Castillo v. STEM

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
November 13, 2025

2025COA88

No. 24CA1046 Castillo v. STEM — Government — Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act — Claire Davis School Safety Act;
Justiciability — Mootness

As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of

appeals considers whether the Claire Davis School Safety Act, § 24-

10-106.3, C.R.S. 2025, requires a case to proceed to a jury trial

after the parties have completed full discovery, the defendant

deposits with the court the maximum amount of damages that the

plaintiffs could recover at trial, and the defendant agrees that the

sum may be released to the plaintiffs but does not admit liability.

The division concludes that in these circumstances, a district court

does not err by dismissing the case as moot.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA88

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1046
Douglas County District Court No. 21CV30323
Honorable Gary M. Kramer, Judge

John Castillo and Maria Castillo,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

STEM School Highlands Ranch, Science Technology Engineering and Math
(STEM) School, and Science Technology Engineering and Math (STEM) High
School,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Grove and Bernard*, JJ., concur

Announced November 13, 2025

The Dan Caplis Law Firm, LLC, Daniel J. Caplis, Babar Waheed, Denver,
Colorado; 5280 Appellate Group, Nelson Boyle, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiffs-
Appellants

Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Ryan L. Winter, Andrew P. Reitman, Matthew J. Hegarty,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Plaintiffs, John and Maria Castillo (the Castillos), appeal the

district court’s judgment dismissing as moot their claims against

defendant, STEM School Highlands Ranch aka the Science

Technology Engineering and Math High School (STEM).1 We affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

A. School Violence

¶2 School shootings in the United States occur with alarming

repetition, terrorizing students, teachers, families, and

communities. Colorado has not escaped these tragedies. See Ch.

266, sec. 1(2), 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 1035 (Between 1999 and

2015, there were “three separate incidents of school violence [in

Colorado] in which students [were] killed at their schools.”); Haylee

May, Colorado Already Has Measures in Place to Prevent School

Shootings, Where Are the Gaps?, Colo. Pub. Radio (Sept. 12, 2025),

https://perma.cc/Z4HX-NN66 (“Colorado has seen [twenty-five]

incidents of gunfire on school campuses since 2013 . . . .”).

1 The Castillos also named the Douglas County School District as a

defendant. However, the District and the Castillos settled their
dispute, and the District is not a party to this appeal.

1
¶3 In an effort to prevent school violence and to compensate

victims, while simultaneously protecting public and charter schools

from unlimited liability, the Colorado General Assembly passed the

Claire Davis School Safety Act (Act), § 24-10-106.3, C.R.S. 2025.

The General Assembly explained the Act’s multiple objectives as

follows:

(3) . . . [T]he General Assembly . . . declares the
purposes of this [A]ct are:

(a) To recognize and state that there is a
limited duty of reasonable care upon public
schools, charter schools, and their employees
to provide for student safety and to protect
students and employees in their schools;

(b) To waive on a limited basis governmental
immunity, thereby allowing for recovery of
capped damages where that duty of reasonable
care has been breached by a school district,
charter school, or their employees; and

(c) To waive on a limited basis governmental
immunity to ensure that there is a robust and
effective discovery through the legal system of
the causes of acts of school violence.

(4) It is the intent of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly
in enacting this [A]ct to affirmatively recognize
a statutory duty upon school districts, charter
schools, and their employees to protect
students, faculty, and staff from foreseeable
harm caused by other persons. The [G]eneral
[A]ssembly hereby declares that the purpose of
recognizing that this duty exists under this

2
[A]ct is to create a tort remedy against school
districts and charter schools in cases where a
school district, charter school, or its employees
knew or should have known of the danger that
was presented and breached that duty of care.

(5) The [G]eneral [A]ssembly also further states
that its intent in enacting the provisions in
this [A]ct regarding discovery and settlement is
to provide a remedy for plaintiffs affected by
acts of school violence and to achieve robust
and vigorous discovery of events leading to
those incidents of school violence.

2015 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1036; see Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d

437, 443 n.7 (Colo. 2007) (treating an uncodified legislative

declaration of purpose “as equal in authority” to a codified

declaration).

¶4 To achieve these objectives, the General Assembly created a

limited waiver of schools’ sovereign immunity to permit victims of

school violence to bring a claim for monetary damages, subject to

the limits of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), see

§§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S. 2025, and to engage in “vigorous

discovery” concerning the events leading to the school violence.

2015 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1036.

