Peo in Interest HHM

25CA0283 Peo in Interest of HHM 09-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0283
Douglas County District Court No. 22JV30075
Honorable Ben L. Leutwyler III, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of H.H.M., a Child,

and Concerning A.R.M. and A.A.M.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 18, 2025

Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Valerie Brewster, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant A.R.M.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant A.A.M.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, A.R.M. (father) and

A.A.M. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with H.H.M. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2020, the Douglas County Department of Human Services

(the Department) received a referral after the then-newborn child’s

umbilical cord tested positive for illegal substances. The child was

adjudicated dependent or neglected and the family participated in a

dependency and neglect action. In February 2022, the dependency

and neglect action closed successfully with the child in the custody

of her parents. However, just one month later the Department

received another referral due to a domestic violence incident

between mother and father. The Department opened a non-court-

involved voluntary case and, in September 2022, filed a petition in

dependency and neglect raising concerns that mother and father

were not following safety plans to address domestic violence

between them. The petition also raised concerns about mother’s

substance dependence and both parents’ mental health. The court

granted mother temporary custody of the child, with protective

supervision by the Department.

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¶3 The court again adjudicated the child dependent and neglected

and adopted treatment plans for both parents. After mother tested

positive for methamphetamine in January 2023, the juvenile court

granted temporary custody of the child to the Department.

¶4 In April 2024, the Department and the child’s guardian ad

litem (GAL) moved to terminate both parent’s parental rights. The

parties agreed to continue the hearing scheduled for August 2024

to give mother more time to continue substance dependence

treatment. Five months later, the juvenile court terminated mother

and father’s parental rights following a contested hearing.

II. Father’s Treatment Plan

¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding his

treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child

legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the

problems that required intervention into the family. People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 25. Therefore, an appropriate

treatment plan is one that is approved by the court, relates to the

child’s needs, and provides treatment objectives that are reasonably

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calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to

the child within a reasonable time. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025;

People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 13. A juvenile court

abuses its discretion in formulating a treatment plan when its

actions are manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based

on an erroneous understanding or application of the law. People in

Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶¶ 12, 32.

¶7 The appropriateness of a treatment plan is determined by its

likelihood of successfully reuniting the family, which we assess

based on facts existing at the time the juvenile court approved the

plan. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App.

2005). The fact that a treatment plan is not ultimately successful

does not mean that it was inappropriate when the court approved

it. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo. 1986).

b. Analysis

¶8 The juvenile court adopted father’s treatment plan in

November 2022 with father’s agreement. The plan required him to

(1) maintain communication with the Department; (2) complete a

domestic violence evaluation and comply with the

recommendations; (3) cooperate with probation and the courts

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regarding his criminal cases; and (4) complete a mental health

evaluation and comply with any recommendations. The plan stated

that “if [father] becomes incarcerated, his treatment plan will be

reassessed and then modified to include the treatment programs

available through the DOC facility or jail, if necessary.”

¶9 In January 2023, father’s probation was revoked, and he was

sentenced to the Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶ 10 The juvenile court found that the treatment plan was

appropriate. Because father questioned whether the terms of the

treatment plan became inappropriate after his incarceration, we

may presume that the court considered his argument and

applicable evidence when making this finding. See In re Marriage of

Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329-30 (Colo. App. 2007) (appellate court

may presume that the district court considered evidence presented,

even if the order does not expressly reflect consideration of all

relevant circumstances). The court recognized that domestic

violence treatment was not available to father after his incarceration

but nonetheless found that the need for participation in domestic

violence assessment and treatment remained “significant” given the

risk of physical and emotional harm to the child.

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¶ 11 The record supports these findings. Father was incarcerated

due to a domestic violence incident that occurred in front of the

child. This incident resulted in the Department re-engaging with

the family after the first dependency and neglect case closed. The

requirements that father engage in domestic violence and mental

health evaluations were designed to mitigate the risk of future

domestic violence incidents and facilitate the safe reunification of

the family. Although “changed circumstances may render a

treatment plan, previously approved at a dispositional hearing, no

longer appropriate,” People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 26,

the plain language of the treatment plan provides that it will be

“modified . . . if necessary,” not automatically at father’s sentencing.

