Peo in Interest of MNG

25CA0834 Peo in Interest of MNG 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0834
Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30323
Honorable Lindsay VanGlider, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.N.G., a Child,

and Concerning C.N. and A.G.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
C.N.

Patrick R. Hensen, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for A.G.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, C.N. (mother) and A.G.

(father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child legal

relationships with M.N.G. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth and Families

(the Division) filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging

that the child was born substance exposed and that mother had

abandoned the child at the hospital. The juvenile court adjudicated

the child dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for

both parents.

¶3 The Division later moved to terminate both parents’ parental

rights. However, the Division asked to continue the termination

hearing after locating father in custody and confirming his

parentage though genetic testing. Four months after the

continuance was granted, the juvenile court terminated mother’s

and father’s parental rights following a contested hearing.

II. Mother’s Contentions

¶4 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she could not become fit within a reasonable time when it

terminated her parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.

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2025. However, mother does not challenge the court’s finding that

she abandoned the child or its termination of her parental rights

under section 19-3-604(1)(a)(I) as a result of that abandonment.

When a department seeks, and the court grants, termination of

parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(a), the court is not

required to consider if a parent might become fit. See People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 37. Because mother does not

contend that the court erred by terminating her parental rights due

to abandonment, we need not address her concerns related to

additional grounds for termination. See IBC Denver II, LLC v. City of

Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo. App. 2008) (when a party

doesn’t challenge all bases of a court’s ruling on appeal, the

appellate court must affirm); see also C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at

every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in

the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the

parties.”).

III. Father’s Contentions

¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

(1) there was no less drastic alternative to termination; (2) the

Division made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him; and (3) his

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treatment plan was appropriate. Father also contends that the

court erred by taking judicial notice of minute orders in his criminal

cases. We address, and reject, these contentions in turn.

A. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Father first contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Division made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him.

Specifically, father contends that the Division failed to comply with

the requirements of section 19-3-508(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 2025, which

requires the Division to report either (1) the services and treatment

available to a parent incarcerated after dispositional orders are

entered or (2) the caseworker’s efforts to obtain this information.

§ 19-3-508(1)(e)(III).1

¶7 The Division contends that father did not preserve this issue

for review. While we agree that father did not ask the court to make

1 In making this argument, father’s opening brief relies extensively

on an unpublished decision by a division of this court, which
violates our formal policy prohibiting parties from citing such cases
(with exceptions that don’t apply in this case). See Colo. Jud.
Branch, Court of Appeals Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of
Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2025),
https://perma.cc/Z88K-5U7F. We trust that this violation of our
policy won’t be repeated.

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findings specifically related to the reporting required by section 19-

3-508(1)(e)(III), the court entered findings regarding the Division’s

reasonable efforts in light of father’s in-custody status. We will

therefore address father’s contention generally that the Division

failed to make reasonable efforts after he was transferred to the

Denver City Downtown Detention Center (Denver Downtown

Detention). See Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2019 COA

11, ¶ 21 (“If a party raises an argument to such a degree that the

court has the opportunity to rule on it, that argument is preserved

for appeal.”).

1. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶8 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), a department of human services must make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” for a child who is in out-of-home placement, and the

reasonable efforts standard is satisfied when services are provided

in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

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¶9 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,

the court should consider whether the provided services were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Whether a

department made reasonable efforts should be “measured

holistically” rather than individually focused on a single element or

time period. People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 11 (citation

omitted). A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

offered by a department, and the juvenile court “may therefore

consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when

determining whether a department made reasonable efforts.” Id. at

¶ 12.

¶ 10 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 11 We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error

but review de novo its legal determination, based on those findings,

as to whether a department satisfied its reasonable efforts

obligation. E.D., ¶ 13.

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2. Additional Background

¶ 12 Mother identified father at the child’s birth, but the Division

could not locate him for the first six months after the petition was

filed. The caseworker met with father for the first time while he was

in custody in the Jefferson County Detention facility. He was

released shortly thereafter and was not in contact with the Division

while he was in the community. Three months later, father was

incarcerated for the second time at Jefferson County Detention.

