Estate of Schafer

24CA1383 Estate of Schafer 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1383
Adams County District Court No. 20PR30195
Honorable Sara Price, Magistrate

In re the Estate of Llewellyn Woodrow Schafer, a/k/a Llewellyn W. Schafer,
a/k/a Llewellyn Schafer, deceased.

David L. Schafer,

Appellant,

v.

Kendra Knogge,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 23, 2025

David L. Schafer, Pro Se

Schwartz, McMinimee & Andrew, LLC, Marcie R. McMinimee, Tyler C.
McFarland, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 David L. Schafer appeals the district court’s order for final

settlement of the estate of Llewellyn Woodrow Schafer, his deceased

father. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After Llewellyn died, David’s sister opened a probate case and

the court appointed her personal representative of the estate.1

¶3 Llewellyn’s will directed that his residuary estate be divided

among his seven children. The estate’s primary asset was real

property, which included a house and other buildings. At the time

Llewellyn died, David lived in the house. After David refused to

vacate, the personal representative retained counsel and began

eviction proceedings.

¶4 During this process, David set fire to the property, damaging

the house and other structures. For this conduct, David pleaded

guilty to first degree arson and received a six-year prison sentence.

¶5 The estate incurred about $35,000 in fees and costs related to

the eviction proceedings and property remediation. And while

insurance covered some of the property damage, it did not cover an

1 Because several parties have the same last name, we refer to

individuals by their first names. We mean no disrespect.

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estimated $170,000 in repair costs for a damaged outbuilding. The

estate didn’t repair the outbuilding but sold the property “as is” at a

reduced price. The estate retained the insurance payment and sale

proceeds.

¶6 After selling the property, the personal representative filed a

petition for final settlement of the estate. Among other things, the

petition requested that the court offset against David’s share of the

estate the fees and costs related to the eviction proceedings and

property remediation ($35,000) and the estimated repair costs

($170,000). David and another sibling objected. Through counsel,

David challenged the offset of the estimated repair costs (but did

not appear to challenge the offset of the fees and costs).2

¶7 After a hearing, the district court issued a written order

(1) modifying the personal representative’s hourly rate for her

“executor work” (which reduced the requested fees and costs from

$35,000 to about $15,000) and (2) rejecting David’s objection to the

offset. The court found that the requested offset “properly

account[ed] for damages” that David caused to the estate, including

2 Though David didn’t object to the personal representative’s hourly

rate, his sibling did.

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legal and repair costs. The court directed the personal

representative to file an amended petition reflecting the offset with

the modified rate.3

¶8 As directed, the personal representative filed an amended

petition for final settlement, but for reasons the record doesn’t

explain, the court didn’t enter a final settlement order at that time.

About a year later, David — now representing himself — filed a

“motion objecting to granting” the final settlement, raising a slew of

new and different objections to the petition. The district court

denied the motion, ruling that it was “unsupported by sufficient

and relevant facts and unwarranted by applicable law.” The court

then entered an order approving the amended petition for final

settlement of the estate. After deducting the approved offsets,

David received nothing from the estate.

II. Analysis

¶9 David appeals the order for final settlement. Because he is

self-represented, we broadly construe his filings to ensure he isn’t

3 David appealed the district court’s initial order directing the

personal representative to file an amended final petition, but this
court dismissed that appeal for lack of a final, appealable judgment.

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denied review of important issues because of his inability to

articulate his arguments like a lawyer. See Jones v. Williams, 2019

CO 61, ¶ 5. Doing that here, we understand David to argue that

• he was wrongfully evicted from the property;

• he did not set fire to the property and never admitted

liability for the property damage; instead, the personal

representative and other family members burned down the

house for the insurance money;

• the damage to the outbuilding was never proven and did not

affect the property’s sale price;

• he had a right to be present at the hearing on the petition

for final settlement of the estate, and his attorney’s

presence at the hearing did not waive that right;

• several of his constitutional rights were violated, including

his right to due process;

• the personal representative and other family members

“conspired” to forge Llewellyn’s will and “defraud” the

estate;

• the personal representative committed various crimes,

including theft, fraud, and forgery;

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• the personal representative breached her fiduciary duty to

the estate by, among other things, incurring excessive

attorney fees and repair costs against the estate and by

charging excessive personal representative fees;

• the personal representative violated the will by refusing to

sell David the house; and

• the district court’s order is “flawed due to lack of competent

evidence.”

