Peo v. Owens

23CA1062 Peo v Owens 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1062
El Paso County District Court No. 15CR2609
Honorable Frances R. Johnson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Desmond Darnell Owens,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Moultrie and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Desmond Darnell Owens appeals the postconviction court’s

summary denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We reverse and

remand for further proceedings under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V).

I. Background

¶2 Evidence supporting the following facts was presented at trial:

Owens and Brainard Clark robbed a pharmacy
and a check-cashing business at gunpoint,
attempted to rob another pharmacy, and stole
several cars. During these events, Owens wore
a court-ordered ankle monitor that recorded
his location, complete with time stamp and
GPS information. The data collected from the
ankle monitor placed Owens at the scene of
each crime at the time it occurred.

People v. Owens, (Colo. App. No. 17CA0223, June 20, 2019) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Owens I). A jury found Owens

guilty of many offenses, including two class 2 felony counts and two

class 3 felony counts of aggravated robbery. At sentencing, the

People requested a sentence of 192 years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC), and the trial court understood

the sentencing statutes to prescribe a minimum 192-year DOC

sentence. Nonetheless, the trial court applied the habitual criminal

statute’s section 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2025, and the crime

of violence statute’s section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), C.R.S. 2015, to

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impose a cumulative 392-year DOC sentence. See Owens I, ¶¶ 29,

33-34 (noting that at the time of Owens’s offenses, the crime of

violence statute required consecutive sentencing for aggravated

robbery).

¶3 Owens challenged his sentence and convictions on direct

appeal based on, among other things, (1) the consecutive nature of

some of his sentences and (2) the alleged violation of his statutory

right to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 2025. See

Owens I, ¶¶ 3, 28. As relevant here, a division of this court

(1) concluded that the trial court had properly applied the

sentencing statutes and (2) declined to address the merits of the

speedy trial claim, concluding that Owens had waived the right by

failing to move for dismissal before his trial began. Id. at ¶¶ 10,

32-34. The division affirmed Owens’s sentence and judgment of

conviction. Id. at ¶ 35.

¶4 Owens timely filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion requesting

the appointment of counsel. In part, he asserted that his trial

counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing (1) to argue

that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his

crimes and (2) to move for dismissal between his statutory six-

2
month speedy trial deadline on August 8, 2016, and the beginning

of his trial on August 30, 2016.

¶5 The postconviction court denied Owens’s motion without

appointing counsel, finding, as relevant here, that (1) his offenses

were largely per se grave and serious and (2) the trial delay was

reasonable under section 18-1-405(6)(c) because Owens’s trial had

been joined with that of a “codefendant as to whom the time for trial

ha[d] not run and there [wa]s good cause for not granting a

severance.”

II. Analysis

¶6 On appeal, Owens contends that he is entitled to appointed

counsel and a hearing on his postconviction motion. We agree that

Owens is entitled to appointed counsel because his Crim. P. 35(c)

motion sufficiently asserted at least one ineffective assistance claim

with arguable merit. We do not decide whether he is entitled to a

hearing; we leave that question to be decided when all claims,

including any added by postconviction counsel, have been briefed.

See People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70, ¶ 26 n.8; see also Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(V).

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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 We review the summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion de

novo. People v. Marquez, 2020 COA 170M, ¶ 17. When a pro se

defendant requests postconviction counsel and his Crim. P. 35(c)

motion raises at least one claim which, broadly construed, has

arguable merit, the postconviction court must grant the request for

counsel. Segura, ¶ 26; see People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34

(Appellate courts “will broadly construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings

to effectuate the[ir] substance.”).

¶8 A claim lacks arguable merit when the motion, files, and

record in the case clearly establish any of the following: the claim

(1) is barred as untimely or successive; (2) does not state adequate

factual or legal grounds for relief; (3) states unmeritorious legal

grounds for relief; or (4) states factual grounds that do not merit

relief, even if true, or are directly refuted by the record. See Segura,

¶ 25 n.6; Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV), (VI)-(VII); Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d

73, 77 (Colo. 2003).

