Peo v. Nielsen

22CA1352 Peo v Nielsen 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1352
Fremont County District Court No. 20CR524
Honorable Ronald M. Mullins, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Mark Nielsen,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Pawar and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kira L. Suyeishi, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Mark Nielsen appeals his conviction on one count of reckless

manslaughter. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 A jury could have reasonably found the following facts from

the evidence introduced at trial.

¶3 Nielsen and Danylle Shatto, who was Nielsen’s fiancée at the

time, lived together in a home (the residence) that Shatto rented

from her uncle John Achertkirch. Achterkirch and his

stepdaughter, J.J., later moved into the residence.

¶4 After J.J. moved into the residence, Shatto learned that J.J.

had an active arrest warrant. On July 28, 2020, Shatto reported

J.J.’s whereabouts to the police. J.J. was arrested only hours after

Shatto made her report.

¶5 When Achterkirch learned that J.J. had been arrested, he sent

angry text messages to Shatto. Nielsen and Shatto were alone in

the residence when Achterkirch sent the texts.

¶6 Shortly thereafter, Achterkirch returned to the residence and

announced that he “was going to kill [Nielsen and Shatto].” Shatto

and Achterkirch argued about J.J.’s arrest. Nielsen interrupted the

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argument and said to Achterkirch, “Come on, let’s talk about this.”

In response, Achterkirch “knocked [Nielsen’s] head” onto a counter.

¶7 Achterkirch then said to Shatto, “I’m going to effing kill you.”

He approached her with his “hands out.” But before Achterkirch

could reach her, Nielsen drew a gun and fatally shot him.

¶8 Nielsen was charged with one count of second degree murder

and one count of the lesser included offense of reckless

manslaughter.

¶9 Before trial, the court denied Nielsen’s request for admission of

evidence of Achterkirch’s past violent acts toward women in his

family. Nielsen sought to introduce such evidence at trial to

support his self-defense theory.

¶ 10 At trial, defense counsel argued to the jury that Nielsen shot

Achterkirch in defense of himself and Shatto.

¶ 11 The jury acquitted Nielsen of second degree murder but

convicted him of reckless manslaughter.

¶ 12 On appeal, Nielsen contends that the court reversibly erred

and violated his constitutional rights by barring him from

presenting evidence of Achterkirch’s prior violent acts against

women in his family. In addition, Nielsen asserts that the court

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plainly erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury to disregard

testimony that the court ruled was inadmissible. Lastly, Nielsen

argues that the court plainly erred by permitting the prosecutor to

commit misconduct during rebuttal closing argument and that the

cumulative errors at his trial require reversal of his conviction. We

disagree.

II. Analysis

A. The Court Did Not Err by Excluding Evidence of
Achterkirch’s Prior Violent Acts

¶ 13 Nielsen contends that the court erred by barring him from

introducing evidence of Achterkirch’s prior violent acts against

women in Achterkirch’s family. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 14 “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion.” Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 16, 504 P.3d 296, 302.

“A trial court abuses its discretion when it misconstrues or

misapplies the law, or when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107, ¶ 31,

487 P.3d 1243, 1252.

3
2. Additional Facts

¶ 15 Nielsen filed a pretrial notice that he intended to introduce

evidence of Achterkirch’s “past violent acts” to support his self-

defense theory. Nielsen identified two acts in the notice: a 2009

alleged domestic violence incident involving Achterkirch and his

then-wife (the DV incident) and Achterkirch’s alleged 2019 sexual

assault of J.J. (the sexual assault). Nielsen argued that he was

entitled to tell the jury about these acts because “evidence of a

victim’s prior violent acts may be introduced when the defendant is

asserting self-defense.” However, he did not explain the connection

between these acts and his assertion that he acted in self-defense

when he shot Achterkirch.

¶ 16 At a pretrial motions hearing, defense counsel orally amended

the notice to include the following allegations:

• J.J. told Nielsen about the sexual assault before the

shooting, although defense counsel did not say how long

before the shooting J.J. provided Nielsen with this

information, or that J.J. told him when the sexual

assault occurred.

