Mora v. Davies

24CA1441 Mora v Davies 07-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1441
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV836
Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge

Denise Mora,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

John Davies, and Office of Clerk and Recorder, Public Trustee,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 17, 2025

Denise Mora, Pro Se

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, McKenzie Brandon, Assistant City
Attorney, Andrew Ken, Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
¶1 Denise Mora appeals the district court’s dismissal of her

second amended complaint (SAC) under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5),

and 12(b)(6). We affirm the court’s judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Acting pro se, Mora filed an amended form complaint in the

district court, naming “Publick Trustee Webb Municipal Jhon Divies

Ect” as the sole defendant. Mora left the spaces for “claims for

relief” blank on the amended complaint and wrote “Rockey

Mountain New Paper” in the fact section. Mora referenced and

included an attached exhibit letter that provided more factual

context. Based on the amended complaint and the attached

exhibit, the district court accepted the following as the facts of the

underlying case:

[Mora’s] grandfather’s home was foreclosed in
the 1990s. [Mora] attempted to purchase the
home. [Mora] tendered an amount of payment
to someone but was not provided with any
documentation of the sale. [Mora] believed
that the sale would be documented in the
“Rocky Mountain News Paper.”

John Davies served as the Public Trustee for
the City [and] County of Denver. At some time,
he told [Mora] that she had to file a “quick
quiet title transfer.” Davies later resigned from
his position as the Public Trustee.

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At some time, [Mora] got a real estate entity
involved and discovered multiple individuals
making claims of ownership on the property.
[Mora] believe[d] that the foreclosure and
subsequent claims on the property [we]re
illegitimate and that procedures were not
followed during the foreclosure.

¶3 The defendants1 moved to dismiss the amended complaint

under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), arguing that Mora failed to connect her

allegations to any specific claim for relief. The district court agreed

and granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court

gave Mora an opportunity to file a second amended complaint.

¶4 Mora filed her SAC, which included an attachment that

reiterated the information provided in the exhibit to her amended

complaint but also provided more information. The attachment set

forth the following factual allegations:

• Mora, who “was a young girl at the time,” attempted to

purchase her grandfather’s property after learning it was

foreclosed on “in the late 1987s to early 1990s.”

1 The Office of the Clerk and Recorder of the City and County of

Denver, Public Trustee of the City and County of Denver, and John
Davies, in his official capacity as Public Trustee, entered their
collective appearances as the defendants in the case.

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• Mora spoke to a woman at the counter of the “Public Trustee

building” about purchasing the property, and the woman,

“noticing [Mora’s] youth, commented on how young she was.”

• Mora told the woman that she was “here to buy [the

property],” provided the money, and provided her name. The

woman processed the transaction, but Mora did not fully

understand the process.

• Mora later found a report discussing properties in Denver and

“discovered that her grandfather’s house was illegally sold,

despite her having purchased it in the late 1980s.”

• Mora spoke with an official named John, who told her that “all

documents on the property were lost due to a system

transfer,” and he advised Mora to execute a quitclaim deed to

“transfer the title due to the lost documents and system

errors.”

Mora then asserted that “the sale of her grandfather’s property was

conducted illegally,” and she requested “legal remedy for the

mismanagement and subsequent loss of the property.” She also

claimed that she suffered from age discrimination “during the initial

transaction” and requested that the district court “address the

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grievances resulting from the improper handling of the property

documents.”

¶5 The defendants moved to dismiss Mora’s SAC under C.R.C.P.

12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), claiming (1) that Mora lacked

standing for failing to state an injury-in-fact or a legally protected

interest; (2) that the SAC failed to state a claim for relief; and (3)

that Mora failed to include the current owner of the property as a

defendant. Mora filed a response, claiming that she “did seek legal

help but was turned away” and “put in legal limbo” by the “help

room,” she was discriminated against because she did not

understand why her first complaint was not correct and “denied” by

the help room, and the case “ha[d] a high concern of money

laundering.” Mora cited other concerns with the foreclosure

process, including an alleged lack of transparency, irregularities,

and unusual transactions occurring during the process. Mora then

requested an investigation into the foreclosure process that had led

to a loss of “critical records” and requested assistance initiating a

quiet title action for the property.

¶6 The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,

concluding that Mora’s SAC lacked standing, failed to state a claim

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upon which relief may be granted, and failed to join an

indispensable party. Mora appeals.

II. Discussion

¶7 Mora is self-represented on appeal. Although she does not

specifically claim that the district court erred by dismissing her

SAC, based on the arguments raised in her opening brief, we

construe this as part of her argument. See Al-Hamim v. Star

Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 11 (recognizing that we liberally

construe filings by self-represented litigants).

¶8 Mora contends the following:

(1) The foreclosure proceeding was flawed “due to lost

documents that should have been presented,” and their loss

“calls into question the validity of the proceedings.”

(2) The money lending practices used in the case were

predatory or otherwise illegal, and they disproportionately

impacted Mora.

(3) The defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations

for Mora’s disability, which violates the Americans with

Disabilities Act.

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(4) The defendants’ mishandling of documents left Mora in a

state of “legal limbo,” which complicated the legal status of

the case.

(5) The defendants’ actions constituted age discrimination

against older individuals in housing and employment

matters.

