Marriage of Moniruzzaman

24CA1757 Marriage of Moniruzzaman 07-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1757
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22DR30867
Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge

In re the Marriage of

MD Moniruzzaman,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

and

Naheda Akter,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 31, 2025

Warren Domangue, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee

Smith Balicki Finn Laraway, LLC, Ashley L. Balicki, William D. Taylor,
Centennial, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant
¶1 MD Moniruzzaman (husband) appeals the portions of the

permanent orders concerning property division and child support

entered on the dissolution of his marriage to Naheda Akter (wife).

Wife cross-appeals the allocation of the parties’ debt. We reverse

the property division, maintenance, and child support portions of

the permanent orders.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2014 and have two children. In 2022,

the parties separated, and husband petitioned to dissolve the

parties’ marriage.

¶3 The district court dissolved the marriage and entered

permanent orders. The marital estate consisted primarily of the

marital home and two vehicles. The court awarded each party a

vehicle. As to the marital home — the largest asset — the court

found that each party’s share of the equity in the home “would be

approximately $110,000.” But instead of dividing this equity

between husband and wife, the court found that “it is in the

children’s best interests to allow them to stay in the home” with

wife, their primary caretaker. The court added that, “[a]s long as

[husband] pays [his] arrearage on child support and remains

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current on child support going forward, he shall continue to build

equity in the value of the marital home.”

¶4 Concerning the marital debt, the district court allocated about

$43,000 to wife and about $138,000 to husband.

¶5 As for child support, the district court ordered husband to pay

wife a total of $3,480 per month: $1,240 based on the child support

guidelines; $1,000 from an upward deviation; and $1,240 in

arrearage installments (lasting two years). Because the court

deviated upward from the child support guideline, it declined to

award wife any maintenance.

II. Property Division

¶6 Husband contends that the district court erred by failing to

divide the marital home’s equity. We agree.

¶7 The district court has broad discretion to equitably divide the

marital property, and we won’t disturb its division absent an abuse

of discretion. In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶¶ 64-65. A

district court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law. Id.

at ¶ 65.

¶8 A district court must equitably divide the marital property,

though the division need not be equal. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S.

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2024; In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001).

But an order that leaves one party with “only the vague expectation

that the property may one day be divided” is “illusory” and does not

comply with the statutory mandate to divide marital property. In re

Marriage of Gehret, 580 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Colo. App. 1978). Thus,

it’s generally improper for the court to continue joint property

ownership between divorced spouses unless the court “gives each

party a definable or ascertainable portion of at least some of the

attributes of ownership” and ensures that “the mechanics of any

fractional division can be accomplished within a reasonable time.”

In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 49 (Colo. App. 1993).

¶9 As best we can tell, the district court awarded husband an

unspecified amount of the marital home’s equity so long as he “pays

the arrearage on child support and remains current on child

support going forward.”1 But the order provides no guidance on

1 The district court added that husband would “continue to build

equity in the value of the marital home.” But if husband is not
awarded any interest in the home, he would not be entitled to any
future increase in the home’s value because property must be
valued at the time of dissolution or the hearing on property division,
whichever comes first. In re Marriage of Wormell, 697 P.2d 812, 814
(Colo. App. 1985); § 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2024.

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when, if ever, the marital home would be sold or how the proceeds

would be split. Instead, it appears that wife may reside in the home

indefinitely while husband has no assurance that he will receive his

interest in the home. Because this leaves husband with an illusory

interest in the marital home, we must reverse the property division.

See Gehret, 580 P.2d at 1276-77 (reversing illusory order that

equally divided marital interest in business “[i]n the event of the

sale of [the business] for any reason”); In re Marriage of Paul, 821

P.2d 925, 927-28 (Colo. App. 1991) (reversing illusory order

concerning husband’s interest in an office building because the

court “imposed no limitations on the time and manner of the

payment of husband’s interest, nor any restrictions on wife’s

exclusive control of the asset”).

¶ 10 And because the allocation of marital debt “is in the nature of

property division,” In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1172

(Colo. App. 2006), the district court must necessarily revisit the

debt allocation on remand, see In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024

COA 103M, ¶ 26 (requiring court to reexamine “the entire property

division on remand” after reversal of material portions of the

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property division). We therefore decline to consider wife’s cross-

appeal concerning the marital debt.2

¶ 11 We express no opinion on how the district court should divide

the marital home or allocate the marital debt. If the marital home

is to be fractionally divided, any such division must be

accomplished within a reasonable time. Simon, 856 P.2d at 49.

III. Other Contentions and Remand Instructions

¶ 12 Because we’re reversing the property division, we must also

reverse the portion of the permanent orders addressing

maintenance and child support. See LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3,

¶ 66; In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005).

For this reason, we similarly decline to address husband’s

contentions regarding child support.

¶ 13 On remand, the district court may take additional evidence as

it deems necessary, see In re Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147,

2 Though we do not consider the allocation of marital debt, we do

observe that the district court appeared to rely on a stipulation that
each party would be “responsible for their respective credit card
debt as reflected on their [s]worn [f]inancial [s]tatements.” Because
the appellate record does not contain this stipulation, to the extent
any such stipulation exists, it should be presented to the district
court and made a part of the record.

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¶ 21, but it must use the same property and debt valuations from

the permanent orders, Capparelli, ¶ 26; § 14-10-113(5). The court

must also examine the property and debt divisions based on the

parties’ current economic circumstances. Capparelli, ¶ 26; § 14-10-

113(1)(c). The court should follow the multi-step analysis under

section 14-10-113 and make explicit factual findings when

required. See LaFleur, ¶¶ 62-63, 65.

¶ 14 After dividing the marital property and debt, the district court

should then assess maintenance and child support under the

procedures laid out respectively in sections 14-10-114(3)(a)(I) and

14-10-115(7), C.R.S. 2024. As before, the court should consider

the parties’ current economic circumstances and make findings

when required. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶¶ 23-24.

Any deviation from the child support guidelines must be supported

by specific findings. See § 14-10-115(8)(e).

IV. Disposition

¶ 15 We reverse the portions of the judgment concerning property

division, maintenance, and child support, and we remand the case

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The portions

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of the permanent orders not challenged on appeal remain

undisturbed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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