People in Interest of O.J.R.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 11, 2025

2025COA78

No. 25CA0282, People in Interest of O.J.R. — Family Law
— Dependency and Neglect — Interstate Compact on Placement
of Children — Revised Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children

In this dependency and neglect case, a division of the court of

appeals addresses two novel issues. First, the division determines

that the Revised Interstate Compact on Placement of Children is not

currently in effect in Colorado. Second, the division concludes that

the existing Interstate Compact on Placement of Children does not

apply when a court grants custody of a child to an out-of-state

parent.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA78

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0282
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV30654
Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of O.J.R., a Child,

and Concerning P.A.R.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Fox and Taubman*, JJ., concur

Announced September 11, 2025

Michiko Ando Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Samantha Metsger, Guardian Ad Litem

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, P.A.R. (father)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment adjudicating O.J.R. (the child)

dependent or neglected and entering the initial disposition. The

resolution of this dispute requires us to determine two novel issues.

First, we must address whether the Revised Interstate Compact on

Placement of Children (Revised ICPC) is currently in effect in

Colorado. We conclude that it isn’t. Second, we consider whether

the provisions of the current Interstate Compact on Placement of

Children (ICPC)1 apply when a court grants custody of a child to an

out-of-state parent. We conclude that they do not.

¶2 We therefore determine that the juvenile court erred by

applying the provisions of the Revised ICPC to this case because

they are not yet effective or binding. Nonetheless, the error was

harmless because the requirements of the current ICPC do not

apply when a court grants custody of a child to an out-of-state

parent. And, because father’s remaining appellate claims do not

warrant reversal, we affirm the judgment.

1 As explained more fully in Part II.B infra, the ICPC governs the

interstate “placement” of children and corresponding provision of
services to children involved in dependency and neglect cases.

1
I. Background

¶3 In July 2024, the Denver Department of Human Services filed

a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the then-eight-

year-old child. The Department alleged that a few days earlier, the

police responded after a third party found the child “actively

bleeding” with cuts on his face. The child reported that his father

had punched him and hit him with a belt, causing injuries to his

face and legs. The child was transported to the hospital by

ambulance. His facial injuries required stitches.

¶4 In the petition, the Department noted that the child’s mother

had never lived in Colorado and was not in the home when the

child’s injuries occurred. However, both parents had a history of

child welfare referrals.

¶5 Mother and father had also been engaged in lengthy and

contentious custody proceedings regarding the child in New York.

In February 2023, the New York court granted primary custody of

the child to father, with mother granted parenting time during

summer, winter, and spring breaks. In May 2024, father registered

the New York custody order in Colorado and obtained a temporary

order limiting mother’s parenting time to supervised visits in

2
Colorado.2 The Colorado domestic relations court subsequently

certified the ongoing custody proceedings into this dependency and

neglect case.

¶6 Initially, the juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of

the child to the Department, and he was placed in foster care.

Within two weeks, mother requested that the child be placed with

her. Shortly after that, the foster parents requested removal of the

child from their home within thirty days.

2 At the initial shelter hearing, the juvenile court found that it had

temporary emergency jurisdiction based on the allegations in the
petition. See § 14-13-204(1), C.R.S. 2025 (providing that a court
has jurisdiction if it is “necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse”). However, the court noted that it was
necessary to determine if Colorado had ongoing jurisdiction over the
case. At the next hearing, the juvenile court informed the parties
that it had spoken to the New York domestic relations judge. The
New York judge told the court that she had issued an order
“waiving” New York’s jurisdiction in December 2023 because by
that point, the child had been living in Colorado for at least six
months and Colorado was a “more appropriate jurisdiction.”
Neither party contests these statements or the juvenile court’s
continuing exercise of jurisdiction. Given this record, we are
satisfied that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify the New
York orders and hear this case pursuant to section 14-13-203(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2025 (permitting a Colorado court to modify child-custody
orders from another state if that state determines it no longer has
continuing exclusive jurisdiction or that Colorado would be a more
convenient forum).