¶9 To sufficiently allege a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a

defendant must (1) “identify the acts or omissions of counsel that

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are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional

judgment” (the deficient performance prong), id. at 690; and

(2) “assert facts that, if true, show a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different” (the prejudice prong), People v.

Timoshchuk, 2018 COA 153, ¶ 22.

B. Ineffective Assistance/Proportionality
Claim Has Arguable Merit

¶ 10 Broadly construing Owens’s pro se postconviction motion, as

we must, see Cali, ¶ 34, we perceive an adequate allegation of

ineffective assistance for this claim under Strickland. Owens alleged

that (1) his counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge his

lengthy sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds; and (2) because

no injuries resulted from the triggering offenses and he was not the

principal actor, his sentence gave rise to an inference of

unconstitutionality. The People argue that counsel’s failure to

challenge Owens’s sentence was not deficient performance because

such challenges are generally unlikely to prevail. See Wells-Yates v.

People, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 62 (noting that per se grave and serious

offenses are “nearly impervious” to proportionality attacks (quoting

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Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 538 (Colo. 2002))). In these particular

circumstances, we conclude that there was arguable merit in a

proportionality attack and, thus, in Owens’s ineffective assistance

claim.

¶ 11 First, we note that the parties in this appeal incorrectly assert

that Owens received a 192-year aggregate sentence. His actual

aggregate sentence was more than twice that length. For the first

aggravated robbery, with two victims and a habitual enhancement

of four times the maximum of the presumptive range for each

victim, the court imposed two consecutive ninety-six-year DOC

terms — a total of 192 years. For the second aggravated robbery,

also with two victims, the court imposed two consecutive sixty-four-

year DOC terms — a total of 128 years. For the attempted

aggravated robbery, Owens received a forty-eight-year sentence.

And for each of two aggravated motor vehicle thefts, Owens received

a twelve-year sentence. The court ordered that all of these

sentences would run consecutively.1

1 At the time of Owens’s sentencing, the supreme court had not yet

clarified that a proportionality review should not focus on a
defendant’s aggregate sentence. See Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO
90M, ¶¶ 37-38.

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¶ 12 While the crime of violence statute required consecutive

sentencing for aggravated robbery at the time of Owens’s offenses,

the General Assembly amended section 18-1.3-406(1)(a) in 2016 to

allow concurrent sentencing for those offenses. See Ch. 85, sec. 1,

§ 18-1.3-406(1)(c)(I), 2016 Colo. Sess. Laws 242 (granting such

discretion when the defendant is convicted of two separate crimes of

violence arising from the same incident and one of the crimes is

aggravated robbery). A trial court should consider statutory

changes when determining whether a defendant’s sentence is

grossly disproportionate, even if the relevant amendments do not

apply retroactively. Wells-Yates, ¶ 45; see People v. Oldright, 2017

COA 91, ¶ 13.

¶ 13 Moreover, the People do not dispute Owens’s assertions that

nobody was injured and that he was not the principal actor in the

triggering offenses. These considerations may also factor into a

proportionality analysis. See Wells-Yates, ¶ 12. For these reasons,

we conclude that Owens’s habitual sentences — particularly his

consecutive 192-year and 128-year sentences for aggravated

robbery — arguably give rise to an inference of gross

disproportionality.

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¶ 14 We recognize that the Crim. P. 35(c) order included a finding

that Owens’s predicate and triggering offenses were largely per se

grave and serious, but we nonetheless conclude that he should be

appointed counsel for his proportionality claim because the

postconviction court’s analysis was incomplete. First, it did not

consider the harshness of the penalty for each offense — a

necessary part of an abbreviated proportionality analysis even if the

triggering offense has been deemed per se grave and serious. See

Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 13, 38; see also People v. Crawley, 2024 COA 49,

¶ 12 (“The assessment of the harshness of the penalty includes

consideration of the length of the sentence . . . .”). And second, it

did not consider the relevant changes to the crime of violence

statute. See Wells-Yates, ¶ 45. Moreover, the court did not

acknowledge the aggregate 200-year sentencing discrepancy

reflected in the record. With the assistance of counsel, these

deficiencies could be properly addressed.

