Peo v. Stine

24CA1342 Peo v Stine 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1342
Jefferson County District Court No. 23CR1594
Honorable Jason Carrithers, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Michael Stine,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Stuart & Ward LLP, Thomas R. Ward, Megan Bishop, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Michael Stine, appeals the $120,000 fine imposed

by the district court. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Stine, a licensed marijuana business owner, was indicted on

nineteen offenses related to his involvement in the illegal

distribution of marijuana and his failure to pay taxes associated

with the lawful sale of marijuana.

¶3 As part of a plea agreement, Stine pleaded guilty to conspiracy

to distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate, distribution of

marijuana or marijuana concentrate, and evasion of taxes

administered by the Colorado Department of Revenue. The

remaining counts were dismissed and the parties agreed to leave

sentencing open to the district court.

¶4 The parties also agreed to distribute $260,000 in funds that

had been seized from Stine by law enforcement as follows:

(1) restitution in the amount of $168,948.20 would be distributed to

the Colorado Department of Revenue for unpaid taxes; (2) $30,000

would be forfeited by Stine and distributed equally among three law

enforcement agencies for training and related operations; and

(3) $61,015.80, the remaining amount, would be returned to Stine.

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¶5 The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced

Stine to five years of probation and imposed a $120,000 punitive

fine.

II. Discussion

¶6 Stine contends that the district court’s imposition of the

$120,000 fine as a punitive sanction violated his constitutional

rights against excessive fines because the court failed to consider

his ability to pay the fine. Because the record before us reflects

that the court did consider Stine’s ability to pay when it imposed

the fine, we disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶7 Generally, a district court is afforded broad discretion in

sentencing, and we will not overturn its decision absent an abuse of

that discretion. Villanueva v. People, 199 P.3d 1228, 1231 (Colo.

2008). However, whether a sentence is constitutionally excessive is

a question of law that we review de novo. Sharrow v. People, 2019

CO 25, ¶ 27; see also Melton v. People, 2019 CO 89, ¶ 9 (reviewing

de novo whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and article II, section 20 of the Colorado

Constitution).

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¶8 To begin, we note that the parties dispute whether Stine

preserved this constitutional claim. But we do not need to resolve

the dispute because, even if the claim was preserved, we conclude

that the district court did not err.

B. Analysis

¶9 A fine is a form of a sentence, and a district court may impose

a fine in addition to, or in lieu of, any other sentence provided by

law. § 18-1.3-401.5(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025; People v. Turner, 644 P.2d

951, 953 (Colo. 1982). However, the Eighth Amendment prohibits

the imposition of “excessive fines.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see

also Colo. Const. art. II, § 20 (same).

¶ 10 Divisions of this court have held that a sentencing court, when

determining the amount of any fine to be imposed, must consider

the severity of the offense, the defendant’s character and

background, the defendant’s financial status, and any other

appropriate circumstances of the case. See People v. Malone, 923

P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Pourat, 100 P.3d 503,

507 (Colo. App. 2004). The Malone division also held that a fine is

excessive when it is so disproportionate to the defendant’s

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circumstances that there can be no realistic expectation that the

defendant will be able to pay it. Id.

¶ 11 Relying on the reasoning of Malone, Stine asserts that the

district court’s findings do not adequately address his ability to pay

the fine imposed. In particular, he points to the absence of the

court’s consideration of his monthly expenses, such as taxes,

mortgage, insurance, food, and other necessities, or his financial

circumstances related to his son. Assuming that Malone remains

good law,1 we agree that findings based on these considerations

1 Although the People do not argue the point on appeal, the

division’s approach in People v. Malone, 923 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo.
App. 1995), is not a universal rule. Some courts have held that a
defendant’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding
whether a fine is “excessive.” See, e.g., People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 (2005); United States v.
Viloski (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111. Others have held that a
defendant’s ability to pay has no bearing on the question. See, e.g.,
United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999). The
United States Supreme Court left the question open in United States
v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-40 n.15 (1998). The Colorado
Supreme Court has not resolved it either, although in Colo. Dep’t of
Labor and Emp. v. Dami Hospitality, LLC, 2019 CO 47M, ¶ 31, the
court observed that, “[f]or some types of criminal or regulatory
infractions,” a fine that would bankrupt a person “might be
warranted, whereas for others the severity of that outcome may be
out of proportion to the gravity of the offense for which the fine is
imposed.”