3
¶7 In August 2024, the juvenile court held a contested placement

hearing. At the end of the hearing, the court found that a home

study for mother was not required under the “ICPC modifications,”

which, as explained below, we construe as a reference to the

Revised ICPC. The court then granted mother’s request for

temporary legal and physical custody of the child. After the

hearing, the child was returned to mother’s home in New York.

¶8 Approximately one month later, father requested that his

counsel withdraw so he could represent himself. The juvenile court

granted the request. Around the same time, mother entered into a

deferred adjudication, admitting that the child had received

improper care through no fault of her own. Father denied the

petition and requested an adjudicatory hearing.

¶9 In November 2024, the juvenile court held a contested

adjudicatory hearing concerning only father. Father appeared and

represented himself. The court found that the child was dependent

or neglected. The court later held a dispositional hearing and

adopted a treatment plan for father.

¶ 10 Father appeals the juvenile court’s decisions granting custody

of the child to mother in New York, adjudicating the child

4
dependent or neglected, and adopting the initial treatment plan for

him.

II. Order Granting Mother Custody

¶ 11 Father first contends that the juvenile court erred by

misapplying the ICPC and granting custody of the child to mother

before an ICPC home study had been completed. Specifically, he

argues that the court improperly applied the Revised ICPC because

it was not in effect when the placement hearing occurred. He also

argues that under the current version of the ICPC, a home study

was required before the court could grant custody of the child to

mother in New York.

¶ 12 We agree that the juvenile court improperly applied the

Revised ICPC. Nonetheless, we conclude the error was harmless

because the current ICPC does not apply when a court grants

custody3 of a child to an out-of-state parent.

3 Our conclusion is not limited to cases in which a court grants

“legal custody,” as defined by section 19-1-103(94)(a), C.R.S. 2025,
to a parent. Rather, the term “custody,” as used in this opinion,
includes an award of either legal or physical custody to a parent.
Thus, even when a court grants legal custody of a child to a
department of human services but “places” the child with an out-of-
state parent, the ICPC does not apply.

5
A. Standard of Review

¶ 13 Whether the juvenile court properly applied the ICPC is a

question of law that we review de novo. See People in Interest of

I.J.O., 2019 COA 151, ¶ 6. We also review questions of statutory

interpretation de novo. People in Interest of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28,

¶ 24.

¶ 14 When interpreting statutes, we seek to discern and effectuate

the legislature’s intent. Id. In doing so, we apply words and

phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings, and we

consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent,

harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Id. If the statutory

language is unambiguous, we apply it as written, and we need not

resort to other rules of statutory construction. Id. In construing a

statute, we must respect the legislature’s choice of language and

refrain from adding words to the statute or subtracting from it. Id.

at ¶ 25.

B. The Revised ICPC is Not Currently Effective in Colorado

¶ 15 The ICPC is an interstate agreement approved by all fifty

states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See

I.J.O., ¶ 9. The purpose of the ICPC is to facilitate interstate

6
cooperation and coordination in the placement of, and provision of

services to, children being placed by one state’s child protective

services agency in another state. Id.

¶ 16 Colorado enacted the ICPC in 1975, and it was codified at

sections 24-60-1801 to -1803, C.R.S. 1975. See Ch. 224, sec. 1,

§§ 24-60-1801 to -1803, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 844-49. The

original language of the ICPC remained codified in sections 24-60-

1801 to -1803 until August 2024, when Colorado became the

eighteenth state to enact the Revised ICPC.4 In doing so, the

legislature included language that will have the effect of repealing

and reenacting, with amendments, part 18 of article 60 of title

24. See Ch. 248, sec. 2, §§ 24-60-1801 to -1804, 2024 Colo. Sess.

Laws 1628-51.

