Peo v. Mullins

23CA1163 Peo v Mullins 09-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1163
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR4100
Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Lance Finas Mullins,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 11, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Claire Pakis, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Lance Finas Mullins, appeals the restitution order

entered following his guilty plea to second degree assault. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mullins pleaded guilty to second degree assault in exchange

for the dismissal of four additional charges. The charges were

based on allegations that Mullins had hit, kicked, and strangled his

girlfriend. As part of his plea agreement, Mullins agreed to pay

restitution, including for dismissed charges, and stipulated to

causation.

¶3 At sentencing, the district court ordered Mullins to pay

restitution but reserved a determination of the amount owed.

¶4 The prosecution requested $2,108.65 in restitution for

payments made by the Crime Victim Compensation Board (CVCB)

to Mullins’s girlfriend.

¶5 Mullins objected and requested a hearing. He subsequently

filed a request for disclosure of the documentation supporting the

CVCB payments, arguing that it was necessary to ensure he

proximately caused the losses. In the motion, Mullins recognized

that, per section 24-4.1-107.5, C.R.S. 2025, the defense must

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present a nonspeculative evidentiary hypothesis to support an in

camera review of CVCB records.

¶6 At a status hearing, defense counsel again argued for

disclosure of the supporting documentation:

I did receive one bill for radiology, but, again,
I’m just really hampered, because right now it
just says victim’s comp, and I think in order to
effectively be able to contest the amount, I
need to know the breakdown of what went
where and for what services. Is this
reimbursement for insurance? [F]or an
ambulance ride? [F]or something completely
different? It’s a black box, and I don’t know
what’s in it.

Counsel went on to identify the evidentiary hypothesis for the

disclosure:

[T]he evidentiary hypothesis is that there may
be things in there — because at the end of the
day, what we are talking about at this point in
the litigation, I think, is monetary and what
services, so I think that there may be things in
[Mullins’s case] that either go to services
rendered that were not proximately caused by
[Mullins] and/or services rendered that are
now — restitution is being requested for that
are for other services that may or may not be
something related to this case.

So, you know, part of this is asking me to
speculate on what the documents might be
when I don’t know what they are, but . . . for
example, in Mr. Mullins’[s] case, Mr. Mullins

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and the victim, who was his former wife, had
had a long and documented history, and I am
concerned that there may have been things
requested that did not have to do with [this]
case, that went beyond that, given the ups and
downs and I think tumult of their relationship.

¶7 The district court took the matter under advisement.

¶8 At another status hearing, the district court denied Mullins’s

request for disclosure of the CVCB documents, finding that he had

failed to establish a “nonspeculative evidentiary hypothesis” to

warrant disclosure. The court, however, ordered the prosecution to

provide Mullins with “a list of the amount of money paid to each

provider by the [CVCB], or if the prosecution is claiming that the

identity or location of a provider would pose a threat to the safety or

welfare of the victim, summary data reflecting what total payments

were made for.”

¶9 The prosecution provided the CVCB’s claim payment summary

to the defense. The summary included the amounts paid to and

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identities of the victim’s medical providers but excluded the identity

of the victim’s mental health provider.1

¶ 10 At the restitution hearing, defense counsel acknowledged

having received the claim payment summary from the prosecution.

Nonetheless, counsel renewed Mullins’s request for disclosure of the

CVCB documentation. She urged the district court to release the

documents so that she could have “a meaningful opportunity to

challenge the request for restitution” and protect Mullins’s due

process rights. The district court maintained its ruling and

proceeded with the hearing.

¶ 11 The victim compensation administrator for the CVCB testified

for the prosecution. She explained the application process for

reimbursement of a victim’s expenses, as well as the process for

1 We note that the CVCB’s claim payment summary provided to the

defense showed total “Medical Payments” of $2,108.65, which was
the full restitution amount requested by the prosecution and
ordered by the district court. However, the summary also
separately showed total “Mental Health Counseling” costs of $90,
for a grand total of $2,198.65, which is more than the prosecution
requested and more than the court ordered. It is therefore apparent
from the record that the prosecution didn’t seek restitution for the
victim’s mental health counseling and only did so for her medical
treatment; nor did the court order restitution for mental health
counseling. Accordingly, we need not address the parties’
arguments regarding the mental health counseling costs.

