Peo in Interest of ARL

25CA0791 Peo in Interest of ARL 09-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0791
El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30831
Honorable Diana K May, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.R.L., Jr., a Child,

and Concerning P.S.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Fox and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 18, 2025

Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, P.S. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with A.R.L., Jr. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services initiated

this case based on substance use by mother and concerns about an

unsafe environment for the child. Early in the case, the child was

placed in the home of his maternal cousin and maternal cousin’s

wife (maternal cousins), where he remained for the rest of the case.

¶3 Mother agreed to a deferred adjudication, and the juvenile

court adopted a treatment plan for her. A year later, the

Department moved to revoke the deferred adjudication. Following

an evidentiary hearing, the court revoked the deferred adjudication

and adjudicated the child dependent and neglected.

¶4 The Department soon moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court terminated

mother’s parent-child legal relationship with the child.

II. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by terminating

her parental rights when an allocation of parental responsibilities

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(APR) to maternal cousins was a viable less drastic alternative to

termination. We disagree.

A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

¶6 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment

plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit;

and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶7 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the court must also consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. In

considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); see L.M., ¶ 29.

¶8 A juvenile court may consider various factors when

determining the viability of a less drastic alternative, including

whether an ongoing relationship with the parent would be beneficial

or detrimental to the child, L.M., ¶ 29, and whether the alternative

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placement option provides the child with adequate permanence and

meets the child’s needs, People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905,

910 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶9 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequate[ly]” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. People in Interest

of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers

a less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and

order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we

must affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 The juvenile court determined that no less drastic alternative

was available and that termination was in the child’s best interests.

While noting that the child “felt [i]nsecure” at the beginning of his

placement with maternal cousins, the court found that he felt

secure and safe there at the time of termination. The court found

that the then-eight-year-old child was having his emotional,

physical, and mental needs met in a caring, stable environment in

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which he had resided for nearly eighteen months. See T.E.M., 124

P.3d at 910.

¶ 11 The testimony of the caseworker, the sole witness at the

hearing whose testimony the court found credible, supports the

court’s findings. The caseworker opined that, while the child

experienced trauma in mother’s care, he is now “settled with the

fact that he is safe” and “knows what to predict day after day.” The

child considered his maternal cousins to be parental figures and

considered his cousins’ son to be his brother. The caseworker

opined that all the child’s needs were being met in his placement.

For example, the child had been attending therapy at the time of

termination.

¶ 12 The court also premised its determination, in relevant part, on

mother’s “complete lack of engagement.” The record shows that

mother did little to engage in treatment or to otherwise comply with

her treatment plan. Significantly, mother had not seen the child for

at least one year and three months by the time of the termination

hearing. According to the caseworker, mother expressed no desire

to “get [her] son back” and instead insisted to the Department that

the child should stay with maternal cousins.

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¶ 13 Notwithstanding, mother contends that an APR to maternal

cousins would have been in the child’s best interests because it

would have preserved his “attached relationship” to mother. We are

not persuaded. The court specifically found, with evidentiary

support, that an APR would not be in the child’s best interests

because it would have created anxiety, “emotional trauma,” and

“[i]nstability” for the “now . . . stable” child. See L.M., ¶ 29 (the

court may consider whether an ongoing relationship with the parent

would be beneficial or detrimental to the child); see also People in

Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 30 (“Permanent placement is not a

viable less drastic alternative if the child needs a stable, permanent

home that can only be assured by adoption.”). According to the

caseworker, the uncertainty surrounding mother’s whereabouts

created “turmoil” and “a little bit of anxiety” for the child.

¶ 14 To the extent that mother contends termination is

unwarranted because the maternal cousins were previously

amenable to an APR, we are unpersuaded. Mother does not direct

us to any authority to support this position. And, while the

caseworker acknowledged that the maternal cousins’ position

changed over time, at the time of the termination, the maternal

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cousins preferred adoption to avoid any “ongoing turmoil” that an

APR might cause. See Z.M., ¶ 31 (noting that the court may

consider whether the placement favors adoption rather than an

APR).

¶ 15 Because the record supports the court’s findings, we affirm its

determination. See B.H., ¶ 80.

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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