Peo in Int of EG-M

25CA0425 Peo in Interest of EG-M 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0425
El Paso County District Court No. 20JV866
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.G-M. and V.G-M., Children,

and Concerning F.E.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Sullivan and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 6, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, F.G. (father) appeals the

judgment terminating his parental rights to E.G-M. and V.G-M. (the

children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2020, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect

regarding the children. The petition alleged that the children were

living with G.M., their alleged father at the time, and were

experiencing medical neglect and living in an unsanitary and unsafe

home. The Department placed the children into foster care, where

they remained for the remainder of the case.

¶3 In August 2021, mother reported that she didn’t believe G.M.

was the children’s biological father. Father was eventually located

in a prison in Texas operated by the Texas Department of

Corrections (TDOC). Father remained incarcerated in a TDOC

facility throughout the remainder of the case.

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¶4 The court held a contested paternity hearing and father was

adjudicated the legal father of the children.1 Father admitted to the

allegations in the petition and the court adjudicated the children

dependent and neglected. A treatment plan was then adopted for

father.

¶5 Later, the Department moved to terminate parental rights.

Following a two-day evidentiary hearing that occurred over the

course of a year, the juvenile court granted the motion and

terminated father’s parental rights.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Father asserts that the Department failed to provide

reasonable efforts because it didn’t facilitate regular family time or

obtain information about the treatment services available to him at

the facility where he was incarcerated. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 Before a juvenile court may find a parent unfit, the county

department of human services must make reasonable efforts to

1 G.M. appealed the paternity adjudication, which was upheld on

appeal by another division of this court in the unpublished opinion
People in Interest of E.G-M., (Colo. App. No. 23CA1142, July 25,
2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

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rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114),

19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Reasonable

efforts mean the “exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents

with their children. § 19-1-103(114).

¶8 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the

services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,

assessments, and individual care plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services available to public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶9 The juvenile court should consider whether the services

provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33.

¶ 10 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

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law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo

its legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to reunify father with the children. The record

supports the juvenile court’s findings.

¶ 12 As father asserts, the Department never provided him with

regular family time with the children. The caseworker admitted

that she was only able to secure a single ten-minute phone visit

throughout the life of the case. However, the record demonstrates

that this was due to action or inaction on the part the TDOC facility

where father was incarcerated and father’s noncooperation, not the

Department’s lack of efforts.

¶ 13 The record shows that the caseworker tried throughout the

case, without success, to set up family time for father. The

caseworker testified that she regularly and repeatedly contacted the

facility where father was incarcerated by phone and email to inquire

about family time. The caseworker reported that she would either

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not receive a response or wouldn’t receive clear information about

how to facilitate family time. Eventually, the caseworker learned

that the facility wouldn’t allow father to have any family time while

his status at the facility was highly restricted. Father’s restriction

status wasn’t lowered until roughly four months prior to the final

termination hearing. Once father’s restriction status was lowered,

the facility reported that he still needed to update his information to

include the children on his family list and family tracking page

before family time could be implemented. At the time of the final

termination hearing, the caseworker reported father had still not yet

provided the facility with the required information despite knowing

for at least two to three months that it was needed before family

time could be set up. Thus, it was father’s lack of effort and the

facility’s noncooperation that precluded father from having regular

family time.

¶ 14 Nevertheless, father points us to the provisions of Senate Bill

23-039 (S.B. 23-039), which provides specific guidance and

directives to help navigate the provision of family time services for

incarcerated inmates in support of his argument that the

Department failed to make reasonable efforts. It’s true that S.B.

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23-039 provides that if in-person family time isn’t reasonably

practicable, a caseworker must communicate with a facility or jail

to learn about their ability to facilitate virtual family time. § 19-3-

507(1)(f)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025. The caseworker did just that, learning

that his facility wouldn’t allow family time while his status was

“highly restricted,” and that once his restricted status was

amended, he had to add the children to his family list in order to

have family time — which he never did. Moreover, father points to

no authority, and we aren’t aware of any, that would allow the

Department to force an out-of-state facility to provide family time

visitation.

¶ 15 Father next contends the Department didn’t make reasonable

efforts because it didn’t provide him with services while he was

incarcerated. Again, however, the record shows it was the facility’s

lack of services, not the Department’s lack of efforts, that prevented

father from accessing services.

