Peo in Interest of EED

25CA1173 Peo in Interest of EED 01-15-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1173
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV89
Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.E.D., a Child,

and Concerning V.P. a/k/a V.D. and M.D.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 15, 2026

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora,
Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant V.P.

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant M.D.
¶1 V.P., also known as V.D. (mother), and M.D. (father) appeal

the judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with

E.E.D. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2023, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services

(the Department) became involved with the family following reports

about the parents’ substance use and the family’s living conditions.

Soon after, the juvenile court granted the Department temporary

legal custody of the then-three-year-old child, and the Department

filed a petition in dependency or neglect. The court adjudicated the

child dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for the

parents.

¶3 The Department later moved to terminate parental rights.

More than two years after the Department filed the petition and

after a three-day evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted the

motion.

¶4 Mother and father appeal the termination judgment, though

for different reasons.

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II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied

with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan, or the plan

has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves the

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact for clear error, but we review de

novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those facts.

People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶7 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,

and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions

drawn therefrom are within the discretion of the juvenile court.

A.M., ¶ 15.

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III. Mother’s Contentions

¶8 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she (1) did not comply with her treatment plan and (2) was unfit

and could not become a fit parent within a reasonable time.

A. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶9 We first consider and reject mother’s contention that she

substantially complied with her treatment plan.

¶ 10 Mother’s treatment plan required her to demonstrate, among

other things, communication with the Department, sobriety,

stability, protective parenting, and legal compliance. The family-

time worker testified that mother’s family time remained supervised

throughout the case, and her engagement was “inconsistent.”

During visits, the family-time worker witnessed mother promising

the child that she would be returning home, which had a

demonstrably negative effect on the child, leading to days of

dysregulation, impacts on her school attendance, and changes in

her overall behavior. Despite direction from the family-time worker,

mother continued to make such promises to the child. One week

before the termination hearing, mother’s promises escalated to the

point that the Department involved law enforcement and ended the

3
visit early due to concerns about the child’s emotional well-being. A

caseworker opined that mother was not compliant with the

protective parenting objective of her treatment plan, in part,

because she was unable to recognize the negative impact her

inconsistent behavior and unrealistic promises had on the child.

¶ 11 Beyond mother’s inability to provide protective parenting, the

caseworker also described mother’s noncompliance with her other

treatment plan objectives. The caseworker specifically testified that

mother was unwilling to communicate with the caseworker during

the last six months of the case, refused to allow her to conduct a

home visit in the months before the termination hearing, stopped

attending therapy after a few sessions, did not demonstrate sobriety

throughout the case, and had outstanding warrants.

¶ 12 While mother points to evidence showing she complied with

some portions of her treatment plan, the juvenile court considered

this evidence and weighed it against the evidence showing mother

had not meaningfully engaged in the treatment plan. We, of course,

may not reweigh the evidence. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 29.

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¶ 13 Because significant evidence supports the court’s finding that

mother did not substantially comply with her treatment plan, we

will not disturb the ruling.

B. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 14 We next reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court

erred by finding that she was unfit and could not become fit within

a reasonable time.

¶ 15 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders her

“unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care to

include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health

needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2).

¶ 16 To determine whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely

to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider

whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition.” S.Z.S., ¶ 24. A reasonable time is

not an indefinite time and must be determined by considering the

child’s needs. Id. at ¶ 25. When a parent has made little progress

on a treatment plan, the court is not required to give the parent

5
additional time to comply. See People in Interest of R.B.S., 717 P.2d

1004, 1006 (Colo. App. 1986).

¶ 17 Mother argues that because she substantially complied with

her treatment plan, she “could have become fit in a reasonable

time.” But, as discussed, the court did not find that mother

substantially complied with her treatment plan, and the record

supports that finding.

¶ 18 The caseworker opined that it would take mother “at least” six

to twelve months to become fit if she consistently and meaningfully

engaged in treatment but that mother had not demonstrated an

ability or willingness to do that during the two years the case had

been open. And the caseworker expressed concern about the

emotional dysregulation the child had experienced throughout the

case and testified that giving mother additional time to become fit

was not in the child’s best interests and would be detrimental to the

child.1

1 To the extent mother suggests the Department should have made

“accommodations” to arrange substance use testing that addressed
her “cultural beliefs,” we don’t address that argument because it
was not raised before the juvenile court. See Gebert v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 2023 COA 107, ¶ 25.

