

inflicted upon” crime victims as compensation for hardship and

suffering. § 18-1.3-601(1)(d)-(e).

¶ 26 Crime victims and their family members may seek

compensation from the CVCB for losses caused by an offender’s

criminal conduct. §§ 24-4.1-102(1), -108, -109(1), C.R.S. 2025. A

“victim compensation board that has paid a victim compensation

claim” is a “[v]ictim” for purposes of the restitution statute.

§ 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV). And if a CVCB has provided assistance to or

on behalf of a victim, “the amount of assistance provided and

requested by the [CVCB] is presumed to be a direct result of the

defendant’s criminal conduct.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 27 Under certain circumstances, a defendant may be entitled to a

reduction or setoff in the amount of restitution owed to a victim. A

restitution order may be (1) decreased if the “defendant has

otherwise compensated the victim . . . for the pecuniary losses

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suffered” or (2) set off by the amount of “compensatory damages”

recovered by the victim “in any federal or state civil proceeding.”

§ 18-1.3-603(3)(b)(II), (6); see also § 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(I) (“[A] court

may not award restitution to a victim concerning a pecuniary loss

for which the victim has received or is entitled to receive benefits or

reimbursement under a policy of insurance or other indemnity

agreement.”). The defendant bears the burden of proving

entitlement to any such reduction or setoff. People v. Lassek, 122

P.3d 1029, 1034 (Colo. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds by,

Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 18.

¶ 28 The Crime Victim Compensation Act (the compensation act)

describes the CVCB’s obligations if the victim or the victim’s family

seeks funds from the CVCB and also receives compensation from a

collateral source, including a “private source.” § 24-4.1-110(1)-(2).

In such cases, the CVCB “may” deduct the amount received from

the collateral source from the compensation it pays out.

§ 24-4.1-110(1). Likewise, any person receiving CVCB

compensation who “also receives a collateral sum” that has not

been deducted “shall refund to the [CVCB] the lesser of the

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sums . . . unless the aggregate of both sums does not exceed the

person’s losses.” § 24-4.1-110(2).

2. Lassek, Stanley, and Gregory

¶ 29 Because both parties’ arguments before the sentencing court

and before this court are guided by People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d

1029; People v. Stanely, 2017 COA 121; and People v. Gregory, 2019

COA 184, we briefly discuss those cases.

a. People v. Lassek

¶ 30 In Lassek, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges related to a

fatal traffic accident. Lassek, 122 P.3d at 1031. The sentencing

court ordered restitution that included burial, travel, and lodging

expenses incurred by the victim’s parents. Id. at 1034-35. The

defendant sought a $50,000 setoff based on a settlement payment

made by his automobile insurer to the victim’s family. Id. However,

the settlement agreement “did not identify any particular losses

covered by the payment.” Id. at 1035. As a result, a division of this

court noted that the victim’s parents could “allocate the entire

settlement to noneconomic damages,” which weren’t covered by

restitution. Id. Thus, the division held that the defendant wasn’t

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entitled to set off the insurance settlement against his restitution

order. Id.

b. People v. Stanley

¶ 31 In Stanley, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony vehicular

assault, driving under the influence, and careless driving. Stanley,

¶ 6. The prosecution sought restitution in the amount of $30,000

to compensate the CVCB for payments made to the direct victim for

lost wages and medical expenses. Id. at ¶ 7. The defendant sought

a setoff of $25,000, arguing that his insurer had settled with the

victim for that amount through an agreement that covered “any and

every claim, demand, right or cause of action” including “personal

injuries and consequences thereof” and any “loss of services”

resulting from the incident. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 5, 11-12. The sentencing

court awarded the defendant a $25,000 setoff, and the People

appealed. Id. at ¶ 12.

¶ 32 A division of this court concluded that the settlement

agreement’s references to “personal injuries” and “loss of services”

sufficiently established that the defendant met his initial burden of

demonstrating that the insurance settlement was intended to cover

lost wages and medical expenses, which were the same losses

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covered by the CVCB’s payment to the victim. Id. at ¶ 28. The

division applied section 18-1.3-603(3) and (6) to conclude that, once

a defendant demonstrates that a civil settlement includes the same

categories of losses or expenses for which the victim received CVCB

compensation, the defendant has met the initial “burden of going

forward” with evidence that the victim received a double recovery.

