White v. Peryam

24CA1655 White v Peryam 12-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1655
Chaffee County District Court No. 20CV30046
Honorable Amanda Hunter, Judge
Honorable Douglas S. Walker, Judge

Jonathan White,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Thomas R. Peryam and Patricia A. Chivvis,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 4, 2025

Jonathan White, Pro Se

The Nettleton Law Firm, Sandra J. Nettleton, Aurora, Colorado; Coruscate
PLLC, Catherine Hulme, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
¶1 Plaintiff, Jonathan White, appeals the district court’s

judgment entered after a bench trial resolving his dispute with

defendants, Thomas R. Peryam and Patricia A. Chivvis (collectively,

the landlords). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2018, White and the landlords entered into a written

lease allowing White to graze cattle and keep horses on their

160-acre ranch. The lease was for a term of five years and

contained a termination clause allowing either party to terminate

the lease by giving at least one month’s notice.

¶3 In the winter of 2018 to 2019, White left his cattle on the

ranch under the supervision of a hired hand while he worked

elsewhere. White claimed that, when he returned to the ranch in

April 2019, the cattle were malnourished, so he had to remove most

of them from the ranch and move them to another pasture to graze.

The landlords said that White removed his cattle because they

terminated the lease.

¶4 In the summer of 2019, White returned to the ranch to irrigate

the property and perform other work. The landlords said that White

irrigated the ranch to compensate for the damage his cattle had

1
done to the property the prior winter and for the chance to bring his

cattle back in the spring of 2020. White asserted he did the work

on the ranch in exchange for not paying rent in 2019. White also

alleged that the landlords did not terminate the lease until early

September 2019 and that the short notice caused him to have to

sell his cattle quickly at a significant loss.

¶5 In September 2020, White filed a complaint against the

landlords, asserting a claim for fraudulent inducement and seeking

declarations that the lease’s termination provision was

unenforceable and that he retained a leasehold interest in the

ranch. White alleged that, to induce him to enter into the lease,

Peryam “made specific representations” that the landlords “would

never exercise nor attempt to exercise the [t]ermination [c]lause.”

White also alleged that the termination clause was “unconscionable,

and therefore unenforceable,” and was “drafted in plain violation of

the written requirements and timelines” in section 13-40-107,

C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 Alternatively, White asserted claims for breach of the lease and

unjust enrichment. He alleged that the landlords “breached the

[l]ease’s plain terms” through “verbal termination of the [l]ease with

2
less than a month’s notice.” And he alleged that the landlords

received the benefit of services he performed on the ranch without

compensating him for his labor.1

¶7 The landlords counterclaimed for breach of the lease and,

alternatively, unjust enrichment. They alleged that White breached

the lease by failing to do the following: pay rent for 2019, clean out

a ditch, maintain the fences and corral, limit the number of grazing

cattle, and compensate them for damage he or his hired men

caused to the ranch.

¶8 In June 2024, the case proceeded to a three-day bench trial.

The district court issued written findings of fact and conclusions of

law, ruling in relevant part as follows:

• White’s fraudulent inducement claim failed because, even if

Peryam said he would not act on the termination clause, White

did not prove that Peryam knew, when he made the statement

1 White originally asserted claims for fraudulent inducement,

declaratory judgment, and breach of lease (in the alternative).
Although White moved to amend his complaint to add several other
claims, the district court granted him leave to add only an unjust
enrichment claim.

3
or when the lease was signed, that the landlords would later

invoke the termination clause.

• The parties waived application of section 13-40-107, which

requires ninety-one days’ written notice prior to termination,

by agreeing to termination on thirty-days’ notice and not

requiring that the notice be in writing.

• The landlords terminated the lease in the spring of 2019 and

provided more than a month’s notice.

• White proved he did work on the ranch after the lease was

terminated and it would be unjust for the landlords to retain

the benefit of that work without paying for it.

• White was not required to pay rent for 2019 because the

landlords terminated the lease in April 2019 before the end of

the first lease year.

• White breached the lease by having more cattle than the lease

allowed and was responsible for damage caused by the

overgrazing. White was also responsible for damage to the

landlords’ fences, dam, and irrigation ditches.