C. Ineffective Assistance/Speedy Trial
Claim Has Arguable Merit

¶ 15 We also perceive arguable merit in Owens’s ineffective

assistance claim involving an alleged speedy trial violation. As to

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this claim, Owens asserted that (1) his trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to assert his statutory right to a speedy trial

before his trial began; and (2) if counsel had moved to dismiss

between August 8, 2016, and August 30, 2016, based on a speedy

trial violation, the charges against him would have been dismissed.

Consistent with the division’s opinion in Owens I, Owens made the

following factual allegations to support the claim:

• His statutory speedy trial deadline was August 8, 2016.

See Owens I, ¶ 6.

• More than three months prior to that deadline, the trial

court granted the prosecution’s motion to join Owens and

Clark as codefendants in the same trial. See id.

• On May 23, 2016, over defense counsel’s speedy-trial

objection, the court set a joint trial for August 29, 2016,

and tolled Owens’s speedy trial deadline until “the trial

date” under section 18-1-405(6)(c). See Owens I, ¶ 6.

• Owens was tried alone, with voir dire beginning on August

30, 2016. See id. at ¶ 6 n.1.

• Defense counsel did not move to dismiss the charges for

violation of Owens’s statutory speedy trial rights “prior to

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the commencement of his trial,” as required to entitle

Owens to a dismissal under section 18-1-405(5). See

Owens I, ¶ 7.

These allegations, if proven true, sufficiently establish Strickland’s

deficient performance prong.

¶ 16 As to Strickland’s prejudice prong, Owens asserted that if

defense counsel had timely moved to dismiss based on a violation of

his statutory speedy trial right, there was a reasonable probability

that the charges against him would have been dismissed. See

People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 18 (“The remedy for a speedy trial

violation is dismissal of charges with prejudice.”). We cannot

conclude — as the postconviction court did — that the record

clearly establishes that such a motion would have been

unsuccessful.

¶ 17 First, while section 18-1-405(6)(c) permits a reasonable period

of delay for a joint trial, Owens was individually tried. The record

does not show what occurred between May 23 and August 30 to

result in Owens being tried alone, after his August 8 statutory

speedy trial deadline. The People allege, and the register of actions

in Clark’s case — El Paso County Case No. 15CR2618 — reflects,

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that on August 8, 2016, the trial court vacated Clark’s trial pending

the outcome of his court-ordered competency evaluation.2 But this

record does not demonstrate that Owens’s trial counsel had no

basis to object to a speedy trial violation. If anything, it suggests

that when Owens’s speedy trial deadline expired, his counsel was

aware that he and Clark would be tried separately. Yet counsel

didn’t move to dismiss the case for a speedy trial violation before

the start of Owens’s trial.

¶ 18 Second, the record leaves some question as to whether the

trial court tolled Owens’s speedy trial deadline until August 29 or

August 30. This distinction matters because although the court

conducted a “trial call” on August 29 (when the attorneys

announced they were ready for trial), voir dire did not commence

until August 30. See People v. Peltz, 697 P.2d 766, 771-72 (Colo.

App. 1984), aff’d, 728 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1986) (noting an accused is

“brought to trial” for purposes of the speedy trial statute when “the

court calls the case for trial, the attorneys indicate their readiness

2 We take judicial notice of the contents of the court records in this

related criminal proceeding. See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56
(Colo. App. 2004).

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to proceed, and the proceedings commence” (emphasis added)); see

also Taylor, ¶¶ 20-23 (considering Peltz and holding that a

defendant is not “brought to trial” on the date of a pretrial readiness

conference).

¶ 19 Because the record does not clearly establish that Owens’s

ineffective assistance claim based on an alleged violation of his

statutory speedy trial right lacks arguable merit, we conclude that

he is entitled to the appointment of counsel and further proceedings

as outlined in Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). See Segura, ¶¶ 25-26. We need

not, and do not, address whether any of his other claims have

arguable merit. See id. at ¶¶ 7-8 (holding that if a postconviction

court appoints counsel after determining that at least one of

defendant’s claims has arguable merit, the court may not restrict

the scope of counsel’s representation to only the arguably

meritorious claims).

III. Disposition

¶ 20 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

postconviction court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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