¶5 This case requires us to resolve whether, after the completion

of vigorous and full discovery, a defendant’s deposit of a plaintiff’s

3
maximum potential recovery in the court’s registry — with an

agreement that such funds should be delivered to the plaintiffs in

satisfaction of their claim, but without an admission of liability —

permits the court to dismiss a plaintiff’s claims as moot. We

conclude that it does and therefore affirm the district court’s

dismissal of the Castillos’ claims against STEM.

B. The 2019 Shooting

¶6 STEM is a publicly funded charter school. On May 7, 2019,

two STEM students obtained handguns, entered a classroom that

contained twenty-nine students — including eighteen-year-old

Kendrick Castillo2 — blocked the door, and started shooting. One

of the perpetrators fatally shot Kendrick when Kendrick rushed

forward to protect others in the classroom. Students then

restrained both perpetrators until police officers arrived.3

Kendrick’s selfless and heroic actions are credited with saving many

lives. He was murdered two weeks before his high school

graduation.

2 To avoid confusion with his parents, we refer to Kendrick by his

first name. We mean no disrespect in doing so.
3 Both perpetrators were subsequently convicted of first degree

murder.

4
C. District Court Proceedings

¶7 In May 2021, the Castillos brought a wrongful death action

under the Act against STEM, seeking monetary damages attributed

to their son’s death. The Castillos alleged that STEM should have

reasonably foreseen the shooting because the perpetrators

insinuated on social media and in an internet post that they

planned to carry out a violent act at the school. The Castillos

argued that Kendrick’s death resulted from STEM’s alleged failure

to take protective steps in view of these threats. They requested a

jury trial to determine the amount of their damages. The Castillos

did not request any form of injunctive or declaratory relief.4

¶8 Early in the case, STEM moved under C.R.C.P. 67(a) to deposit

$387,000 — the maximum recoverable amount under the CGIA5 —

in the court’s registry and to have the court dismiss the action as

moot. STEM did not concede liability, arguing that the Castillos’

4 With respect to incidents of violence that occurred before July 1,

2017, the Act originally prohibited a court from entering a
declaratory judgment that a public school or charter school had
acted negligently. Ch. 266, sec. 2, § 24-10-106.3(9)(b)(I)-(II), 2015
Colo. Sess. Laws 1036-1038. But this provision was repealed
effective July 1, 2018. Id.
5 The parties agree that this sum represented the maximum amount

the Castillos could recover from STEM under the CGIA.

5
claims were subject to the CGIA and that, by tendering the

maximum recoverable amount under the CGIA, their claims were

rendered moot.

¶9 The district court denied STEM’s motions after finding that,

although the CGIA permitted STEM to deposit the maximum

recoverable damages into the court’s registry, dismissal at that

point was inappropriate because section 24-10-106.3(10) prohibits

a party from using procedural mechanisms, such as an offer of

settlement, default, or confession of judgment, to unilaterally

resolve a case before the completion of full discovery.

¶ 10 The parties made their initial disclosures in November 2021.

STEM moved for a broad protective order, which the district court

granted over the Castillos’ objection. Between November 2021 and

December 2022, the parties engaged in robust discovery: 21

depositions — including those of designees of the Douglas County

School District and STEM — the disclosure of over 25,000 pages of

records, a site inspection, and the review of extensive law

enforcement investigation records and testimony provided through

the perpetrators’ criminal proceedings. After the completion of

discovery, the district court set a February 2023 jury trial.

6
¶ 11 In December 2022, STEM renewed its C.R.C.P. 67 motion and

its motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was now moot because

the parties had completed discovery and STEM had deposited the

full amount of the Castillos’ potential monetary damages with the

court. STEM thereafter moved to convert the jury trial into a bench

trial to address the jurisdictional issue of whether STEM was

immune from the Castillos’ claims. See Trinity Broad. of Denv., Inc.

v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 925-27 (Colo. 1993).

¶ 12 In February 2023, the district court granted STEM’s renewed

C.R.C.P. 67 motion and its motion to dismiss after making the

following findings:

(1) STEM’s broad immunity under the CGIA had been

partially waived under the Act.

(2) Pursuant to Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App.

2007), a claim under the CGIA may become moot if the

defendant deposits with the court the maximum amount

recoverable by the plaintiffs at trial. Id. at 29.

(3) Neither the CGIA nor C.R.C.P. 67 required STEM to

admit liability or confess judgment if it tendered the

7
maximum recoverable amount and no other relief was

requested.

(4) Because the parties agreed that the Castillos’ maximum

recovery was $387,000, STEM had deposited that sum

into the court registry, and full discovery had been

completed pursuant to the Act, dismissal was

appropriate.

