Aircomm v. DISH Wireless

24CA1450 Aircomm v DISH Wireless 12-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1450
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV32353
Honorable Sarah B. Wallace, Judge

Aircomm of Avon, LLC; Atlantic Coast Communications, LLC; CCATT, LLC;
CCTMO, LLC; CCTM1, LLC; CCTM2, LLC; Coverage Plus Antenna Systems,
LLC; Crown Atlantic Co., LLC; Crown Castle GT Co., LLC; Crown Castle MU,
LLC; Crown Castle South, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 05, LLC; Crown Castle
Towers 06-2, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 09, LLC; Crown Communication, LLC;
Global Signal Acquisitions, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC; Global
Signal Acquisitions III, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions IV, LLC; Goldenstate
Towers, LLC; High Point Management Co., LLC; ICB Towers, LLC; Interstate
Tower Communications, LLC; Intracoastal City Towers, LLC; Pinnacle Towers
Acquisition, LLC; Pinnacle Towers Asset Holding, LLC; Pinnacle Towers, LLC;
Pinnacle Towers III, LLC; Radio Station WGLD, LLC; Shaffer & Associates, Inc.;
Sierra Towers. Inc.; Tower Development Corporation; Tower Systems, Inc.;
Tower Technology Co. of Jacksonville, LLC; Tower Ventures III, LLC; WCP
Wireless Lease Subsidiary, LLC; and TVHT, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DISH Wireless LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 31, 2025
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Kendra N. Beckwith, Nathan B. Thoreson,
Denver, Colorado; Davis Graham & Stubbs, LLP, Daniel A. Richards, Denver,
Colorado for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP, Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Frederick R. Yarger,
Miranda B. Worthington, Rebekah L. Nickel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellee
¶1 Plaintiffs, which we refer to collectively as Crown,1 appeal the

trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant, DISH Wireless L.L.C.

(DISH). The dispute centers around whether a master lease

agreement (MLA) and related site lease acknowledgments (SLA)

required DISH to pay additional rent for space beyond the exterior

of DISH’s equipment needed to comply with the National Electric

Code (Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n 2023) (NEC).

¶2 We conclude that (1) the trial court properly determined that

the MLA was ambiguous and therefore properly allowed the jury to

1 There are thirty-seven Crown-related entities named as plaintiffs,

which all asserted the same claims and arguments on appeal:
Aircomm of Avon, LLC; Atlantic Coast Communications, LLC;
CCATT, LLC; CCTMO, LLC; CCTM1, LLC; CCTM2, LLC; Coverage
Plus Antenna Systems, LLC; Crown Atlantic Co., LLC; Crown Castle
GT Co., LLC; Crown Castle MU, LLC; Crown Castle South, LLC;
Crown Castle Towers 05, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 06-2, LLC;
Crown Castle Towers 09, LLC; Crown Communication, LLC; Global
Signal Acquisitions, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC; Global
Signal Acquisitions III, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions IV, LLC;
Goldenstate Towers, LLC; High Point Management Co., LLC; ICB
Towers, LLC; Interstate Tower Communications, LLC; Intracoastal
City Towers, LLC; Pinnacle Towers Acquisition, LLC; Pinnacle
Towers Asset Holding, LLC; Pinnacle Towers, LLC; Pinnacle Towers
III, LLC; Radio Station WGLD, LLC; Shaffer & Associates, Inc.;
Sierra Towers. Inc.; Tower Development Corporation; Tower
Systems, Inc.; Tower Technology Co. of Jacksonville, LLC; Tower
Ventures III, LLC; WCP Wireless Lease Subsidiary, LLC; and TVHT,
LLC.

