Peo v. Medina

23CA2029 Peo v Medina 02-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2029
Huerfano County District Court No. 22CR137
Honorable J. Clay McKisson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Emilio Medina,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 5, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Joseph Paul Hough, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Emilio Medina, appeals the district court’s

judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of

three counts of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute

a controlled substance and one count each of possession of an

illegal weapon, possession of a prohibited large-capacity magazine,

and a special offender charge. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Huerfano County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Derek Guess

saw Medina’s SUV parked at a highway-side truck stop at 5:30 one

morning. Medina was slumped over the steering wheel. Deputy

Guess wasn’t sure if he was breathing. Concerned that Medina was

experiencing a potential medical emergency, Deputy Guess drove

into the truck stop and activated his emergency lights.

¶3 Medina started to get out of the SUV. Deputy Guess asked

Medina if he was okay. Medina said he was. But Medina appeared

“really, really nervous.” As Medina got out of the SUV, he dropped a

“tiny blue straw-like material,” which Deputy Guess believed to be a

“tooter” — something “used for the consumption of narcotics.”

¶4 Medina walked in front of Deputy Guess’s vehicle and told him

that he was nervous because there was a warrant out for his arrest.

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At that point, Deputy Guess got Medina’s name and date of birth

and asked the dispatcher to confirm whether there was a warrant

for Medina’s arrest. Deputy Guess told Medina he was being

detained (but wasn’t under arrest), handcuffed him, and placed him

in his patrol vehicle (at Medina’s request) while waiting for

confirmation of the arrest warrant. The dispatcher confirmed the

existence of the warrant.

¶5 Deputy Guess asked Medina if there was anything illegal in

the SUV. Medina said there wasn’t. Deputy Guess also asked

Medina if he consented to a search of the SUV. Medina said he

didn’t.

¶6 Deputy Guess returned to Medina’s SUV to take another look

at the “tiny blue, straw-like material.” He confirmed that it was a

tooter. (The tooter was about six inches long.)

¶7 Believing the tooter gave him probable cause, Deputy Guess

searched the SUV and found a loaded gun and a small container

with blue pills inside (which he believed to be fentanyl). At the

subsequent hearing on Medina’s motion to suppress, Deputy Guess

testified, “I requested a tow truck to come and pick up the vehicle

because I was fearful that either somebody can come and drive the

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vehicle or evidence could be lost or destroyed or anything like that.

So I stayed with the . . . vehicle until the tow truck got there.” He

also testified that the SUV appeared operable and he didn’t know

whether Medina had been with anyone else that day or whether

anyone else had keys for the SUV. He said he was concerned that

someone might drive off with the evidence. A tow truck arrived and

took the SUV to an impound lot while Deputy Guess took Medina to

the local jail. Deputy Guess also searched the SUV at the impound

lot, without obtaining a warrant.

¶8 Substances found in Medina’s SUV tested positive for fentanyl,

heroin, and methamphetamine. (Some of the narcotics, more guns,

ammunition, and drug paraphernalia were found after a court

issued a search warrant.)

¶9 Before trial, Medina’s counsel moved to suppress the evidence

seized during Deputy Guess’s warrantless searches because the

searches violated the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against

unreasonable searches and seizures. At the hearing on the motion,

the district court heard Deputy Guess’s testimony and argument

from counsel. The court denied Medina’s motion in a written order.

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¶ 10 A jury found Medina guilty of the charges noted above. The

district court sentenced him to a controlling sentence of twelve

years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. Discussion

¶ 11 Medina’s sole contention on appeal is that the district court

reversibly erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence

gathered from his SUV because that evidence was obtained as a

result of two illegal searches. We conclude that the court properly

denied the motion.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 12 “[R]eview of a district court’s order regarding a defendant’s

motion to suppress involves ‘a mixed question of law and fact.’”

People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Threlkel, 2019

CO 18, ¶ 15). “We defer to the district court’s factual findings and

do not disturb them if they are supported by competent evidence in

the record. But we review de novo the district court’s legal

conclusions.” Id. (citation omitted).

B. Governing Law

¶ 13 “Under both the United States and Colorado Constitutions,

people have the right to be free from unreasonable searches and

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seizures.” People v. Furness, 2025 CO 16, ¶ 16 (first citing U.S.

Const. amend. IV; and then citing Colo. Const. art. II, § 7).

“Warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and

well-delineated exceptions.’” Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). The automobile exception is one such

exception: It “authorizes an officer to perform a search of an

automobile if he has ‘probable cause to believe that the automobile

contains evidence of a crime.’” Allen, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Zuniga,

2016 CO 52, ¶ 14).

¶ 14 “[T]he test for probable cause ‘does not lend itself to

mathematical certainties,’ and instead calls for ‘consideration of any

and all facts that a reasonable person would consider relevant to a

police officer’s belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is

present.’” Furness, ¶ 28 (first quoting Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d

275, 280 (Colo. 1999); and then quoting Zuniga, ¶ 16). “If probable

cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies

the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may

conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.

798, 825 (1982).

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C. Analysis

¶ 15 Medina contends that the warrantless searches were illegal

because (1) there was no probable cause to believe that his SUV

contained evidence of a crime and (2) the circumstances didn’t

create a practical risk that his SUV might be unavailable if a search

was postponed until a warrant was obtained.

1. Probable Cause

¶ 16 Deputy Guess saw Medina slumped over his steering wheel at

5:30 in the morning. He was concerned there was a medical

emergency. When Medina got out of his SUV, the tooter fell out.

Deputy Guess testified that, based on his training and experience,

“a tooter is a small cylindrical item used for the ingestion of

narcotics.” Deputy Guess also testified that Medina appeared very

nervous throughout the encounter.

¶ 17 Considering the totality of the circumstances, see Zuniga,

¶ 16, we conclude that Deputy Guess had probable cause to believe

that the SUV contained evidence of possession of drugs; the

circumstances suggested that Medina had very recently used drugs

in the SUV. Cf. People v. Verigan, 2015 COA 132, ¶ 15 (police

officers had probable cause to search under the automobile

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exception where they saw a used marijuana pipe with burnt

material in the car), aff’d on other grounds, 2018 CO 53.

¶ 18 People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041 (Colo. 2010), on which

Medina relies, is distinguishable. In that case, police officers saw a

glass pipe in its original packaging in a car. Because the pipe

hadn’t been used, and there were no other indicia of recent drug

use, there was no probable cause to search the car. Id. at 1046.

But Medina’s condition when Deputy Guess confronted him and his

demeanor when he got out of the SUV, along with the facts the

tooter fell out of the car when Medina got out and wasn’t in any

packaging, could lead a reasonable person to believe that Medina

had recently used drugs in the SUV.

2. There Is No Exigency Requirement

¶ 19 Medina next contends that we must reverse because, when

Deputy Guess searched the SUV, there was no “practical risk that

the vehicle might be unavailable” later. He relies primarily on

People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1984), abrogated on other

grounds by, People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41. Thiret articulated a two-

part test for the automobile exception: “(1) there is probable cause

to believe that [the vehicle] contains evidence of a crime; and (2) the

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circumstances create a practical risk of the vehicle’s unavailability if

the search is postponed until a warrant is obtained.” Id. at 202

(quoting People v. Meyer, 628 P.2d 103, 106 (Colo. 1981)).

¶ 20 But, under the current state of the law, “the police may make

a warrantless search of an automobile on probable cause and

without exigent circumstances.” People v. Romero, 767 P.2d 1225,

1227 (Colo. 1989) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392

(1985)). That is because “[t]he automobile exception ‘does not have

a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and

probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth

Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.”’”

Furness, ¶ 17 (emphasis added) (quoting Allen, ¶ 32; in turn

quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)); see

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (probable cause is

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all that’s required under the automobile exception; an automobile’s

“ready mobility” justifies the search without a warrant).1

¶ 21 Thiret and other cases articulating the requirement that the

People prove a “practical risk that the vehicle might be unavailable”

have been implicitly abrogated by subsequent Supreme Court case

law, as more recent decisions by the Colorado Supreme Court seem

to have recognized. See, e.g., Furness, ¶ 17; People v. Smith, 2022

CO 38, ¶ 28 (“Although the automobile exception requires probable

cause, it does not require exigent circumstances.”); Allen, ¶ 32;

People v. Bailey, 2018 CO 84, ¶ 18; Zuniga, ¶ 14; see also People v.

Gamboa-Jimenez, 2022 COA 10, ¶ 52. We are, of course, bound by

the more recent precedent. People v. Washington, 2014 COA 41,

¶ 25; see also id. at ¶ 26 (we are bound by the United States

Supreme Court’s decisions on matters of federal law).

1 It is undisputed that Medina’s SUV was readily mobile. We also
reject Medina’s contention that the searches would only be justified
if he was within reaching distance of the subject items when the
searches occurred. The cases on which he relies, Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332 (2009), and People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, involved
the search incident to arrest exception, not the automobile
exception.

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¶ 22 Because we have already concluded that Deputy Guess had

probable cause to search the SUV without a warrant, and there is

no dispute that the SUV was readily mobile, the district court didn’t

err by denying Medina’s motion to suppress.

III. Disposition

¶ 23 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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