Stetson v. Poudre Valley

24CA1915 Stetson v Poudre Valley 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1915
Larimer County District Court No. 24CV30421
Honorable Laurie K. Dean, Judge

Jacqleen Stetson,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Poudre Valley Health Care, Inc. D/B/A Poudre Valley Health System and
D/B/A UCHealth Mountain Crest Behavioral Health; and
Ashley Barnhart, RN,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Tow and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 24, 2025

Law Offices of J.M. Reinan, P.C., Jerome M. Reinan, Jordana Griff Gingrass,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Caplan and Earnest, L.L.C., W. Stuart Stuller, Laura M. Wassmuth, Travis J.
Miller, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Poudre Valley Health
Care, Inc.

Childs McCune, LLC, Steven A. Michalek, Corinne C. Miller, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellee Ashley Barnhart, RN
¶1 Plaintiff, Jacqleen Stetson, appeals the district court’s order

granting the special motion to dismiss jointly filed by defendants,

Ashley Barnhart, RN, and Poudre Valley Health Care, Inc., d/b/a

Poudre Valley Health System and d/b/a UCHealth Mountain Crest

Behavioral Health (Mountain Crest), under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP

statute, section 13-20-1101, C.R.S. 2024. We affirm the court’s

order and remand the case with directions.

I. Background

¶2 We take the following facts from Stetson’s district court

complaint and her opposition to Barnhart and Mountain Crest’s

joint special motion to dismiss.

¶3 In July 2022, Stetson, a nurse practitioner, was admitted to

Mountain Crest on an involuntary short-term mental health

certification after suffering escalating mental health issues,

including extreme paranoia and psychosis with increased agitation.

During her second day of treatment at Mountain Crest, Stetson

broke off a pointed, four-inch piece of plastic from medical

equipment that had been left in her room and used it as a weapon.

Mountain Crest staff attempted to physically restrain Stetson, but

she managed to push past them and grabbed Barnhart, a nurse at

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the facility. Stetson then placed her arm around Barnhart’s neck,

pulled her toward the exit, and demanded to be released from the

facility. Mountain Crest staff eventually separated Stetson from

Barnhart, removed the weapon from Stetson’s possession, and

placed her in a restraint chair.

¶4 After consulting with other staff members, Barnhart contacted

the police department to report the incident. While making her

report, Barnhart said she had felt she was in a “hostage situation,”

but she also explained that she didn’t believe that Stetson had

acted purposefully, attributing her behavior to her psychiatric

illness. According to Stetson, Barnhart reported the incident to law

enforcement based on her “personal belief” that Stetson should no

longer be allowed to practice as a nurse practitioner.

¶5 Two days later, Mountain Crest discharged Stetson after she

showed signs of improvement and was no longer actively psychotic.

But as she was leaving the facility, police officers arrested Stetson

for her attack on Barnhart. Stetson later came to believe that

Mountain Crest staff, including Barnhart, had “arranged” for police

officers to arrest Stetson by continuing to communicate with law

enforcement after the incident. Mountain Crest staff explained to

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the arresting officers that they hadn’t informed Stetson about her

imminent arrest because they were worried that it would upset her

and make her “unmanageable.”

¶6 Stetson was charged with multiple crimes arising out of her

attack on Barnhart. She ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser

charge — third degree assault — in lieu of proceeding to trial.

¶7 Stetson later filed a civil complaint and jury demand against

Mountain Crest and Barnhart, alleging claims for extreme and

outrageous conduct, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy.1

Mountain Crest and Barnhart filed a joint special motion to dismiss

these claims under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute. After holding

oral argument, the district court granted Barnhart and Mountain

Crest’s special motion to dismiss in a detailed written order. As

relevant to this appeal, the court determined that (1) Stetson’s

claims arose from acts in furtherance of Barnhart’s and Mountain

1 Stetson also filed (1) an abuse of process claim against both

Barnhart and Mountain Crest, which she later withdrew; and (2) a
negligence claim against Mountain Crest only. Mountain Crest
answered the negligence claim, which is currently stayed pending
resolution of this interlocutory appeal.

