Peo v. Moench

22CA1634 Peo v Moench 10-16-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1634
Jefferson County District Court No. 14CR1764
Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Gordon Lee Moench,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 16, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Gordon Lee Moench, appeals the postconviction

court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing.

He also appeals the restitution portion of his sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 One summer evening, Moench called 911 to report “a guy out

front [of his house] with a gun [who] is ready to kill a bunch of

people.” The 911 dispatcher asked, “And you’re inside the

residence?” Moench replied, “Ah, no, I’m the guy with the gun.”

Moench told the dispatcher that he was standing on the back of his

truck with three guns that were “enough to hurt a lot of people.”

The dispatcher asked, “Why would you wanna hurt someone?”

Moench replied, “Good question. But I’ll tell you what, you’ll find

out when you get here. Thanks.” Moench also sent two text

messages: one to his stepson telling him, “I’m coming to kill you,”

and another to his friend reading, “In a blaze of glory,” with an

attached image of three guns on top of his truck. He later testified

at trial that he was trying to commit “suicide by cop.”

¶3 Responding to the 911 calls, Lakewood Police Department

Patrol Officer Jonathan Key drove his patrol SUV to Moench’s

house. Standing on his truck, Moench shot toward Officer Key’s

1
SUV three times. Two shots went through the driver’s side

windshield. Those shots hit Officer Key in his arm and chest.

Officer Key let out a shout, rolled out of his SUV, and called for help

over the radio.

¶4 Agent Kimberly Collins approached Moench’s house from the

direction opposite that of Officer Key. After hearing from the

dispatcher and bystanders that a police officer had been shot, she

walked toward the house with her flashlight raised. Moench, still

standing on top of his truck, shot Agent Collins in the leg just below

her knee. She lost consciousness from loss of blood.

¶5 Agent Luke Godfrey, aware that two of his colleagues had

already been shot, drove to Moench’s house. Once he arrived,

Moench picked up a different gun, got off his truck, and walked into

the street. Agent Godfrey saw Moench approaching with a gun and

ordered him to stop and drop the weapon. Moench began to raise

the gun toward Agent Godfrey. Agent Godfrey shot and

incapacitated Moench.

¶6 Both Officer Key and Agent Collins survived the shootings but

suffered life-threatening injuries.

2
¶7 The People charged Moench with two counts of attempted first

degree murder after deliberation, two counts of attempted first

degree extreme indifference murder, and one count each of

attempted first degree assault and extreme indifference assault.

¶8 Moench initially pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. See

§ 16-8-103(1.5), C.R.S. 2025. At defense counsel’s request, the

district court ordered an in-custody evaluation of Moench’s

competency and sanity. The evaluator concluded that Moench had

the capacity to form the mental state required for the charges and

that he was capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings

against him and assisting in his defense.

¶9 Moench’s theory of defense at trial was that, when he shot the

officers, he didn’t have the requisite mental state to be found guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury found him guilty as charged.

The court sentenced him to 120 years in the custody of the

Colorado Department of Corrections.

¶ 10 A division of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction on

direct appeal. People v. Moench, (Colo. App. No. 16CA1300, Sept.

26, 2019) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

3
¶ 11 Moench, proceeding pro se, timely filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

for postconviction relief. In his motion, he alleged that his

convictions should be vacated because his trial counsel had

provided ineffective assistance. The postconviction court appointed

counsel, who later supplemented Moench’s motion. After reviewing

the motion and supplement, the postconviction court denied the

motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 12 Moench contends that he was entitled to a hearing on his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims that his trial counsel

(1) didn’t adequately prepare him to testify in his defense (Claim 5)

or give him adequate access to discovery (Claim 1); and (2) failed to

“investigate, develop, and present relevant medical and mental

condition” evidence (Claims 2, 3, and 7). We reject each of these

contentions.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 When reviewing ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims,

we apply the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 76 (Colo.