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would have been appropriate. However, so long as the court

considers a defendant’s ability to pay with “sufficient specificity to

allow an appellate court to determine the bases for the sentence

imposed,” it will withstand a constitutional challenge. Id.

¶ 12 The district court here did so. The court imposed the fine

based on its finding that Stine “worked in this business for a very

long time, made lots of money (the grand jury indictment alleged

that Stine and his company failed to report more than $2.5 million

in taxable sales, and in the plea agreement, Stine stipulated to pay

approximately $169,000 in past due taxes), and didn’t follow the

rules.” See Pourat, 100 P.3d at 508 (income earned from illegal

activity can be considered in deciding whether a fine is excessive).

¶ 13 The court also looked to Stine’s particular financial

circumstances when structuring the penalty. Specifically, it

imposed the $120,000 fine in recognition of (1) Stine’s agreement to

forfeit $30,000 to law enforcement; and (2) $61,015.80 of seized

funds that would be returned to Stine. And the fine was only a

fraction of the maximum amount — $750,000 — that the court

could have imposed under the governing statute. See § 18-1.3-

401.5(2)(b)(I); see also Pourat, 100 P.3d at 508 (noting that a fine

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that was ten percent of the maximum amount that could have been

imposed was not excessive).

¶ 14 Further, the exchange regarding the fine between defense

counsel and the district court confirms that, while Stine lacked the

funds to pay the fine at the moment it was imposed, it was

nonetheless realistic to expect that he would eventually be able to

do so under a payment plan. See Malone, 923 P.2d at 166.

Defense counsel told the court, “He doesn’t have that. He’s going to

have to be set up on a payment plan. But he’s got that Probation.”

The court replied, “Absolutely.” Cf. People v. Bolt, 984 P.2d 1181,

1184 (Colo. App. 1999) (the record reflected consideration of the

defendant’s ability to pay where counsel “conferred with defendant

and then informed the court that defendant would be able to make

whatever ‘reasonable payments’ his probation officer required” and

otherwise “did not object to the amount of the [surcharge] or ask

the court to reduce it”).

¶ 15 The district court also considered the severity of the offenses

and found that Stine was “postured differently” — i.e., more

culpable — than his co-defendants because, unlike them, Stine

held a marijuana license issued by the Colorado Department of

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Revenue. See Malone, 923 P.2d at 166 (courts should consider the

severity of the offense to determine the appropriate amount of any

fine to be imposed). And the court found that a punitive sanction

was warranted, “given the unique relationship [Stine] had [as] a

licensee and the trust and privilege that came with that.”

¶ 16 Finally, we reject Stine’s assertion that the district court “did

not contemplate” that the imposition of the fine would result in a

$44,400 victims assistance surcharge pursuant to section 24-4.2-

104(1)(a)(I). Courts are presumed to know the law. See People v.

Abu-Nantambu-El, 2017 COA 154, ¶ 30, aff’d, 2019 CO 106. And

section 24-4.2-104(1)(a)(I) explicitly requires “[a] surcharge equal to

thirty-seven percent of the fine imposed for each felony” to benefit

the victim assistance fund.2

¶ 17 Because the factors considered by the district court included

Stine’s ability to pay the fine and were otherwise appropriate, we

discern no error in the imposition of a $120,000 fine. See, e.g.,

Pourat, 100 P.3d at 508 (affirming $100,000 fine based on findings

2 On appeal, the People note that the surcharge may be waived if

the sentencing court finds that Stine is indigent. See Waddell v.
People, 2020 CO 39, ¶¶ 24-27. But Stine did not request that relief
on appeal, so we do not address it further.

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that the criminal enterprise “had to have been lucrative,” “the

offense was severe,” and the defendant’s role “was major”).

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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