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Crest’s protected rights to free speech and (2) Stetson hadn’t shown

a reasonable likelihood of success on her claims.

¶8 Stetson appeals the district court’s dismissal order under

section 13-20-1101(7).

II. Discussion

¶9 Stetson contends that the district court erred by determining

that (1) Barnhart’s initial call to the police constituted free speech

concerning an important public issue; (2) Barnhart’s and Mountain

Crest’s post-call conduct was related to Barnhart’s initial call and

therefore immunized from civil liability; and (3) Stetson hadn’t

shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims. We

review each contention in turn.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 The anti-SLAPP statute’s purpose is to “encourage and

safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak

freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to

the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, to

protect the rights of persons to file meritorious lawsuits for

demonstrable injury.” § 13-20-1101(1)(b).

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¶ 11 The statute balances these rights by providing a mechanism

for weeding out, at an early stage, nonmeritorious lawsuits brought

in response to a person’s petitioning or speech activities. Tender

Care Veterinary Ctr., Inc. v. Lind-Barnett, 2023 COA 114, ¶ 12 (cert.

granted in part Sept. 3, 2024). A party, typically a defendant, may

file a special motion to dismiss a cause of action “arising from any

act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or

free speech under the United States constitution or the state

constitution in connection with a public issue.” § 13-20-1101(3)(a);

see Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst., 2022 COA 109M, ¶¶ 15-18 (describing

a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute). But if

the plaintiff establishes a “reasonable likelihood” that they will

prevail on the claim, then the court must deny the special motion to

dismiss. § 13-20-1101(3)(a).

¶ 12 Given this statutory framework, the resolution of a special

motion to dismiss follows a two-step process. Tender Care

Veterinary Ctr., ¶ 13. First, the defendant bears the burden of

showing that the conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claims arises

from the defendant’s exercise of their right of petition or free

speech. Id. If the defendant fails to satisfy their step-one burden,

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the court must deny the special motion to dismiss. Id. at ¶ 14. But

if the defendant satisfies this burden, the analysis proceeds to the

second step. Id. At the second step, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the

claim. Id. If the plaintiff fails to make such a showing, the court

must grant the special motion to dismiss.2 Id.

¶ 13 We review an order granting or denying a special motion to

dismiss de novo, applying the same two-part test as the district

court. Coomer v. Salem Media of Colo., Inc., 2025 COA 2, ¶ 16.

¶ 14 With these principles in mind, we turn to Stetson’s

contentions.

2 Divisions of this court have lacked consensus on whether to treat

the plaintiff’s proffered evidence as true at the second step. See
Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 2025 COA 4, ¶¶ 62-63
(Berger, J., specially concurring) (discussing the inconsistent
holdings in Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst., 2022 COA 109M, ¶ 21, and
L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 23); Coomer v. Salem Media of
Colorado, Inc., 2025 COA 2, ¶ 120 (Tow, J., specially concurring)
(same). We need not resolve this question because, even giving
Stetson the benefit of accepting her evidence as true, we conclude
for the reasons below that she has failed to satisfy her step-two
burden.

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B. Analysis

1. Step One

¶ 15 Under step one, we first address Barnhart’s initial call to law

enforcement authorities before turning to Barnhart’s and Mountain

Crest’s post-call conduct.

a. Barnhart’s Initial Report to Law Enforcement

¶ 16 The anti-SLAPP statute protects, as relevant here, “[a]ny

written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,

executive, or judicial proceeding or any other official proceeding

authorized by law.” § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(I). This provision

encompasses communications that are preparatory to or in

anticipation of commencing official proceedings, including

statements meant to prompt action by law enforcement agencies.

L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 28. Barnhart’s initial call to law

enforcement was clearly intended to prompt action by the police,

rendering it protected speech.