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• At the time of the shooting, Nielsen knew that

Achterkirch once threatened to throw J.J. out of a vehicle

and, on another occasion, had held a knife to J.J.’s

throat (the threats). Defense counsel did not specify

when Nielsen became aware of the threats or whether he

knew when Achterkirch made the threats.

• Nielsen “did not know any of the specific facts” about the

DV incident, “just that there was physical violence.”

¶ 17 The prosecutor objected to admission of evidence of the DV

incident, the sexual assault, and the threats (collectively, the prior

acts) because defense counsel did not indicate when or how Nielsen

became aware of them or when they occurred. The prosecutor

argued that the court lacked sufficient information to make the

findings necessary to admit evidence of the prior acts at trial. In

addition, the prosecutor asserted that evidence of the prior acts was

inadmissible under CRE 403 because it was “highly prejudicial.”

¶ 18 The court ordered defense counsel to submit an amended

notice of the prior acts and took the admissibility of the prior acts

under advisement.

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¶ 19 Nielsen’s counsel filed an amended notice consisting of a

single sentence:

Prior to July 28, 2020, [Nielsen] knew of the
following incidents of violence perpetrated by
[Achterkirch]:

That [Achterkirch] sexually assaulted [J.J.],

That [Achterkirch] was physically abusive to
his [then-]wife,

That [Achterkirch] threatened to throw [J.J.]
out of a moving truck, and

That [Achterkirch] at some point held a knife
to [J.J.]’s throat.

Defense counsel did not provide any further information regarding

Nielsen’s awareness of the prior acts, such as when he specifically

learned about them or whether he knew when they occurred.

¶ 20 In ruling that evidence of the prior acts would be inadmissible

at trial, the court said it would “consider an offer of proof at any

time” and would “anticipate more substance at that juncture.”

Based on the limited information Nielsen had provided, the court

said that Nielsen failed “to offer the substance of how he knew of

the prior acts.”

¶ 21 The court concluded that the prior acts were inadmissible

because Nielsen failed to satisfy the “Ferrell test” for establishing

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the relevance of the victim’s prior violent act in a self-defense case.

See People v. Ferrell, 613 P.2d 324, 326 (Colo. 1980); People v. Lyle,

613 P.2d 896, 898 (Colo. 1980). In addition, the court ruled that

evidence of the sexual assault was inadmissible under CRE 401

because it did not “make it more probable” that Nielsen acted in

self-defense and under CRE 403 because the jury would be

confused about how the sexual assault related to the “violence

between [the] two men.” Lastly, the court determined that evidence

of the DV incident was further inadmissible under CRE 401 and

CRE 403 because it was “too remote in time” to the shooting and

“the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues”

outweighed the DV incident’s probative value.

¶ 22 Nielsen never supplemented his amended notice.

3. Evidence of the Prior Acts Was Inadmissible Under
the Second Prong of the Ferrell Test

¶ 23 Nielsen asserts that he made a sufficient offer of proof to

establish a nexus between Achterkirch’s prior acts of violence

against women in his family and Nielsen’s shooting of Achterkirch

purportedly to protect himself and Shatto. We disagree.

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¶ 24 “Without a nexus between the [victim]’s prior violent acts and

the actions of the defendant, the occurrence of these prior violent

acts would be of no consequence in the determination of the guilt or

innocence of the defendant.” Lyle, 613 P.2d at 898. Under the

Ferrell test, a defendant may present evidence of a victim’s prior

violent act at trial only if

(1) the defendant contends that he acted in
self-defense and there is competent
evidence to support the contention,

(2) either the act occurred or defendant
became aware of its occurrence within a
reasonable time of the homicide, and

(3) the defendant knew of the victim’s prior
violence at the time of the homicide.

Ferrell, 613 P.2d at 326.