While there, father participated in paternity testing, which

confirmed that he is the child’s genetic father. Shortly after, father

signed the release of information necessary for the Division to refer

him for jail-based substance dependence treatment. Father

completed a substance dependence evaluation, attended five

substance dependence classes, and began virtual family time while

in custody.

¶ 13 Two months after he began engaging, father was transferred to

Denver Downtown Detention. The substance dependence provider

was not able to continue services there. The termination hearing

occurred approximately three months after father’s transfer.

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3. Analysis

¶ 14 The juvenile court found that the Division made reasonable

efforts to attempt to provide services to father while he was in the

community, while he was in Jefferson County Detention, and after

he was transferred to Denver Downtown Detention.

¶ 15 In so doing, the court credited the caseworker’s testimony and

found that she made six to eight attempts to reach out to

professionals at Denver Downtown Detention “to try to schedule a

meeting with [father], understand what treatment might be

available, provide them his treatment plan, and/or set up family

time.” The evidence was uncontested that the caseworker was not

successful in these efforts. The court considered, and expressed

concerns about, Denver Downtown Detention’s failure to respond to

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the caseworker.2 Nevertheless, “the court d[id] find that the

caseworker made reasonable efforts to attempt to reach out and

work with [father] in Denver.”

¶ 16 First, father asserts that the caseworker was in contact with

the wrong Denver facility. But the record demonstrates otherwise.

Throughout the hearing, the caseworker testified that father was

transferred to “Denver County.” True, the Jefferson County

Attorney referred to the facility as the “Denver County Jail.”

However, the caseworker clarified that there were two jail facilities

in Denver: “Denver County Jail” and “Denver Downtown Detention”

and that, as far as she was aware, father had only been in Denver

Downtown Detention. While the existence of two facilities does

make general references in the record to “Denver County” somewhat

2 We share these concerns. Although the caseworker complied with
the requirements of section 19-3-508(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 2025, Denver
Downtown Detention’s failure to respond to her efforts to engage
with father and provide the information required by the statute
frustrates the intent of this recent legislation. We acknowledge that
the Department cannot force compliance by a different government
agency, particularly one located in a different jurisdiction. But
there are at least some ways that a nonresponsive agency could be
held to account — for example, by issuing a subpoena to appear at
the hearing to the non-responsive official and requiring them to
explain whether, and if so why, they have ignored their statutory
obligation.

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ambiguous, it is clear from the record that the caseworker and the

juvenile court both understood that father was being held at Denver

Downtown Detention.

¶ 17 Next, father contends that the caseworker could have

performed inmate searches to determine father’s inmate number,

thereby allowing her to more effectively communicate directly with

him. Father made a similar claim before the juvenile court,

prompting the court to perform an inmate search on public

platforms during the hearing. However, father does not explain,

and we cannot discern, how determining father’s inmate number

would have remedied Denver Downtown Detention’s failure to

respond to the caseworker’s attempts to communicate, which was

the primary barrier to establishing services there.

¶ 18 Finally, father suggests that the reasonable efforts obligation

required the caseworker to meet with him in person at Denver

Downtown Detention. But we are not aware of, and father does not

cite, any legal authority supporting his claim.

¶ 19 In any event, the Division met the reasonable efforts standard.

It devised a treatment plan for father; made efforts to locate him for

the first nine months of the case; provided multiple parentage

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testing referrals; made referrals for jail-based services and family

time; and facilitated placement services for the child. Once father

was transferred to Denver Downtown Detention, the caseworker

connected the established family time provider with the virtual

visitation system used by that facility and, over the course of three

months, made six to eight attempts to send father’s treatment plan

to the new facility, obtain the information necessary to visit or

communicate with father, and gather information about services

available to father there. Importantly, the caseworker testified that

father made no attempts to engage in paternity testing or treatment,

or to respond to the caseworker’s outreach during the three months

he spent out of custody between first speaking to the caseworker

and being detained in Jefferson County.