¶ 13 The court entered the order granting STEM’s motions to

dismiss subject to the following conditions:

1) STEM is to deposit certified funds in the
amount of $387,000 into the registry of the
Douglas County District Court;

2) The Clerk of Court is to pay over those
funds to . . . [the Castillos’ counsel];

3) By the deposit of the funds, STEM is not
deemed to have admitted liability or confessed
judgment.

4) Upon deposit of the funds, the Plaintiffs[’]
claims will become moot and the trial will be
vacated.

5) The case will be dismissed once the
protective order issue regarding the claims of
confidential information has been resolved.

¶ 14 The district court appointed a special master to resolve the

issues related to the “designation of confidential information

8
pursuant to the protective order.” In October 2023, the special

master issued his final order, “Special Master Order No. 3” (SMO3),

concluding that portions of deposition testimony would remain

confidential because they were protected by the deliberative process

privilege. See City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042,

1050 (Colo. 1998) (concluding that the deliberative process privilege

is part of the common law of Colorado).

¶ 15 The Castillos asked the district court to modify portions of

SMO3 to permit the public release of certain documents that the

special master had concluded were protected from disclosure. In

April 2024, the court held a closed hearing to address the contested

materials. After the hearing, the court largely adopted SMO3 but

made portions of two additional deposition transcripts publicly

available. The April order resolved all outstanding discovery issues,

and neither party challenges any of the special master’s or the

district court’s discovery orders on appeal.

¶ 16 The Castillos filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its

February 2023 dismissal order in light of Scardina v. Masterpiece

Cakeshop, Inc., 2023 COA 8, ¶ 42, vacated on other grounds, 2024

CO 67. STEM opposed the Castillos’ motion and moved for the

9
entry of final judgment. The court set the matter for a hearing and

ordered the parties to file motions addressing how the case should

proceed. After full briefing, the court dismissed the case and

reaffirmed its February 2023 order.

¶ 17 The district court distinguished the division’s decision in

Scardina,6 which was brought under the Colorado Anti-

Discrimination Act (CADA), because the statutory relief under CADA

serves to vindicate a plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from

discrimination and permits only a nominal fine rather than

economic damages.7 In contrast, the court reasoned that the Act’s

purposes include ensuring the completion of full discovery and

providing meaningful economic compensation for victims of school

violence. Given these disparate purposes, the district court

concluded that Scardina did not control.

6 The district court’s order was issued before the supreme court

decided Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina, 2024 CO 67, which
vacated the district court’s and the division’s orders and dismissed
the case. Id. at ¶ 61. In doing so, the court expressed “no opinion
about the merits of Scardina’s claims, and nothing about today’s
holding alters the protections afforded by CADA.” Id.
7 In 2025, the General Assembly amended CADA to allow a person

aggrieved by a CADA violation to recover limited economic damages.
See Ch. 232, sec. 3 § 24-34-602(1)(a), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1099.

10
¶ 18 The district court concluded that dismissal was appropriate

because (1) the parties had completed full and vigorous discovery;

(2) the Castillos sought only economic damages, and STEM

tendered the maximum amount of recoverable damages; (3) there

was no further relief that the court could grant beyond the

$387,000 that STEM had deposited into the court’s registry; (4) the

Act contemplates settlement and does not mandate that a trial

occur; and (5) the Act does not require a determination or

assessment of liability.

¶ 19 The district court also noted that, because the parties had

completed discovery, the Act’s prevention and accountability

purposes had been served because “the public information

disclosed in discovery will be scrutinized and debated by school

officials, safety officials, parents, teachers,” and concerned

members of the public, and that the court of public opinion will

determine whether STEM breached its duty of reasonable care.

This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

¶ 20 The Castillos contend that the district court erred by granting

STEM’s motion to dismiss and depriving them of the opportunity to

11
have a jury determine STEM’s liability. They argue that the Act’s

legislative intent suggests that a plaintiff may compel a trial to

facilitate public disclosure of the events leading to the act of school

violence, determine the standard of care, and hold a negligent

school publicly accountable. The Castillos also argue that STEM

used improper procedural mechanisms to render their claims moot,

and in any event, the claims are not moot under multiple

exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

¶ 21 We begin our analysis by setting forth the controlling legal

standards and then address the Castillos’ specific legal arguments.