1
determine the scope of the parties’ agreement; (2) the jury’s verdict

is supported by evidence in the record; and (3) the trial court

appropriately entered a declaratory judgment in DISH’s favor based

on the jury’s findings and the court’s independent assessment of

the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

I. Background and Procedural History

A. Deal Overview and Subsequent Relationship Breakdown

¶3 In 2019, DISH entered into an asset purchase agreement with

T-Mobile U.S., Inc. and Sprint Corporation to obtain the assets and

liabilities of Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, and other mobile service

providers. As a condition of the merger, the Federal

Communications Commission required DISH to make its 5G2

broadband network available to 20% or more of the United States

population by June 2022 and 75% by 2025.

¶4 To meet these aggressive deadlines, in spring 2020 DISH

negotiated with Crown, which owns and maintains an extensive

nationwide infrastructure to facilitate wireless communications.

2 5G is a wireless standard for mobile devices that supports data

transfers for complex home networks and internet-enabled
appliances. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4MKJ-
UU9X.

2
Wireless network operators, such as DISH, enter into lease

agreements with Crown to obtain access to its towers and adjacent

ground space to install network carrying equipment on and near

the tower. Wireless operators must install equipment on both the

ground and the tower for their networks to operate.

¶5 Between the spring and summer of 2020, DISH discussed

plans with Crown to install its network equipment platforms on the

ground space at thousands of Crown’s tower sites. As part of their

negotiations, Crown and DISH coordinated and discussed DISH’s

template plans for the platforms. Crown provided comments to

DISH concerning the proposed configurations. The template for the

equipment platforms included a cabinet with doors that opened and

closed to allow service of DISH’s equipment (door swings). During

their negotiations, both parties were aware that NEC safety

requirements mandate three feet of unobstructed space adjacent to

some of DISH’s equipment (NEC workspace). See NEC

§ 110.26(A)(1). The parties were also aware that the doors on part

of DISH’s equipment occasionally need to be opened and closed to

service the components. Despite this knowledge, the MLA and SLAs

3
failed to expressly address whether DISH would be required to pay

additional rent for the NEC workspace and door swings.

¶6 In November 2020, the parties signed the MLA, which

permitted DISH to lease space on up to 20,000 communication

towers across the United States in exchange for a single monthly

access fee. The monthly access fee was the only rent provision that

DISH was explicitly required to pay for access to Crown’s sites,

provided DISH’s equipment was within the standard equipment

configuration (SEC) laid out in the MLA. The SEC defined the

leased ground space as “not to exceed 5’ x 7’, inclusive of any

required set-back, buffer or spark radius which must be contained

entirely within such 5’ x 7’” (5’ x 7’ area). The MLA did not define

the phrase “set-back, buffer or spark radius,” or any of the

individual terms therein.

¶7 Crown and DISH entered into an SLA for each new site on

which DISH placed its equipment. Each SLA required the parties to

acknowledge whether the equipment configuration on that site was

consistent with the SEC or, rather, required an expanded

configuration. For all but a handful of leases, the parties

4
acknowledge that the equipment configuration complied with the

SEC.

¶8 Under the MLA,

[t]he full execution and delivery of an SLA shall
grant to [DISH] a lease for the exclusive use of
the Leased Property described in such SLA and
the non-exclusive use, for access purposes, of
the portions of the Site not leased or licensed
to third parties or restricted to Lessor’s use on
the terms and subject to the conditions set
forth in the SLA and [the MLA].

The MLA also gives DISH a “non-exclusive right to access . . . each

Leased Property . . . to enable [DISH] to install . . . remove, operate,

repair, replace, maintain and/or monitor [DISH’s] equipment.” If

DISH needs to lease space beyond the SEC, it is required to pay

additional rent in accordance with the MLA.

¶9 Between November 2020 and July 2021, the parties executed

thousands of SLAs. Around September 2021, Crown informed

DISH that it thought DISH needed to pay additional rent for the

NEC workspace and door swings space for thousands of SLAs.

Shortly thereafter, DISH submitted various equipment designs in an

effort to address the parties’ disagreements. The parties re-entered

5
negotiations to resolve the dispute but their efforts were

unsuccessful.

