Peo v. Chahan

23CA0038 Peo v Chahan 01-29-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0038
City and County of Denver District Court No. 20CR3352
Honorable Jay S. Grant, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Steven J. Chahan,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Dunn and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 29, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kira L. Suyeishi, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Steven J. Chahan, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of three counts of

attempted extreme indifference murder and one count of illegal

discharge of a firearm. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 During a road rage incident on Interstate Highway 25 in May

2020, the driver of a car fired at least four shots at another car that

contained three people. No one was injured. The driver of the car

that was shot at, Benjamin Bauer, identified the shooter’s vehicle as

a dark gray Volkswagen EOS and provided two potential license

plate numbers. During their investigation, the police discovered

that Chahan was the registered owner of a gray Volkswagen EOS

with a license plate that almost matched one of the numbers from

Bauer (the sequence had an “I” rather than Bauer’s “1”). Further,

Chahan was wearing an ankle monitor at the time of the offense

that placed him at the location of the shooting. About a week after

the incident, Bauer identified Chahan from a six-person photo

lineup as the person who had fired the shots. In making the

identification, Bauer said that he “recall[ed] a rounder face” and

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that the person in the third photo “resembles the nose of the driver

seen during the incident.”

¶3 Before his trial, Chahan moved to suppress Bauer’s

identification of him from the photo lineup as unduly suggestive.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress the identification,

finding that the lineup was not unduly suggestive. The court noted

that nothing in Chahan’s photo made him stand out from the rest

of the photos, all the photos included people of Asian descent,

which was how Bauer and one of the other victims had described

the shooter, and the sixth photo, which had a different color

background, didn’t draw the viewer’s attention to Chahan’s photo.

¶4 Following a two-day trial, the jury found Chahan guilty of the

offenses described above.

¶5 On appeal, Chahan contends that his convictions should be

reversed because (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress Bauer’s pretrial identification of him; (2) the trial court

erred when it first denied his motion for a mistrial after the

prosecutor improperly questioned a police detective about Chahan’s

invocation of his right to silence and then gave a defective curative

instruction to address the improper question; (3) the prosecutor

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committed misconduct during voir dire; and (4) the cumulative

effect of these errors warrants reversal of his convictions. As

discussed in detail below, we reject these contentions.

II. The Photo Lineup Was Not Unduly Suggestive

¶6 Chahan argues that the court erred by denying his motion to

suppress Bauer’s photo lineup identification. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 “A defendant is denied due process when an in-court

identification is based upon an out-of-court identification which is

so suggestive as to render the in-court identification unreliable.”

People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93, 103 (Colo. 2003). To determine

whether a pretrial photo identification is admissible, courts apply a

two-part test. Id.

¶8 First, the defendant must show that the photo lineup was

impermissibly suggestive. Id. Relevant factors include the number

of photos in the lineup, the manner of presentation by police, and

the details of the photographs themselves. Id. at 103-04. The

photos should be “matched by race, approximate age, facial hair,

and a number of other characteristics.” Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d

184, 191-92 (Colo. 2002) (citation omitted).

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¶9 Second, if a court finds that the photo lineup was

impermissibly suggestive, the prosecution must show that the

witness’s identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality

of the circumstances. Id.

¶ 10 When the photo lineup is part of the court record, an appellate

court is in the same position as the trial court to review the details

of the photographs and determine, de novo, whether the photo

lineup itself was impermissibly suggestive. People v. Shanks, 2019

COA 160, ¶ 50.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 Chahan’s photo was third in the photo lineup. Chahan

contends, as he did at the pretrial hearing, that the lineup was

unduly suggestive because the last three photos in the lineup were

not comparable to the first three photos. In support, he notes that

the person in the fourth photo was balding; the person in the fifth

photo, unlike the people in the other photos, appeared not to be of

East Asian descent; the appearance of Chahan’s nose was

dissimilar to the appearance of the noses of the other individuals in

the photo lineup; and the background for the sixth photo was a

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different color. Thus, he argues, the court erred by concluding that

the lineup was not impermissibly suggestive. We disagree.

¶ 12 The principal question is whether the photo of Chahan stood

out from the other five photos, indicating that he was more likely to

be the perpetrator. See Bernal, 44 P.3d at 191. If Chahan doesn’t

meet this burden, the claim fails, and we need not address whether

the identification was nonetheless reliable. See Borghesi, 66 P.3d at

103.

¶ 13 Here, the six photos in the lineup all depict men of about the

same age and Asian ethnicity, with relatively short hair, similar eye

and skin coloring, and similarly shaped noses. That the photos

were not identical does not make the lineup impermissibly

suggestive. There was nothing about the array or the presentation

of the photos that made Chahan’s photo stand out from the rest so

as to make it more likely for the witnesses to choose him as the

offender.