A. Standard of Review and Statutory Construction

¶ 22 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we

review de novo. Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Brannberg, 2023 CO 11,

¶ 15. When interpreting statutes, we seek to discern and give effect

to the General Assembly’s intent. Id. “In doing so, we apply words

and phrases in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings,

and we consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent,

harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.” Id. If the

statute’s language is clear, “we must apply it as written, and we

need not resort to other rules of statutory construction.” Id. at

12
¶ 16. Additionally, when construing a statute, we must respect the

legislature’s choice of language. UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark

Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22. Therefore, we do not add words

to or subtract words from the statute. Id.

¶ 23 If a statute’s meaning is clear based on its plain language, we

generally do not consult the statute’s legislative history. Smith v.

Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1190 (Colo. 2010).

Moreover, a court may not interpret a statute to accomplish

something that the statute’s plain language does not suggest,

warrant, or mandate. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,

246 P.3d 651, 661 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 24 We review a district court’s grant of leave to deposit funds

under C.R.C.P. 67(a) for an abuse of discretion. Coors Brewing Co.

v. City of Golden, 2013 COA 92, ¶ 75. A district court abuses its

discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Moore v.

4th Jud. Dist. Att’y, 2024 COA 48, ¶ 6.

¶ 25 Whether a case is moot also presents a question of law that we

review de novo. Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Urbina, 2013 COA 155, ¶ 23.

Courts exercise their jurisdiction to address actual controversies

13
between parties. Rudnick, 179 P.3d at 29. A case becomes moot

when the relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal

effect on the controversy. Urbina, ¶ 22. Subject to limited

exceptions, a court will not exercise its jurisdiction if the case has

become moot. Id.

B. Applicable Laws

1. The CGIA and the Act

¶ 26 Generally, the CGIA provides public entities — including

public schools and charter schools — broad immunity, but it waives

immunity for injuries arising out of certain designated actions.

§ 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. 2025 (“A public entity is immune from

liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort”

unless such immunity has been expressly waived.); § 24-10-

106(1)(a)-(k) (waiving sovereign immunity for injuries arising from

specifically delineated governmental actions).

¶ 27 The CGIA includes monetary caps limiting how much a

plaintiff can recover from a public entity. See § 24-10-114(1)(a)-(b),

C.R.S. 2025. Claims brought under the Act are subject to the

statutory caps. § 24-10-106.3(9)(a). As previously noted, the

parties agree that the maximum amount that the Castillos could

14
recover under the Act was $387,000.8 See § 24-10-114(1)(a)-(b); see

also Colorado Secretary of State, Certificate (Jan. 5, 2022),

https://perma.cc/4FAP-YS2X.

¶ 28 Under the Act, a plaintiff may recover monetary damages if the

school breached its “duty to exercise reasonable care to protect all

students, faculty, and staff from harm from acts committed by

another person when the harm is reasonably foreseeable, while

such students, faculty, and staff are within the school facilities or

are participating in school-sponsored activities.” § 24-10-106.3(3).

A publicly funded charter school’s sovereign immunity is waived

under the CGIA “with respect to . . . a claim of a breach of the duty

of care established in [the Act] . . . arising from an incident of school

violence.” § 24-10-106.3(4).

8 The CGIA imposes a statutory maximum that individuals can

recover “[f]or any injury to one person in any single occurrence.”
§ 24-10-114(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. The maximum recovery is
periodically adjusted “by an amount reflecting the percentage
change over a four-year period in the United States department of
labor, bureau of labor statistics, consumer price index for Denver-
Aurora-Lakewood for all items and all urban consumers, or its
applicable predecessor or successor index.” § 24-10-114(1)(b).

15
¶ 29 In service to its discovery, disclosure, and prevention

purposes, the Act provides as follows:

In order to promote vigorous discovery of
events leading to an incident of school violence
in any action brought under this section, an
offer of judgment by a defendant under section
13-17-202, C.R.S. [2025], prior to the
completion of discovery, is not deemed rejected
if not accepted until fourteen days after the
completion of discovery, and the plaintiff is not
liable for costs due to not accepting such an
offer of judgment until fourteen days after the
completion of discovery. If a defendant refuses
to answer a complaint, or a default judgment
is entered against a defendant for failure to
answer a complaint, or a defendant confesses
liability in an action brought under this
section, the court shall allow full discovery
upon request of the plaintiff.

§ 24-10-106.3(10).

2. Rudnick, C.R.C.P. 67, and Scardina

¶ 30 Both the CGIA and the Act attempt to facilitate multiple

purposes. On the issue of economic damages, the General

Assembly has attempted to provide a measure of compensation to

plaintiffs, or their next of kin, for injuries caused by specific

governmental conduct, while at the same time avoiding excessive

economic exposure to governmental entities.