B. Additional Time to Complete the Treatment Plan

¶ 20 Father next contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that his conduct or condition was unlikely to improve within a

reasonable time. Although father styles his argument for additional

time as a less drastic alternative, he does not propose an alternative

placement option that would resolve the dependency and neglect

case. See People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 44 (noting

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that the less drastic alternative analysis involves the consideration

of whether a placement alternative — such as an allocation of

parental responsibilities — would satisfy the child’s best interests).

¶ 21 The Division again urges us to decline to address father’s issue

as unpreserved, but we do not discern a meaningful distinction

between the request father made before the juvenile court for more

time and his contention before us now. Brown, ¶ 21. We therefore

conclude the issue is preserved and focus our discussion on

whether clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile

court’s conclusion that father’s condition was unlikely to improve

within a reasonable time.

¶ 22 “In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the court may consider

whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition.” S.Z.S., ¶ 24. What constitutes a

reasonable time is fact specific and must be determined by

considering the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs of each particular child. Id. at ¶ 25. A “reasonable time” is

not an indefinite time. Id. In addition, when, as here, the child is

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under six years old at the time of the filing of the petition, the action

is subject to the expedited permanency planning provisions and the

court must place the child in a permanent home as expeditiously as

possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 23 The juvenile court found that father was “minimally engaged”

in his treatment plan and continued to exhibit the same problems

and concerns that required state intervention. The court

acknowledged father’s brief engagement in substance dependence

treatment while he was incarcerated, but found that he had “not

demonstrated sobriety or stability at any point throughout the case”

and had failed to take any steps to comply with the domestic

violence portion of his treatment plan.

¶ 24 The record supports these findings. When the caseworker

located father in custody, he requested, and the caseworker made a

referral for, paternity testing. However, father was released from

custody before the testing could be completed. The caseworker

made an appointment for father for testing in the community, but

father did not attend. The caseworker testified that father did not

make any efforts to participate in his treatment plan or meet with

the child while he was in the community.

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¶ 25 True, father engaged in some services during his second stay

at Jefferson County Detention, but that recent progress did not

require the court to give him additional time to become fit. See

S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24-25.

¶ 26 We therefore discern no error in the court’s determination that

father could not become fit within a reasonable period of time.

C. Father’s Other Contentions

¶ 27 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that his treatment plan was appropriate and by taking judicial

notice of nonadjudicative facts from his criminal cases.

¶ 28 Father concedes that these issues are unpreserved. However,

nevertheless urges us to address his arguments under the

miscarriage of justice exception to the preservation requirement.

See People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 14.

¶ 29 If an error by the trial court involves a miscarriage of justice,

we may consider an unpreserved issue for the first time on appeal.

In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958, 959 (Colo. App. 2004). The miscarriage of

justice exception has a high bar and narrow scope. People in

Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶¶ 23-24. We have recognized the

exception in “rare cases, involving unusual or special

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circumstances, . . . to prevent an unequivocal and manifest

injustice.” People in Interest of E.R.S., 2019 COA 40, ¶ 38.

¶ 30 Father does not provide any explanation why the miscarriage

of justice exception should apply to either his challenge to the

treatment plan or to the scope of the juvenile court’s judicial notice.

We therefore will not consider these claims. See Phillips v. People,

2019 CO 72, ¶ 12 (a party may not merely “mention a possible

argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s

work” (citation omitted)); see also S.Z.S., ¶ 29 (we will not consider

an argument when a parent “develops no legal or factual argument

in support of th[e] assertion”).3

3 Although it does not change the outcome of father’s appeal, we

expressly disapprove of the scope of the juvenile court’s judicial
notice. As father points out, the court originally suggested that it
would take judicial notice only of the existence of father’s criminal
cases and adjudicative facts associated with those cases. But the
court nonetheless looked to the substance of non-adjudicative
documents in those cases, including minute orders indicating that
father had been a “neutral or poor performer” in recovery court and
a presentence investigation report containing statements from
father that appeared inconsistent with some of the positions that he
had taken in this proceeding. While the existence of court actions
is the kind of fact that is proper for judicial notice under CRE 201,
taking judicial notice of “acts or conditions that were the subject of
prior litigation, including court findings and conclusions” is not
proper. Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10, ¶ 11.

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IV. Conclusion

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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