Mosley-Stichter v. ICAO

25CA0995 Mosley-Stichter v ICAO 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0995
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
WC No. 5-178-127

Cherise M. Mosley-Stichter,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Denver Public Schools,
and PMA Management Group,

Respondents.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Tow and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 6, 2025

Cherise M. Mosley-Stichter, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office

Ritsema Law, LLC, Alana McKenna, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents Denver
Public Schools and PMA Management Group
¶1 In this workers’ compensation action, Cherise M. Mosley-

Stichter seeks review of an order denying her request for permanent

total disability benefits. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mosley-Stichter worked for Denver Public Schools (Employer)

as a paraprofessional. On February 17, 2021, she suffered a work

injury to her right knee when she knelt to assist a student. A few

days later, Authorized Treating Physician Jay Reinsma, M.D.,

diagnosed a right knee strain and prescribed physical therapy. Dr.

Reinsma also prescribed temporary restrictions on Mosley-Stichter’s

physical activities at work; specifically, he recommended that she

(1) walk and stand for no more than three hours daily; (2) avoid

walking on uneven terrain; and (3) avoid crawling, squatting,

kneeling, and climbing. When Mosley-Stichter returned to his clinic

on March 19, 2021, reporting a resurgence of pain, Dr. Reinsma

ordered an MRI.

¶3 Mosley-Stichter’s MRI showed a mild acute or subacute MCL

sprain and osteoarthritis. She returned to Dr. Reinsma multiple

times in April 2021, with varying degrees of pain and mobility. In

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May, Dr. Reinsma referred her to physiatrist, Dr. Fredric

Zimmerman, D.O., to explore a possible injection.

A. Permanent Work Restrictions and Additional Diagnoses

¶4 Dr. Zimmerman examined Mosley-Stichter on June 22, 2021.

He diagnosed her with a right knee strain and mild

chondromalacia/osteoarthritis of the knee joint, which he found her

work injury had exacerbated. Dr. Zimmerman prescribed a steroid

injection in her right knee and a patellar support strap.

¶5 The next day, Dr. Reinsma assigned Mosley-Stichter

permanent work restrictions. Specifically, he recommended that

Mosley-Stichter permanently avoid work requiring crawling,

kneeling, squatting, or running.

¶6 Dr. Zimmerman administered a steroid injection to Mosley-

Stichter’s right knee in August 2021, but she found it ineffective.

Per Dr. Reinsma’s orders, Mosley-Stichter underwent a second MRI

on September 30, 2021. Dr. Reinsma noted the imaging showed no

acute injuries.

¶7 In December 2021, Mosley-Stichter received an injection of a

different medication (Synvisc) from Dr. Zimmerman but found it

ineffective. In a follow-up appointment, Dr. Reinsma noted they

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were running out of treatment options and also remarked that

Mosley-Stichter now appeared depressed.

¶8 Mosley-Stichter returned to Dr. Zimmerman in February 2022,

reporting no relief in her symptoms. He determined that “there

[was] nothing further to offer” her in the way of treatment so he

released her from care. Dr. Zimmerman also diagnosed Mosley-

Stichter with “adjustment disorder/depression.”

¶9 Dr. Reinsma similarly released Mosley-Stichter from active

care in March 2022, agreeing that no further treatment options

remained. He also diagnosed her with chronic pain syndrome and

again prescribed permanent work restrictions precluding kneeling,

crawling, or squatting. Mosley-Stichter continued to see Dr.

Reinsma through 2023 for medical maintenance purposes and

medication refills. Dr. Reinsma continually reaffirmed his March

2022 prescription for permanent work restrictions.

B. Permanent Total Disability Benefits

¶ 10 In August 2024, Mosley-Stichter requested a hearing before

the Office of Administrative Courts, to determine whether she was

entitled to receive permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. At

Employer’s request, before the hearing, Mosley-Stichter underwent

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a vocational assessment with Donna Ferris, M.A, to determine

what, if any, jobs Mosley-Stichter could perform in light of her

circumstances. In a report, Ms. Ferris concluded that Mosley-

Stichter could perform multiple available jobs and therefore was not

permanently and totally disabled.