16
¶ 31 Consistent with these dual purposes, our case law recognizes

that a governmental defendant may invoke C.R.C.P. 67(a) to render

a case moot, even when an injured plaintiff would prefer to proceed

to trial. See Rudnick, 179 P.3d at 30-32; C.R.C.P. 67(a) (A

defending party may “deposit with the court all or any part of such

sum or thing, to be held by the clerk of the court subject to

withdrawal in whole or in part at any time thereafter upon order of

the court.”). Even if the deposit does not include an admission of

liability or confession of judgment, the district court may deem the

claim moot if the defending party deposits the maximum

recoverable amount under the CGIA and agrees that the sum may

be delivered to the plaintiff in satisfaction of their claims. Rudnick,

179 P.3d at 30.

17
¶ 32 In Scardina,9 a division of this court addressed Rudnick’s

application to CADA. Scardina, ¶¶ 38-50; see also §§ 24-34-600.3

to -605, C.R.S. 2025. The division concluded that CADA was

enacted by the General Assembly to “fulfill the ‘basic responsibility

of government to redress discriminatory . . . practices.’” Scardina,

¶ 44 (quoting Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 24). Therefore, in

the context of an aggrieved party seeking injunctive relief under

CADA, the division concluded that the trial court correctly found

that the case was not moot under Rudnick because the core policy

of CADA would be frustrated if a defendant could “avoid the finding

of discrimination simply by paying a fine.” Scardina, ¶ 46.

9 Because the Colorado Supreme Court vacated the division’s

opinion, it no longer has the precedential value it did when the
district court dismissed this case. See City of Arvada ex rel. Arvada
Police Dep’t v. Denv. Health & Hosp. Auth., 2017 CO 97, ¶ 24 n.3.
Nonetheless, we understand that the Castillos contend that we
should apply the same legal rationale articulated in Scardina to
reverse the district court’s dismissal order. Thus, we address
whether Scardina’s legal reasoning applies to claims brought
pursuant to the Act. Id. (“[B]ecause our vacated opinion no longer
holds precedential value, we have revisited this issue and reach the
same conclusion.”).

18
C. Legislative Intent Argument

¶ 33 The Castillos argue that we should interpret the Act in light of

its legislative intent. Specifically, they acknowledge that the Act’s

“purposes are unambiguous,” but they argue that “the Act is

ambiguous as to how it will accomplish these purposes — especially

so, if it allows partially suppressed discovery without any means to

fulfill the [General Assembly’s] intention to make schools safer.”

From their perspective, the purposes of providing reasonable

compensation and limiting governmental financial exposure should

not be elevated to the height that they shade the full public

disclosure and accountability provided by a jury trial and verdict on

the parties’ substantive contentions.

¶ 34 The Castillos’ argument has some initial appeal, but it fails on

closer examination. True, a jury trial involving matters of public

interest often serves to educate the public and incentivize policy

changes. And one aspect of a trial is cross-examination, which is

often cited as the legal system’s greatest truth-finding mechanism.

See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-

examination as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the

discovery of truth” (quoting 5 John Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d

19
ed. 1940))). On the other hand, there is an equally compelling

interest in allowing governmental defendants to avoid unnecessary

litigation in order to conserve public resources. Finnie v. Jefferson

Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253, 1260-61 (Colo. 2003).

Ultimately, these types of policy choices are best left to the General

Assembly.

¶ 35 This deference to the General Assembly is particularly apt —

indeed, required absent a constitutional violation — when the

General Assembly has chosen between options available to it.

Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, Inc., 102 P.3d 323, 326-27 (Colo.

2004) (“Our duty is to effectuate the intent and purpose of the

General Assembly. We apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the

statute, if clear.” (citation omitted)). Nowhere in the Act did the

General Assembly direct that a trial must be held if a plaintiff

demands it. In contrast, the Act specifically contemplates the

completion of “vigorous” and “full discovery.” § 24-10-106.3(10).

20
¶ 36 The word “discovery” has specific legal meaning,

1. The act or process of finding or learning
something that was previously unknown . . . .
2. Compulsory disclosure, at a party’s request,
of information that relates to the litigation . . . .
The primary discovery devices are
interrogatories, depositions, requests for
admissions, and requests for production . . . .
3. The facts or documents disclosed . . . .
4. The pretrial phase of a lawsuit during which
depositions, interrogatories, and other forms of
discovery are conducted.