B. Litigation and Trial

¶ 10 In August 2022, Crown filed a complaint asserting three

claims for relief: (1) breach of the MLA and SLAs regarding the door

swings; (2) breach of the MLA and SLAs regarding the NEC

workspace; and (3) declaratory relief from the court to compel DISH

to pay additional rent for each alleged breach. Crown subsequently

removed its door swing claim through an amended complaint.

¶ 11 In response, DISH asserted multiple counterclaims including,

as relevant on appeal, a claim for declaratory judgment that the

MLA and SLAs do not require DISH to pay additional rent to

accommodate the NEC workspace and door swings. The court set

the matter for trial.

¶ 12 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on

whether the MLA and SLAs require DISH to pay additional rent for

the NEC workspace or the door swings. After a hearing, the trial

court ruled that the MLA is ambiguous because it is “susceptible to

multiple readings.” Specifically, it concluded that Crown had

presented a reasonable argument that the 5’ x 7’ area does not

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include the additional area needed to accommodate the NEC

workspace or the door swings. Conversely, the court also agreed

with DISH that it was not clear that the “setback, buffer or spark

radius” language in section 1(D) of the MLA includes the NEC

workspace needed for maintenance. Because the MLA is

susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the court

concluded that it is ambiguous and the resolution of that ambiguity

was “an issue of fact to be determined by the jury.”

¶ 13 With respect to the door swings issue, the court rejected

Crown’s argument that DISH’s claim for declaratory relief was

rendered moot by Crown’s dismissal of its claim related to the door

swings because Crown had never disavowed its right to bring such

a claim in the future. But the court also declined to grant DISH’s

motion for summary judgment on the door swings issue, reasoning

that “whether the [door swings require] extra rent is ambiguous for

the same reason [that] . . . whether DISH must pay extra rent for

the NEC [workspace] is ambiguous.”

¶ 14 After the evidentiary portion of the trial, Crown moved for a

directed verdict by renewing its argument that the MLA’s language

is unambiguously in Crown’s favor and additionally argued that

7
DISH had failed to present any evidence supporting its

interpretation. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the

case to the jury. The jury returned a split verdict, finding that

Crown failed to prove its breach of contract claim related to the NEC

workspace and DISH failed to prove its breach of contract

counterclaim. In view of its findings, the jury declined to award

either party damages.

¶ 15 After the trial, the court addressed DISH’s request for a

declaratory judgment related to the door swings dispute. The court

concluded that the jury’s verdict included an implied finding that

the door swings do not trigger any requirement for DISH to pay

additional rent. Thus, the court entered judgment declaring that

DISH is not obligated to pay additional rent for the door swings, “so

long as the door swings are reasonably placed on the 5’ x 7’ [area].”

II. The Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Order and Directed
Verdict Ruling

¶ 16 Crown argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the

MLA is ambiguous about whether DISH is required to pay

additional rent for the NEC workspace. We are unpersuaded.

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A. Standard of Review

¶ 17 We review questions of law, such as a trial court’s

determination that a contract is ambiguous, de novo. Am. Fam.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶ 23. We also review a trial

court’s denial of a directed verdict de novo. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co. v. Goddard, 2021 COA 15, ¶ 26. In assessing the propriety

of a directed verdict, “we must consider all the facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a

reasonable jury could have found in favor of the nonmoving party.”

Id.

B. Applicable Law

1. Contract Interpretation

¶ 18 “In interpreting a contract, our primary goal is to give effect to

the parties’ intent.” French v. Centura Health Corp., 2022 CO 20,

¶ 25. When a contract is complete and unambiguous, we enforce it

according to its plain language. Klun v. Klun, 2019 CO 46, ¶ 18. In

ascertaining whether contract provisions are ambiguous, we review

“the instrument’s language and construe it consistent with the

plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed.” Id.

“The meaning of a contract is found by examination of the entire

9
instrument and not by viewing clauses or phrases in isolation.”

