Peo in Interest of AH

25CA0717 Peo in Interest of AH 09-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0717
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV486
Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Ad.H. and Ar.H., Children,

and Concerning R.B.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 18, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora,
Colorado, for Appellee

Brittany A. Radic, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 R.B. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with Ad.H. and Ar.H. (the children). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2022, the Arapahoe County Department of Human

Services received a report with concerns about mother’s substance

use and the condition of her home. Mother agreed to provide a

drug screen, which was positive for alcohol and cocaine. The

Department then removed the children and filed a petition in

dependency or neglect.

¶3 Mother agreed to a deferred adjudication under section 19-3-

505(5), C.R.S. 2025, requiring her to comply with the following

treatment plan components: (1) cooperate with the Department; (2)

attend family time; (3) demonstrate protective parenting; (4) address

her substance abuse issues; (5) maintain stable housing; and (6)

secure employment or a legal source of income. After an evidentiary

hearing in September 2024, the court revoked the deferred

adjudication and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.

The court then formally adopted the treatment plan described

above.

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¶4 In January 2025, the Department moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary

hearing in March 2025. After hearing the evidence, the court

granted the Department’s motion and terminated the parent-child

legal relationships between mother and the children.

II. Admission of Evidence

¶5 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by admitting a

report of her compliance with drug testing. Because mother did not

preserve her appellate arguments in the juvenile court, we decline

to address them for the first time on appeal.

¶6 At the termination hearing, the Department called the client

implementation manager for Cordant Health Solutions. The

manager explained that Cordant provides a program called Sentry,

which tracks whether a participant in the program (1) calls into the

random drug screen line, (2) is selected for testing, and (3)

completes a drug test. He also testified that the program compiles a

report that tracks each participant’s compliance.

¶7 The county attorney then asked the juvenile court’s

permission to show the manager a copy of mother’s Sentry

compliance report, along with an affidavit from Cordant’s custodian

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of records. Mother’s counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit was

hearsay and that the county attorney had not laid the proper

foundation to authenticate the document or admit it. But the court

noted that the county attorney had not yet asked to admit the

document and only wanted to show the witness the exhibit to lay a

foundation.

¶8 The county attorney then asked foundational questions before

moving to admit the exhibit as “a self-authenticating document,

CRE 902.” The GAL also interjected that the exhibit was admissible

under CRE 803(6) as a business record. After conducting voir dire,

mother’s counsel objected because the document “was produced in

anticipation of litigation, which . . . disqualifies it as a business

record.” The court overruled mother’s objection, concluding that,

although the document was compiled for the hearing, the data

within the record itself was kept as a business record by Cordant.

¶9 First, mother asserts that the Department failed to provide

written notice of its intent to offer the exhibit as a self-

authenticating record. See CRE 902(11). But mother made no

such objection in the juvenile court. Rather, when the Department

offered the exhibit as a self-authenticating document, mother only

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objected to its trustworthiness under CRE 803(6). In other words,

although mother made an objection, she did so “on grounds

different from those raised on appeal” and therefore did not

preserve her appellate argument. People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36,

¶ 37. Consequently, we decline to address this argument for the

first time on appeal. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13,

¶ 14 (In dependency or neglect cases, appellate courts “review only

issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court.”).

¶ 10 Second, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by

admitting the exhibit under CRE 803(6) because the record was not

made by a “person with knowledge.” Recall that mother objected to

the exhibit because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and

therefore lacked trustworthiness. See People v. Tran, 2020 COA 99,

¶ 30 (“[D]ocuments prepared in anticipation of litigation are

presumptively unreliable and are not admissible under CRE

803(6).”). On appeal, she raises a completely different argument

under CRE 803(6). Thus, because mother did not properly preserve

the argument that she now raises on appeal, we decline to address

it. See M.B., ¶ 14; Ujaama, ¶ 37.

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III. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 11 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination and that the

court should have instead (1) denied the motion and given her more

time to comply with her treatment plan or (2) ordered an allocation

of parental responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandmother. For the

reasons stated below, we disagree.

