Marriage of Beers

25CA0232 Marriage of Beers 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0232
El Paso County District Court No. 23DR31259
Honorable Jill M. Brady, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jason Douglas Beers,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant,

and

Angela May Beers,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 6, 2025

Brown Carrington, PLLC, Dorothy Walsh Ripka, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
and Cross-Appellant

Goldman Law, LLC, Scott D. Goldman, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant and
Cross-Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Angela Beers

(mother) appeals the portion of the district court’s permanent

orders allocating decision-making responsibilities between her and

Jason Beers (father). Father also appeals the district court’s

domestic violence findings. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2013 and had two children together. In

2023, after years of marital discord, the parties separated, and

father filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.

¶3 The court appointed a child and family investigator (CFI) to

assess the parties’ competing allegations of domestic violence and to

make recommendations as to an allocation of parental

responsibilities in the best interests of the children. The CFI

reviewed “[e]xtensive evidence” regarding the parties’ domestic

violence concerns and concluded there was “significant domestic

violence, which contraindicate[d] joint decision-making.”

¶4 After a permanent orders hearing, the district court found, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that father had committed

domestic violence against mother and that there was no credible

evidence that the parties could work together to make decisions for

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the children. The court then awarded sole educational decision-

making responsibility to father and sole medical and religious

decision-making responsibility to mother.

II. Standard of Review

¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

sound discretion of the district court. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131

P.3d 1208, 1214 (Colo. App. 2006); In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018

COA 116M, ¶ 23. We will not disturb the court’s allocation absent

a showing that the court abused its discretion. McSoud, 131 P.3d

at 1214. “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misconstrues or misapplies the law.” In re Marriage of Fabos, 2022

COA 66, ¶ 16. We review the district court’s application of the law

de novo. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 55. And we

review a district court’s factual findings for clear error. Id. “A

court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no support for

it in the record.” Gagne v. Gagne, 2019 COA 42, ¶ 17.

III. Decision-Making Responsibility

¶6 Mother contends that the district court erred by allocating sole

educational decision-making responsibility to father and sole

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medical and religious decision-making responsibility to her — what

she deems “split” decision-making responsibility. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶7 The court may allocate decision-making responsibility with

respect to each issue affecting the children (1) mutually between

both parties; (2) individually to one party; or (3) any combination

thereof. § 14-10-124(1.5)(b), C.R.S. 2025. In so deciding, the court

must allocate decision-making responsibility in accordance with the

children’s best interests. § 14-10-124(1.5). To make this

determination, the district court must “consider the nine parenting

time factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and three decision-making

factors in paragraph (b) of the same subsection.” Morgan, ¶ 21.

¶8 Additionally, if there is a claim of domestic violence or if the

court has reason to believe that a party has committed domestic

violence, the court must consider additional factors before

allocating parental responsibilities. § 14-10-124(4)(a). As relevant

here, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one

of the parties has committed domestic violence, before awarding

joint decision-making responsibility the court must first find

credible evidence of the parties’ ability to make decisions

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cooperatively in the children’s best interest in a manner that is safe

for the abused party and the children. § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A).

B. Analysis

¶9 In allocating decision-making responsibility, the district court

made findings regarding each of the nine parenting time factors in

section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and two of the three decision-making

factors in paragraph (b) of the same subsection. Even so, mother

asserts that the court’s findings were insufficient to support its

allocation of decision-making responsibility because the findings

focused on parenting time. True, many of the court’s findings

related more to its allocation of parenting time, but the court is not

required to make specific findings on all statutory factors. See In re

Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 813 (Colo. App. 2007). Its

findings simply must be sufficiently explicit to give the reviewing

court a clear understanding of the factual basis for the order. In re

Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Garst, 955

P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient

if they identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed persuasive

and determinative of the issues raised.”).

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¶ 10 Here, the court found that (1) the children were well adjusted

to their school which provided stability during a period of

transition; (2) mother disagreed with the children remaining in their

current school; (3) neither parent had any mental health issues

other than father’s substance abuse; (4) neither parent

demonstrated the ability to encourage the children’s relationship

with the other parent; (5) mother and father demonstrated a lack of

trust and respect for one another; (6) historically the parties worked

together, to an extent, to share a system of values, commitment,

and mutual support but, more recently, that was “non-existent”;

and (7) when the parties were not together or engaged in conflict,

they were both able to make good decisions for the children. These

findings are supported by the record, undisputed by mother, and

provide us with a clear understanding of the district court’s basis

for its allocation of decision-making responsibility.

¶ 11 Still, mother contends that the district court did not

appropriately consider some of her proffered evidence or sufficiently

weigh some of the best interest factors. But it is not our role to

reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

district court. In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (stating

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that, even where “there is evidence in the record that could have

supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our

judgment for that of the district court”).

