Peo in Interest of RCML

24CA1659 Peo in Interest of RCML 06-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1659
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 21JV92
Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of R.C.M.L. and R.M.L., Children,

and Concerning R.P.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 26, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Christina R, Kinsella, Assistant City
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.C.M.L.

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for R.M.L.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, R.P.M. (mother)

appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for

R.C.M.L. (the youth) and R.M.L. (the child) to the maternal

grandmother. She contends that the juvenile court erred because it

granted permanent custody of the youth and the child over her

objection and “largely due to [her] residential and employment

instability.” We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in

dependency and neglect, alleging concerns about substance use

and domestic violence in mother’s home. The juvenile court

adjudicated the youth and the child dependent and neglected and

adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to address

substance dependence, mental health, and domestic violence.

¶3 The Department later moved to close the dependency and

neglect action with an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to

the maternal grandmother, with whom the youth and child had

lived for three years. Three and a half years after the petition was

filed, the juvenile court awarded physical custody and

decision-making to the maternal grandmother and awarded mother

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unsupervised family time for four weeks during the school year and

daily unsupervised virtual contact.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶4 The juvenile court has exclusive authority to determine the

legal custody of, or enter an APR judgment with respect to, a child

within its jurisdiction. § 19-1-104(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; L.A.G. v.

People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo. 1996).

¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court

abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. M.A.W. v. People, 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32. “In

weighing sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw every inference

fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the court’s decision.”

People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).

When there is record support for the juvenile court’s findings, its

resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15.

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III. Restriction of Parenting Time

¶6 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by

restricting her parenting time. However, mother does not provide

any reference to her own case in her recitation of the law related to

this issue. Because mother’s claim is “merely a bald assertion

without argument or development,” we will not consider it. People

in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35.

IV. Custody and Decision Making

A. The Juvenile Court’s Grant of Custody and Decision-Making
was Based on Mother’s Failure to Engage in Services

¶7 Mother next contends that the juvenile court vested

decision-making to the maternal grandmother “largely due to

mother’s residential and employment instability.”

¶8 But the juvenile court’s oral ruling makes clear this was not

the case. The court told mother, “your housing and stability [are]

not the hugest concern in this case for me. We have kids who live

with parents in shelters all across Denver.” The court went on to

tell mother that its “biggest concern today and the compelling

reason that I am granting the Department’s motion for [an] APR is I

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don’t know what treatment you have done. I don’t know that you

have addressed” the issues that required the court’s intervention.

¶9 The juvenile court granted an APR to the maternal

grandmother and found, with record support, that mother failed to

complete ordered treatment to address mental health, substance

dependance, and domestic violence. At the hearing, the caseworker

testified that in the three years she had worked with the family,

mother was not consistently engaged in services. The caseworker

testified that mother was discharged from three mental health and

substance dependence treatment centers for non-attendance and

disruptive behaviors. The caseworker further testified that, to the

best of her knowledge, mother had never engaged in any services for

domestic violence treatment, which were required under the terms

of mother’s probation.

¶ 10 The caseworker acknowledged that the youth and child did not

want to return to mother’s care because of her lack of stable

housing. Mother also testified that she believed the Department’s

main concern was her lack of stable housing.

¶ 11 However, the caseworker opined that an APR was in the best

interest of the youth and child not because of mother’s housing

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instability, but because of the Department’s ongoing concerns

about mother’s untreated mental health and substance

dependence. The caseworker testified that, although services had

been established for mother through the Department and

probation, mother had been discharged for “not being consistent”

and for “her behaviors” with staff. The caseworker testified that she

had not been able to confirm what was going on for mother recently

in her treatment or services. Mother testified that she met with an

individual therapist only three times in the year before the APR

hearing, and that her meetings with clinical caseworkers and other

service providers were “fluctuating with different people.” Mother

testified that she had not completed any domestic violence

treatment.

¶ 12 Given this record, the juvenile court’s decision to grant

custody and decision-making to the maternal grandmother is not

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair

B. Mother Was Not Entitled to the Troxel Presumption

¶ 13 Mother next contends that the juvenile court’s judgment

granting custody and decision-making to a non-parent over her

objection was “improper under Troxel.”

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¶ 14 Generally, a fit parent is presumed to act in the child’s best

interests. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). However,

this presumption is overcome by an order adjudicating a child or

youth dependent and neglected. People in Interest of N.G., 2012

COA 131, ¶ 33. After an adjudication, a parent may regain the

Troxel presumption if the court finds that the parent complied with

their treatment plan and demonstrated an ability to safely parent

the children. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶¶ 18-19.

¶ 15 But here, the juvenile court did not find that mother complied

with her treatment plan, and did not find that mother regained

fitness. Instead, the court found that, despite having a treatment

plan in place “for a significant period of time,” — more than three

years — the court did not have a clear understanding of what

mother had done to complete the treatment plan. In other words,

the court found that mother had not completed her treatment plan

or addressed the safety concerns that required state intervention.

Under these circumstances, mother was not entitled to the Troxel

presumption.

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C. The Juvenile Court Made Sufficient Findings

¶ 16 Finally, citing L.A.G., mother contends that the juvenile court

erred by failing to make adequate findings or reference the purposes

of the Children’s Code in the APR judgment. But mother’s reliance

on L.A.G. is misplaced. In that case, “[t]he juvenile court relied

solely on a limited number of the purposes” as articulated in the

domestic relations code and did not “consider any purposes of the

[Children’s] code.” L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1392. In contrast, here, the

juvenile court did not rely on or even mention the domestic

relations code.

¶ 17 When entering an APR judgment, the juvenile court must “be

guided by the underlying purposes of the Code.” Id. at 1391.

Although the court must allocate parental responsibilities to best

serve “the interests of the child and the public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2024, the Children’s Code does not prescribe any specific

factors the court must consider — or recite — in making its

decision. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo.

App. 2005).

¶ 18 The court found that granting an APR to the maternal

grandmother was in the youth and child’s best interests. The court

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made extensive oral findings explaining the compelling reasons why

the youth and child could not be returned to mother’s care and

custody. While best practice would have incorporated these

findings into the written order, the court’s remarks, along with the

written APR judgment, provide a sufficient articulation of the

court’s reasoning to permit appellate review as contemplated under

L.A.G. C.f. L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1392 (concluding that reversal was

required where the juvenile court “fail[ed] to articulate sufficient

facts to permit appellate application of the appropriate legal

standard”).

¶ 19 We therefore discern no error.

V. Disposition

¶ 20 The APR judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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