Peo v. Henry

23CA1655 Peo v Henry 01-08-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1655
City and County of Denver District Court No. 20CR5080
Honorable Kandace C. Gerdes, Judge
Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Adawnous Donnil Henry,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 8, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

M. Linton Wright, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lafayette, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Adawnous Donnil Henry, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of

distribution of controlled substances, two counts of possession of

controlled substances, illegal discharge of a firearm, and third

degree assault. He contends that the trial court reversibly erred by

(1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of

a warrantless search of his house; (2) accepting his waiver of his

right to counsel; and (3) admitting evidence about suspected bomb-

making materials found in a search of his house. We disagree.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Early one morning, officers responded to reports of gunshots

in a residential area. When officers arrived on the scene, they

found a woman — later identified as Raqhel Williams — hiding

behind a vehicle on the back side of the house. Officers later

observed a handgun under the vehicle she’d been hiding behind.

¶3 Officers also found a man — later identified as Henry — in the

front yard of a neighboring house with a gunshot wound and a rifle

within his reach. He was transported to the hospital and received

medical treatment for the gunshot wound and a head injury.

1
¶4 Williams and Henry gave investigating officers conflicting

accounts as to what had led to the shooting.

¶5 Williams told officers that she’d been using Henry’s computer

when he grabbed her by the neck and started choking her. She

said that she was able to grab a knife from Henry and swing it at

him. Then, she said, she grabbed a gun that had fallen out of his

waistband and shot at him multiple times before fleeing the house.

¶6 Henry told officers that he lived in the house and that he’d

invited Williams over, and they’d had consensual sex, after which

he fell asleep and woke up to her attempting to rob him. According

to Henry, Williams had a gun in her hand, and when he tried to

grab it, she shot him in the abdomen. Henry said he grabbed a

rifle, began shooting back, and then fled to the neighbor’s front yard

and shot toward their house to prompt them to call the police.

¶7 After their initial interviews with Henry and Williams, officers

conducted a warrantless sweep of the house. They reported that

during that initial search, they didn’t find anyone else in the house

but observed narcotics and other items of interest in plain view.

Based on these observations, they obtained a search warrant.

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Upon executing the warrant, they seized various controlled

substances and other evidence from the house.

¶8 Henry was charged with several counts relating to the shooting

and the items found in the house. Neither Williams nor Henry

testified at trial, but the jury heard testimony about and saw video

recordings of their interviews with officers. After the trial, the jury

found Henry guilty of two counts of distribution of controlled

substances (cocaine and psilocyn), two counts of possession of a

controlled substance (methamphetamine and

methylenedioxymethamphetamine), one count of illegal discharge of

a firearm, and one count of third degree assault.

¶9 This appeal followed.

II. Suppression Ruling

¶ 10 Henry contends that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless

search of the house. Specifically, he claims that the search wasn’t

justified by exigent circumstances and exceeded the scope of any

such circumstances. He also claims that the evidence presented at

trial undermined the factual findings the court had made after the

suppression hearing and, thus, that the court plainly erred by not

3
revisiting its earlier decision and excluding the challenged evidence

at trial. We disagree with both contentions.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 11 Based on the initial warrantless search of the house, officers

obtained a search warrant. The affidavit in support of the warrant

stated that, during that initial search, officers “observed narcotics,

paraphernalia, shell casings and ammunition in plain view.”

¶ 12 Henry filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized with the

search warrant based on the invalidity of the initial warrantless

search. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,

concluding that the warrantless search was justified by the exigent

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and was

reasonable in scope. The court explained,

[T]here was clearly a colorable claim of
emergency threatening the life or safety of
another which justified a warrantless entry
into the home or other premises . . . .

So the circumstances in which they found
themselves were that . . . they had a call of a
shooting. I have the first victim who is injured;
one officer was speaking to her; Mr. Henry was
lying on the ground with an obvious wound
and said that somebody had shot him, and
then identified the place where — I don’t mean
on his physical person, but that the shooting

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had occurred in his home. And the police had
sufficient justification at that point to enter the
home . . . .

....

[Officers] needed to determine if there was
anybody else who could have been injured who
was in the home or if the shooter was still on
the premises.

¶ 13 The court further concluded that “the search that [officers]

conducted was reasonably related to the exigencies they sought to

address,” and “[t]he things that they found in this home were in

plain view.”

¶ 14 At trial, the evidence showed that drugs were found in the

house in a cooler in a trapdoor area, in a duffle bag inside a closet,

and in a pocket in William’s bag.

