Marriage of Prieto

24CA1812 Marriage of Prieto 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1812
Weld County District Court No. 22DR998
Honorable Julie C. Hoskins, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Manuel Ruiz Prieto,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

and

Lisa Ruiz Prieto,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Harris and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 2, 2025

Antommaria Ilevska Elder, LLC, Sharon Elder, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellant
and Cross-Appellee

Lyons Gaddis, P.C., John Wade Gaddis, Longmont, Colorado, for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant
¶1 Manuel Ruiz Prieto (husband) appeals the division of marital

property entered in connection with the dissolution of his marriage

with Lisa Ruiz Prieto (wife). Wife cross-appeals the lack of security

for payments the court ordered husband to make to her. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The parties were married for eight years. During the marriage,

husband owned and operated a trucking business, Ruiz Trucking,

LLC. In 2018 and 2019, the reported incomes for Ruiz Trucking

were $366,279 and $696,647, respectively. In 2020, husband

closed the business, sold several of its trucks, and moved to Mexico.

In 2022, he returned to Colorado and reopened the business.

Although the parties disputed the amount of Ruiz Trucking’s

income in 2023, there was evidence to indicate that the business

was generating at least $25,000 of monthly income.

¶3 At the permanent orders hearing, husband testified that the

value of Ruiz Trucking was limited to the value of the two trucks it

still owned. He did not specify that value, but in his written closing

argument, he claimed the trucks had no marketable value.

¶4 Wife presented testimony from an expert that Ruiz Trucking

made material misstatements in its financial reports, understated

1
its net income, and misreported its assets. The expert testified that

Ruiz Trucking’s net monthly income for 2023 was at least $37,300.

Although the court precluded the expert from opining on the value

of Ruiz Trucking, wife argued it was worth $454,308 — one times

its average annual income for 2018, 2019, and 2023.1

¶5 The district court adopted wife’s valuation. It first found that

husband’s claim that Ruiz Trucking had minimal or no value was

inconsistent with the substantial income the business had

generated over past years. It also found that husband had “not

been forthcoming with the value of income or assets of his

business,” and “his bookkeeping as to expenses ha[d] been

inaccurate.” Noting that it had “no other starting point” for valuing

the business, the court concluded that wife’s valuation was “quite

reasonable[] and likely understate[d] the value of Ruiz Trucking.”

¶6 The court divided the value of the business equally between

the parties, allocating ownership of the business to husband and

ordering him to pay wife $227,154 (via monthly payments on an

1 Although wife’s expert testified that Ruiz Trucking’s 2023 monthly

income was $37,300, wife’s valuation used a more conservative
calculation of $25,000 that was based on husband’s estimates.

2
interest-bearing promissory note). The court also equally divided

the marital equity in the marital home, with husband retaining the

home and paying wife her share of the equity ($168,762) through

monthly payments on an interest-bearing promissory note. The

court divided the other marital assets relatively equally as well.

¶7 The court reserved jurisdiction to divide a piece of property in

Fort Lupton that wife alleged, in a separate pending civil action, had

been fraudulently transferred from Ruiz Trucking to husband’s

sister-in-law. The civil case resulted in an order invalidating the

transfer and concluding that Ruiz Trucking owned a fifty percent

interest in the property. The dissolution court then allocated to wife

half of the marital equity in that property, entered judgment in her

favor, and authorized her to file a first lien against the property.

II. Value of Ruiz Trucking

¶8 Husband contends that the district court erred in determining

the value of Ruiz Trucking. He argues that the court used an

improper valuation method, relied on outdated and speculative

financial information, and failed to consider the value of the

business’s assets and liabilities. We are not persuaded.

3
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶9 The district court has discretion to determine the value of

marital property, so long as its valuation is reasonable in light of

the evidence as a whole. In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23.

The court may select the valuation of one party over that of the

other, or it may make its own valuation. Id. We will uphold the

district court’s decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.

¶ 10 It is the parties’ duty to present the district court with

sufficient data to make a reasonable valuation, and a party’s failure

to do so is not a basis for reversal. Id. Thus, a party who fails to

present sufficient evidence of value may not on appeal challenge the

adequacy of the evidence to support the court’s valuation. In re

Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003).

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The valuation of Ruiz Trucking proposed by wife, and adopted

by the district court, was grounded in the evidence. Wife first

calculated the business’s average annual net income using (1) its

annual income for 2018 and 2019 — the two most recent years

before husband temporarily closed the business — as reflected on

the company’s tax returns; and (2) its projected annual income for

4
2023 — the first year after the business reopened — based on

husband’s own testimony about the company’s gross revenue and

historical net income percentage. She then used a multiplier of one

times annual net income to arrive at an estimated value.