U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 842 P.2d 208,

213 (Colo. 1992).

¶ 19 If the operative contract terms “are susceptible of more than

one reasonable interpretation, . . . the terms are ambiguous, and

evidence beyond the four corners of the contract is admissible to

establish the parties’ intent.” French, ¶ 25. Mere disagreement

between the parties concerning the meaning of contract terms does

not establish a contract ambiguity. Id. In assessing whether an

ambiguity exists, the court may conditionally admit extrinsic

evidence. Pepcol. Mfg. Co. v. Denv. Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310,

1314 n.3 (Colo. 1984). “If the court, after considering the extrinsic

evidence, determines that there is no ambiguity, then the extrinsic

evidence must be stricken.” Id.; see also Sandstone Invs. I, LLC v.

A. Everett Williams 1963 Tr., 53 P.3d 687, 690 (Colo. App. 2001) (“In

deciding whether a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider

extrinsic evidence bearing upon the meaning of the written terms.

10
However, the court may not consider the parties’ own extrinsic

expressions of intent.”).3

2. Motion for a Directed Verdict

¶ 20 Under C.R.C.P. 50, a party may move for a directed verdict at

the close of evidence. A court properly grants a motion for directed

verdict if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, compels a conclusion that reasonable people

could not disagree with and “no evidence, or legitimate inference

therefrom, has been presented upon which a jury’s verdict against

the moving party could be sustained.” Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. HIVE

Constr., Inc., 2025 CO 17, ¶ 20 (quoting Burgess v. Mid-Century Ins.

Co., 841 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo. App. 1992)).

3 We acknowledge that there may be some tension between Pepcol

Manufacturing Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310 (Colo.
1984), and its progeny, and the supreme court’s later statement
that “extrinsic evidence cannot create ambiguity; it is an aid to
ascertaining the intent of the parties once an ambiguity is found.”
Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶ 4. But we need
not address any tension that may exist between these cases
because the operative contract provisions of the MLA and SLAs are
ambiguous based on their plain terms, and also ambiguous when
considered in the context of extrinsic evidence of the parties’
contractual discussions and course of performance.

11
C. Analysis

¶ 21 Crown argues that the plain meanings of “set-back” and

“buffer” are clear and unambiguous, and, therefore, section 1(D)’s

requirement that “any required set-back or buffer must be entirely

contained within the 5’ x 7’ [area]” unambiguously required DISH to

pay additional rent if the NEC workspace does not fit within the

5’ x 7’ area. Crown points to a dictionary definition of setback that

includes, as one meaning of the word, “the distance of a structure

or other feature (such as a well or septic system) from the property

line or other feature.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://perma.cc/B3G3-59XV. This definition, Crown argues,

means that “set-back,” as it appears in the MLA, refers to the

distance between two physical objects or features. In addition,

Crown points to a definition of “buffer” that includes “something

that serves as a protective barrier.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://perma.cc/T7DM-B7B6. From this definition, Crown posits

that the use of “buffer” in section 1(D) “refers to the space necessary

to safely operate something or perform a task.”

¶ 22 Crown also argues that DISH’s interpretation of the MLA and

SLAs would render the language of section 1(D) superfluous. Thus,

12
Crown contends, section 1(D)’s terms must be construed, as a

matter of law, to mean that the NEC workspace is not part of the

area encompassed by the base rent, and therefore DISH must pay

additional rent for that space.

¶ 23 DISH responds that the trial court properly determined that

the MLA is ambiguous because the plain meanings of “set-back”

and “buffer” do not unambiguously encompass the NEC workspace.

For example, DISH notes that the MLA does not provide or reference

any definition of set-back or buffer, much less Crown’s proffered

definitions.