2003); People v. Long, 126 P.3d 284, 286 (Colo. App. 2005). To

4
prevail on such a claim, a defendant must show that (1) his

counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

¶ 14 To establish deficient performance, a defendant must prove

that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Id. at 688. “[A] court must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at

689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

¶ 15 To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, absent the deficient performance, “the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

¶ 16 Because a defendant must ultimately prove both deficient

representation and resulting prejudice, a postconviction court may

deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion if either Strickland prong isn’t

satisfied. Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77. The court may summarily deny

the motion “if the claims raise only an issue of law, or if the

allegations, even if true, do not provide a basis for relief,” or “if the

5
claims are bare and conclusory in nature, and lack supporting

factual allegations.” People v. Venzor, 121 P.3d 260, 262 (Colo.

App. 2005). And the court may deny the motion without a hearing

if the record refutes the claims. People v. Duran, 2015 COA 141,

¶ 9.

¶ 17 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Crim. P. 35(c)

motion without a hearing. People v. Davis, 2012 COA 14, ¶ 6.

B. Testimony Preparation and Discovery Access

¶ 18 Moench contends that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance by failing to adequately prepare him to testify (Claim 5).

He also contends that his attorney didn’t give him sufficient access

to discovery in his case (Claim 1). The court correctly denied these

claims without a hearing.

1. Testimony Preparation

¶ 19 Moench argues that his counsel didn’t adequately prepare him

to present key information to the jury, so when he testified, he

didn’t clearly explain those facts to the jury. More specifically, he

claims that he wasn’t prepared to explain why his alleged actions

showed a lack of intent. He argues that, with proper preparation,

he would have told the jury that (1) he couldn’t see the agents

6
clearly on the night of the incident; and (2) he took measures to

prevent injury to others (for example, he had previously told an

interviewing officer that he deliberately aimed his gun high and to

the left of the two agents). And he argues that his counsel’s

performance was deficient because competent counsel would have

elicited such testimony on direct examination.

¶ 20 Moench’s claim fails as a matter of law for two reasons.

¶ 21 First, the “facts” at issue — what Moench did on the night of

the incident and what he had told an officer at the hospital — were

facts of which he was always obviously aware, and he doesn’t claim

otherwise. To the extent he failed to adequately explain these

“facts” to the jury under questioning (discussed below), that falls on

him.

¶ 22 Second, the record shows that Moench had ample opportunity

to present these facts to the jury, including in response to his

attorney’s questions.

¶ 23 As for Moench’s alleged inability to see clearly, his attorney

asked him whether the view of the scene at night differed from the

photographs of the scene taken during the day. Moench said it did.

Moench also testified on direct examination that Officer Key’s SUV’s

7
headlights weren’t on and that he subsequently saw Agent Collins

walking towards him holding a flashlight. On this testimony alone,

the jury could have deduced that it was dark at the time.

¶ 24 In response to questions on cross-examination, Moench said

that the darkness affected his actions during the shootings and that

he couldn’t see the officers well because of it. He agreed with the

prosecutor that he fired at one officer from “[a] hundred yards away

under the cover of darkness.”

¶ 25 Jurors, too, asked Moench questions relating to visibility. A

juror asked, “Were there any lights on your residence, or overhead

street lamps illuminating[,] . . . or [were] you completely in the

dark?” Moench replied, “The porch light was on in front of the

house, as was the door was opened, screen door was cracked open

so the inside lights were on, also.” And other witnesses, including

the police officers, testified that it was “extremely dark” at the time

of the shootings.

¶ 26 With respect to his actions showing lack of intent, Moench’s

attorney asked him on redirect whether he meant to hurt the two

agents. He said he didn’t. On direct examination, when defense

counsel asked what happened after his first shot at Officer Key,

8
Moench said he thought he missed Officer Key’s vehicle. And, while

counsel didn’t specifically ask Moench whether he had intentionally

aimed high and to the left when he shot toward the two officers,

Moench’s counsel gave Moench an opportunity to clarify that exact

point when counsel asked him whether he had fired in Officer Key’s

direction and what was going through his mind when he fired

toward Agent Collins. And counsel asked Moench if he was

surprised when he shot Agent Collins. Moench said that he was

and that he was just trying to draw fire.