¶ 11 Citing Ms. Ferris’s conclusions and Mosley-Stichter’s medical

records, the presiding administrative law judge (ALJ) determined

that Mosley-Stichter failed to meet her burden of demonstrating

that she was permanently and totally disabled and therefore failed

to prove entitlement to PTD benefits. The Panel affirmed the ALJ’s

order.

II. Discussion

¶ 12 Mosley-Stichter contends that the ALJ (1) failed to apply the

correct legal standard and (2) overlooked or misapprehended certain

evidence. For these reasons, she argues, the Panel erred by

affirming the ALJ’s order. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 13 Under section 8-43-308, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb the

ALJ’s factual findings when they are “supported by substantial

evidence,” and we may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the

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factual findings (as adopted by the Panel) are not sufficient to

permit appellate review; (2) conflicts in the evidence are not resolved

in the record; (3) the factual findings do not support the order; or

(4) the award or denial of benefits is not supported by applicable

law.

¶ 14 Substantial evidence is “probative, credible, and competent, of

a character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the

existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to

the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences.”

Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).

Assessing the weight, credibility, and sufficiency of such evidence is

the ALJ’s exclusive domain, and findings based on conflicting

evidence are conclusive on review. Delta Drywall v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 868 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Colo. App. 1993); Rockwell Int’l

v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Colo. App. 1990).

¶ 15 A claimant is permanently and totally disabled if they are

“unable to earn any wages in the same or other employment.” § 8-

40-201(16.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. This determination is highly fact-

dependent and consequently varies according to the claimant’s

particular abilities and circumstances. Holly Nursing Care Ctr. v.

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Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 992 P.2d 701, 703 (Colo. App. 1999). In

determining whether a claimant is permanently and totally

disabled, the ALJ may consider “human factors,” including, but not

limited to, the claimant’s general physical condition, mental ability,

age, employment history, education, and the availability of work

which the claimant can perform. Absolute Emp. Servs., Inc. v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 997 P.2d 1229, 1232-33 (Colo. App.

1999); Weld Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550, 556

(Colo. 1998) (that the legislature replaced prior statutory language

prescribing consideration of “human factors” with a system of

medical impairment ratings and a schedule of injuries does not

foreclose consideration of human factors in determining permanent

total disability).

¶ 16 Importantly, in defining “permanent total disability,” the

Workers’ Compensation Act unambiguously states that “the burden

of proof shall be on the employee to prove that the employee is

unable to earn any wages in the same or other employment.” § 8-

40-201(16.5); see also Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 919 P.2d 857,

860 (Colo. App. 1995), aff’d, 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997).

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B. Analysis

¶ 17 Mosley-Stichter cites Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, 102 P.3d

323 (Colo. 2004), for the proposition that the ALJ must consider the

“whole person,” including chronic pain and psychological

conditions, when determining a claimant’s entitlement to PTD

benefits. She argues that the ALJ here failed to consider her “whole

person,” and, more specifically, “the combined impact of [her]

physical disabilities, chronic pain, and adjustment disorder.”

However, Anderson does not discuss PTD benefits and is therefore

inapposite. See id. at 323. To the extent an ALJ considers chronic

pain and mental conditions in a PTD benefits analysis, that

consideration is discretionary, not mandatory. See Bymer, 955

P.2d at 556 (holding that the legislature did not intend to abrogate

consideration of the “human factors” in a PTD benefits analysis);

Joslins Dry Goods Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 21 P.3d 866, 868

(Colo. App. 2001) (in making a PTD determination, the ALJ “may”

consider human factors (citing Bymer, 955 P.2d at 556)).

¶ 18 In any event, the ALJ expressly noted that he considered

“various human factors, including [Mosley-Stichter’s] physical

condition, mental ability, age, employment history, education, and

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availability of work” when evaluating her claim for PTD benefits.

We perceive no legal error in the factors the ALJ considered. See

Joslins Dry Goods, 21 P.3d at 868; Holly Nursing, 992 P.2d at 703.