¶ 17 However, the legislation specifically provides that the Revised

ICPC is not immediately effective:

The [Revised ICPC] shall become effective and
binding upon legislative enactment of the
compact into law by no less than 35 states.
The effective date shall be the later of July 1,
2007, or upon enactment of the compact into

4 The Revised ICPC was drafted by the American Public Human

Services Association (APHSA) in 2006. See APHSA, History of the
ICPC, https://perma.cc/39WY-3S2B.

7
law by the 35th state. Thereafter it shall
become effective and binding as to any other
member state upon enactment of the compact
into law by that state.

§ 24-60-1802, art. XIV(B), C.R.S. 2025. Section 24-60-1804, C.R.S.

2025, reiterates, “Section 2 of Senate Bill 24-125, enacted in 2024,

will take effect on the date the [Revised ICPC] is enacted into law in

the thirty-fifth compact state.” To date, only eighteen states have

adopted the Revised ICPC. See APHSA, Revised ICPC,

https://perma.cc/FZN4-9RZA. Consequently, although the

language of the Revised ICPC presently appears in sections 24-60-

1801 to -1804 of Colorado’s current revised statutes, the Revised

ICPC is not yet in effect or binding.

¶ 18 Thus, we conclude that the language of the prior version of the

ICPC, sections 24-6-1801 to -1803, C.R.S. 2023, remains in effect.

This conclusion is consistent with the plain language of section 24-

60-1804. And, to the extent this language permits any ambiguity,

the legislative history of H.B. 25-1086 reveals that the intent of

section 24-60-1804 was to “clarif[y] that the existing [ICPC] remains

in effect until the updated version is enacted by 35 states.” Legis.

Council of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, Fiscal Note on H.B. 25-1086, at

8
1 (Jan. 30, 2025); see Ch. 60, sec. 1, § 24-60-1804, 2025 Colo.

Sess. Laws 251.

¶ 19 In sum, the Revised ICPC will not take effect in Colorado until

it has been enacted into law by thirty-five states. Unless and until

that happens, juvenile courts in Colorado must apply the language

of sections 24-60-1801 to -1803, C.R.S. 2023, when addressing the

interstate placement of children.

C. The ICPC Does Not Apply to Orders Granting Custody to Out-
of-State Parents

¶ 20 No reported Colorado case has determined whether the

provisions of the ICPC apply when custody of a child is granted to

an out-of-state parent. Courts from other states have reached

different conclusions in resolving this issue. Compare Kurtis A.

Kemper, Construction and Application of Interstate Compact on the

Placement of Children, 5 A.L.R. 6th 193, § 6 (2005) (discussing

cases holding that the ICPC applies to out-of-state placement with a

natural parent), and Green v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 864 A.2d 921,

926-27 (Del. 2004) (concluding that the ICPC should be read to

encompass placement of a child with a noncustodial parent), with

Kemper, § 7 (discussing cases holding that the ICPC does not apply

9
to such placements), and In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d 176, 182 (N.H.

2008) (concluding that the ICPC was intended only to govern

placements of children in substitute arrangements for parental

care, which does not include returning a child to a natural parent).

We now address the issue and conclude that the ICPC does not

apply when a court grants custody of a child to a parent.

¶ 21 The ICPC governs the “interstate placement of children.” § 24-

60-1802, art. I, C.R.S. 2023. Thus, the definition of “placement” is

central to discerning the ICPC’s reach. The ICPC defines

“[p]lacement” as “the arrangement for the care of a child in a family

free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution.”

§ 24-60-1802, art. II(d), C.R.S. 2023. This language, on its own, is

somewhat unclear, particularly “family free” home, which is not

defined by the ICPC. See In re R.S., 215 A.3d 392, 404 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. 2019) (acknowledging that the definition of “family free”

is not clear), aff’d, 235 A.3d 914 (Md. 2020); In re C.B., 116 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 294, 299 (Ct. App. 2010) (stating that “family free home” is

not a term of art, and its meaning is by no means clear on its

face). But see Alexis O., 959 A.2d at 182 (“Although the term ‘family

free’ home is not defined, in context it refers to a home that

10
provides care for a child similar to that which a family would

provide, but that, unlike a boarding home, charges no fee for this

care.”).