The court’s finding that the child still needed father to address

domestic violence amounts to a finding that removing this

component of the treatment plan was not necessary. We discern no

abuse of discretion in this finding.

¶ 12 Father also contends that the treatment plan was not

appropriate because the Department did not fulfill its promise to

reassess the treatment plan after father’s incarceration. But a

department’s later efforts to implement the terms of a treatment

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plan have no bearing on whether the plan was appropriate when it

was adopted. People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 26. We

therefore discern no error in the court’s finding that the treatment

plan was appropriate.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 13 We next consider whether the juvenile court erred in finding

that the Department provided reasonable efforts where the

Department failed to follow through on its promise to reassess

father’s treatment plan. Father also contends that the court erred

in finding the Department made reasonable efforts because it did

not comply with the reporting requirements established by section

19-3-508(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 2025.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 14 Whether a department has met its obligation to make

reasonable efforts to reunify a family is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

juvenile court’s factual findings related to reasonable efforts for

clear error, but we review de novo the court’s legal determination,

based on those findings, as to whether the Department satisfied its

reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

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¶ 15 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the county department of human

services must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and

reunite families. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-

604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the

“exercise of diligence and care . . . for children and youth who are in

foster care or out-of-home placement.” § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 16 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). As relevant here,

section 19-3-208 requires a department to provide individual case

plans for the provision of services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). In evaluating

reasonable efforts, we also consider whether the department

complied with the terms of the case plan. A.N-B., ¶ 26.

b. The Department’s Failure to Reassess the Treatment Plan

¶ 17 When father’s treatment plan was adopted in November 2022,

father knew that he would likely be incarcerated as a result of a

pending probation revocation in a criminal case. At the

dispositional hearing, father agreed with the terms of the

Department’s proposed treatment plan but asked the court to add

an obligation that “if [father] becomes incarcerated, his treatment

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plan will be reassessed and then modified to include the treatment

programs available through the Department of Corrections facility

or jail, if necessary.” At the hearing, the Department agreed that “if

there were to be a subsequent incarceration, we would have the

obligation to assess if the treatment plan continued to be

appropriate.” Father was subsequently incarcerated and, by the

time of the termination hearing, had been incarcerated in the DOC

for almost two years.

¶ 18 The Department and GAL contend that the terms of father’s

treatment plan did not necessarily require court action because the

treatment plan only needed to be “modified . . . if necessary.” We

agree. However, the plan did require the Department to, at a

minimum, internally reassess father’s treatment plan. The

caseworker’s testimony made clear that she made no efforts to do

so. While the Department began providing therapeutically

supervised family time six months after father was incarcerated, the

caseworker did not make any attempts to talk to father’s case

manager at the DOC facility until just one month before the

termination hearing. Even then, the caseworker never asked the

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DOC case manager what programs were available to father through

the facility.

¶ 19 Father’s treatment plan did not require him to participate in

any treatment unless doing so was recommended by a domestic

violence or mental health evaluation. He testified that he was in the

community for nine months before his incarceration. Uncontested

testimony established that father did not engage in any evaluations

or treatment during this time.

¶ 20 The Department could have — but failed to — communicate

with the DOC facility to determine if the facility either (1) offered the

mental health and domestic violence evaluations required by the

treatment plan or (2) permitted a provider contracted with the

Department to enter the facility to administer the necessary

evaluations.

¶ 21 Nevertheless, the juvenile court could have reasonably

determined that the Department’s failure to reassess the treatment

plan after father’s incarceration was mitigated by his earlier failure

to complete the evaluations before his incarceration. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12 (the court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when evaluating

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whether a department made reasonable efforts). Furthermore, the

record contains no evidence that funding was available for the

Department to provide a mental health evaluation or services that

might be recommended by an evaluation at the DOC facility. See

§ 19-3-208(2)(d)(IV) (“[d]iagnostic, mental health, and health-care

services” to be made available based on the availability of funding

and as determined necessary and appropriate by individual case

plans).

¶ 22 In any event, whether a department made reasonable efforts

“must be measured holistically rather than in isolation with respect

to specific treatment plan objectives.” People in Interest of My.K.M.

v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 35. Father does not contend that the

Department’s efforts to meet other terms of his treatment plan were

not reasonable. The juvenile court, with record support, found that

the Department maintained contact with father during his

incarceration and provided therapeutic family time.

