Peo v. Nichols

22CA2251 Peo v Nichols 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA2251
Garfield County District Court No. 21CR201
Honorable John F. Neiley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Padrikea Deangelo Nichols,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Taylor J. Hoy, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 For shooting his ex-wife’s husband, a jury convicted Padrikea

Deangelo Nichols of first degree assault. Nichols appeals his

conviction, arguing that the district court reversibly erred by

(1) denying his motion to suppress statements he made the night

before the shooting; (2) admitting other act evidence under CRE

404(b); (3) admitting video exhibits showing him in jail attire;

(4) allowing a detective to give expert testimony about cell-site

location data; and (5) allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct

in closing argument. Nichols also argues that the cumulative effect

of these errors requires reversal. Because we disagree, we affirm

the judgment of conviction.

¶2 Nichols also challenges the restitution order, claiming that the

district court plainly erred by accepting defense counsel’s waiver of

his presence at the restitution hearing. We again disagree and

affirm the restitution order.

I. Background

¶3 The night before the shooting, Nichols met his ex-wife for

drinks. While they were out, her then husband, the victim, called

Nichols’s ex-wife and threatened her and Nichols. Nichols grabbed

the phone and started arguing with the victim.

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¶4 Someone called 911 about a possible domestic disturbance

and two officers responded just after midnight. Officer Drew

Oesterle first spoke with Nichols and was later joined by Officer

Alicia Hampton. Officer Oesterle’s body camera recorded the

roughly four-minute interaction — during which Nichols described

the threats the victim had made to him and his ex-wife. Nichols

added that if he saw the victim, he would “fuck him up,” that

Nichols was the wrong dude to mess with, and people should not

cross him. Nichols also said he had “a legal right to carry arms and

. . . will fire” in self-defense. After requesting and reviewing his

identification, the officers cleared Nichols and said he could go.

While walking away, Officer Hampton heard Nichols say something

like “pop, pop, pop ’em.”

¶5 The next evening, Nichols was on the phone with his daughter,

who lived with his ex-wife and the victim. Nichols overheard the

couple arguing and the victim threatening Nichols’s ex-wife.

Nichols then drove to the victim’s house. After a brief

confrontation, Nichols shot the victim three times, seriously

injuring him. Nichols then sped away. The confrontation and

shooting were captured on security video.

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¶6 The prosecution charged Nichols with attempted first degree

murder and first degree assault. At trial, Nichols asserted self-

defense. The jury acquitted Nichols of attempted murder but found

him guilty of assault. The district court sentenced Nichols to

twenty-four years in prison and ordered restitution.

II. Motion to Suppress

¶7 Nichols contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion to suppress his statements to officers the night before the

shooting. Nichols says the statements were the product of a

custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436 (1966). We aren’t persuaded.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶8 To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination, officers must provide certain warnings before they

question someone who is in custody. Id. at 444; see People v.

Eugene, 2024 CO 59, ¶ 14. If they do not, any resulting statements

are inadmissible. Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 873 (Colo. 2010).

¶9 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes when formally

arrested, or “if, under the totality of the circumstances, a

reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have felt that

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[his] freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated

with formal arrest.” Eugene, ¶ 15 (citation omitted). This standard

requires a greater restriction on freedom than that necessary for a

Fourth Amendment seizure. See People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 21.

¶ 10 To determine whether an individual was in custody, we

consider, among other factors, (1) the time, place, and purpose of

the encounter; (2) the persons present during the encounter; (3) the

words spoken to the individual; (4) the officers’ tone of voice and

demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the encounter; (6) whether

officers placed any limitation of movement or other form of restraint

on the individual; (7) the officers’ response to any questions the

individual asked; (8) whether the officers gave directions to the

individual; and (9) the individual’s response to such directions.

Eugene, ¶ 15.

¶ 11 Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a

mixed question of law and fact. People v. Bohler, 2024 CO 18, ¶ 17.

We defer to the district court’s factual findings when supported by

the record, although we may independently review police bodycam

video. Id. We review de novo the legal question whether those

facts, taken together, establish that the person was in custody. Id.