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ensuring “there is a nexus between the bills and payments

requested and the crime that occurred.” She said that these

processes were followed in Mullins’s case. The administrator

confirmed that “what was requested by the victim in this case was

related to the underlying crime.” On cross-examination, she

explained that, while she didn’t personally establish the correlations

between the police report and the medical bills, the CVCB did. The

administrator also indicated that she didn’t know if the victim used

insurance to pay for some of the medical bills even though the

CVCB is statutorily required to identify collateral resources.

¶ 12 The prosecution argued that section 18-1.3-603(10)(a), C.R.S.

2025, creates a rebuttable presumption that “if, as a result of the

defendant’s conduct, a [CVCB] has provided assistance to or on

behalf of a victim, the amount of assistance provided and requested

by the [CVCB] is presumed to be a direct result of the defendant’s

criminal conduct.” Defense counsel argued that she was unable to

rebut this presumption because she still didn’t have access to the

supporting documentation for the restitution request.

¶ 13 The district court reiterated that it “was not provided a

nonspeculative evidentiary hypothesis by the Defense that would

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necessitate an in camera review of the [CVCB] full discovery

records” and it didn’t “think the full discovery [wa]s permissible

under the current state of the law.” The court found that the

administrator’s testimony was credible and that the defense had

failed “to rebut the presumption that there’s a proximate causal link

between the strangulation of the victim by Mr. Mullins that he’s

pled guilty to and the restitution that’s being sought by the

[CVCB].” The court further found that the prosecution met its

burden of proving a causal link between Mullins’s conduct and the

restitution sought by the CVCB. The court granted the

prosecution’s request and ordered restitution in the amount of

$2,108.65.

II. Discussion

¶ 14 Mullins contends that the district court abused its discretion

by refusing to conduct an in camera review of the documents

submitted to the CVCB to support the prosecution’s restitution

request. He claims that the court’s refusal to conduct an in camera

review “made it impossible for [him] to exercise his due process

right to rebut the mandatory presumption that all CVCB payments

are proper.” We disagree.

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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 15 A district court’s refusal to conduct an in camera review of

CVCB documents is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v.

Fregosi, 2024 COA 6, ¶ 51. We review de novo whether the court

violated the defendant’s right to due process. People v. Calderon,

2014 COA 144, ¶ 23.

¶ 16 Criminal defendants must “make full restitution to those

harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025.

“Restitution” means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . .

proximately caused by an offender’s conduct . . . that can be

reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”

§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 17 When a CVCB pays a victim’s claim for losses, it may recover

that amount from a defendant. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV); People v.

Martinez-Chavez, 2020 COA 39, ¶ 13.

¶ 18 “In a restitution proceeding, the prosecution bears the burden

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence not only the victim’s

losses, but also that the victim’s losses were proximately caused by

the defendant’s criminal conduct.” Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 14. But the

amount of restitution requested by the CVCB is presumed to be a

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direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.

§ 18-1.3-603(10)(a). Accordingly, once a CVCB has established that

it has paid a victim a certain amount, a defendant has the burden

to present evidence showing that the amount paid was not the

direct result of his criminal conduct. People v. Henry, 2018 COA

48M, ¶ 19.

¶ 19 The amount of assistance that a CVCB provided to a victim

may be established by either (1) a list of the amount of money paid

to each provider; or (2) if the identity or location of a provider would

pose a threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, summary data

reflecting what total payments were made for. § 18-1.3-603(10).

¶ 20 The records kept by a CVCB “relating to [the] claimed amount

of restitution” are confidential. Henry, ¶ 28 (first quoting

§ 18-1.3-603(10)(c); and then citing § 24-4.1-107.5(2)). But a

defendant may obtain an in camera review of CVCB records if he

demonstrates that his request for such a review is “not speculative”

and “is based on an evidentiary hypothesis that warrants an in

camera review to rebut the presumption established in section

18-1.3-603.” Id. at ¶ 29 (quoting § 24-4.1-107.5(3)).

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¶ 21 After conducting an in camera review, a district court may

release additional information contained in the records only if it

finds that the information “[i]s necessary for the defendant to

dispute the amount claimed for restitution” and “[w]ill not pose any

threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, or any other person

whose identity may appear in the board’s records, or violate any

other privilege or confidentiality right.” § 24-4.1-107.5(3)(a)-(b).