¶ 12 We also reject mother’s contention that the district court erred

by not specifically applying section 14-10-124(4) and acknowledging

her objection to joint decision-making responsibility as a victim of

domestic violence. At the outset of its order, the court found that

there were “allegations of domestic abuse or violence that

warrant[ed] the consideration of the factors” in section 14-10-124(4)

“before consideration of the standard factors.” The court then

entered its findings “[i]n contemplation of the domestic violence

factors” in section 14-10-124(4). And before allocating sole

decision-making responsibility, the court found that joint decision-

making responsibility was not in the children’s best interests

because there was no credible evidence that the parties could work

together to make decisions for the children. See § 14-10-

124(4)(a)(II)(A). Thus, the court properly and thoroughly applied

subsection (4) before allocating decision-making responsibility

between the parties.

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¶ 13 Mother next asserts that the district court’s allocation of “split”

decision-making responsibility was “antithetical to the intention of”

section 14-10-124(4). In support, mother contends that the

intention of the statute was to protect victims of domestic violence

from being revictimized. Therefore, she posits, the General

Assembly could not have intended the court “to allocate even some

decisions to the primary aggressor” because doing so would allow

the perpetrator to continue to exert control over the victim.

¶ 14 Statutory interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de

novo. In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 11, aff’d, 2021 CO

12. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to effectuate the

legislature’s intent. Id. at ¶ 12. In discerning that intent, we look

first to the statutory language, giving words and phrases their plain

and ordinary meanings. Id. If we determine that the language is

clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute as written. Id.

¶ 15 Two divisions of this court have interpreted an earlier, yet

substantially similar version, of section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A), then

numbered section 14-10-124(1.5)(b)(V), C.R.S. 2005. See In re

Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308 (Colo. App. 2006); In re

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Marriage of Bertsch, 97 P.3d 219, 221 (Colo. App. 2004).1 Both

Yates and Bertsch held that the district court may grant sole

decision-making responsibility to a parent who has committed an

act of domestic violence against the other parent.

¶ 16 In Bertsch, a division of this court reviewed the plain language

of the earlier version of the statute and held that the legislature “did

not intend to bar or presumptively bar an abusive parent or spouse

from exercising [sole] decision-making responsibility.” 97 P.3d at

221. The division recognized that, although child or spousal abuse

is an important factor, it is not the only one to be considered when

allocating decision-making responsibility. Id. at 222. And it was

not persuaded by the assertion that its interpretation of the statute

would lead to an absurd result. Id. It reasoned that, while past

abuse would severely impede the parents’ ability to work together,

1 Mother argues that the statute applied in In re Marriage of Yates,

148 P.3d 304 (Colo. App. 2006), and In re Marriage of Bertsch, 97
P.3d 219 (Colo. App. 2004), is distinguishable from the current
statute because it does not contain any reference to “a claim of
domestic violence.” However, the prior statutory language still
required the court, when allocating decision-making responsibility,
to consider “[w]hether one of the parties ha[d] been a perpetrator of
spouse abuse.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(b)(V), C.R.S. 2005. Thus, we see
no practicable difference between the prior and current versions of
the statute in this regard.

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“a person’s past abuse of a child or spouse does not necessarily and

inevitably mean that history is doomed to repeat itself or that the

person is incapable of becoming a fit, or even the more fit, parent of

a child.” Id.

¶ 17 Similarly, in Yates a division of this court upheld an allocation

of sole extracurricular decision-making responsibility to the

husband and sole decision-making responsibility over all other

issues to the wife, despite the wife’s prior convictions for domestic

violence and child abuse. 148 P.3d at 308-09. Like in Bertsch, the

division in Yates relied on the plain language of the statute and

held that a finding of child or spousal abuse was not dispositive as

to whether a parent may be granted decision-making

responsibilities. Id. at 309.

¶ 18 Section 14-10-124 has been revised several times in the years

following Bertsch and Yates. See, e.g., Ch. 292, sec. 5, § 14-10-124,

2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 1731-32; Ch. 136, sec. 19, § 14-10-124(1.3),

2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 712; Ch. 344, sec. 3, § 14-10-124, 2024

Colo. Sess. Laws 2336-38. And we may presume that the

legislature knew of those cases when revising the statute. See

Zander, ¶ 26; Przekurat v. Torres, 2016 COA 177, ¶ 23 (reviewing

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court presumes the legislature is aware of published judicial

precedents construing prior versions of a statute), aff’d, 2018 CO

69. One such revision stemmed from H.B. 21-1228 — cited by

mother — detailing a variety of domestic violence statistics and

stressing the need for courts to consider domestic violence as a

factor when allocating parental responsibilities. 2021 Colo. Sess.

