Peo v. Overstreet

24CA0990 Peo v Overstreet 08-28-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0990
Fremont County District Court No. 16CR12
Honorable Kaitlin B. Turner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Sean Patrick Overstreet,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 28, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Solicitor
General and Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee

Sean Patrick Overstreet, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Sean Patrick Overstreet, appeals the district

court’s postconviction order denying his request to reduce his

restitution. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2016, Overstreet pleaded guilty to one count of

attempted first degree murder, a class 2 felony, arising from an

incident in which he stabbed the victim several times with a knife.

All other charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.

¶3 The plea agreement provided that Overstreet “shall be

sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a period of 30-48

years.” It also stated that Overstreet “agrees to pay full restitution

plus interest.” The district court sentenced him to forty years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and ultimately

ordered $20,205.08 in restitution.

¶4 Over the next several years, Overstreet filed multiple

postconviction motions challenging the legality of his aggravated

sentence. The district court denied each motion, concluding that

Overstreet’s sentence was not illegal. Overstreet appealed two of

those denials, and divisions of this court affirmed the orders. See

People v. Overstreet, (Colo. App. No. 20CA0098, Nov. 25, 2020) (not

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published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); People v. Overstreet, (Colo.

App. No. 23CA0976, May 9, 2024) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶5 In May 2024, Overstreet filed a motion asking the district

court to waive fees and costs and the remaining amount of

restitution. Finding that Overstreet was indigent, the district court

waived all waivable fees and costs. But the court denied

Overstreet’s request to be relieved of his obligation to pay

restitution, concluding that it lacked legal authority to reduce the

amount of restitution owed.

II. Analysis

¶6 Overstreet contends that the district court erred by not

waiving the remaining restitution he owed. Specifically, he

contends that forcing him to perform labor under the DOC’s work

program to pay off the restitution amount constitutes involuntary

servitude in violation of article II, section 26 of the Colorado

Constitution.1

1 To the extent Overstreet asserted other claims in his

postconviction motion, but has not reasserted them on appeal, we
deem those claims abandoned. People v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801
(Colo. App. 2007).

2
¶7 Overstreet did not explicitly invoke Crim. P. 35 or its statutory

counterpart, section 18-1-410, C.R.S. 2025. Nevertheless, because

his motion was filed after his conviction and involves a

constitutional claim, we construe this part of Overstreet’s

postconviction motion under Crim. P. 35(c). See People v. Collier,

151 P.3d 668, 670-71 (Colo. App. 2006); People v. Wenzinger, 155

P.3d 415, 419 (Colo. App. 2006). We review de novo the denial of a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Gardner, 250

P.3d 1262, 1266 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶8 Construing this claim under Crim. P. 35(c), we conclude that it

is successive and time barred.

¶9 Absent certain exceptions not present here, a court “shall deny

any claim that could have been presented in an appeal previously

brought or postconviction proceeding previously brought.” Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(VII); see People v. Vondra, 240 P.3d 493, 494 (Colo. App.

2010). Because Overstreet could have raised this constitutional

challenge to the restitution amount in his previous postconviction

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motions, the district court was required to deny this portion of

Overstreet’s postconviction motion.2

¶ 10 Moreover, absent exceptions not alleged here, section

16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025, gives a defendant convicted of a

non-class 1 felony three years to challenge his conviction or

sentence. In cases where there is no appeal, this period starts

when the district court enters judgment and the sentence is

imposed. People v. Pennington, 989 P.2d 230, 231 (Colo. App.

1999); see also Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I) (any motion filed more than three

years after the conviction is final must allege facts to establish

justifiable excuse or excusable neglect). Overstreet first sought to

challenge the restitution order seven years after his conviction was

final. Therefore, his constitutional challenge is time barred.3

III. Disposition

¶ 11 The order is affirmed.

2 Though article II, section 26 of the Colorado Constitution was

amended in 2018, Overstreet does not contend that this is “a new
rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable.” Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(VII)(c).
3 To the extent Overstreet’s claim could be construed as a motion to

reconsider his sentence under Crim. P. 35(b), it is also time barred.
See Crim. P. 35(b) (providing 126 days after sentencing to file such
a request).

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JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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