Black’s Law Dictionary 584-85 (12th ed. 2024).

¶ 37 When the General Assembly used the term “discovery” in

section 24-10-106.3, it did so while referring to remedies that are

generally available to a defendant to settle a case prior to trial. See

§ 13-17-202, C.R.S. 2025. Thus, the General Assembly used

“discovery” in a legal sense. That legal context refers to “[t]he

pretrial phase of a lawsuit” rather than the trial itself. Black’s Law

Dictionary at 584. This provision reflects the General Assembly’s

intent to permit vigorous and full discovery but does not

demonstrate an intent to force a school to trial when the plaintiff

only sought monetary relief and the school has deposited with the

court the full measure of money damages requested in the

complaint.

21
¶ 38 Section 24-10-106.3’s language permitting full and vigorous

discovery before settlement, without reference to any right to

compel a public trial, reflects the General Assembly’s conscious

choice to require discovery but also to permit a post-discovery

resolution in the manner contemplated by Rudnick. Contrary to the

Castillos’ argument, this legislative action does not create an

ambiguity in how the purposes of the Act will be fulfilled but rather

reflects the General Assembly’s deliberate choice.10 We are bound

to respect that legislative choice rather than ignore the Act’s plain

language to achieve a different result. UMB, ¶ 22.

¶ 39 In addition to being inconsistent with the legislative mandate,

the Castillos’ argument is premised on an erroneous legal

assumption. Particularly, they argue that a trial is necessary

because “juries decide the standards of care.” We disagree.

¶ 40 First, the Act expressly sets forth STEM’s standard of care in

these situations. § 24-10-106.3(3). Second, to the extent that the

10 We also note that a trial is not the only venue in which the

discovery mandated by the statute could be useful in fulfilling the
Act’s purposes of education, prevention, and accountability. A
party may present the information obtained in discovery to a school
board, the legislature, a city council, the media, and the governor’s
office, among others.

22
language of the Act permits any uncertainty concerning the

applicable standard of care, the resolution of that issue is entrusted

to courts, not to juries. See White v. Pines Enters., Inc., 728 P.2d

759, 760 (Colo. App. 1986) (“Whether there is a duty of care to

plaintiff is not a matter to be submitted to or decided by a jury. It is

a question of law for decision by the trial court.” (citation omitted)).

¶ 41 Finally, though we may not consider legislative history to

create an ambiguity, we may rely upon the General Assembly’s

statement of purpose — whether codified or not — in confirming

that our interpretation of a statute is consistent with that purpose.

Stamp, 172 P.3d at 443 n.7; Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of

Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 995-98 (Colo. 2003) (considering

legislative history to support the court’s plain language

interpretation of an unambiguous statute). And here, the district

court interpreted and applied the Act consistently with its stated

purpose.

¶ 42 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s

interpretation and application of the Act were not contrary to the

General Assembly’s intent when adopting it.

23
D. The Reasoning of Scardina Is Not Inconsistent with Rudnick

¶ 43 The Castillos argue that the district court erred by not

reconsidering its decision that the case was moot under Rudnick in

view of the reasoning applied in Scardina. We disagree.

¶ 44 Rudnick arose under the CGIA, while Scardina arose under

CADA. See Scardina, ¶ 43. This distinction is vital to understand

the scope of the respective decisions. The CGIA primarily focuses

on providing economic compensation for victims who are injured

through governmental action for which immunity has been waived.

Id. On the other hand, at the time of the division’s decision in

Scardina, CADA imposed “a fine to deter discriminatory practices by

the defendant rather than to award damages to fully compensate

the aggrieved party.” Id. Thus, CADA’s primary focus was not on

providing economic compensation to a plaintiff but, rather, “to fulfill

the ‘basic responsibility of government to redress discriminatory . . .

practices.’” Id. at ¶ 44 (citation omitted).

¶ 45 One trait that CADA and the CGIA do share is that neither

contains an express provision addressing whether a case may be

settled under C.R.C.P. 67(a) before trial. In Rudnick, given the

economic remedy provided by the CGIA, the division concluded that

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a defendant could invoke C.R.C.P. 67 to render a claim moot by

depositing with the court the full amount the plaintiff could recover

under the CGIA. Rudnick, 179 P.3d at 30-31. The division

reasoned that defendants could use this process even though they

did not agree to confess judgment or otherwise admit liability.

