Stonig v. Midyette

24CA1868 Stonig v Midyette 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1868
Jefferson County District Court No. 22CV31081
Honorable Diego G. Hunt, Judge

Christine Stonig,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J Nold Midyette, Mary Katherine Midyette, and Alexander Midyette,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Tow and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Montgomery Little & Soran, P.C., Nathan G. Osborn, Greenwood Village,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Hutchinson Black and Cook, LLC, Keith M. Edwards, Boulder, Colorado; Grata
Law and Policy, Matthew A. Simonsen, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendants-
Appellees J Nold Midyette and Mary Katherine Midyette

Dietze and Davis, P.C., Jennifer Walker, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellee Alexander Midyette
¶1 Plaintiff Christine Stonig (Christine) appeals the district court’s

judgment denying her claim for unjust enrichment and her request

for the imposition of a constructive trust against defendants J Nold

Midyette (J Nold), Mary Katherine Midyette (Mary Katherine), and

Alexander Midyette (Alex).1 She also appeals the district court’s

order precluding her from presenting evidence of monetary damages

at trial. We affirm and remand the case for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

I. Background

¶2 Christine and Alex began a relationship in 2008, while Alex

was incarcerated, and they married in 2011 after signing a

premarital agreement. Christine became friendly with Alex’s father,

J Nold, during their visits to the prison facility. In 2009, Christine

informed J Nold that she was in financial trouble and that a

1 Mary Katherine Midyette is married to J Nold. Christine's appeal
does not appear to challenge any ruling involving Mary Katherine,
but the answer brief was filed jointly on behalf of J Nold, Mary
Katherine, and Alex. We use the parties’ first names because
multiple parties involved in this suit share the same last name. We
mean no disrespect in doing so.

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foreclosure had been initiated on her home (the property) for failure

to pay the mortgage.

¶3 Shortly thereafter, J Nold began paying Christine’s mortgage

and contributing to her and her children’s living expenses. Between

2009 and 2014, J Nold paid $204,367.50 toward the mortgage. He

also secured Christine employment with one of his business

entities. J Nold expected to be repaid for his contributions related

to the property, but not for other living expenses. He and Christine

executed a promissory note in September 2009 for “up to” $500,000

for his property-related expenditures, including mortgage payments,

property improvements and repairs, homeowner’s insurance, and

property taxes (2009 promissory note). The note was secured by a

deed of trust against the property, dated January 2010 (2010 deed

of trust).

¶4 In 2013 and 2014, Christine unsuccessfully attempted to

refinance the property to alleviate the high mortgage balance. In

December 2014, Christine quitclaimed all of her interest in the

property, valued at $925,000, to J Nold and Alex as tenants in

common (2014 quitclaim deed). At trial, Christine testified that she

took this action with the understanding that J Nold and Alex would

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secure a better interest rate by refinancing the property’s mortgage

under their names and, upon doing so, would return the property to

her. (The district court found that her testimony was not credible.)

¶5 J Nold testified that Christine asked him to pay off her

mortgage in its entirety. Because he wanted to protect his

investment in the property, he agreed to buy it from Christine by

paying off the $500,947 mortgage balance and executing releases

for the 2009 promissory note and 2010 deed of trust, effectively

forgiving the approximately $900,000 he had advanced to Christine

in mortgage and other property-related payments. J Nold further

testified that, at one time, he orally agreed with Christine to let her

buy back the property in the future at a price equivalent to the

contributions he had made to it.

¶6 After Christine signed the 2014 quitclaim deed, J Nold and

Alex became the new owners and assumed all financial obligations

related to the property. Christine (and Alex) continued to reside at

the property rent-free, while J Nold paid all the expenses and made

improvements.

¶7 In 2021, Christine and Alex filed for divorce. J Nold

subsequently made an offer in which he and Alex would convey

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their interests in the property back to Christine for a $600,000

promissory note, secured by a deed of trust. Christine didn’t

respond. During the divorce proceedings, Christine and Alex

litigated the validity of their premarital agreement, which, as

relevant here, defined “separate property” as “[p]roperty owned prior

to the marriage of the parties” and “[p]roperty acquired . . . during

the parties’ marriage, if . . . titled in the name of either party

individually.” The dissolution court found that the agreement was

valid and enforceable.