A. More Time to Comply

¶ 12 Mother argues that there was a less drastic alternative in the

form of extending the case and giving her more time. We disagree

that this proposed resolution is properly characterized as a less

drastic alternative to termination. The less drastic alternative

analysis turns on whether there is a permanent or long-term

placement arrangement — such as an APR — that would conclude

the dependency or neglect proceeding without terminating parental

rights. However, rather than rejecting mother’s argument outright,

we opt to construe it as a challenge to whether the court erred by

finding that her conduct or condition was unlikely to change within

a reasonable time. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(III), C.R.S. 2025.

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¶ 13 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

under section 19-3-604 is a mixed question of fact and law. People

in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. When deciding whether a parent can become

fit within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether any

change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social

history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo.

App. 2003).

¶ 14 The juvenile court found that, based on mother’s “lack of

compliance or success at her treatment, combined with a

continuing parental unfitness,” it was unlikely that she could

change within a reasonable time. The court noted that “additional

time would [not] be helpful” for mother “at this point” because the

case had “already been pending for a significant period of time” and

she had not made sufficient improvements in her sobriety and

stability during that time. The court also pointed to evidence that

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mother’s attendance at family time had declined “over the last

year.”

¶ 15 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that mother had partially complied with many

of the objectives of her treatment plan but noted that mother’s

compliance had waned over the course of the case. For example,

mother completed a dual diagnosis evaluation, entered a sober

living facility, and complied with sobriety monitoring. But when

mother moved into her own apartment, she stopped submitting to

drug screens and had not produced a sample since October 2024.

Likewise, mother consistently participated in family time until she

missed nine straight weeks of visits between December 2024 and

February 2025. The caseworker and mother’s family time coach

testified about the negative impacts these missed visits had on the

children, including tantrums, nightmares, and developmental

regressions. Ultimately, the caseworker opined that giving mother

more time would not be in the children’s best interests, considering

that the children “have been displaying emotional distress and

behaviors because of the longevity of this case and the

inconsistency of visits.”

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¶ 16 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by declining to

give her more time because she “put in substantial work” and

“arguably complied with all of her treatment plan objectives.” We

acknowledge that there is evidence supporting mother’s position,

but there is also ample evidence, as described above, supporting the

juvenile court’s decision. See People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d

1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (even “increased compliance” over

the course of a case may not justify additional time). We must

reject mother’s argument because it would require us to reweigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court,

which we cannot do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 29.

B. APR to Maternal Grandmother

¶ 17 Mother submits that that the Department failed to adequately

evaluate maternal grandmother for placement and therefore the

juvenile court erred by rejecting an APR to maternal grandmother

as a less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 18 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

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(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). To aid the court in

determining whether there is a less drastic alternative to

termination, the department must evaluate a reasonable number of

persons the parent identifies as placement options. People in

Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 19 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

¶ 20 The juvenile court determined that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination and that termination and adoption was in

the children’s best interests. In doing so, the court noted that (1)

maternal grandparents were unwilling to accept placement because

they were already a placement for mother’s older child and (2) it had

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not heard any evidence that maternal grandparents had changed

their position.

¶ 21 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that the Department had contacted the

individuals provided by mother, but there was no one who could be

a placement for the children. The caseworker said that the

Department had contacted maternal grandparents early in the case,

and they indicated that they could not be a placement because they

already had mother’s older child. The caseworker also testified that

maternal grandparents had not reached out to her to say that they

had changed their position and maternal grandfather had recently

passed away. The caseworker testified that the children were in a

foster placement, the foster parents wanted to adopt them, and

termination and adoption was in their best interests because they

needed permanency that only an adoption could provide.

¶ 22 Still, mother asserts that the Department did not adequately

investigate maternal grandparents because it did not contact the

maternal grandparents again after the juvenile court adopted a

permanency goal of adoption. But mother does not direct us to any

authority that requires the Department to repeatedly contact a

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relative who already declined placement. Instead, mother cites a

regulation that directs a department to conduct a “[f]amily search

and engagement” every six months until a child has achieved

permanency. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.304.52(C), 12 Code Colo.

Regs. 2509-4. Yet, nothing in this regulation requires the

Department to reach back out to a relative that it has already

contacted. See Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.000.2, 12 Code Colo.

Regs. 2509-1 (defining “[f]amily search and engagement” as “the

diligent and timely good faith effort to locate and contact” relatives).

¶ 23 Accordingly, we conclude that the Department sufficiently

evaluated maternal grandmother for placement and therefore

discern no error in the juvenile court’s decision to reject less drastic

alternatives to termination. See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532.

IV. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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