¶ 16 The caseworker testified that when she inquired about services

available at the facility where father was incarcerated, the facility

reported that they had mental health services focused on

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medication management. The facility ultimately reported that they

didn’t have any treatment services available for father.

¶ 17 Still, father asserts the Department violated section 19-3-

508(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 2025, by failing to provide regular updates on

services available to him. That statute states that “[i]f, after the

dispositional hearing, the child’s parent becomes continuously

incarcerated in a department of corrections facility,” the caseworker

“shall provide information that details the services and treatment

available to a parent” or “the caseworker’s efforts to obtain the

information.” § 19-3-508(1)(e)(III). True, it does not appear that the

caseworker regularly updated the court about her efforts to obtain

information on services available to father. But, as described

above, the caseworker testified that communication with the facility

proved difficult.

¶ 18 Regardless, even if we assumed, without deciding, that this

provision applies when a parent is incarcerated in another state

and that the caseworker fell short of her statutory obligations by

failing to provide the court with updates as to the services available

to father while incarcerated during court hearings as required by

section 19-3-508(1)(e)(III), any such failure to comply with the

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statute would be harmless because the record shows that no

pertinent services were available to father at the TDOC facility

where he was incarcerated.

¶ 19 Given this record, we conclude that the juvenile court didn’t

err in finding the Department provided reasonable efforts to reunify

father with the children.

III. Treatment Plan Compliance and Incarceration as a Basis for
Termination

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 As relevant here, before the juvenile court terminates parental

rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), it must find, by clear and

convincing evidence, that (1) the parent is unfit and (2) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable period of

time. § 19-3-604(1)(c).

¶ 21 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provides nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and

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conditions. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo.

App. 2006).

¶ 22 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child

legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the

problems that required the government’s intervention. K.D. v.

People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006). A treatment plan is

successful if it either renders a parent fit or corrects the conduct or

condition that led to state intervention. People in Interest of C.A.K.,

652 P.2d 603, 611 (Colo. 1982).

¶ 23 The fact that a treatment plan wasn’t successful doesn’t mean

that it was inappropriate, as in many cases it’s virtually impossible

to devise a plan that will guarantee success, People in Interest of

M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121-22 (Colo. 1986), and on appeal father

doesn’t challenge the appropriateness of the treatment plan as

adopted at the dispositional hearing.2 In any event, it’s well-

2 Father also makes an appropriate treatment plan/abuse of

discretion argument, essentially asserting that the juvenile court
devised a new treatment plan in its ruling on his treatment plan
compliance at the termination hearing. But because father agrees
that the treatment plan was appropriate as written, and because
the court’s ruling on father’s treatment plan is addressed below, we
don’t address this argument separately.

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established that although absolute compliance with a treatment

plan isn’t required, partial or even substantial compliance may not

be sufficient to render a parent fit. People in Interest of K.B., 2016

COA 21, ¶ 26.

¶ 24 If a child is under six years old at the time the petition in

dependency or neglect is filed, the court “shall not find” that a

parent has reasonably complied with a court-approved treatment

plan if the parent (1) exhibits the same problems addressed in the

treatment plan without adequate improvement and (2) is unable or

unwilling to provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and

conditions. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B).

¶ 25 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for

clear error, and we review de novo its legal conclusions based on

those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

B. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶ 26 Father asserts that he substantially complied with his

treatment plan as written and that the juvenile court abused its

10
discretion when it “attempt[ed] to rewrite the treatment plan to

include additional objectives or criteria without an opportunity [for

father] to comply with them.” While we agree that the juvenile court

erred — and even assuming that the court’s error was of

constitutional magnitude — we nevertheless conclude the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People In Int. of T.M.S.,

2019 COA 136, ¶ 26 (recognizing that “[o]ur supreme court has not

addressed whether the constitutional harmless error standard

applies with respect to a parent’s constitutional rights in

dependency or neglect proceedings, but nevertheless applying it and

finding the juvenile court’s error harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt) (first citing A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 16 n.10, then citing

People v. Trujillo, 114 P.3d 27, 32 (Colo. App. 2004)).

¶ 27 Father’s treatment plan, as adopted at the dispositional

hearing, required him to (1) cooperate with the Department, the

court, and the guardian ad litem; (2) “have consistent visitation with

his children to maintain their bond” once he was released from

incarceration; and (3) refrain from picking up any new criminal

convictions and address any pending charges “in order to be

available to parent his children.”

