Peo in Interest of KW

24CA0358 Peo in Interest of KW 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0358
El Paso County District Court No. 21JV365
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Kay.W., Kai.W., E.W., D.W., and S.W., Children,

and Concerning K.W.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Brown and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County
Attorney, Adrianne A. Brambila, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Michael Kovaka, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 K.W. (father) appeals the termination of his parent-child legal

relationships with K.W., K.W., E.W., D.W., and S.W. (the children).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2021, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect after father and

the children’s mother — who had mental health and substance

abuse problems impacting the children’s safety — threatened or

attempted suicide. The children were placed in foster care.

¶3 Father didn’t appear for the adjudicatory jury trial he had

requested, and the juvenile court adjudicated the children

dependent and neglected with regard to father by default. The

court then entered a treatment plan for father. Father’s treatment

plan required him to (1) maintain stable housing and provide for the

children’s basic needs; (2) participate in a domestic violence

assessment and comply with any recommendations; (3) maintain

contact with case professionals; (4) participate in a parenting

program; (5) participate in family time; (6) complete a substance

abuse assessment and follow any recommendations; and (7) refrain

from any criminal activity.

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¶4 More than a year after his treatment plan had been adopted,

the court vacated the default adjudication. The court concluded

that adjudication by default was improper because father had been

“represented by counsel and reasonably relied on counsel protecting

his interests.” After a new adjudicatory hearing on October 16 and

18, 2023, during which the court determined that father had

previously waived his right to a jury trial, the court again

adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and adopted a

new treatment plan for father.

¶5 Father’s new treatment plan required him to (1) maintain

stable housing and provide for the children’s basic needs; (2)

participate in a domestic violence assessment and comply with any

recommendations; (3) participate in a parenting program; (4)

participate in family time; (5) complete a substance abuse

assessment and follow any recommendations; and (6) complete a

psychological and psychiatric medication evaluations and follow

any recommendations. The record shows that at least some

services were in place for father when the court adopted the second

treatment plan.

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¶6 The Department filed father’s treatment plan on November 1,

2023. The same day, the Department also filed a new motion to

terminate father’s parental rights as to K.W., K.W., and S.W. Later

that month, the guardian ad litem (GAL) filed a new motion to

terminate father’s parental rights as to E.W. and D.W. After a

hearing in January 2024, the court terminated father’s parental

rights as to all the children.

¶7 Father appealed the new adjudication, arguing that his jury

trial waiver didn’t apply to the second proceeding, and a division of

this court reversed. See People in Interest of K.W., (Colo. App. No.

23CA2106, Aug. 29, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

The supreme court granted certiorari. People in Interest of Kay.W.

v. K.L.W., (Colo. No. 24SC621, Nov. 25, 2024) (unpublished order).

This court nostra sponte stayed father’s appeal in this case pending

a decision by the supreme court.

¶8 In People in Interest of Kay.W. v. K.L.W., 2025 CO 48, ¶¶ 5-7,

33-34, the supreme court concluded that the trial court didn’t err

because father was required by section 19-3-202(2), C.R.S. 2025,

and C.R.J.P. 4.3(a) to timely request a jury trial in his new

adjudication proceeding, which, it concluded, he didn’t do. Having

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lifted the stay in the present case, we now address father’s

contentions relating to the termination proceeding.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶9 Father first contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and reunify his family. We

aren’t convinced.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the state must make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

§§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” for a child who is in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114).

This standard is satisfied by the provision of services in accordance

with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114); see also People in Interest

of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 11 The services must be “appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan.” People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

(Colo. App. 2011). But the parent is responsible for using those

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services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 12 Whether the Department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 Father argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him because

it “dedicated its efforts to having [f]ather’s rights terminated as

quickly as possible.” Specifically, father suggests that the

Department’s filing of a motion to terminate his parental rights

indicates that it didn’t make the reasonable efforts required to

address father’s mental health issues. We perceive no error.

¶ 14 We acknowledge father’s assertions that the court improperly

(1) held its reasonable efforts determination “in abeyance” after

voiding his first adjudication and dispositional orders and (2) relied

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on evidence of his lack of compliance with his first treatment plan.

But we conclude that the record supports the court’s order.

¶ 15 As an initial matter, case law suggests that the court wasn’t

required to disregard father’s lack of compliance with his first

treatment plan. See People in Interest of S.N., 2014 COA 116,

¶¶ 18-19 (facts about a parent’s past treatment of his other

children, as well as facts about a parent’s condition or conduct,

may be considered at adjudication, but aren’t dispositive); see also

People in Interest of K.D., 155 P.3d 634, 637 (Colo. App. 2007)

(services aren’t required if previous efforts in past cases have met

with no success because the state need not persist with futile

efforts). Nevertheless, in this case, the record of the Department’s

efforts since the adoption of the new treatment plan, standing

alone, adequately supports the court’s reasonable efforts

determination.

¶ 16 As part of the new treatment plan, the Department referred

father to a domestic violence therapist with whom he had worked in

the past. But father didn’t re-engage with the therapist after the

adoption of his new plan. The caseworker testified that under the

new treatment plan, like the old one, life skills workers were

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available to help father with his parenting skills. But father didn’t

engage in life skills services under the new treatment plan. At the

time of the termination hearing, father was “on the verge of being

discharged from his current life skills worker.” Father had

communicated with the life skills worker only “twice in the last

month and a half, two months . . . when they should be meeting a

minimum one to two times a week.”