¶ 17 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Stetson’s argument that

Barnhart’s report to law enforcement was “fraudulent and

untruthful.” According to Stetson, Barnhart, a psychiatric nurse,

“knew” that Stetson was suffering from psychosis at the time and

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was therefore “incapable” of distinguishing right from wrong. But a

plaintiff’s mere allegation that the defendant’s otherwise-protected

statement is false doesn’t prevent the defendant from satisfying step

one. Id. at ¶ 31. Were that the case, a plaintiff could evade the

purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute simply by alleging falsity. Id.

As a result, a defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP

statute to dismiss a plaintiff’s action only when the defendant

concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the

assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a

matter of law. Id. at ¶ 30. When the plaintiff’s allegations of

making a false report are controverted, they are insufficient to

render the alleged conduct unlawful as a matter of law. Id.

¶ 18 In this case, Barnhart vigorously disputed Stetson’s

allegations that she knowingly submitted a false report to police.

And Stetson’s guilty plea to third degree assault confirms, at

minimum, that Barnhart’s report wasn’t “conclusively” fraudulent

or untruthful. Id.

¶ 19 Stetson additionally argues that Barnhart’s report fell outside

the anti-SLAPP statute’s protection because it violated (1) certain

federal and state privacy laws and (2) Colorado’s prohibition on

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discriminating against persons who have received an evaluation or

treatment for a mental health disorder, section 27-65-117, C.R.S.

2024.

¶ 20 We reject the first of these contentions because whether

Barnhart unlawfully disclosed confidential or privileged information

is “irrelevant” at step one of the anti-SLAPP inquiry. Moreau v. U.S.

Olympic & Paralympic Comm., 641 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1136 (D. Colo.

2022) (citing Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr.

2d 906, 918 (Ct. App. 2001)).

¶ 21 As to the second contention, Stetson asserts that Barnhart

violated section 27-65-117 by discriminating against her based on

her occupation as a nurse practitioner, alleging that Barnhart didn’t

make similar criminal complaints against previous patients who

also assaulted her. But section 27-65-117 doesn’t protect Stetson’s

position as a nurse practitioner. Rather, it prohibits only

discrimination against individuals who have received an evaluation

or treatment for a mental health disorder. Thus, even accepting

Stetson’s allegations as true, the anti-discrimination provision in

section 27-65-117 doesn’t support Stetson’s argument.

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¶ 22 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Barnhart

satisfied step one as it pertains to her initial report to law

enforcement authorities.

b. Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s Post-Call Conduct

¶ 23 We reach the same conclusion with respect to Barnhart’s and

Mountain Crest’s post-call conduct. Stetson argues that Barnhart

and Mountain Crest staff continued to communicate with law

enforcement authorities after Barnhart’s initial call, thus facilitating

her eventual arrest after she was discharged. But the anti-SLAPP

statute protects “any act . . . in furtherance” of a person’s right of

petition or free speech. § 13-20-1101(3)(a) (emphasis added). Given

the statute’s expansive scope, we perceive no reason why these

post-call communications with law enforcement should receive any

less protection than Barnhart’s initial report. See Proactive Techs.,

Inc. v. Denver Place Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 141 P.3d 959, 961 (Colo.

App. 2006) (the adjective “any” generally means “all” and is a “term

of expansion without restriction or limitation”).

¶ 24 Stetson also argues that Barnhart and Mountain Crest

withheld information from her related to the ongoing criminal

investigation, going so far as to perpetuate the “ruse” that she

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would be discharged home to her husband. In Stetson’s view,

Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s concealment of the truth was

wholly unrelated to the initial law enforcement report and therefore

unprotected.

¶ 25 Even assuming that Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s alleged

concealment of information wasn’t “in furtherance” of their

protected communications with law enforcement, § 13-20-

1101(3)(a), we still discern no basis to reverse. Under step one of

the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff can’t survive a special motion to

dismiss “simply by ‘combining allegations’ of protected and

nonprotected activity ‘under the label of one cause of action.’”

