Bennett v. Peace

24CA2135 Bennett v Peace 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2135
Jefferson County District Court No. 23CV31167
Honorable R. Michael Mullins, Judge

Kathleen R. Bennett,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

William Joseph Peace, M.D.,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Welling and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Jones & Keller, P.C., Stuart N. Bennett, Denver, Colorado; Wahlberg, Woodruff,
Nimmo & Sloane, LLP, Megan K. Matthews, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant

Hershey Decker Drake, P.L.L.C., C. Todd Drake, Lone Tree, Colorado; Robinson
Law, LLC, Bradley G. Robinson, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Plaintiff, Kathleen Bennett, appeals the trial court’s judgment

entered on the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant, William Joseph

Peace, M.D. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2021, Dr. Peace performed a right hip

rhinoplasty (replacement) surgery on Bennett. A few weeks later,

Bennett met with Dr. Peace and complained of hip, nerve, and

muscle pain and expressed concern that one leg was longer than

the other. Dr. Peace explained that he didn’t believe Bennett’s pain

was due to the surgery and that it could instead be explained by

separate issues with Bennett’s spine.

¶3 Dr. Peace subsequently referred Bennett to another doctor

who prescribed spinal and hip injections to reduce her pain and

inflammation. But Bennett’s pain persisted, and she sought a

second opinion from another surgeon, who performed revision

surgery in December 2022.

¶4 In August 2023, Bennett sued Dr. Peace, alleging he

negligently performed the initial hip replacement surgery. Judges

other than the trial judge ruled on pretrial matters. At the close of

evidence, the jury returned a verdict for Dr. Peace, finding that

1
Bennett didn’t have any injuries, damages, or losses and that Dr.

Peace wasn’t negligent.

¶5 On appeal, Bennett contends that the trial court erred by

(1) excluding the testimony of Bennett’s rebuttal expert; (2) issuing

an improper adverse inference instruction regarding spoliated

evidence and admitting that evidence; (3) ignoring pretrial rulings in

violation of the law of the case doctrine; (4) improperly instructing

the jury on recoverable damages; and (5) committing other trial

irregularities. We address each contention in turn.

II. Exclusion of Bennett’s Rebuttal Expert

¶6 We first address Bennett’s contention that the trial court erred

by excluding the testimony of Bennett’s rebuttal expert, Dr. Renato

Bosita Jr.

A. Additional Background

¶7 Before trial, Bennett served Dr. Bosita’s expert report on Dr.

Peace. In the report, Dr. Bosita opined that Bennett’s lumbar spine

wasn’t causing Bennett significant pain. Dr. Peace filed a motion in

limine seeking to exclude Dr. Bosita’s testimony related to the care

provided by Dr. Peace, which the trial court denied.

2
¶8 On the final day of trial, the trial court denied Bennett’s

request that Dr. Bosita be permitted to testify as a rebuttal expert.

The court reasoned that Dr. Bosita wasn’t a proper rebuttal expert

because Dr. Peace hadn’t presented any evidence that Bennett’s

pain was caused by her spinal issues, and, thus, there was no

evidence to rebut. On appeal, Bennett argues that the trial court

shouldn’t have excluded Dr. Bosita’s testimony. We agree but

conclude the court’s error was harmless.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶9 We review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of expert

testimony for an abuse of discretion. Gonzales v. Windlan, 2014

COA 176, ¶ 20. “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling

is ‘manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,’ or when it

misapplies the law.” Rains v. Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8 (quoting

Freedom Colo. Info., Inc. v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 196 P.3d

892, 899 (Colo. 2008)).

¶ 10 But we must disregard any error that is harmless — that is,

error that doesn’t affect the substantial rights of the parties.

C.R.C.P. 61; Leaf v. Beihoffer, 2014 COA 117, ¶ 11. An error

doesn’t affect a party’s substantial rights if we can say with fair

3
assurance that the error didn’t substantially influence the outcome

of the case or impair the basic fairness of the trial. Leaf, ¶ 11.