¶ 19 Mosley-Stichter also appears to argue that the ALJ gave

inadequate weight to medical records which, she argues, show it

would be difficult for her to perform “even sedentary work on a

sustained basis due to physical limitations, [c]hronic [p]ain, and

[p]sychological distress.” Similarly, we discern an assertion that the

ALJ failed to assign sufficient significance to evidence of Mosley-

Stichter’s “limited transferable skill set.” Finally, she notes that

medication side effects have “caused a skin disfigurement” affecting

her self-esteem and “making it difficult to perform with confidence,”

and we infer that she argues the ALJ erred in failing to consider this

evidence.

¶ 20 As discussed above, we perceive no error in the factors the ALJ

considered. Moreover, an ALJ need not address “evidence which

[they] consider[] to be unpersuasive.” Magnetic Eng’g, Inc. v. Indus.

Claim Appeals Off., 5 P.3d 385, 389 (Colo. App. 2000). Thus, we

will not infer that the ALJ improperly overlooked any of the

evidence. And to the extent Mosley-Stichter essentially asks us to

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reweigh the evidence to reach a finding contrary to the ALJ’s

conclusion, we may not do so. See Metro Moving & Storage v.

Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo. App. 1995).

¶ 21 We note that transcripts of the hearings are not part of the

record, and therefore, we must presume that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s findings. See § 8-43-301(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025

(requiring the appellant to order a hearing transcript in connection

with an appeal); Nova v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 754 P.2d 800,

801 (Colo. App. 1988).

¶ 22 Even without a transcript, substantial documentary evidence

in the record — specifically, a vocational evaluation report and

medical records — supports the ALJ’s PTD findings. In her

vocational evaluation, Ms. Ferris analyzed Mosley-Stichter’s

employment history and education and searched for jobs consistent

with that background and the permanent restrictions Dr. Reinsma

assigned Mosley-Stichter — e.g., jobs involving no kneeling,

squatting, or crawling.

¶ 23 Ms. Ferris noted that Mosley-Stichter had earned a high

school diploma and her work experience included eighteen years as

a paraprofessional in the Denver Public Schools. Ms. Ferris

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identified multiple job opportunities, which required no additional

education or physical exertion inconsistent with Dr. Reinsma’s

prescribed restrictions, and which offered on-the-job training. The

available jobs she identified included “platform-generated” services

facilitating meal delivery, and grocery shopping and delivery. Ms.

Ferris noted that these positions also allow for “maximum flexibility

with scheduling and delivery locations.” Additionally, Ms. Ferris

found an available position as a server at a senior living facility.

Job responsibilities included “taking and delivering menu items,

bussing and resetting tables, light janitorial tasks, and

dishwashing.” Finally, Ms. Ferris noted many available positions

with casual- and fast-food establishments, which positions also

offered on-the-job training and required no additional education.

¶ 24 The ALJ expressly found the evidence Ms. Ferris put forth

“persuasive.” He also credited Dr. Reinsma’s determination

regarding appropriate work restrictions for Mosley-Stichter.

Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Reinsma treated Mosley-Stichter

over a period of years and that the restrictions he recommended

remained consistent over that time. Together, the ALJ found, “[t]he

medical records and persuasive opinion of M[s]. Ferris demonstrate

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that employment exists that is reasonably available to [Mosley-

Stichter] under her particular circumstances.” And, “[c]onsidering

various human factors, including [Mosley-Stichter’s] physical

condition, mental ability, age, employment history, education, and

availability of work, reveals that there are a variety of jobs available

in [Mosley-Stichter’s] local labor market within her permanent work

restrictions.” (F. p. 855) The ALJ acted well within his discretion

in crediting Ms. Ferris’s and Dr. Reinsma’s expert opinions, and we

may not reweigh these opinions to overturn the ALJ’s PTD benefits

determination. See Metro Moving & Storage, 914 P.2d at 415.

III. Disposition

¶ 25 We affirm the Panel’s order.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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