¶ 46 In contrast, given CADA’s broader public policy and limited

compensatory purposes, the division in Scardina concluded that the

district court did not err by declining to permit the defendant to use

the C.R.C.P. 67 process to moot the case. Scardina, ¶¶ 38-50.

Indeed, the division concluded that to do so would undermine

CADA’s purpose, diminish the precedential value of a liability

finding, and undermine the “broad societal interests in affirming the

equality of all persons and disavowing discriminatory practices in

the public sector.” Id. at ¶ 46.

¶ 47 The Castillos urge us to adopt the division’s reasoning in

Scardina to disavow the use of C.R.C.P. 67 under the Act. We

decline to do so for two reasons. First, we perceive material

differences between the absence of an economic remedy provided by

CADA at the time of the Scardina opinion and the significant

economic remedy provided by the Act.

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¶ 48 Second, and most critically, in the Act — unlike in CADA —

the General Assembly expressly addressed limitations on a

defendant’s use of procedural mechanisms to obtain dismissal of a

case. The Act limits such practices prior to the completion of

vigorous and full discovery. By drawing this line, the General

Assembly implicitly determined that such practices are permitted

after the completion of discovery, without requiring a trial. See

Kinslow v. Mohammadi, 2024 CO 19, ¶ 21 (“This interpretation of

legislative silence is consistent with ‘the General Assembly’s policy

choice’ . . . .” (quoting Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo.

1999))). As previously explained, we must interpret the Act in a

manner that effectuates the General Assembly’s intent. Thus, we

conclude that the reasoning in Scardina does not apply here.

¶ 49 The Castillos next argue that Rudnick’s reasoning has been

rendered untenable by the United States Supreme Court’s decision

in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016). Campbell-

Ewald held that an “unaccepted settlement offer has no force,” and

“[w]ith the offer off the table, and the defendant’s continuing denial

of liability, adversity between the parties persists.” Id. at 156. But

Campbell-Ewald is distinguishable on multiple grounds.

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¶ 50 First, that case is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,

not C.R.C.P. 67. Id. Second, even if it were interpreting a parallel

rule, we are not bound by the Court’s interpretation of federal rules

when interpreting a Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure. See Garcia v.

Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 (“While this [c]ourt

is not bound to interpret our rules of civil procedure the same way

the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do

look to the federal rules and federal decisions interpreting those

rules for guidance.”).

¶ 51 Most importantly, in Campbell-Ewald, the Supreme Court

expressly stated that it was not deciding “whether the result would

be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s

individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the

court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”

Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 166. For these reasons, we disagree

with the Castillos’ contention that Campbell-Ewald renders the

holding in Rudnick obsolete.

E. Mootness Exceptions

¶ 52 The Castillos argue that their claims should proceed to trial

even if they are moot because, as they see it, various exceptions to

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the mootness doctrine apply to this case. Specifically, they argue

that the case should not be deemed moot because (1) the case

presents issues of great public importance; (2) collateral

consequences are still at issue; and (3) the case is capable of

repetition but evades review.

¶ 53 Ordinarily, a case is moot when the relief requested would not

have a practical effect upon an existing controversy. Urbina, ¶ 22.

Nonetheless, as the Castillos argue, various exceptions allow a case

to proceed that would otherwise be moot. But contrary to their

arguments, we conclude that none of the cited exceptions applies

here.

1. Great Public Importance

¶ 54 A dispute that would otherwise be moot may proceed on the

merits if the case presents an issue “of great public importance.”

People in Interest of C.G., 2015 COA 106, ¶ 37. We agree with the

Castillos that there is significant public interest in preventing and

remediating incidents of school violence. As previously explained,

we also agree that the litigation process, including discovery and

jury trials, can offer a means to educate parties and the public

about the risks that schools face and the type of remedial measures

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that schools have available to mitigate or prevent such tragedies.

But it is clear that the General Assembly was also aware and

mindful of these considerations when it passed the Act. And with

that knowledge, the General Assembly adopted section 24-10-

106.3(10), which limits a defendant’s use of procedural mechanisms

to obtain a dismissal of the case against a plaintiff’s wishes.

¶ 55 The line drawn by the General Assembly reflects a decision to

facilitate the completion of discovery but not to compel a trial once

that discovery is completed and a defendant has complied with the

Rudnick procedures. We are not at liberty to disregard this line

simply because the issues to be addressed at a potential trial

present a matter of public interest. See Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Progressive Mountain Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 250, 256 (Colo. App. 1999)

(“[I]t is for the General Assembly to balance competing social

goals. . . . [W]e cannot supply a right or remedy the General

Assembly has chosen not to provide.”), aff’d, 27 P.3d 343 (Colo.

