Peo in Interest of EJW

25CA0514 Peo in Interest of EJW 08-14-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0514
Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV30192
Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.J.W., a Child,

and Concerning R.R.W.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Fox and Harris, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 14, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Sarah Simchowitz, Assistant County Attorney,
Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.R.W. (father)

appeals the judgment adjudicating E.J.W. (the child) dependent and

neglected and the order adopting a treatment plan. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After receiving a referral raising concerns about mother’s

substance abuse and mental health, the Arapahoe County

Department of Human Services (Department) filed a petition in

dependency or neglect. The Department noted that the extent of

father’s involvement with the child was unknown.

¶3 Six months later, father entered a no-fault admission, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected. See

19-3-102(1)(e), C.R.S. 2024 (“A child is neglected or dependent if . .

. [t]he child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with

his or her parent . . . through no fault of such parent . . . .”).

Following a contested dispositional hearing, the court adopted a

treatment plan for father that included a requirement that he

participate in a domestic violence assessment and complete

domestic violence treatment.

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II. Admission and Adjudicatory Order

¶4 Father first argues that the juvenile court erred by accepting

his admission because he purportedly did not realize that the court

could adopt a treatment plan requiring him to complete a domestic

violence evaluation and treatment. Father argues that if he knew

these requirements were possible, he would not have agreed to the

no-fault admission. We reject his contentions.

A. Preservation

¶5 The Department and guardian ad litem dispute whether father

preserved this issue because he did not inform the court of any

agreement between he and the Department concerning the terms of

his anticipated treatment plan and failed to object when the court

set a contested dispositional hearing to address whether the plan

should include a domestic violence component.

¶6 Father asserts he did not have an adequate opportunity to

preserve the issue because the error only became known after the

court accepted his admission. However, we need not determine

whether father preserved the issue, or was required to, because

even if we assume preservation, we discern no basis for reversal.

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B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 After a department files a petition in dependency and neglect,

a parent may demand a jury trial and require that the state prove

the allegations of the petition. § 19-3-202(2), C.R.S. 2024.

Alternatively, the juvenile court may accept a parent’s admission at

an adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO

105, ¶ 32. Before accepting a parent’s admission, the court must

find that (1) the parent understood their rights, the allegations in

the petition, and the effect of the admission; and (2) the admission

was voluntary. C.R.J.P. 4.2(c) (2024). The “court’s acceptance of [a

parent’s] admission establishe[s] the status of the children as

dependent or neglected.” J.W., ¶ 32.

¶8 A juvenile court’s determination that the parent’s admission

was knowing and voluntary is a question of fact that we review for

an abuse of discretion. See People in Interest of W.P., 2013 CO 11,

¶ 10. A court abuses its discretion “when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies or

misconstrues the law.” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

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C. Additional Background

¶9 Before accepting father’s admission, the juvenile court asked if

he understood that he had the right to (1) an attorney; (2) a trial

where the Department would have to demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the child was dependent or

neglected; (3) cross-examine witnesses who testified against him

and present witnesses to testify on his behalf; (4) submit any

defense to the allegations; and (5) appeal the decision if the child

were found to be dependent or neglected. The court also advised

that it would “retain jurisdiction over [father] and over [his]

treatment plan,” and that the ultimate outcome of the case could be

termination of his parental rights.

¶ 10 Father confirmed his understanding of these rights. He also

confirmed that he was making his admission freely and voluntarily

and that no one had coerced him or made him a promise that had

not been discussed at the hearing. After this advisement, the

juvenile court found that father intelligently, voluntarily, and

knowingly, admitted the child was dependent or neglected, and

entered the adjudication.

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¶ 11 The juvenile court then asked father’s counsel how much time

was needed for a contested dispositional hearing. Father’s counsel

initially requested a case management conference (CMC) and

uncontested dispositional hearing but stated “if we need to set

contested, we’ll let you know.”

¶ 12 After the Department raised concerns regarding potential

delay, the court allowed the parties time to confer instead of setting

a CMC. Following this discussion, the parties returned to the

courtroom and informed the court that they agreed on all treatment

plan objectives other than the domestic violence (DV) portion and

requested a contested hearing to address that objective.

D. Analysis

¶ 13 Father asserts that he was deprived of fundamentally fair

procedures when the juvenile court accepted his admission prior to

addressing his treatment plan, thereby depriving him of “bargaining

power” when discussing his treatment plan requirements.

¶ 14 However, father was represented by counsel, received timely

notice of the adjudicatory hearing, and was advised of his rights

and the effect of his admission as required by C.R.J.P. 4.2(c) (2024).

See C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627, 639 (Colo. 2004) (describing that

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substantial compliance with the statute and applicable court rules

protects a parent’s fundamental rights); see also In re E.R.S., 2019

COA 40, ¶ 41 (finding similar procedures to be fundamentally fair).

¶ 15 Furthermore, nothing in the Children’s Code requires a

treatment plan to be discussed at an adjudicatory hearing. See

§ 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (“After making an order of

adjudication, the court shall hear evidence on the question of the

proper disposition . . . .”) (emphasis added). Dispositional

alternatives include the adoption of a treatment plan or the finding

that an appropriate treatment plan cannot be devised. Thus, the

procedures for a court to follow before accepting a parent’s

admission to the petition do not require the court to advise a parent

concerning specific terms that may be included in a treatment plan.