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¶ 19 Given this, the record supports the court’s finding that mother

was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. We therefore

will not disturb it.

IV. Father’s Contentions

¶ 20 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

(1) his treatment plan was appropriate; (2) he did not comply with

his treatment plan and was unlikely to become fit within a

reasonable time; (3) the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate him and reunify him with the child; (4) there was no

less drastic alternative to termination; and (5) a continuance of the

termination hearing was not appropriate. We address, and reject,

these contentions in turn.

A. Appropriateness of the Treatment Plan

¶ 21 During the two years that the case was open, father was in

and out of custody in various jurisdictions. Father now contends

that the juvenile court erred by concluding that his treatment plan

was appropriate because the plan did not “contemplate his

incarceration.”

¶ 22 Though the parties dispute preservation, we need not

determine whether father preserved his argument (or was required

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to do so) because, even if we assume the argument was preserved,

we see no basis for reversal.

¶ 23 A treatment plan is appropriate if it is reasonably calculated to

render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to the child

within a reasonable time, and it relates to the child’s needs.

§ 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025. We measure the appropriateness of a

treatment plan by its likelihood of success in reuniting the family,

“which must be assessed in light of the facts existing at the time of

the plan’s approval.” People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071

(Colo. App. 2005). A parent’s incarceration does not “prohibit the

creation and implementation” of an appropriate treatment plan, but

it may “render more difficult the crafting of a meaningful and

workable plan.” People in Interest of M.C.C., 641 P.2d 306, 309

(Colo. App. 1982).

¶ 24 Although father generally argues that the treatment plan did

not contemplate his incarceration, he does not dispute that all his

treatment plan components were necessary to address the child’s

needs. See People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶¶ 22-23

(directing the juvenile court to consider on remand whether the

parent’s treatment plan was inappropriate because it did not

8
include a component addressing domestic violence). Nor does

father explain how he could have addressed the identified safety

concerns without completing the treatment plan objectives. See id.

at ¶ 14 (“In determining whether a treatment plan is appropriate,

the court must consider whether the plan’s objectives adequately

address the safety concerns identified during the assessment of the

family.”). And father identifies no modifications to his treatment

plan that the Department could or should have made to address the

periods during which father was incarcerated.

¶ 25 While we recognize that father could not complete some of the

plan’s action steps while incarcerated, father was not continuously

incarcerated. Indeed, father ignores the five months that he was in

community corrections — where he had greater access to services,

including drug testing — and the fourteen months when he was out

of custody entirely, including the eight months before the

termination hearing. Given that father was not incarcerated during

the entire pendency of this case, we don’t see — and father doesn’t

say — how his treatment plan was inappropriate to render him a fit

parent in a reasonable time.

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¶ 26 Therefore, we conclude that father failed to establish that his

treatment plan was inappropriate.

B. Treatment Plan Compliance and Fitness

¶ 27 Father’s treatment plan required him to demonstrate, among

other things, communication with the Department, sobriety,

stability, protective parenting, and legal compliance.

¶ 28 A caseworker testified that father (1) often failed to respond to

Department communications or appear at scheduled meetings;

(2) did not complete a substance use and mental health evaluation;

(3) did not submit to drug testing other than in community

corrections; (4) was inconsistent with family time and had not seen

the child in seven months; (5) had not informed the caseworker

where he lived or provided recent proof of employment; and (6) had

an outstanding warrant. The caseworker opined that father had

not complied with his treatment plan objectives or become fit.

¶ 29 Father argues that he complied with the treatment plan by

pointing to his progress on some aspects of the treatment plan,

including employment and housing. Though the court

acknowledged some progress, after weighing all the evidence, the

court found no “indication . . . that [father] is sober” or “an

10
appropriate caregiver.” See People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d

1080, 1082 (Colo. App. 2005) (noting that unfitness may be

premised on a parent’s failure to document sobriety). Thus, it held

that father did not successfully complete his treatment plan.

¶ 30 Father briefly argues in the alternative that, “to the extent [he]

did not demonstrate fitness,” he could have become fit within a

reasonable time. But the court rejected this claim, given the

minimal progress father made during the case.

¶ 31 Because substantial evidence supports the court’s findings

that father did not successfully complete his treatment plan and

could not become fit within a reasonable time, we will not disturb

them.

C. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 32 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father, including submitting

referrals for father to complete his evaluations, engage in treatment,

and attend family time. Father disagrees and argues that the

Department did not make reasonable efforts because it failed to

(1) consistently communicate with him; (2) provide appropriate

family time; and (3) connect him with service providers.

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1. Legal Principles

¶ 33 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether a department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care.” § 19-1-103(114). A department satisfies its reasonable

efforts obligation if it provides services in accordance with section

19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114). As necessary and appropriate, those

services include screenings, assessments, and individual case

plans; home-based family and crisis counseling; information and

referral services; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b)(I)-(V).

¶ 34 When evaluating a department’s efforts, the juvenile court

should consider whether the services provided were appropriate to

support the parent’s treatment plan. People in Interest of E.D.,

2025 COA 11, ¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately responsible for

using those services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with

the treatment plan. Id. at ¶ 12. Thus, a court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining

12
whether the department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest

of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 35 Whether a department made reasonable efforts is a mixed

question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146,

¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error

and its legal determination based on those findings de novo. Id.

2. Communication

¶ 36 Father argues that the Department failed to properly

communicate with him during his incarceration, which resulted in

his inability to fully comply with his treatment plan.

¶ 37 While it’s true that the caseworkers had difficulty tracking

father while he was in custody and did not consistently meet with

father while he was incarcerated, the record reflects that the

caseworkers had several in-person meetings with father, reached

out to him via phone and text message on numerous occasions, and

conducted diligent searches to locate him. Yet, the caseworker

testified that father often ignored the Department’s attempts to

contact him, did not respond to communications, and did not

attend scheduled meetings. The caseworker said that the

Department tried to remain in contact with father and

13
communicated with his probation officer and the facilities where he

was incarcerated.

¶ 38 Because father failed to communicate with the caseworkers

when he was not in custody and failed to update the Department as

to his location throughout the case, we are unpersuaded that the

Department failed to use reasonable efforts to communicate with

father. See A.V., ¶ 12.

¶ 39 Father now also claims a “reliance interest” in the treatment

plan and argues that “the law of the case” and the Colorado

Department of Human Services rules required monthly in-person

meetings. But father didn’t raise these arguments before the

juvenile court, and we will not consider them for the first time on

appeal. See People in Interest of C.E., 923 P.2d 383, 385 (Colo. App.

1996) (holding that we do not consider issues raised for the first

time on appeal in dependency and neglect cases).2

2 Although we don’t address father’s arguments, we observe that

one of the rules father cites specifically exempts monthly face-to-
face contact “[w]hen the [parent’s] whereabouts are not known
despite efforts to locate the [parent],” as was periodically the case
here. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.204(B)(2)(c), 12 Code Colo. Regs.
2509-3.

14
3. Family Time

¶ 40 Father next claims that he did not receive family time during

the intermittent periods he was incarcerated during the case. But

the record shows that the Department was limited in its ability to

arrange family time during these periods. For instance, at least one

jail denied visitation. And the caseworker testified that some of

father’s periods of incarceration were too short to arrange family

time. The record also shows that father did not update the

Department as to his location and status, which affected the

Department’s ability to arrange family time.

¶ 41 What’s more, the caseworker testified that even when father

was not in jail, he was not consistent with family time. For

example, when father was placed in community corrections, his

failure to consistently communicate with the Department affected

its ability to arrange visits. And even when in-person visits were

scheduled, father failed to appear. Father claimed he could not get

passes to leave community corrections, but he only provided notice

of this barrier to the Department after he missed the visits. The

Department then tried to set up phone visits, but father ignored the

calls.

15
¶ 42 Even after his release from community corrections, father

attended just three in-person family time sessions before he

stopped going. A couple of months later, father wanted to restart

family time. Though the parties dispute why family time did not

immediately restart, it was for the juvenile court to consider and

weigh the evidence. To the extent father asks us to reweigh or draw

different inferences from the evidence, we will not do that.

¶ 43 We are equally unpersuaded by father’s contention that the

Department “lumped [him] in” with mother when seeking to restrict

family time and “gave up” on scheduling visits due to the pending

termination hearing. One week before the termination hearing, the

Department sought a restriction of family time based on the child’s

severe dysregulation following family time and concerns for her

emotional well-being. In support, the family-time worker testified

that father missed more than half of his visits and had not seen the

child in almost five months. The court concluded that father had —

independent of mother — “inconsistency issues” that impacted the

child and justified the restriction.

