Peo in Interest of WMS

25CA0216 Peo in Interest of WMS 08-14-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0216
Montrose County District Court No. 23JV30006
Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of W.M.S., a Child,

and Concerning W.R.S. and J.N.R.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 14, 2025

Julie R. Andress, County Attorney, Montrose, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant W.R.S.

James West, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for
Appellant J.N.R.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.N.R. (mother)

and W.R.S. (father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-

child legal relationships with W.M.S. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Montrose County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect regarding the child due to

concerns about the parents’ substance use and domestic violence.

The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected

and adopted treatment plans for the parents. Father moved to

Ketchikan, Alaska, before the case opened and remained there for

the duration of the case.

¶3 The child and father are enrolled members of the Ketchikan

Indian Community (the KIC), which intervened in this case. And

because the child is an “Indian child” as defined by 25 U.S.C.

§ 1903(4), these proceedings were subject to the Indian Child

Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.

¶4 The child was placed with mother early in the case for a trial

home visit, while the Department remained his legal custodian.

Mother then took the child to Alaska without the Department’s

authorization. Approximately two weeks later, the child was

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returned to Montrose and placed in foster care. Mother came back

to Colorado about three weeks after the child had returned. About

eight months later, the child was placed with his paternal great-

uncle in Texas.

¶5 Later, the Department moved for termination. Following a

three-day hearing held twenty months after the case opened, the

court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights.

II. Mother’s Appeal

¶6 Mother’s sole contention is that the juvenile court lost

jurisdiction over the matter “when she left for Alaska,” and thus

lacked jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.

A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

¶7 The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA) addresses subject matter jurisdiction, which a party may

challenge for the first time on appeal. See People in Interest of B.H.,

2021 CO 39, ¶ 27. We review the juvenile court’s subject matter

jurisdiction de novo. People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 21.

¶8 The UCCJEA sets out a comprehensive framework that

Colorado courts must use to determine whether they may exercise

jurisdiction in child custody matters. People in Interest of C.L.T.,

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2017 COA 119, ¶ 16. And, significantly, “[t]he primary aim of the

UCCJEA is to prevent competing and conflicting custody orders by

courts in different jurisdictions that would put all parties at risk of

uncertainty and unilateral removals of children from or to various

jurisdictions.” People in Interest of M.M.V., 2020 COA 94, ¶ 17.

¶9 The UCCJEA offers courts two ways to exercise jurisdiction to

make an initial child-custody determination — temporary

emergency jurisdiction under section 14-13-204, C.R.S. 2024, and

non-emergency jurisdiction under section 14-13-201, C.R.S. 2024.

S.A.G., ¶¶ 24-26. A Colorado court may exercise non-emergency

jurisdiction to enter an initial child-custody determination if it

successfully navigates one of the four paths to jurisdiction from

section 14-13-201(1), including, as relevant here, home-state

jurisdiction. See S.A.G., ¶ 26.

¶ 10 A Colorado court has home-state jurisdiction if Colorado was

“the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of

the proceeding.” § 14-13-201(1)(a). “Home state” means “the state

in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent

for at least one hundred eighty-two consecutive days immediately

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before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.”

§ 14-13-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

B. Application

¶ 11 While the juvenile court did not make a finding that Colorado

was the child’s home state when the proceeding commenced, no

party disputes that Colorado was the child’s home state at the time

of the initial custody determination. Nor does the record reveal that

the child lived in any state other than Colorado or was subject to a

prior custody order in any other state before the proceeding started.

¶ 12 Mother asserts, without citation to the record, that the court’s

jurisdiction ceased under section 14-13-202(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024,

when the court “found that the child and parents no longer resided

in Colorado.” See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (argument section of appellant’s

brief must contain citations to the parts of the record on which

appellant relies). But the court made no such finding. Rather, the

court acknowledged mother’s self-report that she was in Alaska

with father and directed the Department to facilitate the child’s

return to Colorado.

¶ 13 Having clarified that, we address what remains of mother’s

argument — that her departure from Colorado divested the court of

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jurisdiction. Mother acknowledges that her position is contrary to

the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in R.W. v. People in Interest

of E.W., 2022 CO 51, but urges that we “revisit” this decision.

¶ 14 In R.W., the Colorado Supreme Court determined that “[a]

court that has obtained initial jurisdiction to adjudicate a child-

custody proceeding under the UCCJEA does not automatically lose

jurisdiction under section 14-13-202(b) by virtue of all parties

leaving the state.” R.W., ¶ 24. Rejecting the same argument

mother makes here, the Colorado Supreme Court explained that the

juvenile court “had properly acquired initial jurisdiction when the

proceeding commenced, and it retained exclusive, continuing

jurisdiction because no alternate state asserted a competing, valid

claim.” Id. at ¶ 21. We are bound by this decision. See Willhite v.