¶ 27 On cross-examination, Moench said, “That [shooting two

people] was never an intent. I would not intentionally shoot two

people.” Additionally, a juror asked Moench, “Why did you shoot at

the police instead of in the air or somewhere you knew would not

have any chance of hitting them?” Moench replied, “That’s a

question I ask myself a lot. And, you know, I made a lot of bad

decisions that night. And that was one of the big ones.” A juror

also asked, “Why fire through the windshield instead of the hood or

tires if all you wanted to do was bring more officers to the area?”

Moench replied, “There wasn’t aiming, it was just in the direction of

the police officers. It wasn’t trying, per se, to hit the engine . . . .”

9
¶ 28 At any point during this questioning, Moench could have

drawn on his own memory to answer differently or with more

explanation. None of the questions at issue could have come as a

surprise to Moench, and he cites no authority for the proposition

that his attorney was somehow required to script his answers for

him.1

¶ 29 We therefore conclude that the record refutes this claim of

deficient performance. And to the extent counsel performed

deficiently by failing to ask these questions himself, there was no

prejudice because the questions were asked by others, and Moench

had every opportunity to explain his actions.

2. Discovery Access

¶ 30 Moench contends that trial counsel’s decision to limit his

access to discovery put him at a disadvantage in preparing to testify

(Claim 1). Specifically, he argues that he should have had access to

1 Indeed, to the extent Moench argues that his attorney should have

coached him to answer all of these questions differently than he did
while under oath, he comes perilously close to arguing that counsel
should have coached him to answer questions less than truthfully,
which an attorney obviously can’t do. See Colo. RPC 3.4(b) (“A
lawyer shall not . . . counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely
. . . .”).

10
discovery because it would have refreshed his memory that he told

an officer at the hospital that he had aimed high and to the left of

Officer Key and Agent Collins. This claim also fails as a matter of

law.

¶ 31 A criminal defendant doesn’t have “an unqualified right to

review personally all discovery materials.” People v. Krueger, 2012

COA 80, ¶ 16. Indeed, courts have recognized that there may be

good reasons for counsel not to allow a defendant unfettered access

to discovery. Id. at ¶ 17. Similarly, what defense to present is a

matter of strategy that defense counsel has the authority to

determine. McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 422 (2018); People v.

Gallegos, 2025 CO 41M, ¶ 27; see Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555, 558

(Colo. 2008). “[A] defendant must show that, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions of counsel were

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”

People v. Wilson, 397 P.3d 1090, 1097 (Colo. App. 2011), aff’d, 2015

CO 37.

¶ 32 Moench didn’t allege facts that, if proved, would show that his

attorney’s alleged decision to limit his access to certain discovery

materials (or failure to consider whether he should see these

11
materials) was objectively unreasonable. Rather, his claim was

conclusory. Indeed, on appeal, he relegates the issue to a mere

footnote, thereby failing to adequately develop the argument. See

People v. Wallin, 167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to

address issues presented in a perfunctory or conclusory manner).

But, in any event, what Moench had previously told an investigating

officer about where he had aimed — the only factual matter alluded

to in this claim — was, as previously noted, something of which he

obviously had personal knowledge.

C. Medical and Mental Evidence Investigation

¶ 33 Moench also contends that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance by failing to investigate and present a medical or mental

condition defense (Claims 2, 3, and 7). He says presenting such a

defense would have undermined the People’s attempt to prove that

he possessed the mens rea — knowingly — necessary to convict

him of attempted murder and attempted first degree assault. He

specifically asserts that his counsel should have (1) obtained a

second, privately retained medical and psychological evaluation;

(2) investigated and developed evidence of his claimed lactic

12
acidosis2 and possible diabetic ketoacidosis3 because those

conditions can cause “confusion”; and (3) investigated how

psychiatric side effects of Celexa, an antidepressant medication he

had been taking at the time of the shootings, could have altered his

mental state and behavior.