¶ 24 DISH also notes that the MLA does not equate buffer or set-

back with NEC workspace. Furthermore, DISH notes that the MLA

and SLAs do not describe a set-back or buffer by reference to a

property line, any physical feature, or a protective barrier. DISH

also points to trial testimony from an NEC expert who stated that

he has never heard or used the term set-back or buffer when

referring to the NEC workspace or other NEC requirements.

¶ 25 Relatedly, DISH argues that section 7 of the MLA grants it a

nonexclusive easement to access its equipment for purposes of

maintenance and monitoring. Specifically, it grants DISH

13
a non-exclusive right to access, from a public
right-of-way, each Leased Property to the
extent reasonably deemed necessary by [DISH]
to enable [DISH] to install, photograph,
remove, operate, repair, replace, maintain
and/or monitor [DISH’s] Equipment and to
otherwise utilize each Leased Property for the
Purpose, in each case, to such extent, and in
such means and manners (including, without
limitation, on foot or by motor vehicle,
including trucks and other heavy
equipment . . . )as [DISH] deems reasonably
necessary.

¶ 26 These provisions, according to DISH, at a minimum create

ambiguity regarding whether the NEC workspace requirements

trigger additional rent under the MLA.

¶ 27 In further support of its position, DISH points to evidence that,

when they negotiated the MLA, all parties were aware of the NEC

workspace requirements, and that the NEC workspace would

extend beyond the 5’ x 7’ area, but that neither the MLA nor the

SLAs contain an express provision requiring DISH to pay Crown

additional rent for that additional space. In addition, Crown

worked with DISH in agreeing upon the SEC and approved the

configuration — whether based on the SEC or otherwise — used by

DISH for each SLA.

14
¶ 28 DISH also points to testimony from one of DISH’s negotiators

that during the MLA negotiations, Crown’s deputy counsel said,

“We’re not going to charge you for door swings, let’s move on.”

Finally, DISH points out that the parties executed thousands of

SLAs before Crown first indicated that DISH might owe additional

rent for the NEC workspace. And it was not until late 2021 that

Crown first notified DISH that it was reserving the right to pursue

additional rent for the NEC workspace and door swings. This

extrinsic evidence, DISH argues, supports its contention that when

the agreements were executed, the parties did not intend that DISH

would be charged additional rent for either the NEC workspace or

the door swings. See Sandstone, 53 P.3d at 690.

¶ 29 We are persuaded by DISH’s arguments. Recall that for a

contract to be ambiguous, the language in question must be

susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. French,

¶ 25. Both parties presented reasonable interpretations that a jury

could accept when assessing the meaning of section 1(D).

¶ 30 While “set-back” and “buffer” do not have any defined meaning

in the MLA and SLAs, as the trial court noted, the analysis does not

end there. Based solely on the language of the MLA, it is unclear

15
whether section 1(D) was meant to include the NEC workspace,

considering that the NEC requirements, at least in part, are in place

to allow for maintenance and monitoring of the equipment. This

uncertainty is amplified by section 7 of the MLA, which gives DISH

a nonexclusive right to access the leased property to install,

operate, and repair DISH’s equipment.

¶ 31 Moreover, the parties do not dispute that, despite their

awareness of the need for the NEC workspace, no provision of the

MLA or the subsequent SLAs definitively or directly requires DISH

to pay additional rent for the NEC workspace. In the absence of an

express designation in the parties’ agreement, and because there is

record support for both parties’ interpretations, the trial court

properly found that this was an issue of fact for a jury to resolve.

¶ 32 Nor are we persuaded by Crown’s arguments that the terms

“set-back” and “buffer” necessarily refer to the NEC workspace. As

the complete definitions of the terms relied on by Crown make clear,

the specific meanings Crown attributes to these terms are not their

only meanings. Moreover, as DISH points out, the definitions

emphasized by Crown contain terms — such as boundary, feature,

and protective barriers — that the MLA and SLAs do not further

16
reference or define. Finally, the jury heard testimony that the

interpretation urged by DISH does not render the terms of section

1(D) meaningless because DISH presented evidence that these

terms are not intended to encompass the NEC workspace, but,

rather, specialized equipment DISH installed on the sites —

including generators, gas tanks, and fuel cells. For a directed

verdict to be appropriate, it was Crown’s burden to demonstrate

that the presented evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to

DISH, compelled the conclusion that DISH’s defenses failed. See

Mid-Century, ¶ 20. But we conclude that reasonable jurors could

have found in DISH’s favor based on the evidence.