Rodriguez-Cera, 2012 CO 29, ¶ 9 (The Colorado Supreme Court is

“the final authority on questions of Colorado law.”); People v. Allen,

111 P.3d 518, 520 (Colo. App. 2004) (The Court of Appeals is

“bound by the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court.”).

¶ 15 In sum, mother and the child’s mere brief absence from

Colorado — unauthorized by the child’s legal custodian — had no

impact on the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. See R.W., ¶ 24.

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Accordingly, we reject mother’s argument that her and the child’s

departure from Colorado divested the court of jurisdiction.1

III. Father’s Appeal

¶ 16 Father first contends that the juvenile court erred by

concluding that the Department made active efforts to rehabilitate

him and prevent the breakup of his family. He next contends that

the Department failed to make active efforts to engage with possible

kin placements and, as a result, failed to present sufficient evidence

to show that termination was warranted “relative to a less drastic

alternative.” We address, and reject, each contention in turn.

A. Active Efforts

1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

¶ 17 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment

plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit;

1 We also reject mother’s contention that retaining the case in

Colorado somehow deprived her of her statutory right to counsel.

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and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 18 In addition, ICWA requires that any party seeking termination

of parental rights to an Indian child must “satisfy the court that

active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and

rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the

Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”

25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). Active efforts require “affirmative, active,

thorough, and timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or

reunite an Indian child with his or her family.” 25 C.F.R.

§ 23.2 (2024). A department must, at a minimum, “provide a

parent with the services necessary to achieve each objective of the

treatment plan” and “support the parents through the treatment

plan goals.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶

32. The active efforts standard in ICWA cases is more demanding

than the reasonable efforts standard applied in non-ICWA cases.

Id. at ¶ 31.

¶ 19 Federal regulations include a non-exhaustive list of examples

illustrating active efforts, including identifying appropriate services

and “actively assisting the parents in obtaining such services”;

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inviting tribal representatives to participate in providing support

and services to the family; contacting extended family members;

offering culturally appropriate family preservation strategies;

supporting regular family time; identifying community resources;

and monitoring progress in services. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2.

¶ 20 Because “there is no one-size-fits-all formula,” active efforts

“should be ‘tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case.’”

My.K.M., ¶ 32 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 23.2). As a result, a department

has “discretion to prioritize certain services or resources to address

a family’s most pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s

overall completion of the treatment plan.” Id. at ¶ 33. To that end,

“[c]ourts should analyze an agency’s active efforts by considering

the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all services and

resources provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the

entire treatment plan.” Id. Likewise, a court should measure the

department’s efforts “holistically rather than in isolation with

respect to specific treatment plan objectives.” Id. at ¶ 35.

¶ 21 Whether a department satisfied ICWA’s active efforts

requirement presents a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at ¶ 20.

We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but

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review de novo whether those factual findings satisfy ICWA’s active

efforts requirement. Id.

2. Application

¶ 22 The juvenile court determined, based on the totality of the

circumstances, that the “agencies . . . involved in this case took

affirmative, active, thorough and timely steps to assist the

respondents through the steps of the treatment plans, and therefore

made active efforts.” The court found that the Department’s efforts

went beyond mere referrals or encouragement but instead “included

coordination between child protective agencies in different states,

arranging services in different states, [and] providing supports for

transportation.” The court also relied on the expert testimony of the

KIC’s deputy tribal administrator, whom it designated as an ICWA

qualified expert witness (QEW), and found the QEW’s testimony was

“very persuasive” regarding the active efforts made by the

Department. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (requiring testimony of a QEW

before the court may enter an order terminating parental rights in

an ICWA case).

¶ 23 The record supports the court’s findings.

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¶ 24 Father’s treatment plan required, among other things, that he

engage in parenting education and address his mental health,

anger, and substance use. In consideration of father’s residence in

Alaska, his treatment plan allowed services to be provided by the

KIC. The record shows: (1) the Department coordinated with the

KIC to identify the available services for father; (2) the caseworker

located community providers; and (3) father could access all the

necessary services locally through tribal or other community

providers. See 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (active efforts may include

identifying community resources).

¶ 25 However, the caseworker and the social worker from the KIC

struggled to reach father and had only minimal contact with him.