2001).

2. The Collateral Consequences Exception

¶ 56 Next, the Castillos invoke the “collateral consequences”

exception to mootness. This exception is often invoked in the

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criminal context to allow a defendant to appeal a criminal

conviction that has ongoing collateral consequences even though

the defendant has already completed the underlying sentence.

See DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, ¶ 10 (“Even if a sentence has

been fully served, an appeal of the underlying conviction is not

moot if there is a possibility that the conviction will give rise to

collateral consequences.”). Often the defendant’s completion of

their sentence prevents a court from granting any effective relief.

But application of general mootness principles in this context may

be unjust if the defendant may still be adversely affected by the

conviction. See id. at ¶ 9 (“Collateral consequences can include

prohibitions on a felon’s ability to vote and own firearms, potential

sentencing as a habitual criminal, possible impeachment based on

prior convictions, and proscription from working in certain

regulated professions.”).

¶ 57 Recognizing this practical reality, courts have created the

collateral consequences doctrine as an exception to general

mootness principles to ensure that a claiming party is not deprived

of the opportunity to avoid these adverse collateral impacts. Id.

(“Under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness

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doctrine, a case is moot ‘only if it is shown that there is no

possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on

the basis of the challenged conviction.’” (quoting Sibron v. New York,

392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968))).

¶ 58 Drawing from these principles, the Castillos argue that their

claims are not moot because a trial could visit additional adverse

consequences on STEM. They cite C.G. in support of the argument.

C.G. arose when a child was adjudicated dependent or neglected

based on father’s alleged abandonment of the child and default on

the petition. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. C.G. was placed with his half-sibling in

the custody of the sibling’s father, who was later convicted of

murdering C.G. Id. at ¶ 5. Father brought a federal civil rights

action against the department of human services, alleging a denial

of his due process rights. Id. at ¶ 6. Father then moved to set aside

the adjudication entered against him. Id.

¶ 59 The department argued that father’s motion was moot in view

of the child’s death, but father argued that the adjudication created

adverse consequences for him because it impacted his ability to

proceed on his federal civil rights claim. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. The district

court sided with the department and dismissed father’s motion. Id.

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at ¶ 9. Father appealed to this court, and the division reversed the

mootness ruling under the collateral consequences doctrine, noting

that the dependency and neglect orders had continuing adverse

consequences by limiting father’s ability to pursue the federal

litigation. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.

¶ 60 The common denominator in DePriest and C.G. is that the

underlying judgment or order being appealed had continuing

adverse consequences on the appealing party. The Castillos do not

argue that the dismissal of their claims may have continuing

adverse consequences for them; rather, they argue that “a jury

finding of liability could have had the collateral consequence of

harming STEM’s reputation by exposing its mistakes (from which

the public could learn how to better protect schools).” But the

Castillos do not cite any controlling authority, and we are aware of

none, that would allow us to invoke the collateral consequences

exception to mootness because a trial and resulting judgment could

have adverse consequences for an opponent with no tangible

consequences to the appealing party. Thus, we see no basis for

invoking the collateral consequences exception to mootness.

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3. Capable of Repetition and Evading Review

¶ 61 Finally, the Castillos argue that the district court erred by not

permitting the case to proceed because it presents a controversy

that is capable of repetition but evades review. See Trinidad Sch.

Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1102 (Colo. 1998) (“[W]e may

resolve what is an otherwise moot case when the issue involved is

one that is capable of repetition yet evading review.”). But as STEM

notes, school shootings — though repeated with disturbing and

tragic regularity — are inherently fact specific. And the Castillos do

not develop an argument explaining how the “evading review”

exception can be appropriately invoked in this case. Accordingly,

we decline to address the issue further. See People v. West, 2019

COA 131, ¶ 23 (we do not address arguments that are not

adequately developed on appeal).

III. Summary

¶ 62 In adopting the Act, the General Assembly limited a school’s

ability to use procedural mechanisms, prior to the completion of

vigorous and full discovery, to moot a claim brought to redress

injuries resulting from reasonably foreseeable harm caused by an

incident of school violence. The Act does not, however, impose such

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limitations on a school’s ability to utilize the Rudnick procedure to

moot a case after the completion of such discovery. Thus, the

district court did not err by dismissing this dispute as moot after

the parties completed discovery, STEM deposited funds in the

maximum amount available to the Castillos, and their complaint

requested no other relief.

IV. Disposition

¶ 63 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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