¶ 11 Rebuttal evidence includes “any competent evidence which

explains, refutes, counteracts, or disproves the evidence put on by

the other party, even if the rebuttal evidence also tends to support

the party’s case-in-chief.” Warden v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 CO 74,

¶ 22 (quoting People v. Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 304 (Colo. 2003)). “The

party offering rebuttal evidence ‘must demonstrate that the

evidence is relevant to rebut a specific claim, theory, witness or

other evidence of the adverse party.’” Id. (quoting Welsh, 80 P.3d at

304). But parties have “significant leeway,” and the evidence need

only rebut “some portion of an opposing party’s claim.” Id.

C. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Dr. Bosita’s Rebuttal
Testimony

¶ 12 We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding Dr. Bosita’s rebuttal testimony. The trial court found

that Dr. Peace hadn’t presented any evidence for Dr. Bosita to

rebut, but that finding is contradicted by earlier statements at trial

by defense counsel and Dr. Peace.

4
¶ 13 In his opening statement, defense counsel argued that

Bennett’s lower back issues “could be contributing to some of her

complaints.” Similarly, Dr. Peace testified on direct examination

that he was concerned that Bennett’s lumbar spine issue could be

contributing to some of her pain and that the pain couldn’t be

caused by the hip replacement surgery. On cross-examination, Dr.

Peace again testified that he believed treating Bennett’s spine would

help relieve some of her pain and that her pain wasn’t caused by

the hip replacement surgery.

¶ 14 Because Bennett offered Dr. Bosita to establish that Bennett’s

pain wasn’t due to her spinal issues, his testimony was “relevant to

rebut a specific claim” offered by Dr. Peace. Warden, ¶ 22 (quoting

Welsh, 80 P.3d at 304). Stated differently, Dr. Bosita’s testimony

tended to refute Dr. Peace’s alternative causation theory that

Bennett’s spinal issues led to her pain. Thus, the trial court

abused its discretion when it excluded Dr. Bosita’s rebuttal

testimony. See id. at ¶¶ 27-29 (holding trial court abused its

discretion by striking rebuttal testimony that refuted opposition’s

theory of causation).

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¶ 15 Dr. Peace nonetheless argues that rebuttal evidence isn’t

appropriate when it supports the party’s case-in-chief or when the

opponent doesn’t raise new subject matter. But that argument is

foreclosed by our supreme court’s precedent. See id. at ¶ 27 (“That

[the rebuttal testimony] concomitantly helped the [plaintiffs’] case-

in-chief does not mean it was an improper rebuttal disclosure.”);

Taylor v. Mazzola, 375 P.2d 96, 98-99 (Colo. 1962) (holding trial

court erred by excluding plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony that refuted

defendant’s and officer’s testimony, even though such testimony

also supported plaintiff’s case-in-chief).1 While Dr. Bosita’s

testimony may have supported Bennett’s case-in-chief, it was

1 Dr. Peace’s reliance on People v. Hansen, 551 P.2d 710, 712 (Colo.

1976), to argue otherwise is misplaced. That criminal case predates
Warden and, in any event, involved a defendant’s request to admit
surrebuttal evidence, not rebuttal evidence. See id.

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offered to refute Dr. Peace’s specific testimony that Bennett’s spinal

issues caused her pain.2

D. The Court’s Error Was Harmless

¶ 16 While the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Dr.

Bosita’s rebuttal testimony, we nonetheless conclude that the error

was harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61.

¶ 17 “[A] jury determination that a plaintiff has suffered no injury

or damage renders harmless any error relating solely to the issue of

liability” if it is clear the fact finder determined the injury issue

separately from the liability issue. Dunlap v. Long, 902 P.2d 446,

448 (Colo. App. 1995). In Dunlap, another medical malpractice

case, a division of this court concluded that the trial court’s alleged

evidentiary and instruction errors on the issue of liability were

harmless because the jury followed the trial court’s instruction to

2 To the extent Dr. Peace argues that Dr. Bosita’s testimony

constituted a “backdoor” attempt by Bennett to offer evidence on
the standard of care, Dr. Peace could have requested a limiting
instruction informing the jury that it could consider Dr. Bosita’s
testimony solely to rebut the theory that Bennett’s spinal issues
caused her pain. See People v. Rowerdink, 756 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo.
1988) (holding trial court acted within its discretion when admitting
rebuttal testimony because any potential prejudice was dispelled by
court’s limiting instruction and the parties’ stipulations).