For instance, the caseworker noted that the “[s]uccessful contacts”

with father were limited to three to four calls during the

fourteen-month period she had worked on the case. The

caseworker and social worker therefore brainstormed “creative

solutions for engagement,” like “try[ing] to get [father] involved even

if he wasn’t wanting to talk to the Department.” See 25 C.F.R.

§ 23.2 (active efforts may include helping parents overcome barriers

to obtaining services). Without receiving verification from father

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about his engagement in services, the caseworker reached out to

the social worker to see if he had seen any engagement. Ultimately,

father never verified his participation in any services or provided

any signed releases to the Department.

¶ 26 The QEW testified that father was “well aware of what need[ed]

to be done” on his treatment plan, but that in more than a year’s

time, he had not been able to get that completed. The QEW opined

that while father had been provided the opportunity to complete the

services offered, he was not successful in that endeavor. The QEW

also opined that the Department had made active efforts. See

My.K.M., ¶¶ 37-45 (affirming the juvenile court’s decision that the

department made active efforts and relying, in part, on the QEW’s

opinion that the department had made active efforts, which was

heavily credited by the juvenile court).

¶ 27 Still, father asserts that the Department did not do enough to

assist him with accessing services, specifically suggesting that it did

not accommodate his work schedule or help him overcome barriers

to treatment. (Father testified that he worked in the concrete

industry 365 days per year, with days beginning at 6:00 a.m. and

ending at 6:00 p.m.) Yet, the social worker testified that all the

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local programs were usually offered in the evening or at night to

accommodate working parents, and that an online parenting class

was available for father. Father never notified the caseworker of

barriers to accessing services but maintained he would engage with

services soon. And, crucially, when asked at the termination

hearing why he had not completed the services required by his

treatment plan, father testified that he believed “[mother] would

figure out her stuff soon enough to where it would have made it to

where I wouldn’t have had to selfishly do any of this, and that’s why

nothing has been done on my end.” Father essentially conveyed the

same message to the caseworker during the case, admitting that he

knew he had not been working on his treatment plan and that he

had been counting on mother to do the work. Thus, it was father’s

own unwillingness to participate, rather than any alleged deficiency

in the Department’s efforts, that resulted in his lack of engagement

in services. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12

(stating that “active efforts under the ICWA does not mean

persisting with futile efforts,” and noting that a court may “consider

a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment as a factor in

determining whether the Department made active efforts”).

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¶ 28 Father next claims that the Department’s efforts came up

short because it did not offer “necessary modifications” (which he

does not describe) that would have allowed him to consistently

attend virtual visits, despite his demanding work schedule. The

record indeed shows father did not consistently attend virtual visits.

Father missed over a third of visits, was taken off the visitation

schedule six times, used significantly less time than allotted for

visits, and last saw the child over three months before the

termination hearing. The caseworker testified that father would go

through spurts of consistency with visits but then would “fall off the

map” and be unreachable. While father claims it was too difficult

for him to confirm visits at 6:00 a.m., he admitted at the hearing

that he could have been checking in at that time, which coincided

with the start of his workday. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by

father’s claim concerning virtual visits.

¶ 29 Father also asserts the Department failed to coordinate

in-person visits for him and the child in Alaska. True, the only

in-person contact father and the child shared was during the brief

period when the child was in Alaska during mother’s unauthorized

trip.

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¶ 30 However, father never traveled to Colorado or Texas for

in-person family time. Moreover, for the child to visit Ketchikan

from the child’s placements in Colorado or Texas, the child, who

was four years old when this case opened, would have had to fly

first to Seattle and then to Ketchikan. And the visits would have to

be supervised because (1) father did not progress beyond

supervised virtual visits and (2) according to the caseworker, it was

not safe for father to have unsupervised visits due to ongoing

concerns of domestic violence and substance use. See 25 C.F.R.

§ 23.2 (active efforts includes supporting regular visits in the “most

natural setting possible as well as trial home visits . . . consistent

with the need to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the

child”). Similarly, the social worker testified that the KIC was

concerned about domestic violence while the child was in Alaska.

¶ 31 Even so, father had access to virtual visits throughout the

case but, as we described above, he missed visits often, used little

of the allotted time, and was typically unreachable by the

Department, despite its attempts. See A.V., ¶ 12 (noting that active

efforts does not mean persisting with futile efforts). Accordingly, we

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are unpersuaded that the Department failed to make active efforts

with respect to visitation.

¶ 32 Finally, father contends that the Department did not make

active efforts because it did not adequately identify and engage with

kinship placements. Assuming without deciding that the active

efforts standard applies to placement, we disagree.