¶ 25 The second prong of the Ferrell test is derived from the

“remoteness test” set forth in People v. Burress — specific act

evidence is relevant in a self-defense case so long as the “defendant

establishes (1) that he was aware that the specific violent act took

place, and (2) that either the act occurred or the defendant became

aware of its occurrence within a reasonable time of his use of force

in self-defense.” 515 P.2d 460, 463-64 (Colo. 1973).

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¶ 26 But even logically relevant evidence that satisfies the Ferrell

test “may be excluded” if “its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” People v. Rath, 44

P.3d 1033, 1038 (Colo. 2002) (quoting CRE 403).

¶ 27 “Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or

excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected,

and . . . [i]n case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the

substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or

was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.”

CRE 103(a)(2). Thus, “[w]hether a trial court abuses its discretion

in excluding evidence depends upon the offer of proof under

consideration by the trial court rather than a later assessment of

the value of the evidence by a reviewing court.” People v. Saiz, 32

P.3d 441, 448 (Colo. 2001); see also People v. Crow, 789 P.2d 1104,

1106 (Colo. 1990) (“A court abuses its discretion only when, based

on the particular circumstances confronting it, its ruling . . . is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.”).

¶ 28 We need not analyze the first prong of the Ferrell test because

the parties do not dispute that Nielsen asserted a self-defense

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theory supported by competent evidence. See Ferrell, 613 P.2d at

326.

¶ 29 Our analysis focuses on the second prong of the Ferrell test —

“either the act occurred or defendant became aware of its

occurrence within a reasonable time of the homicide” (the

remoteness test). Id. The remoteness test, which requires

consideration of “both the time of the prior violent act and the time

of its discovery,” guides the trial court in “determining whether a

specific act of violence by a victim . . . could have created present

apprehension or fear sufficient to justify the force used in the mind

of a reasonable man.” Burress, 515 P.2d at 464. Absent a nexus

between the prior violent act and the defendant’s conduct, evidence

of the act is irrelevant. See Lyle, 613 P.2d at 898.

¶ 30 The court found that Nielsen’s offer of proof regarding the prior

acts did not satisfy the Ferrell test because Nielsen did not indicate

how long before the shooting J.J. had “revealed” the prior acts to

him. Nielsen’s offer of proof was thus inadequate to apprise the

court when he learned about the prior acts or when they occurred.

See Saiz, 32 P.3d at 448. Rather, Nielsen vaguely said that he

learned about the prior acts before “the incident.” Accordingly,

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Nielsen’s evidence of the prior acts did not satisfy the remoteness

test. See Ferrell, 613 P.2d at 326.

¶ 31 Nielsen nonetheless contends that the court “ignored” the

language of the remoteness test that “either the [prior acts] must

have occurred or the defendant became aware of [their] occurrence

within a reasonable time of the incident at hand.” We disagree.

¶ 32 Under the remoteness test, the court must consider “both the

time of the prior violent act and the time of its discovery.” Burress,

515 P.2d at 464. The court concluded that Nielsen “fail[ed] to offer

the substance of how he knew of the prior acts.” Although, as

noted above, the court invited Nielsen to make a further “offer of

proof at any time” and observed that it “would anticipate more

substance” in such a subsequent offer of proof. Yet Nielsen did not

provide the court with any additional information regarding the

timing of the prior acts or when he discovered them.

¶ 33 At trial, Shatto testified that J.J. moved into the residence

around “a month and a half” before the shooting. But that

testimony did not fill in the gaps in Nielsen’s offer of proof. Nielsen

did not establish that he learned about the prior acts when J.J.

moved into the residence.

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¶ 34 Nielsen asks us to infer a link between the time J.J. moved

into the residence and when he discovered the prior acts. Nielsen’s

argument not only involves too great a logical leap, but it would

require us to make a finding of fact that the court did not make.

See People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 459 (Colo. 2002) (“[L]aw

declaration is clearly the prerogative of appellate courts, and fact

identification is clearly the prerogative of trial courts.”). He does not

point to any location in the record where he represented that J.J.

told him about the prior acts when she moved into the residence or

that he had not previously been aware of the prior acts.