• The landlords’ unjust enrichment claim failed because the

court awarded damages for breach of the lease.

4
• Both sides proved that they incurred damages. The net award

was in White’s favor in the amount of $1,081.92.

¶9 The landlords moved for “clarification” that they were the

prevailing parties entitled to costs under C.R.C.P. 54(d). White

responded and requested reconsideration of several parts of the

order. The court treated both the landlords’ motion and White’s

response as C.R.C.P. 59 motions (although White’s motion was not

timely filed) and denied them. It clarified that White was the

prevailing party entitled to costs. White appeals.

¶ 10 Although White has been represented by counsel at various

times in the district court, he indicates that he has drafted his own

appellate briefs without the assistance of counsel. As a result, we

construe his briefs broadly to ensure that he is not denied review

because of an inability to articulate his arguments like a lawyer.

Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. Even so, it is not our role to

rewrite his briefs or act as his advocate. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024

COA 5, ¶ 10.

5
II. Notice of Termination

¶ 11 White contends that the district court erred by concluding that

the parties waived the statutory notice requirements of section

13-40-107.2 We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law

¶ 12 The interpretation of a lease, like any other contract, is a

question of law that we review de novo. Dinnerware Plus Holdings,

Inc. v. Silverthorne Factory Stores, LLC, 128 P.3d 245, 246 (Colo.

App. 2004). Because we “recognize a strong policy of freedom of

contract,” we must interpret contracts “in a way that best

effectuates the intent of the parties and allows each party to receive

the benefit of the bargain.” Ravenstar, LLC v. One Ski Hill Place,

LLC, 2017 CO 83, ¶ 12 (citation omitted).

¶ 13 “Parties to a contract may agree on whatever terms they see fit

so long as those terms do not violate statutory prohibitions or

public policy.” S. Conejos Sch. Dist. RE-10 v. Wold Architects Inc.,

2 To the extent White also cites section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 2025, we

note that statute addresses the notice required to evict a tenant for
unlawful detention. Because White was not evicted, this statute
does not apply. Even so, the requirements of section 13-40-104
may be waived by contract. See Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646
P.2d 345, 349 (Colo. 1982).

6
2023 COA 85, ¶ 24. Parties may even enter into contracts

abrogating or limiting statutory provisions that confer a right or

benefit on them. Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345, 349

(Colo. 1982); Armed Forces Bank, N.A. v. Hicks, 2014 COA 74, ¶ 28.

¶ 14 We also interpret statutes de novo. Ferguson v. Spalding

Rehab., LLC, 2019 COA 93, ¶ 8. In doing so, we strive to give effect

to the legislature’s intent, giving the words and phrases their plain

and ordinary meanings. Id. at ¶ 10.

B. Analysis

¶ 15 Under section 13-40-107(1), (2)(a), a landlord of a

nonresidential real property may terminate a lease for a fixed term

of one year or longer by providing written notice at least ninety-one

days before the end of the term. The statute does not prohibit a

tenant or landlord from waiving the notice requirements or agreeing

to different termination terms. See id. Indeed, where the

legislature has intended to limit parties’ ability to waive statutory

requirements, it has done so expressly. See, e.g., § 38-38-703,

C.R.S. 2025 (“A waiver of or agreement to shorten the time period to

exercise the right to cure a default granted by the provisions of this

article that is made before the date of the default as to which the

7
waiver is granted under a deed of trust, mortgage, or other

instrument evidencing a lien or an evidence of debt secured thereby

shall be void as against public policy.”). We see no such intent

reflected in section 13-40-107.

¶ 16 Under the lease’s termination provision,

[t]he Lease may be terminated by Lessor or
Lessee. Lessor shall be required to give Lessee
at least one (1) month notice when the Lease is
to be terminated. Likewise, Lessee shall be
required to give Lessor at least one (1) month
notice of termination of the Lease.

¶ 17 The district court determined that the lease’s termination

provision plainly provided for “one month’s notice and there [was]

no requirement that the notice be in writing.” Based on the lease’s

plain terms, the court determined that the parties waived the

statutory notice requirements. We perceive no error.