¶ 33 The Department initially identified the child’s paternal great-

uncle as a possible placement, and the KIC supported this

placement. Paternal great-uncle was a member of the child’s

extended family, eligible for membership in the KIC, and a member

of the Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes.

Therefore, paternal great-uncle (who the child was placed with at

the time of termination) was a preferred placement under ICWA.

See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (enumerating placement preferences for

Indian children in foster care, including “a member of the Indian

child’s extended family”); see also People in Interest of A.R., 2012

COA 195M, ¶ 47 (noting that courts have interpreted this statute as

“expressing a presumption that the child’s best interests are served

by placement with an extended family member who also has Indian

heritage”).

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¶ 34 Further, the record reflects the Department’s efforts to identify

and locate family placements for the child:

• The Department sent out letters, talked to both parents, and

requested two Interstate Compact on Placement of Children

(ICPC) home studies, one of which was for paternal great-

uncle.

• The other ICPC home study the Department requested was for

a member of the KIC, who was like a sister to father, but the

ICPC was denied due to her moving to a different state, and

she did not reengage with the process thereafter.

• The Department and the KIC coordinated to investigate tribal

placements while the child was in Alaska in an effort to allow

him to remain there.

• The QEW spoke with community members to discern possible

placements, including family members of paternal great-uncle.

We are not otherwise persuaded by father’s claim that the

Department did not adequately explore placement with paternal

grandmother or grandfather. Both family members received letters

inquiring about their interest in acting as a placement. Yet, father

concedes that paternal grandfather refused to be a placement early

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in the case, and nothing in the record suggests anyone

recommended him as a placement thereafter. Moreover, while the

Department and the KIC discussed paternal grandmother, the KIC

did not support that placement due to a safety concern.

¶ 35 Thus, the Department’s efforts, under the totality of the

circumstances, demonstrate affirmative, active, thorough, and

timely efforts to rehabilitate father’s parental fitness and reunite

him with the child as ICWA requires. See My.K.M., ¶ 47.

B. Less Drastic Alternatives

1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

¶ 36 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must also consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.

In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); see L.M., ¶ 29. For a less

drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than “adequately”

meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic alternative must be the

“best” option for the child. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021

CO 14, ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic

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alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. B.H., ¶ 80.

2. Application

¶ 37 Father argues that as a direct result of the Department’s

deficient efforts to locate kinship placements, it presented

insufficient evidence that termination was “preferable to placement

with an Alaska relative and an [allocation of parental

responsibilities] involving one or both parents.”

¶ 38 However, we have already rejected father’s argument that the

Department made deficient efforts to engage with kin placements.

See Part A.3. Further, we are unpersuaded by father’s less drastic

alternative arguments.

¶ 39 The juvenile court considered whether any less drastic

alternative to termination existed and concluded that

(1) termination was in the child’s best interests, and (2) custody of

the child with the parents would result in serious emotional or

physical harm to him. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). The court found

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that “there [was] scant, if any, evidence” that an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) “[wa]s an actual alternative in this

case,” and that permanency, which was long overdue for the child,

could only be achieved by termination and adoption. See People in

Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 30 (“Permanent placement is not a

viable less drastic alternative if the child needs a stable, permanent

home that can only be assured by adoption.”); see also L.M., ¶ 29

(noting that a juvenile court may consider the child’s need for

permanency when determining whether there is a viable less drastic

alternative to termination).

¶ 40 The record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 41 The caseworker, noting that the child had just turned six,

opined that he “needs permanency and APR doesn’t grant

permanency that he is in desperate need of,” but would instead “put

him at risk for bouncing around again,” and opined that the child

“can’t afford to continue to go through the same things he’s been

going through the past two years.” Moreover, paternal great-uncle

wished to adopt the child. See Z.M., ¶ 31 (providing that the court

may consider whether the placement favors adoption rather than an

APR). And the court found, with record support, that the adoptive

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family would “support and maintain the child’s cultural ties to his

tribal communities.” Indeed, paternal great-uncle planned to travel

to Alaska shortly after the termination hearing for the child to

connect with his culture and visit with family. Finally, though

father raises concerns that, at times during the case, paternal

great-uncle was experiencing financial and marital struggles, the

caseworker testified at the termination hearing that those issues

had been resolved.

¶ 42 Lastly, to the extent father asserts the court could have

granted an APR to paternal grandmother or grandfather, the KIC

deemed placement with paternal grandmother inappropriate, and

there was no indication paternal grandfather was an available

placement.

¶ 43 Because the record supports the court’s findings, we must

affirm its determination. See B.H., ¶ 80.

IV. Disposition

¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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