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B. Nichols Wasn’t in Custody

¶ 12 Considering the nonexhaustive factors outlined above and

based on our own independent review of the bodycam video, we

conclude that, at the time Nichols made the challenged statements,

his freedom was not restrained to the degree associated with formal

arrest.

¶ 13 Though the encounter occurred just after midnight, the

officers contacted Nichols on a public and lighted sidewalk with

onlookers strolling past. See id. at ¶ 20 (finding questioning at

night to be neutral because of public location next to a street and

officers not arranging the time and place). And the purpose was to

investigate a possible domestic disturbance, not to “elicit

incriminating information” as Nichols characterizes it. Indeed, no

crime had been committed at that point.

¶ 14 Consistent with the investigatory nature of the encounter, the

officers’ tones were “calm and conversational,” Davis, ¶¶ 33-34,

with one officer saying, “It’s all good man. We’re just making sure.

Somebody was worried that you guys were arguing out there, so

we’re just checking on you to make sure everyone’s safe.” The

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officers were not, as Nichols claims, “confrontational and

accusatory.”

¶ 15 While the officers were in uniform and armed, they never drew

their weapons, displayed force, or threatened Nichols. See People v.

Willoughby, 2023 CO 10, ¶ 34. Nor did they handcuff or physically

restrain Nichols. See Mumford v. People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 17.

Unrestrained, Nichols moved about during the encounter and

smoked a cigarette. Willoughby, ¶ 36 (“No one who had their

freedom of movement restrained to the degree associated with a

formal arrest would reasonably feel like they could smoke a cigar,

let alone without asking for permission.”).

¶ 16 The entire interaction lasted just four minutes. See id. at ¶ 33

(noting that the shorter the encounter, the less likely that it is

custodial). And during that brief time, Nichols did most of the

talking, volunteering his version of the night’s events with little

questioning or prompting by the officers. See Niemeyer v. People,

2024 CO 58, ¶¶ 26-27, 30 (determining that open-ended

conversational questions and long-form narrative responses going

beyond the scope of the initial question weigh against custody).

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¶ 17 Other than Officer Oesterle’s request for identification and

statement to Nichols to wait until they cleared him, the officers did

not give Nichols any directions. A request for identification and a

brief detention don’t create custody for Miranda purposes. See

People v. Stephenson, 159 P.3d 617, 622 (Colo. 2007) (“[W]e have

never held that retaining a driver’s license . . . creates custody for

Miranda purposes.”); see also People v. Klinck, 259 P.3d 489, 495

(Colo. 2011) (concluding that the defendant was not in custody

where the police asked for the defendant’s identification, had him

wait while they spoke with the victim, and then questioned the

defendant).

¶ 18 Because Nichols wasn’t in custody, we conclude that the

district court properly denied Nichols’s motion to suppress his

statements to the officers.

III. Other Act Evidence

¶ 19 Over Nichols’s objection, the district court allowed Officer

Hampton to testify that she overheard Nichols say something like

“pop, pop, pop ’em” the night before the shooting. Nichols contends

that the statement was extrinsic other act evidence and the court

erred by admitting it under Rule 404(b). We disagree.

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A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 20 Evidence of other crimes or acts is not admissible “to prove a

person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion

the person acted in conformity with the character.” CRE 404(b)(1).

But such evidence is admissible for nonpropensity purposes. Rojas

v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 28; CRE 404(b)(2).

¶ 21 To evaluate whether other act evidence triggers Rule 404(b), a

court “must first determine if the evidence is intrinsic or extrinsic to

the charged offense.” Rojas, ¶ 52. If the acts are intrinsic, meaning

they either (1) directly prove the charged offense or (2) occurred

contemporaneously with it and facilitated its commission, then Rule

404(b) doesn’t apply. Id. at ¶ 44. The admissibility of intrinsic

evidence is governed by the general evidentiary rules of relevance

and prejudice. See id. at ¶ 52.

¶ 22 But if the other act evidence suggests bad character and is

extrinsic to the charged offense, Rule 404(b) applies. To be

admissible under Rule 404(b), such evidence must be (1) logically

relevant (2) to a material fact (3) independent of the prohibited

inference of the defendant’s bad character, and (4) the probative

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value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the

risk of unfair prejudice. See id. at ¶ 27.