¶ 33 In reaching this conclusion, we do not need to assess which of

the parties’ arguments we find more persuasive. Instead, we must

determine whether DISH presented reasonable interpretations of

the disputed provisions, and whether DISH offered evidence at trial

to support those interpretations. Because both occurred, it was the

jury’s responsibility to resolve that factual dispute. See E. Ridge of

Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969, 974

(Colo. 2005) (“When an ambiguity has been determined to exist, the

meaning of its terms is generally an issue of fact to be determined

17
in the same manner as other factual issues.”); see also People v.

Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 33 (“An appellate court may not serve as a

thirteenth juror and consider whether it might have reached a

different conclusion than the jury.”).

¶ 34 For similar reasons, we reject Crown’s alternative argument

that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict

on the breach of contract claim because DISH failed to present any

evidence at trial supporting its interpretation of section 1(D).

Consistent with its argument that section 1(D)’s language is

unambiguous, Crown argues that DISH failed to present any

evidence supporting its interpretation of section1(D). Therefore,

Crown argues, the extrinsic evidence that DISH presented at trial —

including the templates that DISH shared with Crown prior to

executing the MLA, witness testimony about how the parties

intended section 1(D) to function, and evidence related to Crown’s

failure to immediately enforce the MLA — did not create a factual

dispute.

¶ 35 DISH responds that Crown was not entitled to a directed

verdict because Crown erroneously insisted that its reading of the

MLA is the only reasonable interpretation. Furthermore, DISH

18
notes that Crown failed to object to the admission of any of the

contested evidence during trial and the court instructed the jury

that it was permitted to consider evidence, including “the parties’

negotiations” and “earlier dealings,” in discerning the parties’ intent

concerning the meaning of these terms.4

¶ 36 Because we have already determined that the trial court did

not err by finding that the MLA is ambiguous, the court properly

allowed the admission of extrinsic evidence. See E. Ridge, 109 P.3d

at 974. Crown does not appear to challenge a single piece of

evidence that was admitted; rather, it seems to be challenging

allowing the matter to proceed to trial at all because, it argues,

there is no reasonable alternative reading of section 1(D).

¶ 37 Crown accurately points out that it presented evidence

supporting its interpretation of section 1(D). But that does not lead

to a conclusion that the interpretation urged by DISH was

untenable. Indeed, we have already determined that section 1(D)’s

plain meaning does not unambiguously compel DISH to pay

4 This instruction was based on Colorado’s model civil jury

instruction for determining the parties’ contractual intent, CJI-Civ.
30:31 (2025), which Crown does not challenge on appeal.

19
additional rent for NEC workspace. And DISH presented the jury

with evidence supporting its urged interpretation. It necessarily

follows that Crown’s motion for a directed verdict on the breach of

contract claim could not be granted.

¶ 38 DISH also presented evidence in support of its interpretation

of section 7 of the MLA, which gives DISH a nonexclusive right to

access its equipment for repairs and maintenance, including

testimony from an NEC expert that NEC workspace can be in a

“general open space” and it “does not need to be cordon[ed] off at all

times.”5

¶ 39 Moreover, the jury’s verdict on the NEC workspace claim, and

the trial court’s and our independent assessment of the evidence,

lead to the conclusion that reasonable minds could construe the

direct and circumstantial evidence to support DISH’s interpretation

of the MLA relative to the NEC workspace dispute. Thus, the trial

5 Illustrative of their competing interpretations of the various

contractual terms and the evidence, at oral argument Crown argued
that NEC workspace could not be used for any shared purpose.
True, the jury heard evidence to support Crown’s interpretation.
But the jury also heard evidence that the NEC workspace did not
need to be dedicated for DISH’s exclusive use. This is simply
another illustration of ambiguous language and conflicting evidence
that the court properly allowed the jury to resolve.