B. Analysis

1. In Camera Review

¶ 22 Mullins argues that the district court erred by denying his

request for an in camera review of the CVCB documents because he

established a nonspeculative evidentiary hypothesis: that the “long

and documented history” between him and the victim created the

possibility that the requested amounts related to “other incidents”

and thus the expenses weren’t proximately caused by his actions in

this case. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 23 As in Fregosi, Mullins “presented no evidence or information

that the victim received medical or mental health treatment

unrelated to the conduct for which he was convicted.” Fregosi,

¶ 56. For example, if Mullins wished to rely on his history of

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domestic abuse with his girlfriend to establish an evidentiary

hypothesis, he could have supplied the court with information

regarding the supposed “other incidents” that occurred before the

incident at issue here. But he didn’t. His hypothesis that the “long

and documented history” between him and the victim could have

shown that the requested amounts related to “other incidents” is

speculative at best because Mullins presented no evidence or

information that the victim suffered injuries possibly requiring

medical treatment prior to the incident at issue. See People v.

Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272, 1277 (Colo. App. 2010) (finding the

defendant’s evidentiary hypothesis that the victim “must have had

previous mental health problems” speculative “because there [wa]s

no evidence that [the victim] received counseling prior to [the

defendant’s] sexual assault”). And the only record evidence of

previous incidents are references in the arrest warrant affidavit to

mandatory protection orders issued against Mullins in 2017 and

2018 with his girlfriend as the protected party. But, again, Mullins

didn’t present these as evidence or information that there were

“other incidents” possibly related to the medical payments.

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¶ 24 Nor did Mullins “offer an evidentiary hypothesis to the [district]

court that would have shown how the records would have rebutted

section 18-1.3-603(10)(a)’s rebuttable presumption.” Henry, ¶ 30

(emphasis added). For example, he didn’t allege “how [the CVCB]

records would have shown” that the victim’s medical payments

“were not a direct result of [his] criminal conduct.” Id. (emphasis

added). Mullins contends that he satisfied this requirement by

alleg[ing] how the CVCB records would have
shown that the victim’s medical costs “were
not a direct result of [Mr. Mullins’s] criminal
conduct” when trial counsel explained to the
court that Mr. Mullins and the victim had a
long and documented history of physical
altercations such that in camera review was
required to ensure that the services received
by the victim were related to this specific case.

¶ 25 But he still didn’t allege how the CVCB records would have

shown that the services the victim received weren’t related to this

case when there was no evidence that the victim sustained injuries

prior to the incident at issue.

¶ 26 Essentially, Mullins “alleged nothing more than that he needed

or wanted additional information.” Fregosi, ¶ 56. But “[i]f a litigant

fails to show ‘a specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable

likelihood’ that the discovery will yield material evidence, the

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request for in camera review is properly denied.” Id. (quoting People

v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 671 (Colo. 2010)). Mullins’s reference to

a “long and documented history” between him and the victim and

his suggestion that there were “other incidents” don’t satisfy this

requirement.

¶ 27 Mullins relies on People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA 111, for the

assertion that the standard for establishing a nonspeculative

evidentiary hypothesis is low and that he satisfied this low standard

because he

presented the court with (1) evidence, by way
of a radiology bill, that the CVCB had records
related to the monetary award for medical
costs, and (2) Mr. Mullins needed access to
those records to determine whether the
amount of money awarded was a proximate
result of his criminal conduct in this case
given his “long and documented history” with
the victim.

¶ 28 In Hernandez, the division addressed the defendant’s facial

constitutional challenge to section 18-1.3-603(10), which

establishes the rebuttable presumption for CVCB payments.

Hernandez, ¶¶ 53-60. In determining that the statute isn’t

unconstitutional in all its applications, the division gave an example

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of an evidentiary hypothesis that the defendant could have

presented:

Consider the “Claimant Payment Summary”
introduced during the restitution hearing. It
included the names of two payees — Heather
L. Rogers and SCL Health System — along
with the amounts paid and the dates of
payments. As to Ms. Rogers, who is not
otherwise identified, because the payment
could have been for anything, forming an
“evidentiary hypothesis” might be difficult. In
contrast, as to SCL, knowing that the victim
had suffered a knife wound and that SCL is a
health care provider, Hernandez could have
easily formed such an hypothesis: “Defendant
needs to discover the nature and dates of the
medical services provided to ascertain the
nexus, if any, to the injury sustained.”