¶ 14 Contrary to Chahan’s assertion that the different colored

background in the sixth photo made it stand out such that the

lineup could be considered unduly suggestive, as the trial court

noted, that difference would have made it more likely that the

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witness would choose the person in the sixth photo, not Chahan in

the third photo. Thus, the different background for the sixth photo

doesn’t alter our conclusion that the lineup wasn’t impermissibly

suggestive.

¶ 15 Because we conclude that Chahan has failed to establish that

the lineup was impermissibly suggestive, this claim fails, and we

need not address the second part of the test or Bauer’s in-court

identification of Chahan. See id.

III. We Discern No Reversible Error in the Court’s Handling of the
Prosecutor’s Questioning of the Detective

¶ 16 Chahan raises two claims with respect to the prosecutor’s

questioning of a police detective — (1) the trial court erred when it

denied his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor asked the

police detective whether Chahan had agreed to talk to him following

his arrest; and (2) the court erred when it gave a deficient curative

instruction that told the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question,

but not the answer. We perceive no reversible error.

A. Additional Background

¶ 17 The police detective investigating the case testified that he was

notified when Chahan was placed in custody. The detective

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responded to where Chahan was being held in custody. After the

detective identified Chahan in court as the person he saw in

custody, the prosecutor asked the detective, “[D]id Mr. Chahan wish

to speak to you?” And the detective answered, “No, he did not.”

¶ 18 Chahan objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the

question created a negative inference as to his guilt because it let

the jury know that he had invoked his right to remain silent.

¶ 19 The court found that the prosecutor’s question was

inappropriate, knowing that Chahan had invoked his right to

remain silent at the time of his arrest. However, the court denied

the motion for a mistrial, noting that such a remedy was too drastic

and, instead, offered to cure the error by instructing the jury to

disregard the question and any inference that could be made from

it.

¶ 20 Chahan objected to the court’s proposed remedy and insisted

that a mistrial was appropriate. However, he didn’t object to the

court’s proposed curative instruction.

¶ 21 The court then instructed the jury as follows:

The jury is instructed at this time to disregard
the last question made by the District Attorney
to this detective, and that – and you are to

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conduct your – your analysis of the case not –
giving that no weight at all, as though it – you
never heard it. Do you understand?

¶ 22 The jury affirmatively indicated it understood the instruction.

B. The Court Did Not Err By Denying Chahan’s Request for a
Mistrial

¶ 23 Although the prosecutor’s question to the detective was

improper because it asked the detective to comment on Chahan’s

invocation of his right to remain silent, see People v. Rios, 2020

COA 2, ¶ 24 (“A prosecutor should . . . avoid making comments

regarding a defendant’s pre- or post-arrest silence.”), we conclude

that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying Chahan’s

motion for a mistrial.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 24 We won’t disturb a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a

mistrial absent an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the

defendant. See People v. Santana, 255 P.3d 1126, 1130 (Colo.

2011). Because a mistrial is “the most drastic of remedies,” it is

“only warranted where the prejudice to the accused is too

substantial to be remedied by other means.” People v. Abbott, 690

P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 1984).

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2. Analysis

¶ 25 Here, the prosecutor’s question and the detective’s answer

were brief and Chahan’s silence was never referenced again or used

by the prosecutor to imply his guilt. Further, after Chahan

objected, the court instructed the jury that it should disregard the

question and not consider it further. Under these circumstances,

we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion when it

declined to grant Chahan a mistrial. The court’s instruction was

sufficient to cure any prejudice from that brief reference to

Chahan’s right to remain silent. Thus, because we presume the

jury understood and followed the court’s instruction, see People v.

Abdulla, 2020 COA 109M, ¶ 58, and a mistrial is a drastic remedy

to be applied only when the prejudice cannot be remedied by other

means, see Abbott, 690 P.2d at 1269, we perceive no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s denial of Chahan’s mistrial motion.

C. The Court Did Not Plainly Err in Giving the Curative
Instruction

¶ 26 Nevertheless, Chahan argues that the court’s curative

instruction was insufficient to remedy the prejudice because it

failed to tell the jury to disregard the detective’s answer — it only

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said to disregard the question. We agree that the court’s

instruction was flawed because it didn’t tell the jury to disregard

the detective’s answer. However, because Chahan didn’t object to

the instruction as given, reversal is only required if the error

constitutes plain error.