¶ 22 But the ICPC provides additional guidance through provisions

that address conditions for placement. Specifically, article III of the

ICPC provides as follows:

(a) No sending agency shall send, bring, or
cause to be sent or brought into any other
party state any child for placement in foster
care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption
unless the sending agency shall comply with
each and every requirement set forth in this
article and with the applicable laws of the
receiving state governing the placement of the
children therein.

(b) Prior to sending, bringing, or causing any
child to be sent or brought into a receiving
state for placement in foster care or as a
preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending
agency shall furnish the appropriate public
authorities in the receiving state written notice
of the intention to send, bring, or place the
child in the receiving state.

§ 24-60-1802, art. III(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2023 (emphasis added). And,

although the ICPC does not define “foster care” or “adoption,” the

plain meaning of those terms does not include an award of custody

to a parent.

11
¶ 23 This conclusion is consistent with Colorado’s statutory

definition of “[f]oster care.” The Children’s Code defines “foster

care” as

the placement of a child or youth into the legal
custody or legal authority of a county
department of human or social services for
physical placement of the child or youth in a
kinship care placement; supervised
independent living placement, as defined in
section 19-7-302[, C.R.S. 2025]; or certified or
licensed facility, or the physical placement of a
juvenile committed to the custody of the state
department of human services into a
community placement.

§ 19-1-103(66), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 24 Thus, “placement in foster care” does not include placement

with parents. See R.S., 215 A.3d at 405 (referring to Maryland’s

statutory definition of “foster care” in concluding that the ICPC’s

definition of “placement” does not encompass a child’s out-of-state

placement with a parent); see also In re Emoni W., 48 A.3d 1, 7-8

(Conn. 2012) (“Children in the care of their own parents are not in

‘foster care’ in any ordinary sense of that phrase, and parents are

not required to adopt their own children.”).

¶ 25 Moreover, to the extent that the ICPC placement provisions

create any ambiguity, the original drafter’s notes, supplied by the

12
Council of State Governments, “reinforce the notion that the [ICPC]

does not apply to parental placements.” McComb v. Wambaugh,

934 F.2d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1991). These notes explain that the

ICPC “exempts certain close relatives . . . in order to protect the

social and legal rights of the family and because it is recognized

that regulation is desirable only in the absence of adequate family

control or in order to forestall conditions which might produce an

absence of such control.” Id. (citation omitted). The purpose of this

exemption is to limit the state’s unnecessary intrusion into family

life. Id. (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494

(1977)). This deference is at its zenith when the proposed custody

award is to a parent. See id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745 (1982)); see also Alexis O., 959 A.2d at 183.

¶ 26 In sum, we conclude that the plain language of section 24-60-

1802, C.R.S. 2023, limits the applicability of the ICPC to cases in

which children are placed for foster care or adoption. In other

words, it applies to substitutes for parental care that are not

implicated when custody of a child is granted to a parent.

¶ 27 We acknowledge that our interpretation of the ICPC conflicts

with “Regulation 3” promulgated by the Association of

13
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of

Children (AAICPC) and adopted in Colorado through Department of

Human Services Rule 7.307.1, 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-4. The

AAICPC’s Regulation 3 states in pertinent part that compliance with

the ICPC is required for “[p]lacements with parents and relatives

when a parent or relative is not making the placement.” AAICPC,

Regulation 3(2)(a)(3) (effective Oct. 1, 2011),

https://perma.cc/82ME-QNBV. Likewise, we acknowledge that our

interpretation of the ICPC conflicts with the Colorado Department of

Human Services’ rules implementing ICPC Regulations 3, which

provide that the ICPC procedures “shall be initiated for children

who are considered for placement out-of-state for . . . [h]omes of

parents.” Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.307.31(B), 12 Code Colo.