¶ 34 We conclude that the record lacks any significant support for

any of these contentions. And, regardless, Moench failed to allege

facts showing that any decision to forgo such an approach to the

defense was anything other than legitimate trial strategy.

1. Additional Background

¶ 35 Moench, who is diabetic, testified that, the day before the

shootings, he tried to kill himself by overdosing on insulin. He had

2 Lactic acidosis is a medical condition that occurs when there is a

buildup of lactic acid in the body’s bloodstream. Cleveland Clinic,
Lactic Acidosis (June 13, 2023), https://perma.cc/D398-UPPA.
Symptoms of lactic acidosis may include nausea, vomiting,
exhaustion, fatigue, respiratory compensation, and muscle cramps.
Id. As relevant to this appeal, advanced symptoms may include
delirium and confusion. See id.
3 Diabetic ketoacidosis is a medical condition that affects people

with diabetes who have high blood sugar and ketone levels. Mayo
Clinic, Diabetic Ketoacidosis (July 25, 2025),
https://perma.cc/YJ74-PWAP. Symptoms may include belly pain,
weakness/tiredness, shortness of breath, frequent urination, and,
as relevant on appeal, confusion. See id.

13
recently lost his job and had experienced frequent disagreements

with his wife and stepson. He still maintained a life insurance

policy from his former employer and wanted to ensure that his wife

received money from that policy after he died. Moench went inside

a camper that he owned, which was in his driveway. Alone, he

injected large quantities of insulin and fell asleep. Moench woke up

around 4 a.m. on the day of the shootings. He checked his insulin

level; “[i]t was seventy-two.” He then went to his bedroom, where

his wife was, and told her he had almost died. His wife said at trial

that “[h]e seemed melancholy,” but she “wasn’t concerned that he

was in a crisis.”

¶ 36 Later, after Agent Godfrey shot him, Moench was taken to the

hospital. After he was treated, Lakewood Police Detective Bryan

Feik interviewed him at the hospital. Detective Feik asked him how

he felt when he woke up in bed on the day of the shootings after

taking large quantities of insulin. Moench said he felt “very loose.”

Later, Moench said he hadn’t felt cranky or high from the effects

when he was arguing with his wife and stepson later that day.

¶ 37 Detective Feik asked if he was still feeling any effects of the

insulin overdose at the time of the shootings. Moench said he

14
wasn’t. He elaborated that the weakness from high insulin can

stick around for twenty-four hours. He said, “My blood sugar is

high and you know, um, I’m attributing that to some cookies I ate

and all of the stress involved. Stress does create higher blood sugar

too, so . . . .” Detective Feik asked, “The reason I asked about the

blood sugar is . . . where I’m getting at is I’m wondering if in your

opinion if that contributed to the reason why we’re here.” Moench

replied, “I personally do not think the blood sugar did . . . .”

¶ 38 Detective Feik asked Moench if he usually took his

medications as prescribed. Moench said he sometimes forgot to

take his medications but usually got “massive heartburn” to remind

him that he forgot. He said he took his medications five to six times

per week. Detective Feik asked whether taking or not taking his

medications, including Celexa, could affect his behavior and

decision-making. Moench said, “Normally it’s just the heartburn,”

but “[i]f I miss [Celexa] two days in a row, it’s bad news.” But

Moench didn’t mention that he was experiencing heartburn or other

side effects from his medications on the day of the offenses, nor did

he say that he missed taking his medications on or around the day

of the offenses.

15
¶ 39 The in-custody evaluation of Moench’s sanity and competence,

which Moench’s counsel requested, also shed light on his

conditions. Dr. John DeQuardo with the Colorado Mental Health

Hospital in Pueblo performed the evaluation and compiled a report.

In his report, Dr. DeQuardo concluded the following:

• “[Moench’s] glucose control, although suboptimal, was

adequate, and he presented no symptoms suggestive of

delirium or other acute somatic medical problem that

contributed to his mood disturbance at any time in his

past, including at the time of the index offense.”