¶ 23 Furthermore, father does not explain what he believes should

have resulted from the Department’s reevaluation of the treatment

plan, given the limited resources available at the DOC facility. At

the termination hearing, father agreed that domestic violence

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impacted the child and was the basis for the dependency and

neglect case. The treatment plan could not be “modified to include

the treatment programs available through the Department of

Corrections” because testimony from father, his DOC case manager,

and the Department’s caseworker suggested that domestic violence

and mental health evaluations were not available. The lack of

resources at the DOC facility did not invalidate the child’s need for

father to address domestic violence. See K.B., ¶ 14 (A treatment

plan must “adequately address the safety concerns identified during

the assessment of the family.”); see also § 19-1-103(12) (A treatment

plan must “relate[] to the child’s needs.”). Moreover, father never

explained why he was unable to engage in domestic violence and

mental health evaluations during the time preceding his

incarceration.

¶ 24 Given this record, we discern no error in the court’s

conclusion that the Department provided reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate father and reunify the family.

IV. Compliance with Section 19-3-508

¶ 25 The Department and GAL contend that any violation of section

19-3-508(1)(e)(III) falls outside the Department’s reasonable efforts

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obligation under section 19-3-208 and, therefore, should not be

considered as a reasonable efforts issue. We need not decide

whether father’s closing statement was sufficient to preserve this

issue; regardless of whether father failed to preserve the issue or

whether we address it on the merits, the outcome is the same. See

L&R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 536 (Colo. App. 2011)

(declining to resolve an issue where outcome would not change);

People in Interest of R.R., 607 P.2d 1013, 1015 n.2 (Colo. App.

1979).

¶ 26 If, after disposition is entered, a child’s parent becomes

continuously incarcerated for more than thirty-five days, “the

caseworker assigned to the case, upon knowledge of incarceration,”

shall provide information detailing either (1) “the services and

treatment available to a parent at the facility or jail where the

parent is incarcerated” or (2) “the caseworker’s efforts to obtain the

information at the next scheduled court hearing.” § 19-3-

508(1)(e)(III).

¶ 27 Father was sentenced to the DOC in January 2023. The

statutory provision at issue took effect January 2024. Ch. 191, sec.

6, § 19-3-508(1)(e)(III), 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 957. The next

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dependency and neglect hearing was in February 2024. In her

court letter for that hearing, the caseworker reported that father

was “working to complete offered services while in DOC” including

anger management. In the next court letter, filed in April 2024, the

caseworker reported that father “engages in services as he is

permitted through the correctional facility” including the Reimagine

program, Reading for Success, psychiatry, and family time. As

father points out, the caseworker admitted that she did not attempt

to obtain information directly from the DOC facility. Instead, she

relied on information provided by father and included that

information in the court reports submitted after section 19-3-

508(1)(e)(III) took effect. This fulfills the statute’s narrow

obligations.1

1 Father’s contention highlights a key difference between section 19-

3-508(1)(e)(III) — applicable here because father’s incarceration
occurred after the dispositional order was entered — and section
19-3-508(1)(e)(I), which applies when a parent is incarcerated while
a treatment plan is being developed. While section 19-3-508(1)(e)(I)
requires a caseworker to “communicate with the facility or jail
where the parent is incarcerated regarding the requirements of the
court-ordered treatment plan,” section 19-3-508(1)(e)(III) contains
no such requirement.

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V. Fit in a Reasonable Time

¶ 28 Mother contends that the court erred by finding that she was

unfit and unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. We

discern no basis for reversal.

¶ 29 An unfit parent is one whose condition or conduct renders him

or her unable to give a child reasonable parental care. People in

Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable

parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide

nurturing and protection adequate to meet the child’s physical,

emotional, and mental health needs. People in Interest of A.J., 143

P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 30 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider

whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24. What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific

and must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of each particular child. Id. at

¶ 25. When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time of

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the filing of the petition, the action is subject to the expedited

permanency planning provisions and the court must consider the

child’s need to be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as

possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 31 The juvenile court found mother unfit in large part because of

her continued use of substances. The court noted that this was the

child’s second dependency and neglect action and found that

mother consistently failed to follow through with recommended

services. The court found mother’s testimony to be “less than

credible” regarding her plan to begin an intensive outpatient

program for substance dependence the day after the termination

hearing, noting she had made similar unfulfilled promises before.