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determine the plaintiffs’ damages separately from the defendant’s

liability and found none. Id. at 448-49.

¶ 18 Here, as in Dunlap, the trial court instructed the jury that it

should determine the issues of liability and damages separately.

Specifically, the trial court told the jury in a special verdict form to

answer the same three questions posed in Dunlap: (1) “Did the

plaintiff, Kathleen Bennett, have injuries, damages or losses?”;

(2) “Was the defendant, William Joseph Peace, M.D., negligent?”;

and (3) “Was the negligence, if any, of the defendant, William

Joseph Peace, M.D., a cause of any of the injuries, damages or

losses claimed by the plaintiff?” And as in Dunlap, the jury

separately answered each question, “No.” See id. at 448.

¶ 19 Accordingly, because the jury determined that Bennett didn’t

suffer any damages, and because the exclusion of Dr. Bosita’s

rebuttal testimony related solely to the issue of liability, we can say

with fair assurance that the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of Dr.

Bosita’s testimony didn’t substantially influence the jury’s verdict or

impair the basic fairness of the trial. See id. at 448-49; Leaf, ¶ 11.

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III. Spoliated Evidence

¶ 20 Bennett contends that the trial court erred by (1) issuing an

adverse inference instruction regarding spoliated evidence; and

(2) admitting an altered version of that evidence at trial, arguing it

was inauthentic.

A. Additional Background

¶ 21 During discovery, Bennett sought electronic evidence of the

preoperative template used by Dr. Peace to plan Bennett’s hip

replacement surgery. Dr. Peace accessed Bennett’s electronic chart

and used his cell phone to take a photograph of the computer

screen with the template displayed. When Dr. Peace closed out of

the chart, the template was overwritten and saved with a new date.

Although Dr. Peace provided Bennett with the photograph he took,

he wasn’t able to provide the template with the original date.

¶ 22 At a hearing the week before trial, the trial court found Dr.

Peace had committed “willful conduct” by “allowing these

documents to not be properly preserved.” It found that an adverse

inference instruction was appropriate, but it couldn’t determine

whether Dr. Peace altered the evidence in bad faith. The court

therefore said that the trial judge would decide the precise wording

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of the adverse inference instruction after determining Dr. Peace’s

state of mind.

¶ 23 At trial, Dr. Peace testified about accessing the template and

why the template included a new date. Based on his testimony, the

trial court found that Dr. Peace hadn’t acted in bad faith. Bennett

admitted the photograph taken with Dr. Peace’s phone, while Dr.

Peace admitted the template with the new date. The trial court

instructed the jury that it “may infer, by reason of Dr. Peace’s

failure to preserve [the original template], that the evidence

contained in the template may have been unfavorable” and that the

jury “shall determine the weight to give this inference, if any.”

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 24 We review a trial court’s decision on the form of an adverse

inference instruction for abuse of discretion. See Aloi v. Union Pac.

R.R. Corp., 129 P.3d 999, 1002 (Colo. 2006). A trial court enjoys

broad discretion in issuing an adverse inference instruction. Id.;

Warembourg v. Excel Elec., Inc., 2020 COA 103, ¶ 76.

¶ 25 An adverse inference instruction can serve both a punitive and

remedial purpose. Aloi, 129 P.3d at 1002. In determining the

severity of the instruction, the spoliator’s state of mind is

10
important. Warembourg, ¶ 57. At the harshest end of the

spectrum, when the spoliator acts in bad faith, the court may

instruct the jury that certain facts are deemed admitted and must

be accepted as true. Id. At the other end of the spectrum, “[t]he

least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to

presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the

innocent party.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pension Comm. of

Univ. of Montr. Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 685 F. Supp. 2d

456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also Terra Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Keaten,

2025 CO 40, ¶ 31 (courts consider a “variety of factors” when

deciding whether to sanction a party for spoliation of evidence,

including the spoliator’s culpability and degree of prejudice to the

other party).

¶ 26 We similarly review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility

of evidence for abuse of discretion. Warembourg, ¶ 88.

Authentication is a condition precedent to the admissibility of

physical evidence. People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 12. The

authentication requirement is satisfied by “evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent

claims.” CRE 901(a). But an original isn’t required if all originals

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have been lost or destroyed, “unless the proponent lost or destroyed

them in bad faith.” CRE 1004(1).