Laws at 1731-32. And yet, nothing in section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A)

indicates a legislative intent to (1) overrule the holdings and

reasoning in Bertsch or Yates; (2) bar a parent found to have

perpetrated domestic violence from being allocated sole decision-

making responsibility; or (3) add further limitations on the court’s

authority to allocate decision-making responsibility mutually

between both parties, individually to one party, or any combination

thereof. Therefore, we see no reason to depart from those cases

holding that the plain language of the statute allows a district court

to grant sole decision-making responsibility to a parent who has

committed an act of domestic violence.

¶ 19 We are similarly unpersuaded by mother’s attempt to

distinguish this case from Bertsch and Yates. Mother argues that

because father made no attempt to correct his abusive behavior,

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unlike the perpetrating parties in Bertsch and Yates, the court’s

allocation of sole educational decision-making responsibility to

father was contrary to the children’s best interests. But mother’s

argument effectively asks us to read an additional factor into the

required analysis under section 14-10-124(4) — that, for a district

court to award sole decision-making responsibility to a parent

found to have committed acts of domestic violence, the court must

first find that parent has engaged in corrective measures. As

discussed above, if the General Assembly intended to impose

additional measures or restrictions on the court’s ability to award

decision making responsibility to a perpetrating parent, it could

have. But it did not, and we will not read additional requirements

into the plain language of the statute. See Springer v. City & County

of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 804 (Colo. 2000) (“Where the legislature

could have chosen to restrict the application of a statute, but chose

not to, we do not read additional restrictions into the statute.”).

¶ 20 Finally, mother contends that the court’s allocation of

educational decision-making responsibility to father erroneously

curtailed her religious decision-making responsibility. In support

mother argues that she objected to the children’s continued

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enrollment at their current school due to its “religious teachings.”

True, mother testified about her concerns with the curriculum. But

the CFI testified that the curriculum appeared to be standard and,

based on her investigation, that father seemed poised to make

better educational decisions for the children. And it is not our role

to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

district court. Nelson, ¶ 35

¶ 21 Because the district court’s findings have clear record support,

and the court considered the statutory factors of section 14-10-124,

including those in subsection (4), we conclude that the court’s

allocation of decision-making responsibility was not an abuse of

discretion.

IV. Domestic Violence Findings

¶ 22 Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the district court

erred by finding that he was the “primary aggressor” of domestic

violence. We discern no error.

A. Preservation

¶ 23 As a preliminary matter, we disagree with mother’s contention

that father failed to preserve this issue. Father’s contention is

directed at the district court’s finding, and he could not have raised

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it until after the court ruled. A party need not object to a court’s

findings to preserve a challenge to those findings. In re Marriage of

Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 17; see C.R.C.P. 52. Accordingly, we

consider, and reject, father’s assertion of error.

B. Analysis

¶ 24 In considering whether one of the parties committed an act of

domestic violence, engaged in a pattern of domestic violence, or had

a history of domestic violence, as directed by section 14-10-

124(4)(a)(II), the district court found that the parties had a

“complicated dynamic,” had both demonstrated domestic violence

“characteristics,” but that father was the “primary aggressor.”

Father contends that making a finding regarding the parties’

“comparative levels of perpetration of domestic violence,” in the

absence of a statutory mandate to make such a finding, was an

abuse of the district court’s discretion. Effectively father argues

that a fact finder’s authority must be limited to making only

findings which are specifically prescribed by statute. But father

cites no authority supporting this assertion and we are aware of

none.

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¶ 25 Father also asserts that the court’s finding was clearly

erroneous because it was based upon speculative evidence

insufficient to meet the required burden of proof. True, the court

had a “question mark” regarding how much of mother’s “abusive

behavior” was reactive to abuse perpetrated by father as opposed to

independently instigated by mother. But the court was clear that it

had no question that father had perpetrated domestic violence and

made such a finding by “more than” a preponderance of the

evidence. In reaching this finding the court considered (1) mother’s

testimony about physical, emotional, verbal, and financial abuse

perpetrated by father during the marriage, which the court found to

be credible; (2) father’s admissions to the CFI; (3) father’s

explanation for one alleged instance of abuse, which the court

found to be incredible; and (4) the CFI’s report, which concluded

father was often the predominant aggressor. See In re Marriage of

McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 333 (Colo. App. 1998) (“[I]t is the

responsibility of the trial court as the trier of fact to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence.”).

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¶ 26 Because the district court’s findings are supported by the

record, we decline to disturb them.

V. Attorney’s Fees

¶ 27 Mother and father request attorney fees under C.A.R. 38(b),

C.A.R. 39.1, and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, asserting that the

other party’s appeal is substantially frivolous. We deny these

requests. Although unsuccessful, neither party’s contentions were

so lacking in merit as to constitute frivolity or bad faith. See

Mission Denv. Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984)

(“Standards for determining whether an appeal is frivolous should

be directed toward penalizing egregious conduct without deterring a

lawyer from vigorously asserting his client’s rights.”); see also In re

Marriage of Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be awarded

only in clear and unequivocal cases . . . .”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.

VI. Disposition

¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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