Peo v. Brown

23CA1551 Peo v Brown 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1551
El Paso County District Court No. 19CR6356
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Cruzito Romeo Brown,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kevin M. Whitfield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Cruzito Romeo Brown, appeals the district court’s

order revoking his sentence to the Youthful Offender System (YOS)

and imposing the previously suspended twenty-year Department of

Corrections (DOC) sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 When he was fifteen years old, Brown and his older brother

shot at a motorcyclist several times. The victim died, and the

prosecution charged Brown with first degree murder in the district

court. In exchange for the dismissal of that charge plus five other

juvenile cases, Brown agreed to plead guilty to one count of second

degree murder.

¶3 As specified in the plea agreement, the district court sentenced

Brown to twenty years in the custody of the DOC, suspended on the

condition that he successfully complete a six-year YOS sentence.

See §§ 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (the YOS statute);

19-2.5-802(1)(d)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025. When he entered YOS, Brown

signed a behavior contract saying he understood he could be

removed or revoked from YOS for violating its terms and conditions,

including assault on other offenders and gang-related activities.

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¶4 Brown did not successfully complete his YOS sentence.

Although he graduated from the YOS intake phase at the top of his

class, he later accumulated over 100 incident reports and twenty

Code of Penal Discipline (COPD) convictions for conduct including

several assaults on other offenders and gang-related activities.

After failed remediation attempts over two years, a multidisciplinary

YOS team conducted a second “suitability hearing” and

recommended revoking Brown’s YOS sentence because he had

violated the terms and conditions of his behavior contract and failed

to progress in the system. The YOS warden and the Executive

Director of the DOC reviewed and approved the team’s

recommendation.

¶5 The prosecution moved to revoke Brown’s YOS sentence and

reinstate his DOC sentence in accordance with section

18-1.3-407(5)(c). Brown was represented by counsel at the

revocation hearing, where the district court considered an extensive

revocation packet and the testimony of YOS staff members. The

court found that Brown had failed to comply with the terms and

conditions of his YOS sentence. As relevant to the primary

argument in this appeal, the court found that

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. . . despite having gone through one suitability
hearing before and having been given the
opportunity to remain in the YOS program,
there’s still a persistent representation to the
Court that it is everyone’s responsibility but
Mr. Brown’s as to why he failed to comply with
the terms and conditions of his YOS sentence.

The revocation packet does not reflect a failure
. . . of YOS to engage Mr. Brown in the
programing. To the contrary, it reflects time
and time again that they endeavored to keep
him in the program and endeavored to see him
successfully complete it.

Consequently, the court revoked Brown’s YOS sentence and

imposed the suspended twenty-year DOC sentence, with credit for

time served.

II. Discussion

¶6 At Brown’s revocation hearing, he conceded that under the

circumstances, the district court “has no discretion in this matter.”

Nonetheless, on appeal, Brown argues that the district court

abused its discretion by revoking his YOS sentence because (1) he

did not receive the full benefit of YOS programs due to the COVID

pandemic and disciplinary restrictions, (2) the prosecution failed to

establish that YOS followed all proper procedures prior to

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revocation, and (3) the evidence shows that Brown’s successes in

YOS outweigh his failures. We reject these arguments.

A. Limited Discretion to Not Revoke

¶7 We review a district court’s decision to revoke a YOS sentence

for an abuse of discretion, People v. Johnson, 2022 COA 68, ¶ 35,

but this discretion is limited by the YOS statute, People v. Morris,

2024 COA 105, ¶ 26. Once the YOS recommends revocation and

the DOC returns an offender to the district court, the YOS statute

requires the district court to revoke the offender’s YOS sentence

and impose the suspended DOC sentence unless certain conditions

apply. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27; § 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(II), (5).

¶8 Under existing case law, a court has discretion to deny a YOS-

recommended revocation when (1) the prosecution moves to revoke

without just cause or fails to prove that the offender cannot

successfully complete the sentence, People v. McCoy, 939 P.2d 537,

540 (Colo. App. 1997); or (2) the DOC fails to comply with the

provisions of the YOS statute, People v. Martinez, 2015 COA 33,

¶¶ 29-30. And the court may impose a reduced DOC sentence only

when the offender’s inability to complete a YOS sentence is due to a

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diagnosed “behavioral or mental health disorder or intellectual and

developmental disability.” § 18-1.3-407(5)(b).

¶9 A court abuses its discretion in a YOS revocation decision

when the decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

Johnson, ¶ 35.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 To the extent the district court had discretion to not revoke

Brown’s YOS sentence, we perceive no abuse of discretion.

¶ 11 With respect to the lack of YOS programming, Brown argues

that because the YOS statute guarantees “enriched programming”

and Brown did not receive the full array of programs, the court

should have exercised its discretion not to revoke.1 Even accepting

that the statute guarantees a certain amount of enriched

programming, we perceive nothing manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair about the court’s decision. While the

record shows that some YOS programs were affected by pandemic

1 The stated purpose of the YOS statute is to provide youthful

offenders with “a controlled and regimented environment that
affirms dignity of self and others, promotes the value of work and
self-discipline, and develops useful skills and abilities through
enriched programming.” § 18-1.3-407(1), C.R.S. 2025.

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lockdowns, it also supports the court’s findings that YOS did not

fail to offer enriched programming — rather, Brown failed to

successfully engage in the programs offered, and his participation

was necessarily limited by the risk of harm to other inmates.

¶ 12 Regarding Brown’s argument that the prosecution failed to

prove that YOS followed proper revocation procedures, Brown

appears to make two assertions: that (1) he did not receive the

administrative due process afforded for his COPD convictions, and

(2) the YOS did not follow its own procedures — specifically, giving

notice of the witnesses against Brown and access to physical

evidence — for the suitability hearing. We reject this argument for

three reasons.

¶ 13 First, this is not the due process argument Brown pursued at

the revocation hearing, where he challenged the validity of the YOS

procedures themselves. Second, the legality of Brown’s COPD

convictions was not properly before the district court in the

revocation proceeding. See Garcia v. Harms, 2014 COA 154, ¶ 10

(holding that “where an inmate challenges the [DOC]’s quasi-

judicial action, his claim falls within the scope of Rule 106.5, and

he must bring his action in accordance with the rule”). And third,

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the administrative regulation that governs an offender’s due process

rights at a suitability hearing does not provide for notice of

witnesses or access to physical evidence. See DOC Admin. Reg.

1600-01(IV)(F)(5)(a) (listing specific due process rights offered at a

suitability hearing).

¶ 14 Finally, we reject Brown’s argument that the YOS statute

grants the district court discretion to weigh an offender’s success-

to-failure rate and determine whether the offender remains a

suitable candidate for YOS. See Morris, ¶¶ 25-27. A court cannot

abuse discretion it has no authority to exercise.

¶ 15 We conclude that here, the district court properly exercised its

limited discretion.

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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