¶ 18 The termination provision is clear and unambiguous. See Fox

v. I-10, Ltd., 957 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Colo. 1998) (“[W]here a contract

is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to the plain and

ordinary meaning of its terms.”). The provision allows the landlords

to terminate the lease with thirty days’ notice. There is no

requirement that the termination be in writing. And White does not

8
assert that he did not understand the provision. When a tenant

agrees to waive the benefit of statutory notice provisions, “he should

be held to his bargain.” Francam, 646 P.2d at 349. Accordingly, we

conclude that the court correctly determined that the parties waived

the statutory notice requirements through the terms of the lease.

¶ 19 Even so, White contends that the court erred for three

reasons: (1) the termination provision was not explicit enough to

waive the statutory notice requirements; (2) a provision allowing for

termination of an agricultural grazing lease with only thirty days’

notice contravenes public policy; and (3) the statute should act as a

gap filler requiring written notice when the lease is silent regarding

the form of notice. We conclude that White did not preserve these

arguments.

¶ 20 White did not argue that the language of the termination

provision was not explicit enough to waive the notice requirements

in section 13-40-107 until his untimely C.R.C.P. 59 motion.

Raising an issue for the first time in a Rule 59 motion does not

preserve that issue for appellate review. See Briargate at

Seventeenth Ave. Owners Ass’n v. Nelson, 2021 COA 78M, ¶ 66

(arguments made for the first time in a post-trial motion are deemed

9
waived for purposes of appeal); People v. Schaufele, 2014 CO 43,

¶ 49 (Boatright, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Motions for

reconsideration are designed to correct erroneous court rulings;

they are not designed to allow parties to present new legal

arguments for the first time and then appeal their denial . . . .”).

And White never argued to the district court that the termination

provision violated public policy or that section 13-40-107 should

act as a gap filler for terms not included in the lease. See Gebert v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2023 COA 107, ¶ 25 (“In civil cases,

arguments never presented to, considered by, or ruled upon by a

district court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”); In re

Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 21 (no talismanic language is

required to preserve an issue for appellate review, but the issue

must be brought to the trial court’s attention and ruled upon).

¶ 21 Unpreserved civil claims are “very rarely” reviewed “and only

‘where necessary to prevent manifest injustice.’” In re Estate of

Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 73 (citations omitted); see Wycoff v.

Grace Cmty. Church of Assemblies of God, 251 P.3d 1260, 1269

(Colo. App. 2010) (applying plain error review in civil cases involves

“‘unusual or special’ circumstances” and only “when necessary to

10
avert unequivocal and manifest injustice” (citations omitted)).

White summarily requests that we review his unpreserved

contentions, but he does not explain why we should do so in the

interest of justice. And we fail to see any particular injustice in

enforcing an unambiguous contract provision. Accordingly, we

decline to review White’s unpreserved contentions. See Roberts v.

Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 144 P.3d 546, 549 (Colo. 2006) (appellate

courts have discretion to review unpreserved civil errors).

¶ 22 We conclude that the district court did not err when it ruled

that the landlords did not have to comply with section 13-40-107

when terminating the lease. See Ravenstar, ¶ 9; Dinnerware Plus

Holdings, Inc., 128 P.3d at 246.

III. Evidentiary Contentions

¶ 23 As best we understand, White challenges the district court’s

decision to exclude three categories of evidence: (1) evidence of how

the landlords became the owners of the ranch; (2) evidence of the

landlords’ motive to enforce the termination clause as retaliation;

and (3) a ranch hand’s statement. We see no reason to reverse.

11
A. Standard of Review

¶ 24 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Zapata v. People, 2018 CO 82, ¶ 25. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair or if it misconstrues or misapplies the law. People v. Liggett,

2021 COA 51, ¶ 16, aff’d, 2023 CO 22.

B. Additional Background

¶ 25 At a pretrial conference, Judge Amanda Hunter, the first judge

to preside over the case, addressed the landlords’ objections to

several exhibits that White proposed to introduce at trial. These

exhibits pertained to proof of the landlords’ ownership of the ranch

and the competency of their mother before she passed. Although

White was not contesting who owned the ranch, he argued that the

evidence should be admitted because, before the landlords owned

the property, they asked White to falsely testify that their mother

was incompetent when she rewrote her will a month before her

death to exclude the landlords from inheriting her estate, but White

refused. Litigation over the mother’s estate was ongoing when the

landlords entered into the grazing lease with White. White argued

12
that the evidence was relevant to the landlords’ bias, credibility, and

motive to retaliate against him by terminating the lease.