Moreau, 641 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (quoting Fox, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

918). Instead, when a claim is based on a mixture of “allegedly

protected and unprotected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute,”

id. at 1135, the court must examine the “principal thrust or

gravamen” of the plaintiff’s claim. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Schack,

64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 873 (Ct. App. 2007)). Unless the allegedly

protected activity is “‘merely incidental’ to the unprotected

conduct,” the court may still determine that the defendant has

satisfied their step-one burden as to the “mixed” claim and proceed

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to step two. Id. (quoting Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v.

Happening House Ventures, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 139 (Ct. App.

2010)).

¶ 26 We agree with the district court that the principal thrust or

gravamen of each of Stetson’s claims centered around Barnhart’s

and Mountain Crest’s protected communications with law

enforcement. In her intentional infliction of emotional distress and

breach of fiduciary duty claims, Stetson alleged that Barnhart and

Mountain Crest caused her to be prosecuted and criminally

punished, abused their power over her, caused her medical

information to be exposed, favored Barnhart’s desire to prevent

Stetson from practicing her profession, failed to keep Stetson safe,

and intentionally traumatized her by discharging her into police

custody rather than to her husband. In her civil conspiracy claim,

Stetson similarly alleged that Barnhart’s coworkers encouraged

Barnhart to (1) abuse her power over Stetson; (2) contact law

enforcement; (3) make a “paper trail”; and (4) follow through on her

plan to deprive Stetson of her career.

¶ 27 Although the specific details vary, the principal thrust or

gravamen of each of these claims is that Barnhart and Mountain

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Crest allegedly breached various duties owed to Stetson by

communicating with law enforcement without her knowledge and

then discharging her into police custody. Barnhart’s and Mountain

Crest’s protected communications with law enforcement are integral

to each of these claims. Indeed, Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s

alleged concealment of information regarding the police

investigation couldn’t have occurred if Barnhart hadn’t contacted

law enforcement in the first place. As a result, Barnhart’s and

Mountain Crest’s protected communications with law enforcement

weren’t “merely incidental” to the unprotected conduct alleged in

Stetson’s complaint. Moreau, 641 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (citation

omitted).

¶ 28 Accordingly, we conclude that Barnhart and Mountain Crest

satisfied their step-one burden as to their post-call conduct.

2. Step Two

¶ 29 Turning to step two of the anti-SLAPP statute’s analysis, we

conclude as a matter of law that Stetson failed to satisfy her burden

of establishing a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims.

We base this conclusion on the broad civil immunity afforded to

those who report alleged crimes to law enforcement authorities.

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¶ 30 In Colorado, any person or corporation who has “reasonable

grounds” to believe that a crime has been committed has a duty “to

report promptly the suspected crime to law enforcement

authorities.” § 18-8-115, C.R.S. 2024. “When acting in good faith,

such corporation or person shall be immune from any civil liability

for such reporting or disclosure.” Id.; see also § 16-3-202(4), C.R.S.

2024 (“Private citizens, acting in good faith, shall be immune from

any civil liability for reporting to any police officer or law

enforcement authority the commission or suspected commission of

any crime or for giving other information to aid in the prevention of

any crime.”).

¶ 31 Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s communications with law

enforcement fell squarely within the civil immunity provided by

section 18-8-115. All agree that Stetson placed her arm across

Barnhart’s neck and wielded a sharp piece of plastic as a weapon to

bargain for her release from the facility. Barnhart and Mountain

Crest therefore had “reasonable grounds” to believe that Stetson

had committed a crime. § 18-8-115. Indeed, Stetson later pleaded

guilty to third degree assault. See § 18-3-204, C.R.S. 2024.

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¶ 32 Similar to her step-one argument, Stetson nonetheless argues

that Barnhart and Mountain Crest lacked a good faith belief that

Stetson was criminally culpable based on their awareness of her

psychosis and resulting inability to form the requisite mental state.

But nothing in section 18-8-115 required either Barnhart or

Mountain Crest to investigate or confirm Stetson’s mental state

before reporting Stetson’s attack to authorities. The statute

requires only that the reporter have “reasonable grounds” to believe

that a crime has been committed. § 18-8-115. Stetson’s wielding of

a weapon against Barnhart provided more than ample grounds to

report her to law enforcement authorities.