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¶ 28 At the termination hearing, the juvenile court found that, with

regard to the first objective, father was “minimally compliant and

sufficiently compliant,” but that his compliance wasn’t successful in

rehabilitating him.

¶ 29 Similarly, the juvenile court found that father was

“technically” compliant with objective two as it was written, but that

“[o]bviously, everyone was working towards this objective being an

active visitation objective” and it further noted that “we haven’t

been able to even begin work on [father] establishing a relationship

with his children.”

¶ 30 Finally, regarding the third objective, the juvenile court again

found father “technically” compliant because he picked up new

charges prior to the treatment plan’s adoption, not after.

Nevertheless, the court indicated that it “believe[d] the purpose of

objective number three is that [father] will do his measured best

while at [the Texas] Department of Corrections, in order to comply

with a release such that he could become available to parent his

children.” Therefore, the court found that “there’s an argument to

be made that he violated objective number three.”

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¶ 31 Overall, the court found that while an appropriate treatment

plan had been drafted and father had primarily complied with its

components, it wasn’t successful in rehabilitating him, and he was

unfit. See K.B., ¶ 26 (“partial, or even substantial compliance, may

not be sufficient to render the parent fit.” (Emphasis added.)).

¶ 32 We agree with father that the court’s finding “that [father]

violated objective number three,” was erroneous. The record shows

father’s new criminal charges happened before his treatment plan

was adopted and thus it was inappropriate for the court to consider

the new charges to be a violation of this treatment plan component.

Nevertheless, for reasons further described below, we conclude the

court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 33 “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there is no

reasonable possibility that the error prejudiced the appellant.”

T.M.S., ¶ 26 (citing People v. Trujillo, 114 P.3d 27, 32 (Colo. App.

2004)). To be sure, the record shows that father had substantially

complied with the components of his treatment plan. Nevertheless,

our review of the record convinces us that there is no reasonable

possibility that the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different had the court concluded that father substantially complied

13
with the treatment plan as adopted at the dispositional hearing

(and not, as father argues, amended it at the termination hearing).

See T.M.S., ¶ 27. This is because, as discussed below, the record

overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that, notwithstanding his

substantial compliance with the treatment plan as adopted at the

dispositional hearing, the treatment plan wasn’t successful in

rehabilitating father and thus termination was the proper result.

See § 19-3-604(1)(c); K.B., ¶ 26.

¶ 34 The caseworker opined that father had not developed a

relationship or bond with the children. The caseworker noted that

father had previously had a mandatory release date in 2026 until

he received an additional conviction while incarcerated that

resulted in his mandatory release date being pushed to 2032. She

further posited that father was incarcerated “due to his actions”

and while his incarceration wasn’t why the case was opened, it was

what directly prevented father from being able to reunify with his

children.

¶ 35 Most importantly, the caseworker opined that the children

needed permanency and that she didn’t believe it was in the

children’s best interests to keep the case open any longer. The

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caseworker reported that the children had complex medical and

emotional needs that required considerable treatment. V.G-M. was

diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder and autism spectrum

disorder, required leg braces, and was engaged in individual

therapy. E.G-M. “ha[d] a long list of medical diagnos[es] and needs”

that required, among other things, that he have a G-tube, a helmet,

foot lifts, and a speech assistance machine. He underwent several

surgeries throughout the case, and more surgeries were likely to

occur in the future. Both children were involved in equine therapy,

speech therapy, occupational therapy, and applied behavior

analysis therapy. The caseworker reported that father had never

expressed any interest in the children’s medical appointments, nor

did he regularly inquire about the children’s well-being. Father

himself agreed he wasn’t currently able to care for the children or

meet their needs.

¶ 36 The caseworker further opined that even if father was

immediately released, he wouldn’t be able to safely parent his

children. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B). She noted that father currently

resides in another state and that she didn’t believe, given father’s

criminal history, that Texas would approve an Interstate Compact

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on the Placement of Children home study, and thus the Department

would have to look at moving father to Colorado, which could be

complicated by his parole status once released. Even once father

was in Colorado — assuming that could be achieved — the

Department would still need to formulate a new appropriate

treatment plan, enroll him in services, train him on the children’s

medical needs, and begin reintegration services. The caseworker

opined that after his release it would take another year, at a

minimum, for father to be rehabilitated and to establish a

relationship with his children.