¶ 26 Judge Hunter ruled that the ownership of the ranch was not

relevant because it was undisputed that landlords owned the

property when they entered into the lease with White. She also

ruled that the mother’s competency was not relevant. As a result,

Judge Hunter excluded the exhibits White sought to offer. But she

told White that if he wanted to offer evidence that Peryam asked

White to perjure himself or that the landlords claimed ownership of

property they did not own to show their motive or character for

truthfulness, she would consider that evidence if White made an

adequate showing at trial that it was relevant and admissible under

the procedures set forth in CRE 404, 405, and 608.

¶ 27 After the hearing, White moved the court to reconsider the

admissibility of his exhibits. Judge Hunter denied the motion

based on her ruling at the hearing.

¶ 28 On the first day of trial, White asked Judge Douglas Walker,

the judge who presided over the bench trial, to “rule on [his] last

submission regarding . . . admissibility.” Judge Walker declined to

reconsider Judge Hunter’s ruling, stating that he agreed with her

13
logic and that the evidence was not admissible because it was “too

far afield” and “a waste of all of our time.” But consistent with

Judge Hunter’s ruling, Judge Walker advised White that he could

ask questions about some of the evidence so long as he complied

with the relevant rules of evidence related to character witnesses.

¶ 29 At trial, White sought to offer evidence regarding how the

landlords came to be owners of the ranch, details of the dispute

around the mother’s competency, and a statement a ranch hand

made to him about what Peryam said regarding White’s cattle being

neglected. The district court precluded White from offering evidence

about ownership and competency because it was irrelevant, and it

precluded the ranch hand’s statement because it was hearsay.

C. Motion to Reconsider

¶ 30 White contends that (1) Judge Hunter erred by denying his

motion to reconsider the admissibility of his exhibits without any

substantive analysis, and (2) Judge Walker erred by reversing

Judge Hunter’s ruling that the ownership and competency evidence

was admissible. We disagree.

¶ 31 Judge Hunter preliminarily ruled that evidence of ownership

and the mother’s competency was irrelevant and excluded

14
documentary exhibits addressing those topics. White moved to

reconsider that ruling. To the extent White claims he did not

receive a reasoned ruling on his motion to reconsider, the record

refutes this claim. Judge Hunter denied the motion before trial

based on her ruling at the pretrial conference.

¶ 32 Then, on the first day of trial, Judge Walker declined to reverse

Judge Hunter’s ruling, explaining that the evidence was not

relevant. Even so, Judge Walker said he would allow White to ask

certain questions relating to character as allowed by the rules of

evidence, which was consistent with Judge Hunter’s pretrial ruling

that White could introduce evidence of motive and character for

truthfulness if he complied with CRE 404, 405, and 608. Both

judges explained their reasoning. And contrary to White’s claim,

the “abrupt judicial reassignment of the case” from Judge Hunter to

Judge Walker did not result in a reversal of “previously established

evidentiary rulings without substantive justification.” Judge Walker

did not reverse Judge Hunter’s pretrial ruling.

¶ 33 We conclude that White has failed to show any reversible

error. See Vogel v. Carolina Int’l, Inc., 711 P.2d 708, 715 (Colo. App.

1985) (the party asserting error has the burden to establish it); Rego

15
Co. v. McKown-Katy, 801 P.2d 536, 540 (Colo. 1990) (“[T]he burden

is on the party asserting the error to show reversible error.”).

D. Ownership

¶ 34 White contends that the district court erred by excluding

evidence of how the landlords became owners of the ranch because

it was relevant to his claims, which involved “questions of character

and truthfulness.” We are not persuaded.