Regs. 2509-4. However, in light of our conclusion that the relevant

text of the ICPC unambiguously confines its application to

placements of children in foster care or as preliminaries to

adoption, both ICPC Regulation 3(2)(a) and Department of Human

Services Rule 7.307.31(B), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-4, are

inconsistent with the enabling legislation and, therefore, cannot be

given effect. See B.C.B., ¶ 27 (“In conducting our statutory

14
analysis, we may consider an administrative agency’s interpretation

of the statute, but we are not bound by this interpretation, and we

will not defer to it if it conflicts with the statute’s plain language.”);

see also D.L. v. S.B., 201 N.E.3d 771, 777 (N.Y. 2022) (concluding

that ICPC Regulation 3 cannot be given effect because it is

inconsistent with the language of the ICPC); R.S., 215 A.3d at 406-

07 (concluding that Regulation 3 is invalid to the extent it purports

to expand application of the ICPC to out-of-state placements with a

parent).

¶ 28 Moreover, our conclusion does not excuse Colorado juvenile

courts and departments of human services from ensuring that

children are safe when placed with out-of-state parents. Rather,

when making any placement or custody decision, a juvenile court

must consider the overriding purpose of the Children’s Code, which

is to protect a child’s safety and welfare by providing procedures to

serve the child’s best interests. See L.G. v. People in Interest of K.G.,

890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). And a juvenile court’s paramount

concern in a dependency and neglect case must be to protect a

child from any further harm as the result of abuse or neglect. Id.

15
¶ 29 More specifically, before an adjudication has been entered and

after notice to the parents, a juvenile court may hold a hearing and

enter temporary orders for the custody and protection of a child so

long as such orders are in the child’s best interests. See § 19-1-

104(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025. And, after an adjudication has been

entered, a juvenile court “may place the child in the legal custody of

one or both parents . . . , with or without protective supervision,

under such conditions as the court deems necessary and

appropriate.” § 19-3-508(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 30 Based on the foregoing, we join those states holding that the

ICPC does not apply when a court grants custody of a child to an

out-of-state parent. See D.L., 201 N.E.3d at 775 (the clear language

of the ICPC limits its applicability to cases of placement for foster

care or adoption, which do not include custody with out-of-state

parents); R.S., 215 A.3d at 396 (the ICPC does not apply to the out-

of-state placement of a child with a biological parent); In Interest of

C.R.-A.A., 521 S.W.3d 893, 903 (Tex. App. 2017) (The plain

language of the ICPC shows “it is inapplicable to an interstate

placement of a child with a parent.”); In re S.R.C.-Q., 367 P.3d 1276,

1282 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he ICPC applies only to out-of-state

16
placements of children with foster care or as a preliminary to a

possible adoption, not to out-of-state placements with a parent.”); In

re D.B., 43 N.E.3d 599, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[T]he statute

quite plainly provides that it applies only to placement in foster care

or a preadoptive home. A biological parent is neither of these.”);

Emoni W., 48 A.3d at 7-8 (“[T]he ordinary meaning of the [ICPC’s

language] does not encompass placement with a noncustodial

parent.”); C.B., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302 (An “out-of-state placement

with a parent is never subject to the ICPC.”); Alexis O., 959 A.2d at

182 (The language of the ICPC shows that it “does not apply to care

for a child by his or her natural parent.”).

D. Application to the Current Case

¶ 31 We now turn to the juvenile court’s ruling. Recall that the

court expressly applied the “ICPC modifications.” Specifically, it

found that an ICPC home study was unnecessary because mother

qualified as a “non-custodial parent.” But the language about non-

custodial parents appears only in article III of the Revised ICPC, not

the current ICPC. Compare § 24-60-1802, art. III(B)(5), C.R.S.