¶ 23 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the

admission of other act evidence, for an abuse of discretion. People

v. Lancaster, 2022 COA 82, ¶ 37.

B. The Other Act Evidence Was Admissible

¶ 24 Nichols agrees that the statement is related to a material fact

and is logically relevant. But he says the court should not have

admitted it because the statement’s logical relevance is not

independent of the prohibited propensity inference and any

probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice.1

¶ 25 We disagree with Nichols that the statement is not logically

relevant to a material fact.2 A jury could reasonably consider the

statement as circumstantial evidence that Nichols intended to shoot

1 Because the statement neither directly proved the charges, nor

occurred contemporaneously with and facilitated Nichols’s alleged
crime, we disagree with the People that the statement was intrinsic
evidence. See Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 52.

2 To the extent Nichols argues that the prosecution did not

articulate a precise evidential hypothesis for the admissibility of the
statement independent of the prohibited propensity inference, we
disagree. The prosecution argued that the statement demonstrated
Nichols’s motive and intent to shoot the victim.

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the victim. That logical relevance is independent of the inference

that Nichols acted in conformity with a bad character. To the

extent the statement could support a propensity inference, Rule

404(b) does not demand the absence of any possible propensity

inference. See People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216, 227 (Colo. App.

2009).

¶ 26 We also disagree with Nichols that the statement was unfairly

prejudicial. Because intent can rarely be proved by direct evidence,

the statement had substantial probative value to prove that Nichols

intended to shoot the victim. And any prejudice flowing from the

probative value of the statement is not unfair. See People v. Dist.

Ct., 785 P.2d 141, 147 (Colo. 1990) (evidence is not “unfairly

prejudicial simply because it damages the defendant’s case”).

Indeed, the statement — “pop, pop, pop ’em’” — is not particularly

inflammatory and was not likely to “unduly inflame the passions of

the jury” as it considered the charges. People v. Cross, 2023 COA

24, ¶ 26.

¶ 27 Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the

statement under Rule 404(b).

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IV. Video Evidence

¶ 28 Nichols next argues that the district court erred by admitting

three redacted video clips that, to varying degrees, show him

handcuffed and either wearing jail attire or being fitted for jail

attire. He maintains that the evidence undermined his due process

rights and his presumption of innocence. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 29 The parties dispute whether Nichols preserved his objection

with respect to one video clip, as the parties stipulated to its

admission. Because the evidence was properly admitted, we

needn’t resolve this dispute.

¶ 30 “The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in

the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our

system of criminal justice.” Perez v. People, 2013 CO 22, ¶ 16

(quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)). When a

defendant is required to appear before the jury in visible restraints

or prison clothes, this presumption is directly undermined because

it is a “constant reminder of the accused’s condition” that “may

affect a juror’s judgment.” Estelle 425 at 504-05. That risk “is not

present when the jury is shown a video depicting the defendant in a

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prison uniform,” however, because “[m]ost jurors would not be

surprised by the fact that a defendant was handcuffed and wearing

jail clothing while in jail prior to trial.” People v. Thames, 2019 COA

124, ¶ 49 (citation omitted).

¶ 31 We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of

evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Schnorenberg, 2025

CO 43, ¶ 16. To the extent Nichols alleges a constitutional

violation, we review that allegation de novo. People v. Cuevas, 2024

COA 84, ¶ 21.

B. The Video Clips Were Properly Admitted

¶ 32 Nichols argues that his “presumption of innocence did not

remain intact” because the video clips “served as a constant

reminder of his incarceration” during the trial.

¶ 33 A review of the video clips shows otherwise. The three

redacted video clips total approximately twenty-four minutes of a

multiday trial. And of those twenty-four minutes, Nichols is seen

handcuffed and wearing jail attire (or being fitted for jail attire) for

less than three minutes. Even then, Nichols is covered by a jacket

much of the time. Thus, the three video clips briefly showing

Nichols in prison attire and handcuffs during a lengthy trial with

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dozens of witnesses and exhibits hardly acted as a “constant

reminder” of Nichols’s temporary custody. See Thames, ¶ 50

(rejecting argument that a video slightly over an hour long showing

the defendant in prison attire was a constant reminder of the

defendant’s condition that violated the presumption of innocence);

cf. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504-05 (holding that the defendant’s right to

a fair trial was violated when he was compelled to wear identifiable

prison clothing during his trial, which was a “constant reminder of

the accused’s condition” that may have affected the jury’s

judgment).