¶ 35 All relevant evidence is admissible unless prohibited by the

United States or Colorado Constitutions, a state statute, the rules

of evidence, or any other supreme court rule. CRE 402; see Alhilo

v. Kliem, 2016 COA 142, ¶ 9. Evidence is relevant if it has “any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401.

¶ 36 White never disputed that the landlords owned the ranch

when the parties entered into the grazing lease. White fails to

explain why the events leading up to the landlords becoming the

owners are relevant to his claims of fraudulent inducement, breach

of the lease, or unjust enrichment. In particular, the fraudulent

inducement claim, which is the claim White seems to focus on

16
when arguing that the landlords’ character for truthfulness is

relevant, was based on White’s allegation that Peryam told White

that the landlords would never exercise the termination provision; it

did not relate to how or when the landlords came to own the ranch.

Because White failed to explain how evidence of ownership made

any fact of consequence more or less probable, we conclude the

district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence.

See CRE 401; Zapata, ¶ 25; Liggett, ¶ 16.

E. Motive

¶ 37 White contends that the district court erred by excluding

evidence that Peryam asked White to perjure himself because it was

admissible under CRE 404(b), 405(b), and 608 as evidence of the

landlords’ motive to enforce the termination clause as retaliation.

We are not persuaded.

¶ 38 Under CRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

may be admitted, as relevant, to show motive or intent. And CRE

405(b) allows proof of specific instances of a person’s conduct when

the character or trait of a person is an essential element of a claim.

But such evidence may be admitted under CRE 608 in only two

ways: (1) “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported

17
by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation,” CRE 608(a); and

(2) “[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose

of attacking . . . the witness’ character for truthfulness . . . may not

be proved by extrinsic evidence” but may, “in the discretion of the

court, . . . be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness,”

CRE 608(b).

¶ 39 The evidence White sought to admit — namely, that Peryam

asked White to lie under oath — was a specific instance of Peryam’s

conduct, which White sought to admit to attack Peryam’s character

for truthfulness. Under CRE 608(b), White was only allowed admit

that evidence during cross-examination of Peryam. To the extent

White sought to admit the evidence through Chivvis or his own

testimony, CRE 608(b) prohibited him from doing so.

¶ 40 To the extent White attempted to introduce evidence of motive

through Peryam’s cross-examination — the only authorized method

for its introduction, see CRE 608(b) — White has not persuaded us

that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the

evidence was irrelevant. As best we understand, White contends

that the evidence shows retaliatory motive — he claims that the

landlords lied to him about enforcing the termination provision to

18
get revenge on him for refusing to perjure himself in their mother’s

competency proceedings. But the court reasoned that the evidence

was “too far afield” to be relevant for that purpose. The court knew

what evidence White intended to offer and concluded that the

evidence was too attenuated to make it more likely that Peryam lied

when he told White that the landlords would not enforce the

termination provision. Based on that rationale, we cannot conclude

that the court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence. See

Hall v. Moreno, 2012 CO 14, ¶ 54 (When reviewing a trial court’s

decision for abuse of discretion, “we ask not whether we would have

reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s

decision fell within the range of reasonable options.” (citation

omitted)).

F. Ranch Hand’s Testimony

¶ 41 White testified that when he returned to the ranch in 2019, he

asked his hired ranch hand what happened to his emaciated cattle.

White continued, “His response was Mr. Peryam told me that was

the only place I could feed your cattle on the ranch . . . .” The

landlords’ counsel objected to hearsay, and the district court

sustained the objection, explaining to White that “what Peryam told

19
somebody else is not [hearsay], but what the young man relayed to

you is.” White contends that the court erred. We disagree.

¶ 42 Hearsay is any “statement other than one made by the

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence

to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). CRE 802

prohibits the admission of hearsay unless the statement falls under

an exception. When a statement contains multiple layers of

hearsay, each layer must be separately analyzed to determine

whether a recognized exception applies. See CRE 805; Bernache v.

Brown, 2020 COA 106, ¶ 14.