¶ 44 The court properly considered the Department’s efforts to

arrange family time throughout the case — both when father was in

16
and out of custody. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022

CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35 (stating that a juvenile court’s determination of

whether a department made reasonable efforts must be based on

the totality of the circumstances). Because the record supports the

court’s conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts, we

will not disturb the ruling.

4. Connection with Service Providers

¶ 45 Father asserts that the Department failed to (1) provide him

with a referral to an evaluator closer to his community corrections

facility for completion of his substance use and mental health

evaluation; (2) timely communicate with the facility regarding

available services; and (3) offer housing assistance and resources

following his release.

¶ 46 But again, father was not in custody for portions of the case,

and he does not explain why he could not complete the previously

ordered evaluation when he was not in custody — including the

eight months between his release and the termination hearing.

And, in any event, the record shows that the caseworker tried, on

several occasions, to communicate with community corrections but

did not receive a timely response. Finally, father informed the

17
caseworker that he had a place to stay upon his release. See § 19-

3-208(2)(b) (requiring referrals to public and private assistance

resources only if they are determined to be necessary and

appropriate).

¶ 47 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude

that the juvenile court did not err by finding that the Department

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunify him with

the child.

D. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 48 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding no

less drastic alternatives to termination existed. He maintains that

the court could have ordered an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to his brother. We disagree.

¶ 49 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic alternatives, the court

bases its decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

18
¶ 50 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must be the “best”

option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. For that reason, if the court

considers a less drastic alternative but finds that termination is in

the child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative

and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. We are bound by that

determination. See People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 51 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that no

available less drastic alternative would have met the child’s

physical, emotional, and mental health needs. The caseworker

described the child’s significant mental health needs, the negative

impacts caused by father’s inconsistent family time attendance, and

the child’s need for permanency and stability. The caseworker

questioned father’s ability to consistently attend visits if the court

ordered an APR and expressed concern that the “constant . . . in

and out” would be too much for the child to handle. And the

caseworker concluded that an ongoing relationship between father

and the child would be detrimental, and an APR was not in the

child’s best interests. Though father largely ignores this evidence, it

supports the court’s finding that no viable less drastic alternative to

19
termination existed. And because the evidence supports the

finding, we must affirm it. See id.

¶ 52 Still, father contends that an APR to his brother was a viable

less drastic alternative, and the Department should have done more

to investigate that option. But that argument doesn’t address the

court’s finding that no alternative would meet the child’s physical,

emotional, and mental health needs. Because the court found that

termination was in the child’s best interests, whether father’s

brother (or any relative) would accept an APR doesn’t matter. See

A.M., ¶ 27 (“[I]f a proposed alternative to termination is to be

deemed viable, it must not only be adequate, it must be in the

child’s best interests.”).

¶ 53 We conclude that the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that an APR was not a viable less drastic alternative to

termination.

E. Continuance

¶ 54 At the time of the termination order, there was a pending

inquiry under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children

(ICPC) to determine whether placement with father’s brother would

20
be suitable.3 Father asserts that “[a]ssuming that the juvenile court

could not rule that a less drastic alternative existed because an

ICPC had not yet been completed,” the court erred by denying his

request to continue the termination hearing. (Emphasis added.)

We disagree for two reasons.

¶ 55 First, father’s premise is incorrect. The completion of the ICPC

did not prevent the court from determining whether a less drastic

alternative to termination existed. And because the court

concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests, an APR

to any individual was not a viable less drastic alternative. Thus, the

ICPC status had no effect on that decision.

¶ 56 Second, the case had been pending for two years. In denying

the requested continuance, the juvenile court properly balanced the

need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice against

the facts underlying the request and the child’s best interests,

including her need for permanency. See People in Interest of R.J.B.,

2021 COA 4, ¶ 11. The court considered the request along with the

3 Father’s brother initially expressed interest in being a placement

option but then withdrew from consideration. On the second day of
the termination hearing, the brother again expressed interest and
the Department then initiated the ICPC.

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child’s needs, including the “extreme negative impact” family time

had on her. Based on the evidence, we cannot say that the court

abused its discretion by denying the requested continuance.

¶ 57 Finally, to the extent father generally asserts a violation of his

procedural or substantive due process rights, he hasn’t developed

these arguments. We therefore do not consider them. See People in

Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to

address undeveloped arguments).

V. Disposition

¶ 58 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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