¶ 35 In the absence of this information, the court correctly

concluded that Nielsen’s skimpy offer of proof fell short of satisfying

the remoteness test. Because Nielsen bore the burden of apprising

the court of “the substance of [the prior acts] evidence,” his

insufficient offer of proof undercuts his claim that the court

improperly barred him from introducing evidence of the prior acts.

CRE 103(a)(2); see also Saiz, 32 P.3d at 448; Brewer v. Motor

Vehicle Div., 720 P.2d 564, 570 (Colo. 1986).

¶ 36 Because Nielsen did not satisfy the second prong of the Ferrell

test — the remoteness test — the court acted within its discretion

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by excluding evidence of the prior acts. In light of this holding, we

do not reach Nielsen’s CRE 403 argument.

B. The Court’s Lack of an Instruction to the Jury
to Disregard Testimony

¶ 37 Nielsen contends that the court abused its discretion by not

sua sponte instructing the jury to disregard a prosecution witness’s

testimony after sustaining defense counsel’s objection to it. We

disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 38 “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion.” Rojas, ¶ 16, 504 P.3d at 302. “A trial court abuses its

discretion when it misconstrues or misapplies the law, or when its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Knapp,

¶ 31, 487 P.3d at 1252.

2. Additional Facts

¶ 39 The prosecutor called Laura Rodriguez, one of Achterkirch’s

coworkers, to testify in response to Nielsen’s counsel’s assertion

during his opening statement that Achterkirch was under the

influence of methamphetamine at the time of his altercation with

Nielsen. Rodriguez described her interaction with one of

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Achterkirch’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning clients the

day after the shooting:

[W]hen [Achterkirch] was not able to return [to
the client’s home] the next day, I called that
client, advising them that another technician
would be going there, and the client opposed
that because they only wanted [Achterkirch].
They developed a relationship with
[Achterkirch] and really liked him. And I told
[the client], unfortunately [Achterkirch] had
passed away, and they actually cried on the
phone because it was — I mean, it’s — that
was [Achterkirch]. He took people’s heart.

¶ 40 Defense counsel objected to this testimony (the inadmissible

testimony) on unspecified grounds. The court sustained the

objection. Defense counsel did not ask the court to instruct the

jury to disregard the inadmissible testimony.

3. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Not Sua Sponte
Instructing the Jury to Disregard the Inadmissible Testimony

¶ 41 Nielsen contends that the court abused its discretion by not

sua sponte instructing the jury to disregard the inadmissible

testimony.

¶ 42 But Nielsen does not cite, and we are not aware of, any

authority requiring a trial court to provide such an instruction sua

sponte after sustaining an objection to the evidence.

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¶ 43 Colorado case law does not obligate a trial court to sua sponte

direct the jury to disregard inadmissible evidence. See People v.

Mersman, 148 P.3d 199, 203 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[T]o receive a

curative instruction, a defendant must request it . . . .”); see also

People v. Krueger, 2012 COA 80, ¶ 67 n.5, 296 P.3d 294, 309 n.5

(perceiving no reversible error in the court’s failure to give a curative

instruction sua sponte); People v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112,

1117 (Colo. App. 2004) (finding no error “in the trial court’s failure

sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard the challenged

remark”).

¶ 44 And, as the People note, a curative instruction might have

highlighted the inadmissible testimony for the jury even though

defense counsel may have decided not to focus the jury’s attention

on it. Indeed, defense counsel may have chosen “for strategic or

tactical reasons” not to request an instruction directing the jury to

disregard the inadmissible testimony to avoid drawing “special

attention to the evidence, thus giving it greater emphasis and jury

impact than it would have had if left alone.” People v. Gladney, 570

P.2d 231, 234 (Colo. 1977).

15
¶ 45 Because defense counsel did not seek an instruction that the

jury should disregard the inadmissible testimony, we conclude that

the court did not abuse its discretion by not giving such an

instruction. See Mersman, 148 P.3d at 203. Accordingly, the court

did not abuse its discretion by not instructing the jury to disregard

the inadmissible testimony.