¶ 43 Peryam’s statement was not hearsay because it was a

statement by a party-opponent offered against him. See CRE

801(d)(2). Had Peryam made the statement directly to White and

White testified to that statement at trial, there would be no hearsay

problem. But what the ranch hand said to White was hearsay

because it was an out-of-court statement by a third party (the

ranch hand) offered for the truth of the matter asserted (what

Peryam said). CRE 801(c). And White has not explained how the

ranch hand’s statement satisfied any exception to the rule against

hearsay. CRE 802. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court

20
did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony. See

Zapata, ¶ 25; Liggett, ¶ 16.

IV. Procedural Irregularities

¶ 44 White contends that the district court erred when it (1) allowed

defense counsel to coach a witness; (2) dispensed with closing

arguments; (3) reassigned the case to a new judge for trial without

notice; (4) denied White’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion as untimely; and

(5) displayed bias. We reject each contention.

A. Coaching a Witness

¶ 45 White contends that the district court erred by failing to stop

the landlords’ counsel from coaching a witness. We disagree.

¶ 46 A trial court “is obligated to administer justice, control the

decorum of the courtroom, and make sure that cases are decided

on appropriate grounds.” Makeen v. Hailey, 2015 COA 181, ¶ 38.

The court has broad discretion to achieve those aims. See id.

¶ 47 On the second day of trial, White told the district court that he

believed counsel was “making facial expressions,” nodding her

head, and making hand gestures to coach Chivvis. The court

indicated that it had heard “some sort of coaching going on from

21
somewhere” but that it had stopped after the court commented on

it. The court said that it trusted the attorneys to act appropriately.

¶ 48 White did not ask the court for further relief; rather, he told

the court, “I just wanted you to be aware of that so that it doesn’t

happen again.” See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 24 (“[W]hen a

court takes curative action after a party brings an issue to the

court’s attention and the party fails to object or ask for further

relief, any complaint that the court neglected to do more is

unpreserved.”). White does not point to any instances of coaching

or alleged inappropriate behavior after the court admonished the

parties and counsel. Nor does he identify any prejudice stemming

from the alleged coaching. See C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at every

stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the

proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the

parties.”).

¶ 49 On this record, we conclude that the court controlled the

decorum of the courtroom, and we perceive no abuse of discretion

by the court in declining to do more. See Makeen, ¶ 38.

22
B. Closing Argument and Reassignment of the Case

¶ 50 White contends that the district court erroneously denied him

the ability to make a closing argument and that the “abrupt”

reassignment of the case to Judge Walker for trial left White unable

to prepare. But White did not object to Judge Walker presiding over

the trial, nor did he object when the court explained that it would

not allow closing arguments. Thus, we conclude that White failed

to preserve these challenges, and we decline to address them

further. See Ramstetter, ¶ 73.

C. Denial of the Untimely Motion to Reconsider

¶ 51 For the first time in his reply brief on appeal, White appears to

contend that he was unaware of the deadline to file a C.R.C.P. 59

motion and that the district court erroneously denied his motion as

untimely. But we do not address arguments raised for the first time

in a reply brief. IBC Denv. II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d

714, 718 (Colo. App. 2008).

D. Bias

¶ 52 To the extent White argues that the district court was biased

against him, he does not adequately develop the argument for our

consideration. See S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. &

23
Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 2014 COA 171, ¶ 35 (declining

to address conclusory argument presented without authority);

Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010)

(Appellate courts “will not consider a bald legal proposition

presented without argument or development.”). In addition, White

does not point to anything in the record beyond the court’s adverse

rulings, which are insufficient to support a claim of bias. See In re

Marriage of Johnson, 576 P.2d 188, 190 (Colo. App. 1977) (“Adverse

rulings, standing alone, do not constitute grounds for claiming bias

or prejudice . . . .”).

V. The Lease Termination Date

¶ 53 White contends that the district court erred by finding that the

landlords terminated the lease in April 2019. We are not

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 54 “A trial court’s judgment following a bench trial presents a

mixed question of law and fact.” State ex rel. Weiser v. Ctr. for

Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc., 2023 CO 23, ¶ 33. We defer to the

trial court’s determinations of credibility and will not disturb its

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and unsupported

24
by the record. Skyland Metro. Dist. v. Mountain W. Enter., LLC, 184

P.3d 106, 115 (Colo. App. 2007). “If the evidence is conflicting, we

may not substitute our own conclusions for those of the trial court

merely because there may be credible evidence supporting a

different result.” Frisco Lot 3 LLC v. Giberson Ltd. P’ship, LLLP,

2024 COA 125, ¶ 66 (citation omitted).

¶ 55 In civil cases, the court must make its findings by a

preponderance of the evidence. See § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S. 2025.