Id. at ¶¶ 30, 34. The division remanded the case for further

proceedings to give the prosecution an opportunity to rebut the

inference. Id. at ¶ 34.

c. People v. Gregory

¶ 33 In Gregory, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of

vehicular homicide. Gregory, ¶ 2. The defendant’s insurance

company settled with the deceased victims’ families, who each

received $500,000 in exchange for release of all claims stemming

from the incident. Id. The CVCB paid the deceased victims’

families $15,513.43, collectively, to cover expenses for funerals,

travel, and mental health counseling. Id. at ¶ 3. Noting that the

CVCB wasn’t a party to the settlement agreements, the court

entered a restitution order for the entire amount requested by the

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prosecution.2 Id. at ¶ 4. A division of this court reversed and

concluded that “when a settlement agreement is clearly intended to

cover all categories of loss for which restitution could be imposed,

the defendant has met his burden of going forward.” Id. at ¶ 29.

Like the division in Stanley, the Gregory division indicated that the

prosecution would have the opportunity to rebut the inference of

double recovery on remand. Id. at ¶ 30.

D. Analysis

¶ 34 Eddington contends that the sentencing court erred by

concluding that the GoFundMe donations were “unearmarked” (as

in Lassek) and argues that this case is closer to Stanley and

Gregory because the GoFundMe screenshots indicated that Sadler’s

sister requested donations in part because “[o]ur family needs

financial assists [sic] paying for . . . cremation and services for

[Sadler].” We disagree.

¶ 35 The divisions’ reasoning in Stanley and Gregory relied on the

existence of an enforceable contract (in both cases, a settlement

agreement) in which both parties expressed an intent to

2 The court excluded a small portion of the requested amount for

reasons not relevant here.

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compensate the victims for losses arising from the crimes

committed against them, including losses covered by restitution.

Stanley, ¶¶ 27-28; Gregory, ¶¶ 27-29. In contrast, a request for

monetary gifts (even a request that contemplates a use for the

funds) doesn’t create a “contract” that “designate[s] the proceeds as

being for any particular purpose,” nor does it indicate that the gift

giver intends for the recipient to spend the funds in a specific way.

Stanley, ¶¶ 24, 27; see Gregory, ¶ 27 (focusing on “the intent of the

parties”). As the district court noted, absent evidence that the

donated funds are required to be used in one or more specific ways,

there are no strings attached to donations or other monetary gifts.

In sum, we conclude that this case is closer to Lassek because

there is no agreement in which both Sadler’s family and the donors

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expressed an intent to use donated funds for any particular

purpose.3

¶ 36 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by the language of the

compensation act. We need not (and do not) decide whether a

monetary gift is a “collateral sum” that triggers the victim’s

obligation to reimburse the CVCB under section 24-4.1-110

because the CVCB is a victim in its own right, and Eddington

(1) didn’t present any evidence that the CVCB actually received a

3 We also note that the divisions’ reasoning in Stanley and Gregory

was informed partly by the restitution statute’s prohibition on
“double recovery” in certain circumstances. People v. Stanley, 2017
COA 121, ¶¶ 20, 30-32; People v. Gregory, 2019 COA 184, ¶¶ 24,
29. Both divisions noted that the restitution statute provides that a
defendant is entitled to a setoff to or reduction in the amount of
restitution owed when the victim has otherwise been compensated
(1) by the defendant; (2) by amounts recovered by the victim in any
federal or state civil proceeding; and (3) by amounts the victim has
received or is entitled to receive from benefits or reimbursement
under an insurance policy. Stanley, ¶¶ 20-21; Gregory, ¶ 24; § 18-
1.3-603(3)(b)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (The court may decrease restitution
“[i]f the defendant has otherwise compensated the victim . . . for the
pecuniary losses suffered.”); § 18-1.3-603(6) (Restitution “shall be
set off against any amount later recovered as compensatory
damages by such victim in any federal or state civil proceeding.”);
§ 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(I) (The “court may not award restitution” for a
loss “for which the victim has received or is entitled to receive
benefits or reimbursement under a policy of insurance or other
indemnity agreement.”). There is no similar statutory entitlement to
a reduction or setoff in restitution when the victim has received
monetary gifts.

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refund from Sadler’s family; (2) doesn’t otherwise contest the

amount that the CVCB paid to Sadler’s family; and (3) doesn’t

contest that his conduct proximately caused the economic loss.

Further, Eddington doesn’t direct us to any language in the

restitution statute or the compensation act (and we can find none)

that requires a court to reduce the amount of restitution simply

because a victim received a monetary gift. Thus, the court didn’t

err by ordering him to pay the CVCB the full amount of the

compensation that the CVCB paid to Sadler’s family.

IV. Disposition

¶ 37 The sentence and restitution order are affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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