See People in Interest of C.L.S., 934 P.2d 851, 855 (Colo. App. 1996)

(“The adjudication of whether a child is dependent and neglected

involves a hearing distinct from, and is for a purpose different than,

the determination of a proper disposition of a child so

adjudicated.”); see also E.O. v. People, 854 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo.

1993) (noting that the Children’s Code permits a bifurcated

proceeding where the court first determines whether there are

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grounds to adjudicate the child dependent or neglected and, if so, it

proceeds to the second, or dispositional phase, which commences

with entry of a dispositional order and adoption of a treatment

plan).

¶ 16 Thus, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s acceptance of

father’s admission without first advising him that he may be

required to complete a domestic violence evaluation as part of his

treatment plan if warranted by the findings at the dispositional

hearing.

III. Father’s Treatment Plan

¶ 17 Father also asserts that the juvenile court erred by adopting

the domestic violence objective of his treatment plan. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 18 The juvenile court has discretion to formulate an appropriate

treatment plan for a parent. C.L.S., 934 P.2d at 855. An

appropriate treatment plan means a plan “approved by the court

that is reasonably calculated to render the particular respondent fit

to provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time

and that relates to the child’s needs.” § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2024.

A treatment plan’s appropriateness is measured by the likelihood of

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success in reuniting the family free of ongoing department

involvement and must be assessed in light of the facts existing at

the time it is approved and the safety concerns identified during the

assessment of the family. People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶

14; People in Interest of D.C-M.S., 111 P.3d 559, 561 (Colo. App.

2005). Because the purpose of a treatment plan is to address the

barriers to reunifying families, it may include issues that were not

the basis for the adjudication judgment. People in Interest of M.W.,

2022 COA 72, ¶ 43. Generally, a court may require treatment

“when it is warranted by the record before the court.” People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 51.

B. Analysis

¶ 19 After hearing the evidence at the dispositional hearing, the

juvenile court adopted the domestic violence objective, which

required, among other things, that father “complete an assessment

to evaluate [the] level of treatment needed” and “fully participate in

domestic violence treatment.” The court found that the treatment

plan, including the domestic violence objective, (1) was reasonably

calculated to render father fit to provide adequate parenting to the

child within a reasonable period; (2) related to the child’s needs; (3)

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provided objectives to address safety concerns; and (4) was in the

child’s best interests. In so finding, the court focused on the need

to ensure father’s home was physically and emotionally safe for the

child.

¶ 20 These findings are supported by the record. The juvenile court

took judicial notice of father’s two prior DV-related criminal

convictions (harassment and stalking), including the findings,

sentences, and unsuccessful termination of probation. The

caseworker testified that she was concerned that the child would

witness domestic violence in the future if she was returned to father

absent an appropriate domestic violence assessment and

completion of any indicated treatment. Based on her training, the

caseworker described the traumatic impact domestic violence can

have on children. She opined that the domestic violence objective of

the treatment plan was necessary to make father a fit and proper

parent.

¶ 21 Father first argues that, because domestic violence was not a

concern at the outset of the case, the juvenile court erred by

adopting that treatment plan objective. But the court found that

father had a history of domestic violence with mother and, although

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it was in the past, it was not significantly distant in time. The court

also noted that father’s probation was unsuccessfully terminated

approximately two years prior to the dispositional hearing.

¶ 22 Even though domestic violence was not the initial concern that

brought the family to the Department’s attention, the purpose of a

treatment plan is to address “the material issues that are barriers

to reunifying children with their parents.” See M.W., ¶ 43 (“Because

the purpose of a treatment plan is to address the material issues

that are barriers to reunifying children with their parents, it is

appropriate for a treatment plan to address those material issues

even if the order of adjudication was not necessarily predicated

upon the particular problem the treatment plan seeks to address.”).

¶ 23 Father next argues that the juvenile court disregarded the lack

of an ongoing domestic relationship between he and mother. But

this argument disregards the court’s consideration that an

allocation of parental responsibilities between mother and father

was a potential resolution of the case. Such a resolution would

have required mother and father to jointly parent the child, even if

they were not living together. And, considering mother’s and

father’s history and the caseworker’s testimony describing the

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coercive dynamic of domestic violence and the resulting negative

impact on a co-parenting relationship, it was appropriate for the

treatment plan to include the objective.

¶ 24 Father also argues that the juvenile court erred by adopting

the domestic violence objective of his treatment plan because he

“served time for past domestic violence incidents” and was

“rehabilitated.” But despite father being ordered to complete

domestic violence treatment as part of his probation, the

caseworker testified that she had no information that he had taken

or successfully completed such treatment. Based on her training,

she explained that without treatment domestic violence

perpetrators tend to follow their same patterns.

¶ 25 Because the record supports the court’s findings that domestic

violence treatment for father was appropriate, we discern no error.

See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29 (explaining that

we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that

of the juvenile court).

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE HARRIS concur.

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