C. The Court Did Not Plainly Err by Allowing the Prosecutor
to Refer During His Rebuttal Closing to
the Inadmissible Testimony

¶ 46 Nielsen next contends that the court plainly erred by

permitting the prosecutor to engage in misconduct by referring to

the inadmissible testimony during rebuttal closing argument. We

disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 47 “In a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the reviewing court

engages in a two-step analysis.” Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089,

1096 (Colo. 2010). “First, it must determine whether the

prosecutor’s questionable conduct was improper based on the

totality of the circumstances and, second, whether such actions

warrant reversal according to the proper standard of review.” Id.

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¶ 48 Because defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor

referred to the inadmissible testimony, “we apply a plain error

standard of review.” Id. at 1097. “Crim. P. 52(b) permits [plain

error] review if (1) there is an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that

affects the defendant’s substantial rights.” People v. Crabtree, 2024

CO 40M, ¶ 41, 550 P.3d 656, 667.

¶ 49 An error is plain if it is “so clear cut and so obvious that a trial

judge should have been able to avoid it without benefit of objection.”

People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 54, 361 P.3d 1005, 1020. “An

error is substantial if it so undermines the fundamental fairness of

the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the

judgment of conviction.” People v. Deutsch, 2020 COA 114, ¶ 22,

471 P.3d 1266, 1272.

¶ 50 “In the context of plain error review of prosecutorial

misconduct, we will only reverse when the misconduct was

‘flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper.’” People v.

Robinson, 2019 CO 102, ¶ 19, 454 P.3d 229, 233 (quoting Domingo-

Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1053 (Colo. 2005)).

17
2. Additional Facts

¶ 51 During his closing argument, defense counsel reiterated his

contention that Achterkirch had been high at the time of the

altercation with Nielsen. Even though the court had earlier

sustained defense counsel’s objection to the inadmissible testimony,

the prosecutor repeated it during rebuttal closing argument in

response to the defense’s attack on Achterkirch’s sobriety:

You know [defense counsel] also told you that
day that one of two things must have
happened. Either [Achterkirch] must have
been high all day at work. Well, what is that
consistent with the evidence in the actual
case? His boss and his coworker came in and
said that [Achterkirch] all day was doing an
exceptional job at work. That people — his
customers the next day wanted him back at
their house again, that someone cried when
they heard what happened to him.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 52 As noted, defense counsel did not object to this argument.

3. The Court Erred by Not Striking the Prosecutor’s
Reference to the Inadmissible Testimony,
but the Error, While Obvious, Was Not Substantial

¶ 53 The People assert that the prosecutor’s reference to the

inadmissible testimony was proper because the prosecutor was

attempting to rebut defense counsel’s argument that, when Nielsen

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fought with Achterkirch, Achterkirch was “high on

methamphetamine” and must have been “either injecting himself or

smoking meth late in the workday or the second he g[ot] off work.”

We disagree.

¶ 54 Although “prosecutors have wide latitude in the language and

style they choose to employ, as well as in replying to an argument

by opposing counsel,” People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167, ¶ 30, 302

P.3d 311, 317, that latitude does not grant them license to violate

the black-letter rule that lawyers may not refer to facts not in

evidence, People v. Walters, 148 P.3d 331, 334 (Colo. App. 2006)

(“[I]t is not proper for a prosecutor to refer to facts not in

evidence.”).

¶ 55 The prosecutor’s reference to testimony to which the court had

sustained defense counsel’s objection was neither a benign

rhetorical flourish nor a matter of style. See id. Because under

well-established Colorado law, lawyers cannot refer to facts not in

evidence during closing argument, we conclude that the prosecutor

engaged in misconduct by repeating the inadmissible testimony.

See id.