¶ 34 For these reasons, we conclude that the video clips did not

violate Nichols’s constitutional rights to due process or the

presumption of innocence. The court therefore did not abuse its

discretion by admitting the videos at trial.

V. Expert Testimony

¶ 35 Over Nichols’s objection, the district court allowed a former

detective to offer expert testimony about cell-site location data,

finding that the testimony fell within the scope of the expert’s

endorsement, which broadly included homicide and violent crime

investigations. The detective then testified about his review of

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Nichols’s cell phone location data and how it contradicted Nichols’s

story of where he was just before the shooting.

¶ 36 Nichols raises various objections to the detective’s testimony.

¶ 37 But we needn’t decide whether the court erred by allowing the

testimony because any error was harmless. See Krustinger v.

People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062-63 (Colo. 2009) (reviewing preserved

objection to expert testimony for harmless error). After all, Nichols

admitted to shooting the victim but claimed he acted in self-

defense. The central dispute at trial was not where Nichols said he

was before the shooting. Rather, it was whether Nichols lawfully

defended himself from what he reasonably believed to be the use or

imminent use of unlawful physical force. See § 18-1-704, C.R.S.

2025 (outlining elements of self-defense). The detective’s cell-site

location data testimony shed no light on Nichols’s intent or the self-

defense claim. And even if it raised some question about Nichols’s

credibility, because the shooting was captured on video, the jury

could independently assess the actions of Nichols and the victim

without regard to their prior actions. Put simply, Nichols’s location

before the shooting was irrelevant.

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¶ 38 Because the admission of the testimony did not substantially

influence the verdict or affect the trial’s fairness, any error in

allowing it was harmless.

VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 39 Nichols next contends that the prosecutor made multiple

improper comments during closing argument. We see no

misconduct.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 40 We apply a two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial

misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010).

We first determine “whether the prosecutor’s questionable conduct

was improper based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. If it

was improper, we then determine whether the misconduct warrants

reversal. Id.

¶ 41 Because Nichols didn’t object to any of the prosecutor’s

statements, we will reverse only if any misconduct was plain error.

See People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27, ¶ 88. To constitute plain

error, any prosecutorial misconduct must be obvious and “must be

flagrant or glaring or tremendously improper, and it must so

undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious

15
doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Id. (citation

omitted).

B. Misstatement of Facts

¶ 42 Nichols argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in

the following comments made during closing:

• “[W]hy didn’t [Nichols] go check on [his ex-wife]? He

wasn’t concerned for her safety.”

• “The only evidence of anyone threatening to kill anyone

during [the phone] conversation is [Nichols] threatening

to kill [the victim].”

• “[The victim] never had a gun.”

• “[Nichols’s ex-wife] testified that [the victim’s] hands were

open, palms forward. And that’s what the video shows,

too.”

¶ 43 Read in context, all these comments are tied directly to the

record or reasonable inferences from the record. It’s undisputed

that Nichols dropped his ex-wife off at her house and only texted

her — but did not return to the house — after the victim had

threatened her. The references to Nichols’s threats and the victim’s

gun ownership were limited to specific conversations. And the video

16
of the shooting showed that the victim did not have a gun.3 That

the prosecutor highlighted certain facts and didn’t address others

that could lead to a different conclusion does not make the

argument improper. See Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043,

1048 (Colo. 2005) (explaining that during closing argument, counsel

may “point to different pieces of evidence and explain their

significance within the case”).

C. Arguments Calculated to Inflame the Jurors’ Passions

¶ 44 The prosecutor argued, “There was no reasonable belief that

firing a nine-millimeter handgun five times was necessary under

these circumstances. . . . We don’t even do that in war, shoot a

person that’s already wounded on the ground. That’s not self-

defense.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 45 Nichols argues that the emphasized portion of the argument

was improper and calculated to inflame the jurors’ passions. But

the argument was tethered to the video evidence showing Nichols

3 While the prosecutor’s statement that the victim’s hands were

open with palms forward may have been somewhat inaccurate, it
was hardly a flagrant or glaring misstatement. And, at any rate, the
jury had the video and could independently assess whether the
victim’s hands were raised or down.