¶8 In 2023, Christine filed the underlying action against J Nold,

Mary Katherine, and Alex, asserting claims for quiet title, unjust

enrichment, fraudulent inducement, and declaratory relief.2 As

relevant here, Christine claimed that she and J Nold had a

confidential relationship; that she quitclaimed the property to

J Nold and Alex, who promised to reconvey it to her; and that their

failure to keep their promise entitled her to a constructive trust as a

remedy for her quiet title and unjust enrichment claims.

2 The district court consolidated Christine’s claims into an earlier

foreclosure action that J Nold had initiated after Christine asserted
in the divorce that the property belonged solely to her.

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¶9 After a three-day bench trial, the district court made the

following credibility determinations and findings of fact:

• Beginning in 2009, when J Nold began making mortgage

payments on Christine’s behalf, there was a mutual

understanding that Christine was obligated to repay all

amounts advanced towards the property.

• J Nold contributed more than $900,000 to the property.

• Christine’s testimony that J Nold promised to reconvey

the property to her after refinancing the mortgage for a

better rate wasn’t credible.

• At one time, J Nold agreed that Christine could buy the

property back for the contributions he had made to it.

¶ 10 Based on these findings, the district court concluded that

(1) Christine had no legal interest in the property; (2) J Nold and

Alex were the property’s owners; (3) J Nold wasn’t unjustly enriched

because he had contributed more than $900,000 to the property;

(4) Alex’s interest in the property was governed by a valid and

enforceable premarital agreement, so unjust enrichment didn’t

apply; and (5) Christine wasn’t entitled to equitable relief in the

form of a constructive trust.

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¶ 11 After trial, the district court denied Christine’s motion to

amend the judgment, in which she reasserted that she had proved

her unjust enrichment claim and was entitled to a constructive

trust. Christine appeals.

II. Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust

¶ 12 Christine contends that the district court erred by concluding

that J Nold and Alex were not unjustly enriched because (1) the

district court applied the wrong law and (2) even if it applied the

right law, its factual finding that they contributed more than

$900,000 to the property is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 “Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual, equitable remedy

designed to undo a benefit conferred on one party at the unfair

expense of another party.” Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty.

Ass’n, 2016 CO 64, ¶ 63. To prevail on an unjust enrichment

claim, a party “must prove that (1) the defendant received a benefit

(2) at the plaintiff’s expense (3) under circumstances that would

make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without

commensurate compensation.” Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134,

1141 (Colo. 2008).

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¶ 14 A constructive trust is “remedial in nature and [is] not

appropriately pleaded as a separate cause of action.” Indian

Mountain Corp. v. Indian Mountain Metro. Dist., 2016 COA 118M,

¶ 23. “In general, ‘a constructive trust is imposed . . . because the

person holding the title to property . . . would be unjustly enriched

if he were permitted to keep the property.” Mancuso v. United Bank

of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732, 737 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Trs. ch. 12, topic 1, intro. note (A.L.I. 1959)). Therefore,

for a plaintiff to be entitled to a constructive trust, they must prove

their unjust enrichment (or other equitable) claim.

¶ 15 “[T]he conclusion of the trial court that a party was unjustly

enriched is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lewis, 189 P.3d at

1141. A trial court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Hock v. N.Y. Life Ins.

Co., 876 P.2d 1242, 1251 (Colo. 1994). We review de novo the

court’s application of the governing legal standards. Lawry v. Palm,

192 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. 2008). However, we review challenges to

the court’s underlying factual findings for clear error, meaning that

we will reverse only if the findings have no support in the record.

Gagne v. Gagne, 2019 COA 42, ¶ 17.