Id. at ¶ 59.

¶ 29 While it’s true that the example given by the Hernandez

division lends itself to a low standard for establishing a

nonspeculative evidentiary hypothesis, we don’t perceive this as

greenlighting Mullins’s hypothesis. Fregosi and Henry require more

— that the defendant present evidence or information that the

victim received medical treatment unrelated to the conduct for

which he was convicted and/or that he explain how the CVCB

records would have rebutted section 18-1.3-603(10)(a)’s rebuttable

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presumption. See Fregosi, ¶ 56; Henry, ¶ 30. Mullins’s hypothesis

did neither.2 Nor did it “show ‘a specific factual basis

demonstrating a reasonable likelihood’ that the discovery [of the

CVCB documents] will yield material evidence.” Fregosi, ¶ 56

(quoting Spykstra, 234 P.3d at 671). And to the extent the

hypothetical in Hernandez articulated a lower evidentiary threshold

than Fregosi and Henry, we agree with standard outlined in the

latter cases. See People v. Thomas, 195 P.3d 1162, 1164 (Colo.

App. 2008) (one division of this court isn’t bound by the decision of

another division).

¶ 30 Mullins also asserts that “[s]ection 24-4.1-107.5 creates a

Catch-22 situation: a defendant must present a non-speculative

evidentiary hypothesis to obtain in camera review of information

held by a CVCB, yet doing so may be impossible without knowing

2 Although in his briefing to us Mullins argues that he presented a

radiology bill to the district court as evidence, we can’t ascertain
from the record where this occurred. In his objection to restitution,
he references a radiology bill he received in discovery. And at one of
the status conferences, Mullins explained that he had received a
radiology bill, but he didn’t present the bill to the court. Nor did he
argue that this bill related to an incident other than the one at
issue. He merely questioned the breakdown of the expense because
of the bill’s lack of specificity.

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the information held by the CVCB.” But this argument was

dispelled in Hernandez. There, the defendant argued that “to

obtain an in camera review of information held by the CVCB, he

must present ‘an evidentiary hypothesis.’ Yet, without knowing

what information the CVCB has, . . . he cannot present such a

hypothesis.” Hernandez, ¶ 55 (quoting § 24-4.1-107.5(3)). The

division rejected this argument, concluding that the defendant had

an evidentiary hypothesis available to him that would have passed

muster. Id. at ¶ 59. Likewise, here, Mullins could have presented a

nonspeculative evidentiary hypothesis that would have warranted

an in camera review of the CVCB records if he had presented

evidence or information that the victim received medical treatment

unrelated to the conduct for which he was convicted and/or

explained how the CVCB records would have rebutted section

18-1.3-603(10)(a)’s rebuttable presumption. See Fregosi, ¶ 56;

Henry, ¶ 30.

¶ 31 Accordingly, we conclude that Mullins’s insufficient and

speculative evidentiary hypothesis doesn’t meet the statutory

requirements for an in camera review of the CVCB records.

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Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

the in camera review.

2. Due Process

¶ 32 We also conclude that Mullins’s due process rights weren’t

violated. Due process is satisfied, in the restitution context, when

the defendant receives notice of the factual basis for restitution and

a reasonable opportunity to contest that basis. See People v. Perez,

2020 COA 83, ¶ 49, overruled on other grounds by People v. Weeks,

2021 CO 75, ¶ 47 n.16.

¶ 33 Mullins was on notice of the factual basis for the restitution

request. The prosecution timely filed a restitution request and

subsequently filed a claim payment summary from the CVCB. This

summary listed the amount of restitution sought and the payees on

whose behalf it was being sought.

¶ 34 Mullins had a reasonable opportunity to contest the factual

basis of the restitution request by requesting an in camera review

under section 24-4.1-107.5. That he failed to meet the statutory

requirements for an in camera review of the CVCB records doesn’t

amount to a due process violation. See Hernandez, ¶¶ 59-60.

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III. Disposition

¶ 35 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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