That standard requires only that the court find a fact to be more

probable than not. See City of Littleton v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,

2016 CO 25, ¶ 38.

B. Analysis

¶ 56 We first note that the parties dispute preservation. But

because “a party is not required to object to the trial court’s

findings in the trial court to preserve a challenge to those findings,”

People in Interest of D.B., 2017 COA 139, ¶ 30, we address the

merits of White’s contention. See C.R.C.P. 52 (“Neither requests for

findings nor objections to findings rendered are necessary for

purposes of review.”); In re Marriage of Stradtmann, 2021 COA 145,

25
¶¶ 8-10 (a party was not required to object to a court’s oral rulings

at the conclusion of a hearing to preserve his appellate arguments).

¶ 57 The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence

that the landlords terminated the grazing lease in April 2019. The

court found that the parties had a conversation in the spring of

2019 that a pond would need to be drained and worked on, which

would deprive White’s cattle of water. The court also found that

White’s voluntary removal of the cattle following this conversation

and the fact that White later asked for the landlords’ permission to

use the corral to wean calves were “indicative of knowledge that the

lease [had] ended.”

¶ 58 The record supports the court’s findings. The landlords

testified that they terminated the lease in April 2019. White

acknowledged that he spoke with Peryam in the spring of 2019

about doing work on the pond. Chivvis testified that the landlords

told White to remove his cattle in April 2019 because they had to

drain the pond to do necessary repair work, and there was no other

source of water for White’s cattle. And the landlords testified that

after White removed his cattle, he asked for permission to bring his

calves back to wean.

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¶ 59 Still, White highlights the following contradictory evidence:

• the poor health of White’s cattle necessitated their removal

in May of 2019;

• White was present and continued work on the ranch in the

summer of 2019, including storing his belongings, boarding

his horses, and performing irrigation work and lease

obligations, without objection from the landlords;

• Peryam testified that White irrigated pastures during the

summer of 2019, creating feed for the cattle;

• Peryam admitted there was enough water on the ranch for

White’s horses to survive from June to November 2019;

• a water commissioner testified that water to the pond came

from a neighboring property;

• White testified that the ranch had never had an issue with

water availability for twenty years; and

• Peryam testified that the pond was not dug out until March

2020, and receipts corroborated that work on the pond

occurred in the spring of 2020.

¶ 60 But even if there was contradictory evidence, the district court

was in the best position to make credibility determinations and

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weigh the evidence. See Frisco Lot 3 LLC, ¶ 66. And because the

court’s findings have record support, we cannot disturb them. See

Skyland, 184 P.3d at 115; see also Owens, ¶ 22 (an appellate court

may not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court).

¶ 61 To the extent White contends that the court should have found

that the landlords waived or were estopped from claiming that they

terminated the lease in the spring of 2019, or that equitable

considerations mandated a different finding, White failed to raise

those arguments before the district court, so we decline to address

them. See Ramstetter, ¶ 73.

VI. Damages

¶ 62 White contends that the district court erred in awarding

damages because (1) the economic loss rule did not bar his

noneconomic damages, and (2) its computation of economic

damages was based on erroneous factual findings. We reject these

contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 63 We review a trial court’s assessment of damages for clear

error. Blakeland Drive Invs., LLP IV v. Taghavi, 2023 COA 30M,

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¶ 38. The trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount

of damages to award. McDonald’s Corp. v. Brentwood Ctr., Ltd., 942

P.2d 1308, 1311 (Colo. App. 1997). We will not disturb an award of

damages unless it is completely without record support. Hauser v.

Rose Health Care Sys., 857 P.2d 524, 531 (Colo. App. 1993).

B. Economic Loss Rule

¶ 64 White requested both economic and noneconomic damages on

his claims of fraudulent inducement and breach of the lease.