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B. Analysis

1. The District Court’s Application of the Law

¶ 16 Christine contends that the district court applied the wrong

legal standard in concluding that J Nold and Alex weren’t unjustly

enriched. Relying on Ralston Oil & Gas Co. v. July Corp., 719 P.2d

334, 338 (Colo. App. 1985), she argues that the court should have

concluded that (1) she and J Nold had a confidential relationship;

(2) J Nold promised to reconvey the property to her; (3) J Nold broke

that promise; (4) a broken promise to reconvey property between

two parties in a confidential relationship is an abuse of that

relationship; and (5) abuse of a confidential relationship is all that

is required to find unjust enrichment and impose a constructive

trust. See id. at 338 (“Where there [wa]s an oral agreement to

reconvey property, . . . the refusal to perform the promise to

reconvey is itself an abuse of confidence sufficient to allow the

conveyance to be set aside.”); see also Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792,

798 (Colo. 1979) (noting that a transaction may be set aside for

abuse of a confidential relationship if the plaintiff proves that the

party in possession of the property at issue refused to act in

accordance with the parties’ mutual intent).

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¶ 17 However, even if we assume that J Nold and Christine were in

a confidential relationship (and that the court erred by concluding

otherwise) and that J Nold’s broken promise to reconvey property

(abuse of the relationship) are the only requirements to find unjust

enrichment and impose a constructive trust, Christine hasn’t

demonstrated that the court erred.

¶ 18 In support of her argument, Christine cites J Nold’s testimony:

“I bought the property and then on a friendship basis . . . I said,

‘Christine, . . . at any time you can buy back the property for what I

have in it at that time.’” She also points to text messages and

related testimony with similar sentiments. The district court

acknowledged this testimony in its order.

¶ 19 But Christine cites no evidence in the record indicating that

she ever attempted to buy back the property “for what [J Nold] ha[d]

in it at that time” or that J Nold rejected her attempt. In fact, the

record reflects that J Nold offered to sell the property to Christine

during the divorce proceedings for a $600,000 promissory note

(considerably less than what he had spent on it), secured by a deed

of trust. But, as the district court found, Christine never responded

to that offer and instead pursued this litigation. In short, Christine

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doesn’t point to any evidence that J Nold ever broke his alleged

promise to reconvey the property in exchange for the amount he

had paid toward it. Thus, even under Christine’s proposed legal

standard, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by concluding that

J Nold and Alex weren’t unjustly enriched.

2. J Nold’s Contributions

¶ 20 Christine argues that J Nold and Alex were unjustly enriched

by the 2014 conveyance because their contributions to the property

were less than its $925,000 value.

¶ 21 First, Christine contends that Alex was unjustly enriched

because he contributed nothing to the property. However, the

district court concluded that unjust enrichment didn’t apply to Alex

because his interest was governed by a valid contract (the

premarital agreement). See Pulte Home Corp., ¶ 64 (“A party

generally cannot recover for unjust enrichment . . . where there is

an express contract addressing the subject of the alleged obligation

to pay.”). Because Christine doesn’t challenge that conclusion, we

perceive no basis for reversal.

¶ 22 Next, Christine argues that the finding underpinning the

district court’s rejection of her unjust enrichment claim against

10
J Nold — that he contributed more than $900,000 to the

property — was clearly erroneous. We disagree.

¶ 23 Christine asserts that J Nold contributed, at most,

$705,316.19 to the property in the form of mortgage payments.

However, the record supports the court’s findings that J Nold made

more than $900,000 in contributions to the property overall. The

court found, with record support, that J Nold paid

• at least $204,000 in monthly payments to Christine’s

mortgage lender between October 2009 and December

2014;

• “$500,947.68 to [Christine’s] mortgage lender on or

around December 30, 2014”;

• “$75,000 for [renovations to install a] basement salon”;

• at least $50,000 in property tax “between 2015 and

2024”;

• “$25,000 for homeowner’s insurance between September

2015 and September 2023”; and

• “$75,000 in property improvements and repairs between

2015 and 2021.”

Together, these payments total at least $929,947.68.

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¶ 24 We consider, and reject, Christine’s arguments that the court

should have disregarded some of these payments.

¶ 25 First, Christine contends that the nonmortgage contributions

are unsupported because J Nold didn’t provide “documentation” of

them. However, J Nold testified about the expenditures, and the

district court was entitled to rely on his testimony. Gagne, ¶ 17

(noting that we will affirm the trial court’s factual findings if there is

any record support for them); see also People in Interest of C.A.K.,

652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982) (“[The] weight of the evidence[] and

the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all within

the province of the trial court.”).