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¶ 56 Next, we must determine whether the court plainly erred by

not sua sponte striking the prosecutor’s improper reference to the

inadmissible testimony. See Conyac, ¶ 54, 361 P.3d at 1020 (Under

the plain error standard of review, the defendant bears the burden

to establish that the error was “so clear cut and so obvious that a

trial judge should have been able to avoid it without benefit of

objection.”). We break no new legal ground by noting that, in cases

tried to a jury, the court must “prevent inadmissible evidence from

being suggested to the jury by any means.” CRE 103(c). Thus, it

was obvious at the time of Nielsen’s trial that a prosecutor may not

refer to inadmissible evidence when addressing the jury. See People

v. Marko, 2015 COA 139, ¶ 207, 434 P.3d 618, 657 (“[A] prosecutor

may not misstate the evidence nor may a prosecutor refer to facts

not in evidence.” (Internal citations omitted)), aff’d on other

grounds, 2018 CO 97, ¶ 207, 432 P.3d 607; Walters, 148 P.3d at

334.

¶ 57 For these reasons, we conclude that the court’s silence when

the prosecutor referred to the inadmissible testimony constituted

error and that the error was obvious because the court “should

20
have been able to avoid it without benefit of objection.” Conyac, ¶

54, 361 P.3d at 1020.

¶ 58 Accordingly, we turn to whether the error was substantial —

whether it so undermined “the fundamental fairness of the trial

itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

conviction.” Deutsch, ¶ 22, 471 P.3d at 1272. We conclude that

the error was not substantial and, therefore, was not plain and does

not warrant reversal.

¶ 59 Notably, the prosecutor’s reference to the inadmissible

testimony was momentary; it consisted of a single sentence within a

rebuttal closing argument that spans eight transcript pages over

the course of a nine-day trial. Because the prosecutor’s misconduct

was fleeting, the lack of sua sponte judicial intervention to strike it

“does not warrant the drastic remedy of reversal under the plain

error standard.” People v. Salazar, 2023 COA 102, ¶ 53, 542 P.3d

1209, 1221 (quoting Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1055).

¶ 60 Even if Nielsen is correct that the prosecutor improperly

referred to the inadmissible testimony during rebuttal closing to

“manipulat[e] the jurors’ emotions” and “invoke their sympathy for

[Achterkirch],” Nielsen’s speculation regarding the prosecutor’s

21
intent cannot overcome the brief statement’s harmlessness to his

defense. Similarly, Nielsen offers no support for his related

argument that the prosecutor improperly invoked the inadmissible

testimony despite knowing it had not been admitted into evidence.

¶ 61 In addition, Nielsen argues that the prosecutor’s misconduct

was particularly harmful, and thus warrants reversal, because

“rebuttal closing is the last thing a juror hears from counsel before

deliberating.” Nielsen’s contention proves too much, however, as

fleeting references to facts not in evidence during a rebuttal closing

argument are not automatic grounds for reversal. In any event,

after the prosecutor referred to the inadmissible testimony, the

court paused the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument and

dismissed the jury to conduct a bench conference. Thus, the

prosecutor’s reference to the inadmissible testimony was not the

last thing the jury heard before beginning its deliberations.

¶ 62 Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not plainly err by

not interrupting the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing to strike the

prosecutor’s reference to the inadmissible testimony.

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D. The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply

¶ 63 Nielsen asserts that the court’s cumulative errors deprived

him of a fair trial. We disagree.

¶ 64 “[R]egardless of whether any error was preserved or

unpreserved,” under the cumulative error doctrine, “reversal is

warranted when numerous errors in the aggregate show the

absence of a fair trial, even if individually the errors were harmless

or did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.” Howard-

Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 26, 443 P.3d 1007, 1012. “Stated

simply, cumulative error involves cumulative prejudice.” Id. at

¶ 25, 443 P.3d at 1011. “The doctrine of cumulative error requires

that numerous errors be committed, not merely alleged.” Conyac,

¶ 152, 361 P.3d at 1030.

¶ 65 We identified at most one trial error. But “a single error is

insufficient to reverse under the cumulative error standard.” People

v. Thames, 2019 COA 124, ¶ 69, 467 P.3d 1181, 1194.

¶ 66 Thus, we conclude there is no cumulative error.

III. Disposition

¶ 67 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE LUM concur.

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