C. Adverse Inference Instruction

¶ 27 Bennett challenges the wording of the trial court’s adverse

inference instruction, arguing it was insufficient to remediate the

harm to her because the instruction used the word “loss” rather

than “destruction.” Bennett also argues the instruction allowed the

jury to determine whether Dr. Peace preserved the template and

what weight to give the adverse inference, if any. Finally, Bennett

contends the trial court failed to properly consider her objections

and articulate its reasoning. We reject these arguments and

conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in issuing the

adverse inference instruction.

¶ 28 At trial, Dr. Peace testified that he inadvertently saved over the

original template when he accessed it for this litigation. But he

explained that, other than the new date being saved, he made no

other changes to the template. This testimony supports the trial

court’s finding that Dr. Peace didn’t alter the template in bad faith.

Further, Dr. Peace’s testimony suggests that the original

preoperative template wouldn’t have been unfavorable to the

12
defense. See Terra Mgmt. Grp., ¶ 31. Thus, the trial court didn’t

abuse its discretion by giving a less severe adverse inference

instruction than Bennett requested. See Rodriguez v. Schutt, 896

P.2d 881, 884-85 (Colo. App. 1994) (trial court didn’t abuse its

discretion by declining to give an adverse inference instruction

when the evidence wouldn’t have been unfavorable to the spoliator,

and the court found no bad faith), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on

other grounds, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 29 We similarly reject Bennett’s argument that the trial court

abused its discretion by omitting the word “destruction” in the

instruction. “[D]estroy” means “to ruin the structure, organic

existence, or condition of” and “to bring to naught by putting out of

existence.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 615

(2002). Dr. Peace testified that the only change he made to the

template was changing the displayed date. In other words, he

didn’t ruin the structure of the template or put it out of existence.

With the exception of the date, the template still existed and

contained the same information as before. Thus, the trial court

didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to use a word that was

inconsistent with Dr. Peace’s actions.

13
¶ 30 Bennett’s other arguments are also unavailing. Contrary to

her contention that the court permitted the jury to determine

whether the evidence was preserved, the instruction properly

informed the jury of “Dr. Peace’s failure to preserve” the evidence.

In addition, commensurate with the court’s finding that Dr. Peace

hadn’t acted in bad faith, the instruction gave the jury discretion to

determine how much weight to give the inference that the lost

evidence would have been unfavorable to Dr. Peace. Finally, the

court explained that it adopted the given instruction because it

hadn’t heard any evidence of bad faith.

¶ 31 Given the court’s findings, the permissive instruction given by

the court wasn’t an abuse of discretion. See Aloi, 129 P.3d at 1001-

04 (concluding trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by giving a

similar instruction when court found spoliator destroyed evidence

willfully but not in bad faith); see also Scalia v. County of Kern, 658

F. Supp. 3d 809, 816 (E.D. Cal. 2023) (determining permissive

adverse inference instruction was warranted when defendant didn’t

act in bad faith).

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D. Admission of the Preoperative Template

¶ 32 Bennett also contends that the trial court erred by admitting

the template with the new date and by not giving the adverse

inference instruction contemporaneously with the introduction of

that template. We disagree.

¶ 33 During trial, Dr. Peace moved to admit the version of the

template with the new date. Defense counsel asked a defense

expert witness whether it was the “actual template” used for

Bennett’s surgery. Bennett’s counsel asked to approach the bench

and argued that the witness couldn’t testify that it was the actual

template Dr. Peace used and that an adverse inference instruction

should be given contemporaneously. The court admitted the

template and declined to instruct the jury contemporaneously, but

it sustained Bennett’s “objection to the way the question was

asked.” Under these circumstances, we perceive no abuse of

discretion.

¶ 34 As a threshold issue, we note Bennett didn’t preserve this

issue by objecting to the admission of the template at trial. Rather,

Bennett’s counsel indicated that he objected to defense counsel

asking the witness whether the offered template was the actual

15
template used by Dr. Peace. Because Bennett’s counsel never

specifically objected to the admission of the template, her

contention wasn’t preserved for appellate review. See CRE 103(a)(1)

(error may not be predicated on a ruling admitting evidence unless

the party timely objects and states “the specific ground of

objection”); cf. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 325-

26 (Colo. 2009) (claim unpreserved when party objected only to the

evidence’s relevance, not to its unfair prejudice).