• “Concerning Mr. Moench’s mental state at the time of the

index offense, I do not believe that there is evidence that

he suffered from any statutorily defined mental illness,

disease or defect.”

• “Mr. Moench did have symptoms of major depression at

the time of the index offense, in my opinion; however,

these were not associated with psychotic symptoms and

did not interfere in any significant way with Mr. Moench’s

ability to understand his circumstances, or alter his

behavior . . . .”

16
• “Mr. Moench clearly demonstrated his ability to

deliberate based on his behavior during and around the

index offense. He clearly described his thinking, behavior

and intent to myself, as well as several other

interviewers.”

• “I do not believe that there is any significant evidence to

suggest that Mr. Moench could not form the culpable

mental state necessary for the crimes charged.”

• “I do not believe that there is any evidence that Mr.

Moench was suffering from a statutorily-defined mental

disease or defect, nor did he have the inability to form the

culpable mental state necessary for the crime charged, or

to know that his behavior was wrong at the time of the

index offense.”

¶ 40 As a result of the report, Moench’s counsel chose to forgo a not

guilty by reason of insanity defense. Dr. DeQuardo didn’t testify at

Moench’s trial.

2. Second Evaluation

¶ 41 The record shows that Moench’s counsel’s decision not to seek

a second, privately retained medical and psychological evaluation

17
(Claim 3) wasn’t deficient performance. Dr. DeQuardo’s report

included significant detail about interviews he and others had with

Moench. Dr. DeQuardo also reviewed Moench’s past psychiatric

and medical history prior to the shootings. Dr. DeQuardo was

aware of Moench’s medical conditions, including diabetes,

hypertension, and head trauma (from motorcycle falls), and that he

was taking insulin and Celexa, among other medications. He was

also aware that Moench was suffering from significant depression,

with symptoms including sleep disturbance, diminished energy,

diminished hedonic capacity, suicidal ideation, and suicide

attempts. After reviewing all of this information, Dr. DeQuardo

concluded that Moench didn’t “have the inability to form the

culpable mental state necessary for the crime charged.”

¶ 42 Moench failed to allege any facts that, if proved, would show

that choosing to rely on Dr. DeQuardo’s detailed report fell outside

the range of professionally competent assistance. See Wilson, 397

P.3d at 1097. He failed to allege any facts casting doubt on Dr.

DeQuardo’s conclusions and failed to identify any potential expert

who would have done so; this claim was, as the postconviction

court ruled, conclusory. Indeed, he alleged only that, “[h]ad an

18
evaluation done by a nonbiased/private evaluator” who had

reviewed his “medical records,” “it would have changed the outcome

of my trial.”

3. Lactic Acidosis and Diabetic Ketoacidosis

¶ 43 There is no record support for Moench’s contention that his

trial counsel should have investigated or developed evidence of

potential lactic acidosis or possible diabetic ketoacidosis (Claim 2).4

¶ 44 First, Moench’s statements and his wife’s testimony indicated

that he felt and appeared fine at the time of the shootings. Moench

told Detective Feik that he had felt fine and that his diabetes hadn’t

4 Moench questions whether evidence of his insulin levels could

have given rise to a voluntary intoxication defense. See People v.
Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 777 (Colo. 2005) (“[T]he medical condition of
insulin-induced hypoglycemia may, depending upon the particular
facts and circumstances, constitute the affirmative defense of
involuntary intoxication.”). But the record doesn’t support a finding
that, at the time of the offense, he was intoxicated at all because Dr.
DeQuardo confirmed that Moench’s “glucose control, although
suboptimal, was adequate, and he presented no symptoms
suggestive of delirium or other acute somatic medical problem that
contributed to his mood disturbance at any time in his past,
including at the time of the index offense.” Moreover, while a
defendant may request an involuntary intoxication defense when
he’s intentionally ingested an amount of substances he believed he
could consume, the facts in this case show that Moench
intentionally attempted to overdose on insulin, so an involuntary
intoxication defense wouldn’t have been viable. See People v.
Turner, 680 P.2d 1290, 1291-93 (Colo. App. 1983).