20
court did not err by concluding that DISH presented sufficient

evidence to defeat Crown’s motion for a directed verdict.

III. Declaratory Judgment on the Door Swings

¶ 40 Finally, Crown contends that the trial court clearly erred by

granting DISH’s request for declaratory relief on its door swings

claim because it lacked record support for its findings. We, again,

discern no error.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 41 Declaratory judgments are intended to resolve disputes

between parties concerning their respective rights under a law,

relationship, or controlling instrument — such as a contract. § 13-

51-106, C.R.S. 2025; C.R.C.P. 57. In resolving a declaratory

judgment dispute, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de

novo and its factual findings for clear error. See Saxe v. Bd. of Trs.

of Metro. State Coll. of Denv., 179 P.3d 67, 72 (Colo. App. 2007) (“A

trial court’s decision to accept jurisdiction to enter a declaratory

judgment is a matter we review de novo.”); Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n

v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 24 (“We review findings of

fact for clear error, meaning that we won’t disturb such findings if

21
there is any evidence in the record supporting them.”), aff’d, 2021

CO 56.

¶ 42 C.R.C.P. 57, which governs declaratory judgments, is

“remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to ‘afford

relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status,

and other legal relations.’” City of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.,

2018 CO 59, ¶ 28 (quoting Toncray v. Dolan, 593 P.2d 956, 957

(Colo. 1979)); see generally §§ 13-51-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2025 (the

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law). A court may fashion a

remedy in proceedings where declaratory relief is sought and the

judgment or decree will “terminate the controversy or remove an

uncertainty.” § 13-51-109, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 43 When a jury decides factual issues incident to its resolution of

claims related to a request for declaratory relief, a trial court “is

bound by the jury’s determination” where there are “essential

factual issues that are central to both” the jury verdict and the

declaratory judgment claim. Marquardt v. Perry, 200 P.3d 1126,

1130-32 (Colo. App. 2008) (applying this concept in the context of a

court’s resolution of equitable contract claims after a jury trial on

the legal claims). “In determining this issue, we must analyze what

22
findings were actually made by the jury or were necessarily implicit

in its verdict, and whether the trial court’s subsequent findings and

conclusions conflict with the jury’s determination.” Id. at 1132.

B. Analysis

¶ 44 After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court addressed the

competing declaratory judgment claims and found that “the parties

intended DISH to be able to use space beyond its exclusive 5’ x 7’

[area] for its door swings, without triggering [a]dditional [r]ent under

the MLA so long as the door swings are reasonably placed on the

5’ x 7’ [area].”

¶ 45 Crown argues on appeal that if it prevails on either of its

arguments with respect to the NEC workspace, reversal of the

court’s order on the door swings issue is required. But we have

concluded that Crown’s NEC workspace arguments fail, so this

contention fails as well.

¶ 46 Crown also argues there was no controversy or uncertainty for

the court to resolve through the entry of declaratory relief because it

had previously dismissed its door swings claim. We disagree. As

evidenced by Crown’s continued pursuit of the issue on appeal,

Crown’s dismissal of the door swings claim did not resolve the

23
dispute. Rather, absent resolution through a declaratory judgment,

DISH continued to face the prospect of future claims based on the

door swings. The resolution of this uncertainty was clearly within

the purpose of a declaratory judgment claim. See § 13-51-106,

C.R.S. 2025; Cmty. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Heather Corp., 677 P.2d

330, 334 (Colo. 1984) (“The purpose of this statute is to afford relief

from the uncertainty surrounding legal rights and legal relations; it

is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed and

administered.”).