B. Applicable Legal Standards

¶ 15 Our review of a trial court’s suppression order presents a

mixed question of law and fact. People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15,

¶ 15. We defer to the court’s factual findings, such as findings of

historical facts underlying a search, if those findings are supported

by the record. See id. But we assess de novo the legal significance

of those facts, such as whether a search was constitutional. See

People v. Berdahl, 2019 CO 29, ¶ 18.

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¶ 16 The United States and the Colorado Constitutions both protect

an individual’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7; People v. Oates,

698 P.2d 811, 814 (Colo. 1985). A search of a home without a

warrant is presumptively unreasonable unless it is justified by an

exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Karo, 468

U.S. 705, 717 (1984); People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶ 23.

¶ 17 One such exception is that a warrantless search is justified by

exigent circumstances, when “the public’s interest in a timely police

response to emergent and fast-developing situations outweighs the

individual’s privacy interests.” People v. Brunsting, 2013 CO 55,

¶ 25. As relevant here, this exception may apply if “there is a

colorable claim of an emergency situation threatening the life or

safety of another.” People v. Pate, 71 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Colo. 2003);

accord People v. Gillespie, 2024 COA 98, ¶ 41. The two

requirements to apply this exception are that (1) officers have an

objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to

protect the lives or safety of themselves or others and (2) the

manner and scope of the search is reasonable. Brunsting, ¶ 31.

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¶ 18 Our supreme court has identified several factors relevant to

determining whether there is a colorable claim of an emergency. Id.

at ¶ 30. These factors include

• the gravity or violent nature of the offense involved;

• whether there is probable cause to believe the suspect

committed the offense;

• whether there is strong reason to believe the suspect is

on the premises;

• whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;

• the risk posed to other persons from unnecessary delay;

and

• the circumstances of the entry, including whether it was

made at night and whether it was made peaceably.

Id.; People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27, ¶ 27.

¶ 19 When exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a

home, “[t]he scope of the permissible intrusion is determined by the

exigency justifying the initiation of the warrantless entry.” Gillespie,

¶ 41 (quoting People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)).

¶ 20 As a safeguard for an individual’s constitutional rights, the

exclusionary rule “‘forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence

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at trial,’ as well as ‘evidence later discovered and found to be

derivative of an illegality.’” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 19

(first quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009);

and then quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 232 (2016)).

C. Exigent Circumstances

¶ 21 We conclude that the trial court properly denied Henry’s

motion to suppress on the basis that the warrantless search of the

house was justified by exigent circumstances.

¶ 22 Officers arrived on scene to a reported shooting and found

Williams nearby, acting “extremely hysterical” and saying she’d

been shot at. Officers also found Henry in the front yard of a

neighboring house with a gunshot wound. In addition to the violent

nature of the offense, officers in the back yard were receiving

different information than those in the front yard, making it difficult

to determine who was a victim and who was a suspect.

¶ 23 Also, while Williams and Henry both reported that they were

alone at the house, Henry made conflicting statements, some of

which suggested that the woman who had shot him could still be in

the house, and he didn’t initially provide the woman’s name.

Officers thus couldn’t be sure whether Williams was that woman or

8
whether Williams and Henry were telling the truth about no one

else being at the house. Indeed, some neighbors had reported

seeing another woman earlier, and responding officers believed

they’d heard three gunshots coming from the direction of the house

after they had made contact with Williams.

¶ 24 Based on these circumstances, officers had an objectively

reasonable basis to believe there was an immediate need to protect

the lives or safety of themselves or others. See Brunsting, ¶ 31.

Specifically, they had reasonable grounds to believe that they or the

public could be endangered if there was a shooter or another victim

inside the house. And although by the time they entered the house

they had spent about an hour tending to Williams and Henry,

getting information from them, and loudly ordering anyone in the

house to come out, there was adequate reason to suspect that

someone might still be hiding inside with a gun or might be injured

inside and unable to leave or call out — and it was reasonable for

them to conduct a sweep of the house to be sure.

¶ 25 Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the

initial warrantless search of the house was justified by the exigent

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

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¶ 26 We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the

manner and scope of the search were reasonable. See id. Henry

argues that the body camera video shows that “officers continue[d]

to search the home after they determined that no one else was

present.” But the hearing testimony and bodycam evidence showed

that, after officers visually cleared the rooms, they were instructed

to double-check closets, cabinets, and crawl spaces where someone

could be hiding before leaving the house. Given the exigencies of

the situation, it was reasonable for them to do so.