(6) The defendants and agencies involved mishandled the case

by withholding evidence and misrepresenting facts.

(7) The defendants neglected to provide Mora with assistance,

and the Denver County Court Clerk’s Office and defendants’

counsel failed to answer and return Mora’s phone calls.

¶9 First, because they are unpreserved, we decline to address

contentions two through seven mentioned above. Second, we

disagree that the district court improperly dismissed Mora’s case.

A. Most Arguments Raised in Mora’s Amended Opening Brief
Were Not Properly Preserved

¶ 10 Except for the argument that the foreclosure proceeding was

flawed because key documents were lost, Mora’s remaining claims

were not presented to the district court, and, therefore, we are

unable to address them.

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1. Applicable Law

¶ 11 For us to consider Mora’s arguments on appeal, each

argument must be preserved — that is, it must have first been

presented to the district court. See Madalena v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,

2023 COA 32, ¶ 50; Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2019

COA 11, ¶ 21. Additionally, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, a

court may only consider claims raised in the plaintiff’s complaint.

N.M. v. Trujillo, 2017 CO 79, ¶ 48; Al-Hamim, ¶ 24; Yadon v. Lowry,

126 P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2005).

2. Analysis

¶ 12 Of the claims Mora raises in her amended opening brief on

appeal, only the first claim was raised in her SAC before the district

court. In her response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mora

mentioned case status and handling, failure to provide assistance,

failure to accommodate a disability, and possible money laundering.

But these issues were not raised in the SAC. And though Mora

asserted age discrimination in her SAC, the basis for that claim was

discrimination for her young age and her inability to understand

why her amended complaint was dismissed. In her amended

opening brief, Mora instead contends that she was discriminated

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against due to old age, which is an argument that the district court

did not have the opportunity to review.

¶ 13 Because Mora’s SAC did not raise contentions two through

seven listed above, we do not consider them. See Al-Hamim, ¶ 24

(declining consideration of claims raised in the appellant’s opening

brief that were not pleaded in his complaint).

B. The District Court Did Not Err by Dismissing Mora’s Second
Amended Complaint

¶ 14 We agree with the defendants’ argument that Mora’s

remaining claim — that the foreclosure process was flawed — was

properly dismissed by the district court. Because proper dismissal

under one rule is dispositive of the entire case, we will only discuss

whether Mora’s claim survives a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to

dismiss.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 15 Because Mora is a self-represented litigant, we liberally

interpret her SAC and response to the defendants’ motion to

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dismiss. See Al-Hamim, ¶ 11; People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686,

696-97 (Colo. 2010).2

¶ 16 “The purpose of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) is to test the legal sufficiency

of the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a

claim or claims upon which relief can be granted.” Hemmann Mgmt.

Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856, 858 (Colo. App. 2007).

Dismissal under this rule is generally disfavored and should only be

granted when “the plaintiff’s factual allegations cannot support a

claim as a matter of law.” BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d

66, 71 (Colo. 2004).

¶ 17 We review orders to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) de novo

and apply the same standard as the district court. Denver Post

Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011).

2 Mora’s amended opening brief does not comply with C.A.R.

28(a)(7)(A), which requires citation to the record and requires the
appellant to indicate whether the issues raised were preserved on
appeal. Mora’s status as a self-represented litigant does not exempt
her from complying with the procedural rules that all parties must
follow. See Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128,
¶ 11; In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 33. We decline,
however, to impose sanctions under C.A.R. 38(a) and simply remind
Mora that all litigants have a duty to comply with the rules. See
Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006)
(recognizing that it is the litigant’s duty to locate and synthesize
relevant facts and arguments).

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¶ 18 To survive a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, a complaint

must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is

plausible on its face when the factual allegations raised are more

than speculative and “allow a ‘court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”

Woodall v. Godfrey, 2024 COA 42, ¶ 7 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678).

¶ 19 During our evaluation, we accept all material facts as true and

view a complaint’s factual allegations in a light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Campaign Integrity Watchdog LLC v. Colo. Republican

Party Indep. Expenditure Comm., 2017 COA 32, ¶ 2. “[W]e may

consider only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents

attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and matters

proper for judicial notice.” Denver Post Corp., 255 P.3d at 1088.

We are not required to accept legal conclusions as true, even if they

are asserted as factual allegations. Id.

2. Analysis

¶ 20 In her SAC, Mora asserted:

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(1) She gave a woman at the public trustee’s office money to

purchase her grandfather’s property.

(2) The woman processed the transaction.

(3) She came across a property report in 2020 and

“discovered that her grandfather’s house was illegally

sold.”

(4) She contacted Davies, who told her that all documents

for her grandfather’s property were lost due to a system

transfer.

(5) Davies advised Mora to execute a quitclaim deed to

transfer title of her grandfather’s property.

She then claimed that the sale of her grandfather’s property was

conducted illegally, that the property was mismanaged, and that

the property documents were mishandled. None of these assertions

raise an actual claim against the defendants. While Mora did

include more factual assertions in the SAC than in her first

complaint, these additional facts were not enough to support a

claim against the defendants as a matter of law.

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3. Conclusion

¶ 21 Because Mora failed to state a claim for relief that is facially

plausible, the district court properly dismissed her complaint under

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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