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shooting the victim while the victim was on the ground. Though the

language may be dramatic, it is not improper to “engage in

oratorical embellishment.” People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167, ¶ 31.

And the statement did not invite the jury to decide the case on

anything other than the evidence.

VII. Cumulative Error

¶ 46 Nichols asserts that, collectively, the district court’s errors

violated his right to a fair trial, entitling him to a new one. See

Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24. But cumulative error

requires multiple errors resulting in cumulative prejudice. Id. at

¶ 25. Because we disagree that the district court committed

multiple errors, cumulative error doesn’t apply.

VIII. The Restitution Hearing

¶ 47 Defense counsel objected in writing to the prosecution’s

requested restitution and asked for an evidentiary hearing. The

objection twice stated that Nichols “requests that he be excused

from such a hearing.” And though the prosecution filed a writ for

Nichols to appear at the restitution hearing, it later moved to vacate

it because Nichols had “waived his appearance” for the hearing.

The court then vacated the writ.

18
¶ 48 At the restitution hearing, the court said that Nichols’s

“personal appearance or WebEx appearance was waived by

agreement of the parties.” Defense counsel did not object and,

instead, represented Nichols at the hearing.

¶ 49 Nichols now contends that the restitution order should be

vacated because he wasn’t present at the hearing and “there is no

evidence Nichols voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his

right to be present.”

¶ 50 To be sure, a defendant has the right to be present at all

critical stages of a criminal proceeding, which includes restitution

hearings. People v. Martinez Rubier, 2024 COA 67, ¶ 61. But the

right is not absolute; a defendant may waive his right to be present.

People v. Janis, 2018 CO 89, ¶ 17.

¶ 51 Because defense counsel did not object to proceeding without

Nichols present, we review for plain error. People v. Hernandez,

2019 COA 111, ¶ 29. An error is plain in the restitution context

when it is obvious, meaning that it casts serious doubt on the

reliability of the restitution award. Id. at ¶ 30.

¶ 52 Under these circumstances, we are unconvinced that any error

was plain. Because defense counsel represented in writing that

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Nichols asked to be excused from the hearing, did not object when

the prosecutor moved to vacate the writ, and did not object when

the court said that Nichols had waived his appearance, we are

skeptical that the district court obviously erred by proceeding

without Nichols present.

¶ 53 But even assuming the court should have inquired further,

Nichols doesn’t explain how his absence from the restitution

hearing “so undermined the fundamental fairness of the [hearing]

itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability” of the outcome.

Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). Indeed,

Nichols doesn’t say how his presence would have affected the

hearing or what testimony he could have added that might have

affected the restitution order. We therefore can’t conclude that any

error in proceeding without Nichols was substantial enough to be

plain. Cf. Hernandez, ¶ 24 (“[I]f particular facts show that the

defendant’s presence would be useless or only slightly beneficial,

proceeding in the defendant’s absence will be harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.”).

¶ 54 We are unpersuaded that Hernandez requires a different

result. In that case, defense counsel planned “to writ” the

20
defendant to the restitution hearing but “didn’t do that.” Id. at ¶ 4.

Defense counsel did not represent that the defendant asked to be

excused or did not want to be present. Even so, defense counsel

asked to waive the defendant’s presence and proceed without the

defendant. Id.

¶ 55 That’s very different from what happened here. Defense

counsel did not forget to obtain a writ for Nichols’s appearance at

the restitution hearing. Rather, before the restitution hearing,

defense counsel represented that Nichols asked to be excused.

Despite several later opportunities to demand Nichols’s presence,

defense counsel never suggested that Nichols’s position had

changed and that he wanted to be present.

¶ 56 Because we cannot conclude that the district court plainly

erred by proceeding with the restitution hearing without Nichols

present, we affirm the restitution order.

IX. Disposition

¶ 57 The judgment of conviction and restitution order are affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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