¶ 27 Finally, we reject Henry’s argument that the trial court erred

in concluding that the search was reasonable in scope, as the drugs

officers observed were in fact not in plain view. There was no

evidence before the trial court at the time of the suppression

hearing to rebut the officers’ assertions that the drugs were in plain

view. See Thompson, ¶ 15; see also People v. Singley, 2015 COA

78M, ¶ 26 (an appellate court confines itself to the evidence

developed at the suppression hearing when assessing whether the

trial court erroneously denied a defendant’s suppression motion).

Henry points out that the officers didn’t testify at the hearing that

they observed any drugs in plain view. But an officer had already

10
averred that fact in the search warrant affidavit submitted to the

court in conjunction with the hearing, and the prosecutor alluded

to it in her argument at the hearing. Henry never challenged that

averment, either in his motion to suppress or at the hearing. Thus,

we discern no error in the court’s finding that the officers observed

the drugs and other items in plain view.

D. Plain Error Regarding the Drugs Being in Plain View

¶ 28 Henry further contends that the trial court plainly erred by

admitting the evidence seized from the house during the trial

because the evidence presented at trial revealed — contrary to the

search warrant affidavit — that the drugs couldn’t have been in

plain view. See Singley, ¶ 26 (an appellate court may consider “the

entire record” if a party asserts that the trial court plainly erred in

relation to a suppression issue). We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 29 An error is plain when it is both obvious and substantial, such

that it “so undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself

as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

conviction.” People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 43.

¶ 30 Crim. P. 41(e) provides that a motion to suppress “shall be

made and heard before trial unless opportunity therefor did not

11
exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion,

but the court, in its discretion, may entertain the motion at the

trial.” This rule “require[s] the parties . . . to pursue discovery

vigorously prior to trial.” People v. Tyler, 874 P.2d 1037, 1039

(Colo. 1994).

¶ 31 We conclude that because the trial court would’ve had

discretion to decline to consider a renewed motion to suppress the

challenged evidence at trial had Henry brought such a motion, the

court didn’t plainly err by admitting the evidence. Indeed, if, as

Henry claims, the drugs couldn’t have been in plain view during the

initial warrantless search of the house, then that fact was

reasonably discernable prior to trial through due diligence. Thus,

the issue could’ve been raised at the suppression hearing or

otherwise in advance of trial, and the trial court could have denied

any suppression motion made at trial on the basis that it was too

late to consider the issue. See People v. Hastings, 983 P.2d 78, 82-

83 (Colo. App. 1998) (trial court properly denied as untimely a

suppression motion made during trial, even though the motion was

based on testimony not presented until the trial, because the

defendant knew about the potentially illegal search from the

12
moment it occurred), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Gorman v.

People, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2000).

III. Waiver of the Right to Counsel

¶ 32 Henry also contends that the trial court erred by granting his

motion to represent himself because his waiver of his right to

counsel was ineffective. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 33 During his altercation with Williams, Henry sustained a

traumatic brain injury (TBI).

¶ 34 Before trial, the issue of competency was raised, and the court

ordered an evaluation of Henry. The evaluation revealed the

following:

• Henry was diagnosed with dyslexia as a child, and he

reported having received “special education services for

dyslexia ‘most’ of his life.”

• Henry said he believed he sustained a stroke in 2020.

• Henry’s attorney indicated that Henry has difficulty

retaining information and has a history of TBI.

• The evaluator stated that Henry reported his memory had

“vanished” since “the incident” but noted that, in fact,

13
“he discussed all topics with no significant memory

impairment noted.”

• The evaluator remarked, “[O]verall, [Henry’s] thought

process was goal-directed and linear. . . . His speech was

clear and coherent. His thoughts were simple but

appeared logical. No significant confusion was noted. . . .

Throughout the evaluation, he maintained satisfactory

attention, did not evidence cognitive impairment or

disorientation, and showed no difficulty understanding

me or conveying his thoughts.”

• The evaluator added that Henry “displayed an

understanding of his current legal situation.” She went

on to describe how he was able to identify all his charges,

display an understanding of the class level of his charges,

provide responses regarding his preferred legal strategy,

note some evidentiary issues, and discuss the possible

consequences he might face if convicted.

• The evaluator opined that Henry “d[id] not currently have

a mental disability or developmental disability that

prevent[ed] him from having sufficient present ability to

14
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding in order to assist in his defense,

or prevent[ed] him from having a rational and factual

understanding of the criminal proceedings.”

¶ 35 Based on the results of the evaluation, the trial court

concluded that Henry was competent to stand trial. At no point —

including on appeal — has Henry challenged the court’s

competency determination.

¶ 36 On multiple occasions before trial, Henry expressed a desire to

speak for himself rather than through his attorney.

¶ 37 Shortly before trial, Henry moved for a hearing under People v.

Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989), which the court granted. At the

hearing, Henry expressed a desire to waive his right to counsel and

represent himself with advisory counsel. The court gave Henry an

Arguello advisement, during which Henry indicated that he

understood the nature of the charges against him and the

consequences of representing himself. He also indicated that he

could “barely” read, write, and understand the English language,

though he later said that he could “follow” the advisement form,

which he was given a copy of at the start of the advisement, “along

15
with [the court].” The court noted that Henry seemed confused at

times but worked to further explain those topics to him. At the end

of the hearing, the court permitted the public defender’s office to

withdraw as counsel and allowed Henry to proceed pro se with

advisory counsel.

B. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 38 A defendant’s right to legal counsel is protected under both the

United States and the Colorado Constitutions. See U.S. Const.

amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; Arguello, 772 P.2d at 92. As a

corollary to the constitutional right to counsel, “a defendant has the

alternative right to self-representation.” Arguello, 772 P.2d at 92;

see also People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1263-64 (Colo. 1985)

(“[T]he express guarantee of the right to counsel implicitly embodies

a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help . . . .”).

¶ 39 If a defendant requests to represent themself, the court must

“conduct a specific inquiry on the record to ensure that the

defendant is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waiving the

right to counsel” before it can grant the request. Arguello, 772 P.2d

at 95; accord People v. Davis, 2015 CO 36M, ¶ 15.

16
¶ 40 A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the record clearly shows

that the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the

statutory offenses included within those charges, the range of

potential punishments, the possible defenses to the charges and

circumstances in mitigation of the charges, and all other facts

essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. People v.

Lavadie, 2021 CO 42, ¶ 28. Other factors courts consider in

determining whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent include

whether the defendant understood the requirement of complying

with procedural rules at trial, whether the court’s exchange with the

defendant consisted merely of pro forma answers to pro forma

questions, and whether the defendant was trying to delay or

manipulate the proceedings. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94-95.

¶ 41 Whether a defendant effectively waived their right to counsel,

and therefore can exercise their right to self-representation, is a

mixed question of fact and law. Lavadie, ¶ 22. On appeal, we

“accept the trial court’s findings of historic fact if those findings are

supported by competent evidence, but we assess the legal

significance of the facts de novo.” People v. Coke, 2020 CO 28, ¶ 10

(quoting People v. Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 14).

17
C. Application

¶ 42 Henry doesn’t challenge whether his waiver was voluntary; he

only challenges whether it was knowing and intelligent. We agree

with the trial court’s conclusion that it was.

¶ 43 Henry continuously engaged with the court during the Arguello

advisement and at the later trial and sentencing, and he seemed to

understand what was happening overall, despite a few moments

when he expressed confusion. And to the extent that some of his

responses during the Arguello advisement may have bolstered his

current claim, the trial court — which had the opportunity to

observe his demeanor — expressed concern at one point that his

responses were “trying to make it vague and stuff to try to create

some error.”

¶ 44 Also, while Henry said he had difficulty reading, there was no

indication that this impacted the knowing and voluntary nature of

his waiver because the court read the advisement in its entirety and

provided an advisement form to Henry so he could follow along —

and he indicated that he was able to do so.

¶ 45 Finally, the fact that the court didn’t expressly consider any

potential impact of Henry’s TBI on the knowing or intelligent nature

18
of his waiver doesn’t render it ineffective. Neither Henry nor his

counsel referenced the TBI at any point during the Arguello

advisement or asked the court to expressly consider it. Moreover,

while the competency evaluation noted Henry’s history of TBI, the

evaluator’s findings — such as that Henry didn’t exhibit any

significant confusion or difficulty understanding things, displayed

an understanding of the nature of his charges and the

consequences he might face if convicted, and didn’t have a mental

or developmental disability that prevented him from having a

rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings —

were consistent with the court’s later conclusion that Henry’s

waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent.

IV. Evidence of Suspected Bomb-Making Materials

¶ 46 Lastly, Henry contends that the trial court plainly erred by

admitting evidence about suspected bomb-making materials found

in the house in violation of CRE 401, 403, and 404(b). We disagree

and conclude that any error in admitting the evidence wasn’t plain.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 47 While executing a search warrant of the home, officers found

what they described as “suspected bomb-making materials.” The

19
officers contacted the bomb squad to investigate the materials,

which turned out to be substances that were legal to possess and,

when combined, could not create an explosive device. Henry thus

wasn’t charged with any offenses relating to those substances.