¶ 12 The district court’s decision to adopt wife’s proposed valuation

was reasonable in light of the evidence presented. See Krejci, ¶ 23.

Neither party presented expert testimony of the business’s value.

And husband maintained only that the business was practically

worthless — a position the district court rejected as incredible in

light of the business’s substantial income in past years and

husband’s inadequate financial disclosures. See In re Marriage of

Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (noting that credibility determinations

are “within the sole discretion of the [district] court” (citation

omitted)). The district court appropriately weighed the parties’

conflicting valuations and found wife’s reasonable based on the

financial evidence presented.2 See Krejci, ¶ 23; In re Marriage of

Nordahl, 834 P.2d 838, 842 (Colo. App. 1992) (upholding the

district court’s valuation of a business when neither party

2 Indeed, the district court found that wife’s formula “likely

understate[d] the value of Ruiz Trucking.”

5
presented expert evidence of its value, the parties’ valuations were

“sharply conflicting,” and the court had evidence of capital

investments, value of assets, and annual gross and net earnings).

¶ 13 Husband takes issue with the district court’s methodology,

arguing that it is overly simplified and fails to take into account

several other pertinent factors, including the value of the business’s

goodwill (if any), a marketability discount, and a capitalization rate.

But husband did not present any evidence — or even argument —

to allow the court to make these determinations. See Krejci, ¶ 23;

Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012

CO 61, ¶ 18 (“[I]ssues not raised in or decided by a lower court will

not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”). And he does not

point us to any legal authority that requires the court to sua sponte

value a business’s goodwill or determine and apply a marketability

discount and capitalization rate that is not argued by either party

and that there is no evidence to support. See In re Marriage of

Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (noting that party asserting error bears

burden of providing supporting authority for their contentions).

¶ 14 Husband also argues that the district court erred by relying on

Ruiz Trucking’s income from 2018 and 2019, before he moved to

6
Mexico and sold many of the business’s assets. But based on the

record in this case, we cannot say that the court’s reliance on the

2018 and 2019 income was unreasonable. Those were the last two

full years of operation before husband temporarily closed the

business from 2020 to 2022. When husband reopened the

business, it quickly returned to generating substantial income.

From this evidence, the court could reasonably determine that the

business’s annual incomes in 2018, 2019, and 2023 — the most

recent years of operation — were the most credible indicators of

what its performance would be going forward. To the extent

husband asserts that the income projection for 2023 was

speculative, that calculation too is supported by the record,

including wife’s expert’s testimony and husband’s own testimony.

¶ 15 Thus, the record supports the district court’s calculation of

Ruiz Trucking’s average annual income. And based on the evidence

and arguments before the court, the court’s decision to calculate

the value of the business by multiplying its average annual net

income by one was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. We

therefore will not disturb that valuation. See Krejci, ¶¶ 23, 25.

7
III. Division of Marital Property

¶ 16 Husband also contends that the district court erred in its

division of the marital estate. We again disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 17 The district court has great latitude to equitably divide the

marital estate in a manner it deems just based on the facts and

circumstances of the case. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re

Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. We will not disturb the

court’s division of property absent an abuse of discretion, which

occurs when the decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair or when the court misapplied the law. Medieros, ¶ 28.

B. Analysis

¶ 18 Husband first argues that the district court failed to address

whether Ruiz Trucking, which husband founded before the

marriage, was his separate property. But while an asset acquired

before the marriage is generally considered the party’s separate

property, § 14-10-113(4), such an asset becomes marital property if

it has become so commingled with marital property that it cannot

be traced back to its original separate form, In re Marriage of Smith,

2024 COA 95, ¶ 59. Moreover, any increase in value of a separate

8
asset during the marriage is marital property. § 14-10-113(4). The

party seeking to have property declared as separate bears the

burden of proving it retains its separate character. Smith, ¶ 41.

¶ 19 By dividing the value of Ruiz Trucking as marital property, the

district court implicitly found that husband did not meet this

burden. See Medeiros, ¶ 52 (holding that, by classifying property as

marital, the district court implicitly determined that husband did

not overcome the statutory presumption). That finding has record

support. In particular, husband does not direct us to any evidence

of Ruiz Trucking’s premarital value, if any. See § 14-10-113(4). Nor

did he present any evidence to otherwise trace Ruiz Trucking’s

present value — in whole or in part — to his separate property.

Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding, albeit

implicitly, that the full value of Ruiz Trucking was marital property.