19
affected his behavior on the night in question. Moench said he

didn’t feel any effects of the insulin overdose at the time of the

shootings. He also said that his blood sugar was high because of

the cookies that he had eaten, combined with stress. And he said

that he “personally [didn’t] think the blood sugar” contributed to his

actions during the shootings. As well, after Moench went back to

his bedroom the morning before the shootings and told his wife that

he almost died after taking large quantities of insulin, his wife, who

is a nurse, wasn’t concerned about Moench’s demeanor.

¶ 45 Second, though hospital records showed that Moench had a

higher-than-normal insulin level at the hospital, those records

attributed that measurement to the intravenous fluid dye given to

Moench after the shootings and the shock he was experiencing.

Moench alleged no facts suggesting otherwise.

¶ 46 Third, Dr. DeQuardo’s report indicated that “no symptoms

suggest . . . delirium . . . that contributed to [Moench’s] mental

state.” He reached this conclusion with full knowledge of both

Moench’s deliberate insulin overdose and the cookies he ate the

following day.

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¶ 47 In sum, the evidence in the record refutes Moench’s

postconviction claim that his mental condition was impaired at the

time of the shootings. His motion implying otherwise offered

nothing but conclusory assertions.

¶ 48 We also observe that, had counsel chosen to raise Moench’s

medical condition, the prosecution likely would have called Dr.

DeQuardo as a witness to testify that Moench wasn’t affected by

those conditions on the day of the offenses, that Moench had the

“ability to deliberate based on his behavior during and around the

index offense,” and that Moench could have “form[ed] the culpable

mental state necessary for the crime charged.” And, of course,

there were his own statements to police and his wife’s testimony,

which also would have undermined this defense.

4. Celexa Side Effects

¶ 49 The record refutes Moench’s assertion that he may have been

affected by Celexa’s potential psychiatric side effects on the day of

the offenses. When Moench told Detective Feik that he occasionally

missed a day taking his prescribed medications, including Celexa,

he said it was only noticeable when he forgot for two days or more.

In that interview, Moench never suggested that Celexa’s potential

21
side effects were the reason for his behavior during the shootings.

And Dr. DeQuardo didn’t “believe that there [wa]s evidence that

[Moench] suffered from any statutorily defined mental illness,

disease or defect” at the time of the shootings. He also concluded,

“Mr. Moench did have symptoms of major depression at the time of

the index offense, in my opinion; however, these were not

associated with psychotic symptoms and did not interfere in any

significant way with Mr. Moench’s ability to understand his

circumstances, or alter his behavior . . . .” Again, Moench’s motion

failed to allege facts that, if proved, would contradict this record

evidence.

III. Restitution Order

¶ 50 For the first time on appeal, Moench contends that the district

court lacked authority to enter a restitution order, and therefore,

his sentence was illegal.

¶ 51 We review the legality of a sentence de novo. Snow v. People,

2025 CO 32, ¶ 23.

¶ 52 A defendant may challenge his sentence under Crim. P. 35(a)

as either an illegal sentence claim or an illegal manner claim.

Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 24. This is an important

22
distinction “because an illegal manner claim is subject to a time

limitation, but an illegal sentence claim is not.” Id. at ¶ 30.

¶ 53 A sentence is illegal if it “is not authorized by law because it

fails to comply in full with statutory requirements.” Id. at ¶ 25; see,

e.g., Downing v. People, 895 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Colo. 1995)

(resentencing to a longer term than originally imposed in violation

of a statutory prohibition is illegal); People v. White, 179 P.3d 58,

60-61 (Colo. App. 2007) (a sentence imposed to be served

concurrently, when the General Assembly required it be imposed to

be served consecutively with another sentence, is illegal).

¶ 54 “A sentence is imposed in an illegal manner ‘when the trial

court ignores essential procedural rights or statutory considerations

in forming the sentence.’” Tennyson, ¶ 29 (quoting 15 Robert J.