¶ 48 Henry’s theory of defense as to the drug charges was that the

drugs had been planted in the house and that the police

investigation wasn’t sufficiently thorough. He specifically

questioned why officers didn’t run specific tests, search particular

areas, or collect certain evidence.

¶ 49 The prosecution called the bomb squad supervisor to testify at

trial about the investigation of the suspected bomb-making

materials. The supervisor testified that the bomb squad was called

to the house to “look at the chemicals and make sure that they were

safe to be moved and make sure that they were not anything

explosive.” On cross-examination, he clarified that the bomb squad

didn’t find any actual explosives and that the substances found

were legal to possess.

¶ 50 On redirect examination, the prosecutor elicited the following

testimony from the bomb squad supervisor:

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[The substances] were three of four chemicals
that were needed [to make a bomb]. So if there
was one more chemical, which would be
charcoal, you could make black powder, then
confine that in something, and then it would
become an improvised explosive device.

But the individual precursors by themselves
are legal to possess and not enough to consist
of an improvised explosive device as we found
them and what we found at the scene.

¶ 51 These materials were mentioned a handful of other times at

trial, once by Henry himself, but Henry never lodged an objection.

B. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 52 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Abad, 2021 COA 6, ¶ 8. A trial court abuses

its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair or if it misapplies the law. Id.

¶ 53 In the absence of a contemporary objection, we will reverse an

error only if it amounts to plain error — in other words, if the error

was “obvious, substantial, and ‘so undermined the fundamental

fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability

of the judgment of conviction.’” People v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M,

¶ 33 (quoting People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1203 (Colo. 2011)).

21
¶ 54 As a general rule, evidence is admissible if it is relevant, CRE

402, meaning it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”

CRE 401. However, relevant evidence may still be excluded if the

risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.

CRE 403. Moreover, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts isn’t

“admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a

particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the

character.” CRE 404(b)(1). To determine whether such evidence is

admissible for other purposes, a court must apply the four-part test

outlined in People v. Spoto, considering whether (1) the evidence

relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence is logically relevant;

(3) that relevance is independent of the prohibited inference that the

defendant has a bad character and acted in conformity with that

character; and (4) the evidence’s probative value isn’t substantially

outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 795 P.2d 1314, 1318

(Colo. 1990).

22
C. Application

¶ 55 We conclude that the trial court didn’t err by admitting the

testimony generally referencing the suspected bomb-making

materials because that testimony was relevant to rebut Henry’s

assertion that the police investigation was inadequate. Specifically,

it was relevant to explain the officers’ actions during the

investigation of the house and why there was a pause in the police

investigation while the bomb squad cleared the house.

¶ 56 However, we conclude that the trial court should not have

allowed the bomb squad supervisor’s testimony on redirect

indicating that there was only one substance missing to create an

explosive device. That testimony had no logical relevance

independent of the impermissible inference that Henry acted in

conformity with a bad character trait. Thus, admitting the

testimony was not consistent with the law. See id.; Abad, ¶ 8.

¶ 57 This error was not plain, however, for two reasons.

¶ 58 First, the references to suspected bomb-making materials were

largely fleeting, and one of those references was made by Henry

himself in his cross-examination of one of the officers. The instance

of the prosecution using the materials as impermissible character

23
evidence occurred only once in the course of a five-day trial. And

the prosecutor didn’t mention the materials in opening statements

or closing arguments.

¶ 59 Second, the evidence supporting the convictions was

overwhelming. As to the drug convictions, multiple officers testified

that when Williams was questioned following the incident, she said

she’d observed Henry sell drugs from the house earlier in the day.

Moreover, the drugs underlying the charged offenses were found in

a cooler in the house where Henry was staying. That same cooler

also contained items often used in the distribution of drugs — such

as a scale, small bags, and cash in different denominations — and

multiple pieces of mail addressed to Henry. And an expert testified

that the amount of drugs and the other items found with the drugs

were indicative of narcotic sales.

¶ 60 As to the illegal discharge of a firearm conviction, officer

testimony and bodycam video showed that officers found Henry

with a rifle. Officer testimony and bodycam video also showed that

when questioned at the scene, Henry admitted to shooting into the

neighbor’s house to prompt them to call 911. There was also

evidence of bullet holes found in the neighbor’s house.

24
¶ 61 Finally, as to the assault conviction, one of the officers testified

that Williams reported that Henry choked her. Photos taken that

night show cuts and bruises on Williams’s neck and arms. And an

officer testified that he observed these injuries, as well as petechiae

in her eyes, and that they were consistent with being choked.

¶ 62 Accordingly, the error wasn’t so substantial as to call into

question the validity of Henry’s convictions.

V. Disposition

¶ 63 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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