¶ 26 Second, Christine contends that the district court shouldn’t

have considered J Nold’s contributions to improvements on the

property absent evidence that the improvements increased the

property’s value. In support of her argument, she relies on Martinez

v. Martinez, 638 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo. App. 1981), and Thomas v.

Thomas, 352 P.2d 279, 280-81 (Colo. 1970). Martinez and Thomas

concern the consideration due to a cotenant who makes

improvements to jointly owned real estate for purposes of partition.

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Christine doesn’t cite, and we haven’t found, any case extending

that principle to unjust enrichment claims.

¶ 27 Third, Christine argues that the district court’s $900,000

figure is inflated because it “double counted” property taxes and

insurance that were already part of J Nold’s mortgage payments.

However, the district court found, with record support, that J Nold

paid those amounts in 2015 and later — after he had paid off the

mortgage in full.

¶ 28 Fourth, as best we understand her, Christine argues that

(1) much of the $900,000 J Nold contributed was a gift and (2) the

amount she needed to repay J Nold for him to reconvey the property

was unclear. However, we decline to address these arguments

because they weren’t sufficiently developed in her opening brief.

People v. Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶ 70 n.2 (“We do not consider bare

or conclusory assertions presented without argument or

development.”); In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31 (“We do

not consider the arguments [raised] for the first time in [the] reply

brief or those that seek to expand upon the contentions [appellant]

raised in her opening brief.”).

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III. Monetary Damages and Set-Off

¶ 29 Finally, Christine contends that the district court erred when

it precluded her from presenting evidence of her monetary damages

and “set off” as a sanction for her untimely disclosure. We perceive

no basis for reversal.

A. Monetary Damages

¶ 30 In her amended complaint, Christine requested

“commensurate compensation to avoid unjust enrichment” in the

event the district court ruled in favor of J Nold and Alex. She

asserts this statement notified J Nold and Alex of her request for

monetary damages. C.R.C.P. 26(a) requires a party requesting

damages to disclose a “computation of any category of . . . damages

claimed” “within 28 days after the case is at issue.” However,

Christine didn’t make any such disclosure until approximately

three weeks before trial.

¶ 31 In a pretrial conference held on March 27, 2024, the district

court heard arguments pertaining to Christine’s damages

calculation and issued an oral ruling concluding she had violated

her discovery obligations and precluding her from seeking damages

because of her delay. The court entered a minute order (sanctions

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order) on April 4, 2024, stating, “[T]he [c]ourt finds [a] discovery

violation for [the] reasons stated on the record and precludes

[Christine] [from] pursuing damages on the unjust enrichment

claim.”

¶ 32 “The trial court has broad discretion in managing discovery,

including an ability to issue discovery sanctions.” Warden v.

Exempla, Inc., 2012 CO 74, ¶ 32. A court abuses its discretion in

ordering a discovery sanction when the decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Hock, 876 P.2d at 1251.

¶ 33 Christine argues that the district court’s refusal to allow her to

request monetary damages and failure to sufficiently explain its

reasoning in the order constitutes an abuse of discretion. However,

we can’t evaluate her claim because the transcript from the pretrial

conference isn’t part of the record on appeal. Id. at 1252 (the

appellant has the duty to designate all portions of the record

necessary for appeal). The sanctions order indicates that the

district court explained its reasoning orally. And in the absence of

this material portion of the record, we assume that it supports the

district court’s decision to preclude Christine’s damages evidence.

Id. We therefore decline to disturb the court’s ruling.

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B. C.R.C.P. 105 Set-Off

¶ 34 C.R.C.P. 105(e) provides that a party who makes permanent

improvements to real property in good faith may obtain a set-off for

the value of those improvements in the event the court enters a

judgment in favor of the other party for possession of the property.

In her answer to J Nold’s counterclaim and cross-claim for quiet

title, Christine asserted that she was “entitled to an off-set under

C.R.C.P. 105.”