¶ 35 But even if we were to reach the merits of Bennett’s claim that

the court shouldn’t have admitted the template because it was

inauthentic, we would disagree. Authentication requires evidence

“sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what

its proponent claims.” CRE 901(a). In this case, the defense’s

expert witness testified that he relied on the admitted template in

forming his opinions. This testimony was sufficient to satisfy CRE

901(a). See Gilley v. Oviatt, 2025 COA 27, ¶¶ 17-18 (exhibit

properly authenticated when witness testified that it was a fair and

accurate representation of the medical bills they reviewed for the

case).

16
¶ 36 Moreover, the template offered by Dr. Peace wasn’t

inadmissible simply because the original was lost or destroyed.

When, as here, the court finds that the proponent of the evidence

didn’t act in bad faith, the original of a written document isn’t

required, and the court may admit other evidence of its contents.

See CRE 1004(1); Rodriguez, 896 P.2d at 884-85.

¶ 37 We also aren’t convinced by Bennett’s argument that the

adverse inference instruction should have been given

contemporaneously with the admission of the template. As the trial

court explained, it couldn’t determine the exact form of the

instruction until it heard testimony from Dr. Peace, which hadn’t

occurred when the template was offered into evidence.

¶ 38 Bennett’s reliance on Aloi is misplaced. That case permits, but

doesn’t require, the court to give an adverse inference instruction

contemporaneously, consistent with the broad discretion afforded to

trial courts when issuing such instructions. See Aloi, 129 P.3d at

1004-06.

¶ 39 Accordingly, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting

the template or by declining to give the adverse inference

instruction contemporaneously with its admission.

17
IV. Law of the Case

¶ 40 Bennett also contends that the trial court erred by failing to

follow the law of the case doctrine when it reversed three pretrial

orders issued by other judges: (1) an order ruling Bennett had

properly disclosed Dr. Bosita’s rebuttal expert opinions; (2) an order

ruling that an adverse inference instruction should be given; and

(3) an order ruling that Dr. Peace couldn’t testify to matters beyond

his treatment of Bennett or not disclosed in his non-retained expert

report. We discern no error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 41 As applied to earlier rulings of a trial judge, the law of the case

doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice that provides that “prior

relevant rulings made in the same case are to be followed unless

such application would result in error or unless the ruling is no

longer sound due to changed conditions.” Stockdale v. Ellsworth,

2017 CO 109, ¶ 37 (quoting People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 758

(Colo. 1999)). But the doctrine doesn’t prevent a court from

clarifying or even revisiting its prior rulings. Id.; In re Bass, 142

P.3d 1259, 1263 (Colo. 2006). Rather, a trial court may rescind or

18
modify prior rulings in an ongoing proceeding “upon proper

grounds.” Bass, 142 P.3d at 1263.

¶ 42 We review whether a trial court had “proper grounds” for

modifying a prior ruling for an abuse of discretion. S. Cross

Ranches, LLC v. JBC Agric. Mgmt., LLC, 2019 COA 58, ¶ 44.

B. Analysis

¶ 43 As to Bennett’s first and second contentions under the law of

the case doctrine, we have already determined that (1) it was an

abuse of discretion, but harmless, to exclude Dr. Bosita’s

testimony; and (2) the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by

giving a less severe adverse inference instruction than Bennett

requested. Because Bennett offers no additional arguments

explaining why these actions constituted error under the law of the

case doctrine, we need not address these issues through a law of

the case lens.

¶ 44 As to her third law of the case contention, Bennett argues that

the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Peace to testify about liability

and causation despite a pretrial ruling limiting his testimony to his

observation and treatment of Bennett.

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¶ 45 In a pretrial ruling, the court said that if Dr. Peace’s testimony

went beyond his care and treatment of Bennett, it “would be a

determination at trial where [Bennett] c[ould] object and the [c]ourt

c[ould] make that determination.” After that pretrial ruling, Bennett

filed a motion in limine to preclude Dr. Peace from testifying that

his care was reasonable. But the court denied that motion, ruling

that Bennett’s motion would be “more properly addressed during

witness examination and objections, and/or during voir dire.”