2025, with § 24-60-1802, art. III, C.R.S. 2023. Thus, when read in

context, it is clear that the juvenile court was referring to and

17
applying the Revised ICPC when it found that an ICPC home study

was not required before granting temporary physical and legal

custody of the child to mother in New York. In doing so, the court

erroneously relied on the language of the Revised ICPC because that

language is not yet effective.5 See §§ 24-60-1802, art.

XIV(B), -1804, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 32 Nonetheless, as explained above, the provisions of the ICPC

were not triggered when the juvenile court granted custody of the

child to mother in New York. See § 24-60-1802, arts. II(d), III(a)-(b),

C.R.S. 2023. Thus, we discern no reversible error in the court’s

finding that an ICPC home study was unnecessary before granting

custody to mother.

¶ 33 Moreover, consistent with its general obligations under the

Children’s Code, the record indicates that the Department had

taken steps to ensure that granting mother custody was safe for the

child. See § 19-3-508(1)(a). Specifically, the Department flew a

5 We recognize that at various times throughout the proceedings,

the parties argued that the juvenile court was required to relinquish
jurisdiction upon granting custody to mother. However, these
arguments were based on the provisions of the Revised ICPC. We
need not address these arguments in light of our conclusion that
the Revised ICPC is not yet effective.

18
caseworker to New York to visit mother’s home prior to the

placement hearing. After inspecting mother’s home and meeting

with everyone who lived there, the caseworker had no safety

concerns. Another caseworker testified that she had been in

contact with the New York Department of Social Services and that a

New York casework supervisor had agreed to conduct courtesy

home visits if the court granted custody to mother. The Colorado

caseworker stated that if the child was placed with mother in New

York, she planned to conduct weekly phone calls with the child and

could fly to New York to do face-to-face visits when necessary.

¶ 34 Additionally, before granting temporary custody to mother, the

juvenile court considered the child’s safety, as evidenced by its

entry of several protective orders. Specifically, the court ordered

that mother refrain from any use of corporal punishment, abstain

from excessive use of alcohol or drugs around the child, and ensure

that the child have no contact with mother’s ex-boyfriend. The

court also noted that the Department would be required to continue

working with the New York Department of Human Services “in

regards [sic] to making sure that [the child] is safe.”

19
¶ 35 Accordingly, the court’s erroneous application of the Revised

ICPC was harmless because the court had the authority to grant

custody of the child to mother in New York and because it entered

temporary orders to ensure that the custody arrangement was safe

and in the child’s best interests. See § 19-1-104(3)(a).

III. Child Hearsay

¶ 36 Father next contends that at the adjudicatory hearing, the

juvenile court erred by eliciting and considering the child’s out-of-

court statements that constituted inadmissible hearsay. However,

father concedes that he did not preserve this claim for appeal.

Indeed, he did not object when the court directed a witness — the

child’s discharge nurse — to review her notes for any statements

the child made to other medical professionals about the cause of his

injuries and to summarize those statements for the court.

¶ 37 Nevertheless, father urges us to review his appellate claim to

avoid a miscarriage of justice, specifically arguing that there was a

“power imbalance between [the judge] directly questioning a witness

. . . and a pro se litigant’s ability to object to such questioning.”

But the miscarriage of justice exception is a high bar and narrow in

scope, applying only to limited situations in which an error by the

20
juvenile court — not otherwise properly preserved for appeal —

results in a grossly unfair outcome for the parent. See People in

Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶¶ 23-24; see also People in Interest

of A.E., 914 P.2d 534, 539 (Colo. App. 1996). Father’s arguments

do not establish that the court’s adjudicatory judgment created

such a result.

¶ 38 Moreover, even if the court had excluded the child’s

statements, its finding that the child was dependent or neglected

was supported by the remaining evidence. Specifically, father’s own

testimony — that he did not know where his son was when the

third party found him, or how his injuries occurred — supported

the court’s findings that the child lacked proper parental care

through father’s actions or omissions, see § 19-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S.