¶ 32 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that the Department was involved in all but one month of the

child’s life. While acknowledging that mother and the child “have a

great bond,” the caseworker testified that “substance use is my

number one concern.”

¶ 33 Mother contends that she demonstrated “consistent,

significant changes” during the case. The juvenile court found that

mother successfully completed inpatient substance dependence

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treatment, and the testimony was uncontested that mother last

used methamphetamine four months before the termination

hearing. These are significant achievements. But at the

termination hearing, mother agreed that she had not consistently

participated in sobriety monitoring, had not engaged in treatment

for four months, and would test positive for marijuana if tested that

day.

¶ 34 The caseworker, a child protection expert, opined that

marijuana alone “can be a harmful substance when you have a

young child, especially with high needs,” because a parent under

the influence of marijuana is “not as attentive to the child’s needs.”

And the evidence was uncontested that the child had unusually

high needs. The child’s pediatric nurse practitioner testified that

the child was born with congenital anomalies and regularly saw a

team of specialists to address issues with eating, breathing, and a

developmental delay. The pediatric nurse practitioner testified that

the child needed to be closely monitored at all times for potential

complications with her feeding tube, feeding pumps, and breathing.

¶ 35 Notably, mother received additional time to become fit. Recall,

the termination hearing was originally scheduled for August 2024.

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In the month before the scheduled hearing, mother went to, and

successfully completed, inpatient treatment for her substance

dependance. But after that, mother did not continue substance

dependence treatment or follow through with other services.

¶ 36 We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not err by

declining to give mother even more time to achieve fitness. See

S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24, 28-29 (the court need not give a parent additional

time, even when there has been recent progress on the treatment

plan).

VI. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 37 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred in finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. More

specifically, she argues that “despite the availability of family

placements who wanted to provide permanency for the child, the

[juvenile] court rejected these less drastic alternatives.” Again, we

discern no error.

¶ 38 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal relationship.

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). In

considering less drastic alternatives, the court must base its

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decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs.

§ 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1126

(Colo. App. 2006). Notably, it is not enough for a placement to be

“available”; instead, any less drastic alternative must also be in the

child’s best interests. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14,

¶¶ 30-32.

¶ 39 Even when a placement provider or potential placement

provider is willing to enter into an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) with a parent, the court may properly

determine that such an arrangement does not adequately meet the

child’s needs. See People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910

(Colo. App. 2005) (permanent placement with a relative may not be

a viable alternative if it does not provide adequate permanence or

otherwise meet the child’s needs); People in Interest of D.B-J., 89

P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (a proposed placement is not a less

drastic alternative to termination if the placement provider lacks

appreciation of a child’s needs and conditions); A.M., ¶ 31 (“Primary

consideration of the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs requires more than a mere assessment of

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adequacy in order to satisfy the overall intent of the Children’s

Code.”).

¶ 40 The juvenile court found that an APR was “not reasonable”

and there was no less drastic alternative that would serve the

child’s best interests. In so doing, the court noted testimony

regarding the possible availability of the child’s maternal

grandparents, paternal grandparents, and paternal aunt as

potential placements. However, the court credited the caseworker’s

opinion that an APR was “not viable” because the child was “only

four years old and needs a stable home with caregivers who can

meet her needs until at least age [eighteen].” The court found that

the child needed the “stability and finality” that only termination

could provide.

¶ 41 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that the child had high medical needs and needed consistency and

diligence in following through on medical procedures, therapeutic

programs, and educational services. The caseworker opined that

termination best served the child’s needs and conditions, and that

the child deserved permanency and stability. The caseworker

opined that termination was in the child’s best interests.

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¶ 42 Mother emphasizes her “loving and bonded relationship” with

the child, and the positive relationships that the child had with her

extended biological family. The court may weigh a number of

factors when determining if a less drastic alternative is appropriate,

including the child’s relationship with a parent. People in Interest of

A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38. However, no single factor is

dispositive. Id. (noting that the court may consider “various

factors,” such as whether an ongoing relationship would benefit the

child). Because we cannot reweigh the evidence, we reject mother’s

assertion. S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

VII. Disposition

¶ 43 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

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