¶ 46 The trial court’s decision to allow Dr. Peace to testify at trial

about liability after hearing Bennett’s objections was consistent

with these earlier rulings. As a result, the trial court didn’t violate

the law of the case doctrine.

V. Damages Jury Instruction

¶ 47 Bennett next contends that the trial court erred by denying

her tendered jury instruction regarding recoverable damages.

¶ 48 Bennett’s tendered instruction on damages asked the jury to

consider damages caused by “emotional distress from a reasonable

fear of future injuries or damage.” The court rejected Bennett’s

tendered instruction and instead gave an instruction that followed

the pattern damages instruction in CJI-Civ. 6:1 (2025). Consistent

20
with the pattern instruction, the court instructed the jury to

consider “losses or injuries which plaintiff has had to the present

time or probably will have in the future, including: physical and

mental pain and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress,

impairment of the quality of life and physical impairment or

disfigurement.” The court explained that the pattern instruction

adequately covered damages from stress due to the potential for

future injury.

¶ 49 Provided the trial court’s jury instructions correctly state the

law, we review the court’s decision to give a specific jury instruction

for abuse of discretion. Bedor v. Johnson, 2013 CO 4, ¶ 8; see also

Wolven v. Velez, 2024 COA 8, ¶¶ 35-37 (trial court didn’t

inaccurately state the law when it rejected defendant’s proposed

modification to pattern damages instruction in CJI-Civ. 6:1). Under

C.R.C.P. 51.1, a trial court in a civil case must use the pattern

instructions contained in Colorado Jury Instructions when

applicable unless the factual situation or changes in the law

warrant a departure.

¶ 50 We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision

to adhere to the pattern damages instruction. The trial court’s

21
instruction told the jury to consider injuries due to “mental pain

and suffering” and “emotional stress.” The trial court correctly

noted that this language encompassed stress due to the potential

for future injury. See Wolven, ¶¶ 35-37 (trial court didn’t abuse

discretion by giving pattern damages instruction without further

defining its terms).

¶ 51 We aren’t convinced otherwise by Bennett’s reliance on Boryla

v. Pash, 960 P.2d 123, 126-28 (Colo. 1998). In that case, the

supreme court upheld a damages instruction that told the jury to

consider injuries due to “impairment of the quality of life caused by

an increased risk of cancer.” Id. at 126, 128 (emphasis omitted).

But the court didn’t require that a specialized instruction be given

in every case involving fear of cancer, much less every case in which

a party harbors a reasonable fear of heightened risk of future

injury. See id.

¶ 52 Accordingly, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by rejecting

Bennett’s tendered instruction on recoverable damages.

VI. Other Trial Irregularities

¶ 53 Bennett also contends the trial court committed other errors

that led to prejudicial trial irregularities.

22
¶ 54 Bennett first contends, in a single sentence in her opening

brief, that “the trial court allowed [Dr. Peace] to proceed with an

incomplete and problematic set of exhibits, which led to confusion

by the court and, presumably, the jurors.” But Bennett doesn’t

explain how the exhibits confused the jury or why they warrant

granting a new trial. Bennett also argues, without citing any

supporting authority, that a new trial is warranted because the trial

court expressed a desire to complete the trial quickly, giving “an

impression that the trial court did not value [Bennett’s] case.”

Because Bennett hasn’t sufficiently developed either argument, we

decline to address them. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc.,

183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to address

“underdeveloped arguments”).

VII. Cumulative Error

¶ 55 Finally, Bennett contends that the cumulative impact of the

trial court’s errors requires reversal. But Colorado courts haven’t

extended the doctrine of cumulative error to civil cases. Acierno v.

Garyfallou, 2016 COA 91, ¶ 66. Even if the doctrine did apply in

civil cases, it wouldn’t apply in this case because we have identified

only one error and found it harmless. See People v. Conyac, 2014

23
COA 8M, ¶ 152 (“The doctrine of cumulative error requires that

numerous errors be committed, not merely alleged.”).

¶ 56 Accordingly, the cumulative error doctrine doesn’t require

reversal.

VIII. Disposition

¶ 57 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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