¶ 20 Husband next argues that the district court failed to address

his testimony that he was only a fifty-percent owner of Ruiz

Trucking, having transferred half of his ownership interest to his

girlfriend. But wife argued that this transfer was void as a violation

of the automatic injunction prohibiting the transfer of marital

property during the pendency of a dissolution proceeding. See

9
§ 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2025. And by dividing the entire

value of Ruiz Trucking between the parties, the court implicitly

agreed and determined that husband retained full ownership of the

company. See Medeiros, ¶ 46 (holding that district court did not err

by failing to make express finding of husband’s ownership

percentage when its finding was implicit). Husband does not

develop any legal or factual argument that the court erred by doing

so. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA

105, ¶ 29 (declining to address an undeveloped contention).

¶ 21 Finally, husband contends that, in dividing the marital

property, the district court failed to make sufficient findings

regarding the factors in section 14-10-113(1). Those factors include

the parties’ contributions to the acquisition of marital property, the

value of property set aside to each party, the parties’ economic

circumstances, and any increase or decrease in the value of

separate property. § 14-10-113(1). But a court need not make

specific findings as to each statutory factor as long as its findings

allow us to determine that the decision is supported by competent

evidence. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 19.

10
¶ 22 The district court found, with record support, that husband

was earning $25,000 per month, ten times wife’s monthly

employment income of $2,500, and it set aside $150,000 of the

equity in the marital home as husband’s separate property. See

§ 14-10-113(1)(b)-(c). The record also indicates that both parties

materially contributed to the acquisition of marital property —

husband primarily financially, and wife primarily by caring for the

parties’ child and home. See § 14-10-113(1)(a). Based on this

evidence, the court acted within its considerable discretion by

allocating the marital property, including the value of Ruiz

Trucking, relatively equally. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d

525, 538 (Colo. 1995) (“[A]n appellate court must not disturb the

delicate balance achieved by the trial court in division of [marital]

property . . . unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”).

IV. Wife’s Cross-Appeal — Security for Payments Owed

¶ 23 Wife asserts that the district court’s failure to require security

for the amounts it ordered husband to pay her — $168,762 for the

marital home and $227,154 for Ruiz Trucking, payable in

consecutive $5,000 monthly installments — left her “vulnerable to

nonpayment and undue financial risk.” She asks us to “modify” the

11
permanent orders to provide the necessary security through (1) a

lien on the marital home; (2) a security interest in Ruiz Trucking’s

assets; and (3) monthly financial disclosures from husband.

¶ 24 To the extent wife asks this court to enter an order requiring

security, we lack the authority to do so. Our appellate jurisdiction

is limited to reviewing final judgments and orders. See § 13-4-

102(1), C.R.S. 2025; C.A.R. 1(a)(1); In re Marriage of Evans, 2021

COA 141, ¶ 11. It is not our role to issue them. See In re Org. of N.

Chaffee Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist., 544 P.2d 637, 638 (Colo. 1975).

¶ 25 To the extent wife contends that the district court erred by

failing to order security, we are not persuaded. The district court

had the authority to require security from husband to ensure the

enforcement of its orders. § 14-10-118(2), C.R.S. 2025. It did that

by ordering husband to execute interest-bearing promissory notes

payable to wife. Wife did not request any further security for those

payments at the time of the permanent orders.

¶ 26 Later, after the separate civil case determined that Ruiz

Trucking owned a fifty-percent interest in the Fort Lupton property,

wife asked the court to grant her a first security interest in that

property interest to secure husband’s payments for the marital

12
home and Ruiz Trucking. The court awarded wife half of the

marital equity in the Fort Lupton property. It also entered

judgment in wife’s favor and authorized her to file a first lien

against the Fort Lupton property for her share in that property.

¶ 27 Although the court did not grant wife’s request to extend that

security interest to the payments for the marital home and Ruiz

Trucking, it acted within its discretion to order a level of security

that would reasonably secure wife’s right to receive her portion of

the marital estate. The court ordered husband to execute

promissory notes, and it secured wife’s interest in the Fort Lupton

property through a judgment and lien. If husband does not comply

with the terms of the court’s judgment — including by making the

required payments — wife has remedies to enforce that judgment.

See, e.g., C.R.C.P. 107. We cannot say that the court’s ruling was

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or that it misapplied

the law. See In re Marriage of Wormell, 697 P.2d 812, 814 (Colo.

App. 1985) (“[T]he mechanism employed by the court for dividing

the marital estate is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.”).

13
V. Husband’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 28 Husband requests an award of his attorney fees associated

with wife’s cross-appeal on the ground that the cross-appeal was

frivolous and lacked substantial justification. See § 13-17-102(4),

C.R.S. 2025; C.A.R. 38(b). We deny this request. Although wife did

not prevail in her cross-appeal, the appeal was not so lacking in

justification as to warrant an award of fees. See Glover v. Serratoga

Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 70 (noting that awards of appellate

attorney fees for frivolous appeals should be reserved for “clear and

unequivocal” cases involving “egregious conduct” (citation omitted)).

VI. Disposition

¶ 29 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

14