Dieter, Colorado Practice Series: Criminal Practice and Procedure

§ 21.10 n.10 (2d ed. 2004)); see, e.g., People v. Sisson, 179 P.3d

193, 196 (Colo. App. 2007) (a claim of denial of procedural due

process is an illegal manner claim).

¶ 55 As part of its sentencing prerogative, the “General Assembly

has long required that every criminal sentence reflect consideration

of restitution.” Tennyson, ¶ 20. A restitution order under section

23
18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025, “allows a trial court, at or before

sentencing, ‘to merely order that the defendant be obligated to pay

restitution and postpone a determination of the specific amount of

restitution.’” Id. at ¶ 41 (quoting Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576,

578 (Colo. 2008)). Accordingly, a “defendant’s judgment of

conviction becomes final and appealable when the court enters an

order making the defendant liable to pay restitution, even though

the amount of restitution hasn’t been (and won’t be) determined

until sometime after the sentencing hearing.” Id. (citing Sanoff, 187

P.3d at 578-79).

¶ 56 Because the amount of restitution “has been severed from the

meaning of the term ‘sentence,’ . . . an order for a specific amount

of restitution is itself an appealable order,” “[a]s a separate, final

judgment.” Sanoff, 187 P.3d at 578. Accordingly, a claim, “which

challenges the timeliness of the determination of the amount of

restitution, is an illegal manner claim, not an illegal sentence

claim.” Tennyson, ¶ 45 (emphasis added).

¶ 57 Snow, on which Moench relies, doesn’t support his contention.

In Snow, the prosecution asked the district court to “reserve

restitution” for sixty days, and the district court granted its request.

24
Snow, ¶ 7. The prosecution filed a motion for restitution, and the

district court entered a post-sentencing restitution order granting

the prosecution’s motion 108 days after the sentencing hearing. Id.

at ¶ 8. The supreme court held that sentence was illegal because

“the court’s order at sentencing related to restitution did not satisfy

the restitution component of Snow’s sentence and judgment of

conviction.” Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23,

¶¶ 13-14). And because restitution is a component of every

sentence, and the district court didn’t enter any of the orders

authorized by section 18-1.3-603(1), the illegal sentence remained

correctable at any time. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.

¶ 58 By contrast, the court in this case indicated that it would

reserve determining the restitution amount because the necessary

information wasn’t yet available. The prosecutor told the court that

“[s]ome of the [restitution] figures are yet to be determined” and

asked “that the defendant be ordered to pay restitution and that the

amount be determined within 91 days.” Defense counsel said he

had reached out to the prosecution “to check about the restitution,”

and “[i]t sounds like there’s not a figure yet.” And defense counsel

also said the defense had asked if certain of Moench’s property

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could be released to law enforcement “so that they could auction

that and defray some of the expenses in this case.” The

prosecutor’s statements and defense counsel’s responses indicated

that the only possible dispute was over the amount of restitution;

whether restitution should be ordered wasn’t contested. Thus,

when the court later said the prosecution would “have 91 days to

file their motion for restitution,” we read that statement as ordering

restitution but allowing the prosecution time, as requested, to

present a specific amount. See § 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2015.

Therefore, unlike in Snow, the district court in this case granted the

prosecution’s request for restitution and left only the amount of

restitution to be determined later. Compare Snow, ¶¶ 6-7, 27; with

Sanoff, 187 P.3d 577 (“As authorized by the applicable statutory

provision, the court reserved ruling on the specific amount of

restitution . . . .” (footnote omitted)).

¶ 59 To the extent Moench challenges the timing of the court’s

determination of the amount of restitution, that challenge is a time-

barred illegal manner claim. See Tennyson, ¶ 45.

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IV. Abandoned Claims

¶ 60 We deem abandoned any Crim. P. 35(c) claims Moench raised

in his postconviction motion but hasn’t reasserted on appeal. See

People v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801 (Colo. App. 2007).

V. Disposition

¶ 61 We affirm the order and sentence.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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