¶ 47 Next, Crown argues that the trial court’s declaratory judgment

must be reversed because the court misconstrued the verdict and

the evidence. It asserts that the trial court’s conclusion — that “the

jury verdict controls its determination with respect to the door

swing[s]” — has no basis in fact because the claims resolved by the

jury did not expressly address DISH’s use of additional space when

opening and closing its cabinet doors.

¶ 48 DISH disagrees, reasoning that the trial court properly entered

a declaratory judgment in its favor because Crown cannot show

that granting the motion was clear error. DISH also argues that the

trial court properly ensured that Crown could not relitigate the door

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swings controversy because the two claims (the door swings and

whether Crown proved that DISH violated the MLA) were directly

related.

¶ 49 We conclude that Crown’s contentions misconstrue the full

factual basis for the trial court’s judgment on the door swings claim

and ignore evidence that DISH presented in support of its position.

¶ 50 As Crown argues, the trial court did make clear its view that

the jury’s resolution of the NEC workspace claim was not limited to

a particular configuration of DISH’s equipment, as Crown had

argued. And the court stated that Crown had argued at trial that

the NEC workspace and door swings needed to be within the 5’ x 7’

area. Moreover, the court concluded that the jury rejected Crown’s

argument “when it specifically held that NEC working space did not

need to be within the 5’ x 7’ [area].” Similarly, the court concluded

that, “consistent with the jury verdict and the evidence presented at

trial, the parties intended DISH to be able to use space beyond its

exclusive 5’ x 7’ [area] for its door swings without triggering

additional rent under the MLA.” Thus, as Crown argues, the trial

court’s entry of declaratory relief on the door swings was based, in

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part, on the jury’s findings with respect to the NEC workspace

issue.

¶ 51 But the trial court’s declaratory judgment was not based solely

on the jury’s implied findings. To the contrary, as the court

repeatedly made clear, it also independently reviewed the evidence

and independently concluded that the parties contemplated that the

door swings would not trigger additional rent. By way of

illustration, the trial court stated as follows:

As discussed below, this [c]ourt finds that DISH
is entitled to the requested relief on this claim:
declaratory judgment in DISH’s favor is
required by the factual findings necessarily
implicit in the jury’s verdict and by this Court’s
factual findings based on the evidence
presented at trial.

....

Thus, consistent with the jury verdict and the
evidence presented at trial, the [c]ourt finds the
parties intended DISH to be able to use space
beyond its exclusive 5’ x 7’ [area] for its door
swings without triggering [a]dditional [r]ent
under the MLA so long as the door swings are
reasonably placed on the 5’ x 7’ space.

(Emphases added.)

¶ 52 Between these statements, the court conducted an extensive

independent review of the evidence. Among other things, the court

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found that “Crown knew both before and at the time the parties

signed the MLA that DISH’s standard configuration required DISH’s

cabinet doors to extend beyond the 5’ x 7’ Lease Area when

opened.” And the court found that

the intent of the parties when signing the MLA
was that under the [monthly access fee (MAF)]
“it would be the exception, not the rule, for
DISH to get additional ground space at a site”
because the MAF represented what Crown was
going to charge DISH for [the SEC]. Requiring
DISH to pay [a]dditional [r]ent for its door
swings at virtually all Crown sites would be
inconsistent with that intent.

¶ 53 As these findings illustrate, the court did not rely solely on the

implied findings associated with the jury’s verdict when concluding

that the parties intended to permit DISH to open and close the

equipment doors without triggering any additional rent. And

though Crown presented contrary evidence in support of its

interpretation of the parties’ agreements, DISH also presented

competent evidence to support its interpretation. Ultimately, the

trial court — consistent with the jury’s verdict — found DISH’s

evidence more persuasive. Thus, we discern no error in the trial

court’s entry of declaratory relief in favor of DISH on the door

swings dispute.

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IV. Disposition

¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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