¶ 33 Moreover, contrary to Stetson’s implicit argument, a victim’s

report to law enforcement authorities doesn’t lose its protected

status simply because the victim is aware, or suspects, that the

alleged assailant is incapable of distinguishing between right and

wrong. Victims aren’t expected to know or evaluate the precise legal

consequences that flow from an assailant’s impaired mental state.

That task falls to investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and,

ultimately, the fact finder at trial. See Lunsford v. W. States Life

Ins., 919 P.2d 899, 901 (Colo. App. 1996) (Section 18-8-115 doesn’t

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require “the degree of certainty on the part of the citizen reporting

the commission of a crime as does the probable cause standard

that police officers are held to in making warrantless arrests.”).

¶ 34 Thus, based on the broad civil immunity afforded to Barnhart

and Mountain Crest under section 18-8-115, we conclude as a

matter of law that Stetson didn’t satisfy her step-two burden of

showing a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims.

¶ 35 We aren’t convinced otherwise by Stetson’s remaining step-two

arguments. Stetson again emphasizes that Barnhart and Mountain

Crest concealed their communications with law enforcement from

her and conspired to discharge her into police custody. But Stetson

cites no authority that requires an individual who reports a crime,

either generally or specifically within the behavioral health field, to

inform the assailant that their alleged crime has been reported to

law enforcement authorities. In our view, imposing such a

requirement would undermine section 18-8-115’s underlying crime-

reporting goals by affording the assailant an opportunity to flee or

conceal evidence of their wrongdoing.

¶ 36 Nor are we persuaded that Stetson is reasonably likely to

prevail based on Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s alleged violations

16
of certain federal and state privacy laws. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512

(2024); 42 C.F.R. § 2.12 (2024); §§ 27-65-119(1)(n), 27-65-123(1),

C.R.S. 2024. The privacy laws relied on by Stetson carve out

exceptions from their confidentiality provisions for reports of

criminal conduct made to law enforcement. Under a regulation

promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996, for example, a covered entity “may

disclose to a law enforcement official protected health information

that the covered entity believes in good faith constitutes evidence of

criminal conduct that occurred on the premises of the covered

entity.”3 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(5); see also 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(5)

(similar exception for substance use disorder patient records).

¶ 37 Similarly, with exceptions not pertinent here, information

regarding a patient’s mental health disorder isn’t treated as

privileged or confidential under Colorado law if it concerns

(1) “observed behavior that constitutes a criminal offense committed

upon the premises of any facility providing services” for a mental

3 Although the regulation limits this exception to reports made by a

covered entity operating in good faith, we have already rejected
Stetson’s argument that Barnhart and Mountain Crest lacked good
faith when reporting to law enforcement.

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health disorder; or (2) “any criminal offense committed against any

person while performing or receiving services” for a mental health

disorder. § 27-65-123(3)(a).

¶ 38 Barnhart’s and Mountain Crest’s communications with law

enforcement fit comfortably within these exceptions. Thus, the

privacy laws cited by Stetson don’t support her argument that she

is reasonably likely to prevail on her claims.

¶ 39 Accordingly, Stetson failed to meet her step-two burden of

establishing a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on her claims.

Given our conclusion, we perceive no error in the district court’s

decision granting Barnhart and Mountain Crest’s special motion to

dismiss.

III. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 40 Barnhart and Mountain Crest jointly request their reasonable

attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. “[A] prevailing

defendant on a special motion to dismiss is entitled to recover the

defendant’s attorney fees and costs.” § 13-20-1101(4)(a). Because

Barnhart and Mountain Crest have prevailed on appeal, we grant

their request. Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA

145, ¶ 54. Exercising our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1, we remand

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the case to the district court to determine the amount of their

reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

IV. Disposition

¶ 41 We affirm the district court’s order granting Barnhart and

Mountain Crest’s special motion to dismiss and remand the case to

the district court to determine the amount of Barnhart’s and

Mountain Crest’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.

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