¶ 17 The caseworker testified that both father’s life skills workers

and his visitation supervisors “still have concerns with [father’s]

parenting.” And the Department referred father to family therapy,

but father didn’t show up for appointments.

¶ 18 Upon adoption of the new treatment plan, the Department also

referred father for a new substance abuse treatment intake

appointment. Father didn’t complete the intake paperwork and

didn’t communicate with the provider again. The Department

likewise referred him for a medications assessment. The

medications assessor testified that he tried to contact father using

the phone number provided. Although father made an

appointment, he didn’t show up for that session. At the time of the

termination hearing, father hadn’t rescheduled the appointment.

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Finally, the Department found father an appropriate individual

therapist who “went above and beyond to try to get things set up

with [father].” But father never even completed intake paperwork

for that provider, let alone engaged in therapy.

¶ 19 The record evidence thus supports the court’s conclusion that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father after

the court adopted father’s new treatment plan.

¶ 20 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by father’s argument that the

Department’s filing of its motion to terminate is evidence of its lack

of reasonable efforts.

¶ 21 The filing of a termination motion doesn’t, by itself, indicate a

lack of reasonable efforts. No statute prescribes a minimum time

period between the date a court adopts a treatment plan and the

date a termination motion may be filed. People in Interest of D.Y.,

176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007). Regardless, the Department

is obligated to provide reasonable efforts before and after the filing

of a termination motion. See § 19-3-604(2) (at the hearing on the

motion to terminate, the court is required to consider whether

reasonable efforts have been made to rehabilitate the parents).

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III. Reasonable Amount of Time

¶ 22 Father also contends that the Department didn’t provide him

with a reasonable amount of time to become fit. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 23 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c).

¶ 24 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A

parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs

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and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 25 A parent must be afforded a reasonable amount of time to

work on a treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates

parental rights. D.Y., 176 P.3d at 876-77. In determining whether

a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to change within a

reasonable time and whether the parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider whether any

change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social

history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo.

App. 2003).

¶ 26 The determination of what constitutes a reasonable period is

fact-specific and varies from case to case. D.Y., 176 P.3d at 876;

see also People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24 (the court

may look to various case-specific factors). These factors may

include the parent’s social history and the chronic or long-term

nature of the parent’s conduct or condition. S.Z.S., ¶ 24. In any

case a reasonable time isn’t an indefinite time, and it must be

determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

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emotional conditions and needs. Id. at ¶ 25. As in this case, when

a child is under six years old, the juvenile court must also consider

the expedited permanency planning provisions, which require that

the child be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as

possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S.

2025.

¶ 27 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 28 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions. See

id.; A.S.L., ¶ 8.

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B. Analysis

¶ 29 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by concluding that

he couldn’t become a fit parent within a reasonable time because it

“erroneously consider[ed] [f]ather’s treatment plan during the

entirety of the case,” instead of focusing solely on the time after the

court adopted the new treatment plan. Father also suggests that

the court erred by reaching its conclusion “eleven and one-half

months before the plan’s estimated completion date.”

¶ 30 We acknowledge that the court’s language — that the parents’

condition isn’t likely to change within a reasonable time because “it

hasn’t changed in almost three years” — took into account time

before father’s new treatment plan was adopted. But because

father’s lack of compliance with his first treatment plan is part of

his social history and indicates the long-term nature of his conduct,

the court didn’t err by considering it when determining that he had

had a reasonable amount of time to comply with treatment. See

S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24-25.

¶ 31 Even if this were not the case, the written order emphasized

father’s lack of compliance since the adoption of his new treatment

plan. In particular, the court noted that father “had a new

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treatment plan . . . and he had the opportunity to address the

issues in the case.” The court then described, as we have already

discussed, father’s lack of compliance with his medication

evaluation, individual therapy, family therapy, domestic violence

treatment, family time, and substance abuse treatment plan

objectives. The court noted that, at the time of his termination

hearing, father was “still struggling with the issues that gave rise to

this case.”

¶ 32 We also acknowledge that another division of this court has

concluded that a department’s treatment plan completion date is

“some evidence of what the department and the court believe are

reasonable times to comply.” D.Y., 176 P.3d at 877 (emphasis

added). In D.Y., a department filed a motion to terminate weeks

after the court adopted a treatment plan, despite the plan’s

completion date affording many more months to the parent. Id.

But just because the completion date provides some evidence of a

reasonable time to comply doesn’t mean the court necessarily errs

when it doesn’t rely on the completion date provided in the

treatment plan. A.J., 243 P.3d at 249-50 (the juvenile court has

discretion to weigh the evidence). Moreover, this case is factually

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distinguishable from D.Y. Whereas in D.Y. the children were in out-

of-home placement for only eight months, the court in this case

relied on the fact that the young children hadn’t found permanency

for almost three years. The children, the court concluded,

shouldn’t have to wait any longer.

¶ 33 With record support specifically stemming from the time

father’s new treatment plan was in place, the court considered

father’s inability to make significant change during the proceeding.

D.L.C., 70 P.3d at 588-89. The court also considered the young

children’s mental and emotional conditions and needs in this EPP

case and looked to provide permanency as expeditiously as

possible. We therefore perceive no error in the court’s conclusion

that father couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time.

IV. Disposition

¶ 34 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE YUN concur.

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