¶ 10 From all this, David asks us to (1) reverse the district court’s

order for final settlement of the estate, particularly those portions

involving the offset against his share of the estate and the fees and

costs that the personal representative charged against the estate;

(2) order a “full investigation” into the personal representative and

direct that she be charged with several crimes; (3) “suspend any

further use” of the estate’s money; and (4) award him $1,000,000 as

“restitution for his belongings” lost in the fire, for “pain and

suffering from incarceration” caused by the personal representative,

and to cover his share of the estate.

¶ 11 For several reasons, we decline to address David’s arguments.

First, the opening brief does not comply with the Colorado Appellate

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Rules. While we acknowledge that self-representation is difficult,

pro se parties are bound by the same rules, procedures, and law as

represented parties. Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 8. The

opening brief does not comply with C.A.R. 28 because it doesn’t

identify whether or where in the record the arguments are

preserved, include a clear and concise discussion of the grounds on

which David seeks relief, or provide any review standards or record

citations. See C.A.R. 28(a)(5), (a)(7)(A)-(B), (e). And though the brief

cites some legal authority, it primarily directs us to criminal

statutes that David believes the personal representative has

violated. Insofar as the brief references relevant probate law, it does

so in the context of arguments that are conclusory, undeveloped,

and difficult to follow. Based on these deficiencies alone, we could

end our review here. See Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289,

291-92 (Colo. App. 2006) (declining to review contention because

opening brief advanced no “cogent argument” and violated C.A.R.

28); see also C.A.R. 38(a) (outlining possible sanctions for failure to

comply with the appellate rules).

¶ 12 Second, even considering the record, David’s appellate

contentions are largely unpreserved. Before the hearing on the

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petition for final settlement, David’s counsel objected to the petition,

arguing that (1) David did not admit criminal liability for damage to

the outbuilding as part of his guilty plea; (2) the quoted repair costs

were insufficient to prove damage to the outbuilding; and (3) the

insurance payment fully compensated the estate for damage caused

to the house. The objection, however, did not raise the wrongful

eviction, fraud, forgery, conspiracy, fiduciary duty, and

constitutional claims now presented. Because they weren’t raised,

they are unpreserved. And we do not address unpreserved

arguments. In re Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 12.4

¶ 13 To the extent David presents arguments in his opening brief

about the outbuilding damage and repair costs that align with

specific objections raised in the district court before the hearing on

4 We recognize that David raised these new arguments in his pro se

“motion objecting to granting” the petition for final settlement filed a
year after the hearing on the petition and the initial order directing
the personal representative to file an amended petition with the
modified hourly rate. But that motion is essentially a motion for
reconsideration, and the district court wasn’t required to consider
new arguments first raised in a motion for reconsideration. See,
e.g., Lorenzen v. Pinnacol Assurance, 2019 COA 54, ¶ 18 n.3.
Regardless, even if the arguments were properly preserved, we
would not address them because they are conclusory, undeveloped,
and without record support. See In re Estate of Liebe, 2023 COA
55, ¶ 19.

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the final settlement, David doesn’t explain how or why the court

erred by finding that the outbuilding was damaged and the repair

costs were proper. And because the appellate record includes no

transcripts, we must presume that the evidence — including the

testimony the district court references in its initial order —

supports the court’s findings. See Marchant v. Boulder Cmty.

Health, Inc., 2018 COA 126M, ¶ 18 n.2. Without any identified legal

or factual errors, there’s nothing for us to review. See Middlemist v.

BDO Seidman, LLP, 958 P.2d 486, 495 (Colo. App. 1997) (noting the

appellant’s obligation to identify the specific errors and legal

authorities that would support reversal).

¶ 14 Finally, David requests relief that we cannot grant. Our only

role is to review the district court’s order for final settlement; we

cannot award civil damages or order a criminal investigation into

the personal representative. And because David presents no

preserved or developed argument explaining why the district court’s

order was wrong, we have no basis to disturb it. See Biel v. Alcott,

876 P.2d 60, 64 (Colo. App. 1993) (“An appealing party bears the

burden to provide supporting authority for contentions of error

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asserted on appeal, and a failure to do so will result in an

affirmation of the judgment.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 15 We affirm the order for final settlement.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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