2025, and that the child had run away from home or was beyond

father’s control, see § 19-3-102(1)(f). And section 19-3-102 requires

proof of only one of its provisions to support an adjudication. See

People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29, aff’d sub nom.,

People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31.

21
¶ 39 Based on the foregoing, we discern no miscarriage of justice

and therefore decline to address father’s hearsay objection asserted

for the first time on appeal.

IV. Treatment Plan

¶ 40 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by not

approving an appropriate treatment plan at the initial dispositional

hearing. We are not persuaded.

¶ 41 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child

legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the

problems that required intervention into the family. People in

Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 11. Thus, an appropriate

treatment plan is one that is approved by the court, relates to the

child’s needs, and is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit

to provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable

time. § 19-1-103(12); K.B., ¶ 13. A juvenile court must measure

the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its likelihood of success

in reuniting the family, which is assessed based on the facts

existing at the time the court approves the plan. People in Interest

of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005).

22
¶ 42 Here, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing at which

father appeared and represented himself. Prior to that hearing, the

Department filed a proposed treatment plan, which required father

to address his use of corporal punishment and physical discipline,

demonstrate that he could meet the child’s needs, and cooperate

with the Department. The guardian ad litem (GAL) requested

specific amendments to the proposed treatment plan. After

discussing the proposed plan with father, the court adopted it.

¶ 43 Father does not argue that the treatment plan was generally

inappropriate because it was not reasonably calculated to render

him fit to provide adequate parenting to the child within a

reasonable time or because it did not relate to the child’s needs.

See K.B., ¶ 13. Rather, he makes three more narrow arguments,

which we address and reject.

¶ 44 First, we disagree with father’s contention that the juvenile

court did not clarify whether it intended to adopt the modifications

suggested by the GAL. At the beginning of the hearing, the

Department noted that the GAL had suggested some amendments

to the treatment plan, and the Department specifically requested

that the court adopt the “treatment plan with the amendments.”

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The GAL then explained the three proposed amendments: (1) that

an action step be added to require father to engage in parenting

education that focuses on safe discipline practices; (2) that an

action step be added to require father to refrain from telling secrets

or whispering to the child during parenting time; and (3) that an

objective be added to require father to address his mental health

issues.

¶ 45 After discussing the suggested amendments with father, the

court stated that it was “going to adopt the treatment plan as

recommend[ed].” Thus, the record indicates that the juvenile court

did, in fact, adopt the GAL’s proposed amendments as part of

father’s treatment plan. And, consistent with the juvenile court’s

order, the caseworker’s subsequent court report and treatment plan

update expressly included the amendments.

¶ 46 Next, we reject father’s argument that the treatment plan was

inappropriate because it included duplicative services. Although

father stated he had already completed online, self-paced parenting

classes, the juvenile court explained that those classes were not

sufficient because nobody monitored father’s progress and level of

engagement. Thus, the court concluded that it was appropriate to

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require father to engage in a parenting program that had

professionals who could provide updates on father’s engagement.

We discern no error in this ruling.

¶ 47 Last, we reject father’s argument that the juvenile court

“improperly engaged in burden shifting” by requiring him to obtain

a referral for family therapy. Although we agree with father that the

Department is generally obligated to provide referrals for services

required by a treatment plan, see § 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, we

disagree with his interpretation of the court’s orders regarding

family therapy. At the dispositional hearing, father stated that he

believed “group therapy” with the child could be helpful, but he did

not request that it be added to the treatment plan. In response, the

court stated that if father would “like to get [his] provider to

recommend someone, that’s absolutely appropriate” and that the

parties could “take [father’s] lead” in terms of family therapy. But

the court did not say that family therapy would be required as part

of father’s treatment plan. Thus, the court did not require father to

obtain a referral for a service required by his treatment plan, and

we discern no “improper burden shifting” in the court’s order

adopting the plan.

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¶ 48 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile

court’s order adopting father’s initial treatment plan.

V. Disposition

¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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