Specifically, White requested economic damages because he was

not given enough time to find an alternative for grazing his cattle

and had to sell the cattle at a loss. White also requested damages

for the emotional pain and mental anguish he suffered from losing

his cattle, which were his passion and livelihood.

¶ 65 White contends that the district court erred by concluding that

the economic loss rule barred his request for noneconomic

damages. But even if the district court erred in its application of

the economic loss rule, any error was harmless because his claims

for fraudulent inducement and breach of lease failed for other

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reasons.3 See C.R.C.P. 61; Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo.

2010) (An erroneous ruling only requires reversal if it affects a

party’s substantial right, and “[a]n error affects a substantial right

only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the error

substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the

basic fairness of the trial itself.’” (citation omitted)).

C. Computation of Damages

¶ 66 To the extent White argues that the court’s damages award

fails because it is based on an erroneous finding that the landlords

terminated the lease in the spring of 2019, we necessarily reject

that argument for the reasons discussed in Part V.B. To the extent

White argues that the court erred by not awarding damages on his

fraudulent inducement and breach of lease claims, any error is

necessarily harmless because, as noted, those claims fail for other

reasons. Thus, we proceed to address White’s arguments that the

3 The district court also concluded that White did not prove physical

harm, and White does not challenge that part of the order. See IBC
Denver II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo.
App. 2008) (when a lower tribunal gives more than one reason for a
decision, an appellant must challenge all those reasons on appeal).

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record evidence does not support the court’s computation of

damages on his unjust enrichment claim. We are not persuaded.

¶ 67 The court found that White irrigated the ranch after the lease

was terminated, the landlords knew about it, and the landlords did

not pay White. Because it would be unjust for the landlords to

retain the benefit of White’s work without paying him, the court

ordered that White was owed $7,350 based on the amount of work

he did at an hourly rate of $15.00. White argues this finding was

erroneous because it is significantly less than the $27,000 he

claimed the work cost.4 But the court awarded White an hourly

wage for the time he irrigated the ranch based on what the

landlords said they paid for day laborers, so we understand the

4 White also argues that the district court failed to (1) consider labor

costs he performed in lieu of rent and (2) distinguish between
repairs and improvements. White does not point us to anywhere in
the record where he presented evidence of these damages or to the
specific part of the court’s order that he is challenging, so we
decline to address those contentions further. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B)
(Arguments “must contain . . . a clear and concise discussion of the
grounds upon which the party relies in seeking a reversal . . . , with
citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the
appellant relies.”); Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J v. Transamerica Premier
Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 328, 335 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[I]t is not the duty of
the reviewing court to search the record for evidence to support
bald assertions.”), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1997).

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court’s reasoning and its finding enjoys record support. Notably,

the court applied the same hourly rate when computing the

landlords’ damages on their counterclaims.

¶ 68 White points only to his own testimony to support his claim

for damages, but the court did not have to accept White’s figure.

See In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 298 (Colo. App. 2005)

(“The trial court can believe all, part, or none of a witness’s

testimony, even if uncontroverted.”). White’s contention that the

court gave too much weight to the landlords’ testimony is similarly

unpersuasive because the resolution “of conflicts in testimony and

determinations of the credibility of the witnesses are solely within

the province of the fact finder.” People v. Rau, 2020 COA 92, ¶ 22,

aff’d, 2022 CO 3. Regardless of whether there was conflicting

evidence, we cannot disturb the court’s finding because it has

record support. See Blakeland, ¶ 38.

VII. Cumulative Error

¶ 69 Finally, White contends that, even if the alleged errors do not

individually require reversal, their cumulative prejudicial impact

does. “The doctrine of cumulative error, although applied regularly

in criminal appeals, has not been extended to civil cases.” Acierno

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v. Garyfallou, 2016 COA 91, ¶ 66. Other divisions of this court

have declined to extend the doctrine as “[s]uch a significant

expansion of precedent . . . is more properly the province of our

supreme court.” Id. (quoting Neher v. Neher, 2015 COA 103, ¶ 66).

We likewise decline to apply the doctrine here.

VIII. Disposition

¶ 70 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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