¶ 35 To the extent the district court’s sanctions order precluded

Christine from pursuing a set-off under C.R.C.P. 105, we must

assume the record supports the court’s decision in the absence of

the transcript of the proceedings. Hock, 876 P.2d at 1252.

Moreover, Christine doesn’t explain how the adverse ruling

prejudiced her — for example, she doesn’t explain what evidence

she would have presented concerning “permanent improvements”

she made to the property or the value of those improvements.

C.R.C.P. 105(e). We therefore perceive no reversible error. See

C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must

disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect

the substantial rights of the parties.”); State ex rel. Weiser v. Ctr. for

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Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc., 2023 CO 23, ¶ 60 (“An error affects

a substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the

error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired

the basic fairness of the trial itself.’” (quoting Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d

529, 535 (Colo. 2010))).

IV. Request for Attorney Fees

¶ 36 J Nold, Mary Katherine, and Alex seek reasonable attorney

fees incurred in this appeal under C.A.R. 38, asserting that

Christine’s appeal is frivolous.

¶ 37 An appeal may be frivolous as filed or frivolous as argued. An

appeal is frivolous as filed when “the judgment by the tribunal

below was so plainly correct and the legal authority contrary to [the]

appellant’s position so clear that there is really no appealable

issue.” Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App.

2006) (quoting Dungaree Realty, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 122,

124 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Even if an appeal is not frivolous as filed, the

appellant’s misconduct in arguing the appeal may justify the

conclusion that an appeal is frivolous as argued. Id.

¶ 38 While we don’t do so lightly, we conclude that the monetary

damages portion of the appeal is frivolous as argued.

17
¶ 39 As discussed above, Christine didn’t include in the record the

hearing transcript for the pretrial conference where the district

court heard arguments and made findings as to the untimely

disclosure of her damages calculation. This was a violation of

C.A.R. 10(d)(3), which requires the appellant to include “transcripts

of all proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues

on appeal.”

¶ 40 While the failure to designate the transcript may well have

been inadvertent, the sanctions order made clear that the district

court made additional findings on the record at the pretrial

conference. But instead of attempting to supplement the record

with the transcript, Christine argued that the district court abused

its discretion because (1) “the record is void of any evidence of

misconduct or bad faith” related to the untimely disclosure and

(2) the sanctions order “[did] not contain sufficient analysis as to

why there is no prejudice or why there could not have been a less

severe sanction imposed.” (Emphases added.) And her opening

brief avoids any reference to the notion that the court gave

additional reasoning that wasn’t contained in its order. (In fact, the

opening brief avoids any reference to the pretrial hearing at all).

18
Furthermore, even after the answer brief explicitly called attention

to the missing transcript and the district court’s reference to

“reasons stated on the record,” Christine continued to argue in her

reply brief that the order “contain[ed] insufficient analysis” and that

the record contained no evidence of misconduct or bad faith.

¶ 41 For these reasons, we award J Nold, Mary Katherine, and Alex

their reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with

responding to Christine’s arguments related to the preclusion of

evidence of monetary damages. C.A.R. 38; see also Northstar Project

Mgmt., Inc. v. DLR Grp., Inc., 2013 CO 12, ¶ 18 (Because a party

failed to designate required transcripts, the “appellate court should

consider the full range of possible sanctions.”). We note that this

award does not include fees incurred in responding to arguments

related to the preclusion of C.R.C.P. 105 evidence (to the extent

such fees are distinct from those incurred in responding to the

monetary damages argument) because it’s unclear whether the

sanctions order pertains to C.R.C.P. 105. Finally, although

Christine didn’t prevail on the remainder of her arguments, they are

not so lacking in substance as to be frivolous. In re Estate of

Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34 (stating that appellate attorney fees

19
are “appropriate only in clear and unequivocal cases where no

rational argument is presented and, thus, the appeal is frivolous”).

¶ 42 We exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand the

case to the district court for a determination of (1) the reasonable

attorney fees incurred on appeal in relation to the monetary

damages argument and (2) whether those fees should be assessed

against Christine, her counsel, or both.

V. Disposition

¶ 43 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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