¶ 37 Additionally, because the children were less than six years old

when the petition in dependency and neglect was filed, the

expedited permanency planning (EPP) guidelines apply. See §§ 19-

1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025. The EPP provisions require that

such children be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as

possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025;

see also People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25. At the

time of the final termination hearing, the children had already been

in their current foster care placement for over 900 days and the

EPP case had been ongoing for over four years. Father’s mandatory

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release date was in 2032, and the caseworker didn’t believe it was

in the children’s best interests to remain without permanency until

his release.

¶ 38 Finally, the record establishes that father didn’t even take the

minimal steps that were available to him to establish some

relationship with the children or demonstrate an interest in their

well-being. For example, father never added the children to his

family list or family tracking page, which was a prerequisite to

setting up family time once his restriction status was lowered.

Moreover, the caseworker suggested father could have written

letters to the children or the caseworker using the pre-stamped

envelopes the caseworker had sent him. But father didn’t,

testifying that inmates in his TDOC facility can’t have self-stamped

envelopes mailed to them. And no one, including father, testified

that father ever inquired about the children’s well-being or their

medical needs.

¶ 39 Thus, given the overwhelming evidence in the record that

supports the juvenile court’s finding that father is unable or

unwilling to provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet

the children’s needs, any error the court made when it determined

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father didn’t comply with the treatment plan was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. See T.M.S., ¶¶ 25, 29 (assuming constitutional

harmless error applies to juvenile cases, the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt when “ample evidence” supported that

the mother would remain unfit regardless of the alleged juvenile

court’s error).

C. Incarceration as a Basis for Termination

¶ 40 Lastly, father contends that the juvenile court “de facto

resurrected [a] deleted statutory provision” through which the court

inappropriately “allow[ed] termination based solely on

incarceration.” We disagree.

¶ 41 As father asserts, the legislature in 2023 repealed subsection

(1)(b) of 19-3-604, which allowed consideration of a parent’s long-

term confinement status in termination of parental rights. See Ch.

191, sec. 7, § 19-3-604, 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 957 (repealing

former section 19-3-604(1)(b)(III)). In its ruling, the juvenile court

also acknowledged “that the general assembly removed [that

subsection], and the [c]ourt cannot consider long-term

incarceration of the parent alone for purposes of termination.” Still,

the court didn’t believe “it was the intent of the general assembly

18
that the [c]ourt ignore long term incarceration of the parent,

especially when we are to consider and give primary consideration

to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of

these very high-needs children.”

¶ 42 Indeed, S.B. 23-039’s legislative declaration states, in relevant

part, that “decisions to terminate parental rights should be based

on the needs of the child, and not solely on the status of the parent

as incarcerated or the length of the sentence.” 2023 Colo. Sess.

Laws at 953 (emphasis added). In other words, the General

Assembly confirmed that, while a parent’s incarceration can’t be the

sole reason for termination, it may still be considered as one of the

factors in a juvenile court’s decision.

¶ 43 The court noted it wasn’t “hanging [its] hat on long term

incarceration for [its] findings.” Thus, the court explicitly noted its

judgment was not based exclusively on father’s incarceration. The

court further indicated its concern that father “did not know the

dates of birth of his children” and that the court “heard zero

evidence, from [father’s] testimony to the caseworker, that he’s

reached out or in any way tried to learn about these children, learn

more about their special medical [and] emotional needs.” While the

19
court believed father “is sincere in his wanting to be an available

parent,” the court found that “these children cannot wait any longer

for [father] to become an available parent, let alone complete the

kind of work that needs to be done to establish a relationship with

his children.” The record supports the court’s findings, which are,

at least in part, independent of and in addition to the fact that he

was incarcerated.

¶ 44 As described above, the caseworker didn’t believe father could

safely parent his children at the time of termination. The

caseworker further opined that the case was an EPP case that had

already been open for over four years, that the children needed

permanency, and that it wasn’t in the children’s best interests to

keep the case open any longer. She noted that father hadn’t

expressed any interest in the children’s medical appointments, nor

did he regularly inquire about their well-being. And father himself

admitted that he wasn’t able to currently care for the children.

¶ 45 Therefore, although the record shows that father’s

incarceration during the case informed the juvenile court’s decision,

it wasn’t the sole reason that the court found him unfit. See K.D.,

139 P.3d at 703 (The court did not err when it “carefully considered

20
how [the parent’s] continued incarceration affected his fitness and

his corresponding ability to meet [the child’s] needs within a

reasonable time.”). We therefore reject father’s assertion.

IV. Disposition

¶ 46 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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