¶ 27 Under the plain error standard, we will reverse only if we

conclude that an error (1) was obvious and (2) so undermined the

fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on

the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Hagos v. People, 2012

CO 63, ¶ 14; People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005). Plain

errors must therefore be particularly egregious such that they

seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings and cast serious doubt on the judgment of

conviction. Hagos, ¶¶ 18-19. Reversals under this standard “must

be rare to maintain adequate motivation among trial participants to

seek a fair and accurate trial the first time.” Id. at ¶ 23.

¶ 28 Applying this standard, we can’t conclude that the court

committed plain error by instructing the jury as it did. The error in

failing to tell the jury to disregard the detective’s answer, even if

plain, was not substantial. The court’s instruction told the jury

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that it should disregard the question and analyze the case as

though it had never heard it. Thus, that instruction implicitly

conveyed the message that the jury should also ignore the answer.

Further, Chahan’s invocation of his right to silence was never

mentioned again or ever used by the prosecution to infer Chahan’s

guilt. Accordingly, we conclude that this error was not substantial

enough to impact the fairness of the trial and rise to the level of

plain error. Therefore, reversal isn’t required.

IV. There Was No Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 29 Chahan next contends that the prosecutor’s use of

hypotheticals during voir dire — about an altercation in a grocery

store and a witness who recalled some facts incorrectly —

constituted misconduct that requires reversal of his convictions

because they improperly informed the jury about the prosecution’s

version of the facts of the case. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 30 During voir dire, the prosecutor engaged in discussions with

potential jurors using hypotheticals.

¶ 31 While engaging one of the potential jurors, the prosecutor said,

“Let’s say I am going into a Safeway. I am just wandering around,

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and I’m not paying attention. I bump into someone, and I’m like, [‘]I

am so sorry[’]; and that someone says, [‘]What the heck[?’] and

punches me in the face. Is that a reasonable response?” The

potential juror indicated that it was not a reasonable response. The

prosecutor then presented that same hypothetical with varying

details to other potential jurors, and the jurors’ answers varied

depending on the particular facts of the hypothetical.

¶ 32 The prosecutor then changed the hypothetical and asked some

potential jurors whether they would find a witness credible if the

witness misdescribed an offender or their clothing. The jurors’

answers, again, varied based on the details of the hypothetical.

¶ 33 Chahan didn’t object to the prosecutor’s hypotheticals during

voir dire.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 34 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims for

prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096

(Colo. 2010). First, we determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct

was improper based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Second, we decide whether such actions warrant reversal under the

proper standard of review. Id. And, here, because Chahan didn’t

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object to any of the prosecutor’s comments that he now challenges

on appeal, we reverse only if plain error occurred. See Hagos, ¶ 14.

¶ 35 The purpose of voir dire is to allow the parties to reveal and

address the beliefs of potential jurors that could cause them to be

biased in a manner that prevents one of the parties from receiving a

fair trial. People v. Garcia, 2022 COA 144, ¶ 18. However, counsel

isn’t permitted to educate potential jurors on a particular theory of

the case. Edwards v. People, 418 P.2d 174, 177 (Colo. 1966). A

prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire

when she “intentionally use[s] the voir dire to present factual

matter[s] which the prosecutor knows will not be admissible at trial

or to argue the prosecution’s case to the jury.” People v. Adams,

708 P.2d 813, 815 (Colo. App. 1985) (emphasis omitted) (quoting

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.3(c) (2d ed. 1980)).

C. Analysis

¶ 36 Contrary to Chahan’s contention, the hypotheticals posed by

the prosecutor during voir dire didn’t give the jury specific insight

into the prosecution’s theory of the case. First, the hypotheticals

didn’t mirror the facts of this case. Chahan was charged with

attempted extreme indifference murder, and his theories of defense

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were mistaken identity and that he wasn’t the person who fired the

shots. Therefore, whether his actions were reasonable wasn’t an

issue in the case, and the prosecutor’s hypotheticals, while perhaps

irrelevant, weren’t improper indoctrination.

¶ 37 Second, the prosecutor’s variations of the hypothetical about

the credibility of a witness who inaccurately described the details of

an event didn’t draw the jurors’ attention to any particular facts of

the case. Rather, the prosecutor generically probed the potential

jurors about how they would assess any witness’s credibility.

¶ 38 Given the differences between the hypotheticals and the facts

of the case, it is apparent that the prosecutor’s questions weren’t

intended to instruct potential jurors about the case or encourage

them to prejudge the facts. Accordingly, we conclude that the

prosecutor’s use of these hypotheticals wasn’t improper.

V. There is No Cumulative Error

¶ 39 Finally, Chahan argues that reversal is warranted under the

cumulative error doctrine. However, because we’ve identified only

one error, we need not conduct a cumulative error analysis. See

People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 152 (“The doctrine of cumulative

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error requires that numerous errors be committed, not merely

alleged.”).

VI. Disposition

¶ 40 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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